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Abstract 
The turn of the twentieth century was an era of intense exploratory and scientific activity on 
and around the Antarctic continent. A few campaigns specialised in either territorial 
discovery or scientific inquiry, but most combined exploration and science in a comfortable 
alliance that produced results in both arenas. In recent years the scientific achievements of the 
Discovery expedition (1901-04) have been the subject of renewed analysis, but it is never 
clear what criteria, if any, are being applied to support statements about scientific success. 
This research is founded on a case study focused on the magnetic science program of 
the Discovery expedition commencing with preparations, performance of magnetic observing 
at sea and ashore, post-expedition management of the products of research, and finally, 
arrangements for publication. The case study forms the basis for firstly, identifying the 
indicators of scientific success and secondly, an analysis of the relative contributions of the 
drivers promoting quality scientific outcomes during the era of Antarctic scientific 
exploration between 1898 and 1914.  
The principal elements contributing to superior outcomes are identified as the human 
elements of preparation, leadership, scientific practice, skill, knowledge development and 
finally post-expedition management of data or collections gathered during fieldwork. No 
single element guarantees scientific success; it is a product of a combination of factors, but 
failure in just one facet can undermine outcomes fatally. The effectiveness of the relationship 
between these factors determines the degree of success or failure of a program. Achieving the 
potential of a research program relies on elements coming together in a timely and synergistic 
manner in combination with a measure of luck.  
There was confusion between the magnetic work intended to provide improved charts 
for navigation purposes and the scientific research designed to help solve the causes of 
terrestrial magnetism and it’s effects. The magnetic work of the expedition was divided into 
three distinct operations. Firstly, observations were made at sea in the ship’s purpose built 
magnetic observatory and using a recently developed instrument for the determination of 
magnetic dip and force. The results were ultimately never published due to the inadequacy of 
the instrument and the difficulties of taking reliable observations at sea. Secondly, a fixed 
observatory was established at the base station in Antarctica where a different set of 
instruments recorded the magnetic elements almost continuously over the two-year stay of 
the expedition. There was sufficient data from those observations to form the core of the 
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scientific reports on terrestrial magnetism, but large amounts of data were considered 
unreliable and either discarded, or included with cautionary notes. Thirdly, magnetic 
observations made on exploratory sledging journeys away from the ice station added 
evidence for theoretical determination of the location of the South Magnetic Pole and for 
mapping the lines of equal magnetic declination radiating from it. The conclusions from these 
journeys were brought into doubt by evidence from later expeditions.  
During fund raising and promotion of the expedition, Sir Clements Markham, 
President of the Royal Geographical Society stated firstly, that products of the magnetic 
research would include new magnetic charts of value to mariners and secondly, there would 
be significant leaps in knowledge informing magnetic theory. These were ambitious 
objectives and neither were realised, although the data collected did add to knowledge of the 
characteristic fluctuations of the magnetic field at high latitudes. Collaborative arrangements 
planned between the Discovery, the German Gauss expedition and various established land 
observatories never reached their potential. This was partly due to an error in the timing of 
synchronous observations, but mainly a result of collapse of the intended post-expedition data 
sharing arrangements related to rejection by the Germans of the unreliable data from 
Discovery and failure by the English to publish data in a mutually useful format.   
The thesis closes with analysis of how well the Discovery’s outcomes matched their 
potential and concludes that, with respect to magnetic science, institutional failures led to 
avoidable deficiencies in areas of recruitment, training, governance and leadership, 
procedures, instrumentation and post-expedition management of data and publication 
preparations. 
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  Chapter 1: Introduction  
In the April 1901 volume of Nature Professor John Walter Gregory (1864-1932) broadcast a 
provisional summary of the program for the British National Antarctic Expedition (BNAE) 
that later became known as the Discovery expedition. As the civilian director of the scientific 
staff of the expedition, and leader of the overwintering shore party, Gregory anticipated a full 
scientific program in the natural and physical sciences with research into terrestrial 
magnetism the top priority. This expedition was one element of an International scientific 
effort in magnetic science and was the largest scientific campaign of its day. Gregory 
described terrestrial magnetism as: “the object of primary importance” (Gregory 1901c)1. As 
a professor of geology with abundant expedition experience, including the first crossing of 
Spitzbergen with Sir Martin Conway (1856-1937), Gregory was a suitable choice as a leader 
for the forthcoming Antarctic expedition. The expedition was well funded and had the 
patronage and guidance of the Royal Navy (RN), the Royal Society (RS) and the Royal 
Geographical Society (RGS), as well as funding from government and philanthropists. The 
expedition ship under construction was a purpose built, ice-capable floating magnetic and 
marine science laboratory. A mix of competent and enthusiastic civilian scientists and trained 
RN officers would undertake the scientific program. Prospects for the expedition were bright. 
Then, just two months later, the same journal published a short letter from Gregory 
announcing his resignation. He wrote:  
The organisation of the expedition now leaves the head of the civilian scientific staff 
nominally responsible for most of the scientific work of the expedition but gives him 
no power to secure the performance of the scientific part of the programme.  
(Gregory, 1901d) 
How did this come about and what were the consequences for the scientific program?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Quotations and documents reproduced in appendices retain the spelling, punctuation and layout from original documents throughout this 
thesis. 
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Science had been subordinated to other objectives, and leadership of the expedition 
passed to Lieutenant Robert Falcon Scott (1868-1912), a RN career officer. The expedition 
proceeded with Scott as expedition leader, commander of the vessel and in effect, head of the 
civilian scientific party. The enterprise achieved more than three full years of intense 
exploration and scientific work between 1901 and 1904 and contemporary accounts and 
modern reflections generally agree the expedition was highly successful, but it is often 
unclear whether this refers to the exploration, science or both. This thesis examines the 
question of whether the Discovery expedition’s scientific program genuinely achieved all it 
could, and should have, considering the favourable circumstances of its preparation. By 
analysis of the drivers of scientific success for early Antarctic expedition science, and by 
separating the scientific from exploratory outcomes, this thesis ultimately provides informed 
commentary on how well the scientific outcomes matched the expectations of sponsors. 
1.1 Context and scope 
The scientific discovery of Antarctica proceeded in a sporadic manner. The circumnavigation 
of high southern latitudes by James Cook’s (1728-1779) Resolution and Adventure expedition 
(1772-75) and Fabian Gottlieb von Bellingshausen’s (1778-1852) Vostok and Mirny (1819-
21) proved the capability of square rigged sailing vessels to cross the Antarctic circle into the 
zone of icebergs, and demonstrated there were open seas in hitherto unsuspected regions. 
Cook correctly predicted the existence of a significant landmass further to the South. He 
predicted that an Antarctic continent would lie mostly within the Antarctic Circle, was 
protected by a fringe of sea ice dangerous to navigation and that it was a land of thick fogs, 
snowstorms and intense cold. In his journal of Monday 6 February 1775, he argued that the 
massive tabular icebergs that he called “Ice mountains” could only have been created on, or 
by land (Beaglehole, 1961, p. 637). Three significant expeditions took place between 1837 
and 1843, each locating and mapping sections of the coastline of continental Antarctica. The 
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French naval expedition of Captain Jules Sébastien César Dumont d'Urville (1790-1842) 
located the coastline in a region of Adélie Land, an area almost due South of Hobart 
(d’Urville, 1987, p. 469). Two of the ships from Commander Charles Wilkes’ (1798-1877) 
‘United States Exploring Expedition’, the Flying Fish and Peacock, also found the coastline 
near the same region then followed it in a westerly direction. They mapped what appeared to 
be segments of more than 2000 kilometres of coastline (Philbrick, 2004, p. 333). The third 
voyage of exploration of the era was the British Naval Expedition of Captain (later Sir) James 
Clark Ross (1800-1862) in the ships Erebus and Terror. Ross, like D’Urville and Wilkes was 
able to navigate his ships through the protective fringe of sea ice but had the good fortune to 
chance upon a large indentation in the Antarctic coast. He sailed his ships through the pack 
ice and into the open sea now named for him. He followed the coastline south and mapped 
over six and a half degrees of coastline (about 700 kilometres) before ice conditions halted 
his progress (Ross, 1847, pp. 415-417). He discovered Ross Island, which was to become the 
hub of Antarctic exploration and science, and named its two volcanoes after his ships. Then, 
at his southernmost point, Ross discovered a feature new to science, an ice shelf up to sixty 
metres high, which he called “The Great Ice Barrier.” 
These voyages of discovery proved the existence of a significant Antarctic landmass, 
or an archipelago welded together by an ice sheet, and proved the capability of ships to 
penetrate the ring of fringing sea ice. From the scientific perspective their most important 
achievement was their work advancing knowledge of the location and characteristics of the 
south magnetic pole. All three expeditions had research into terrestrial magnetism in their 
instructions. Ross who had previously located the north magnetic pole in 1831, had particular 
magnetic science credentials and his specific mission was to locate its southern equivalent.  
After 1843 there was a thirty-year break in official interest in high southern latitudes. 
Charles Wyville Thompson’s (1830–1882) HMS Challenger expedition of 1872 to 1876 
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concentrated on benthic marine science and oceanography, so did not approach the Antarctic 
coastline although, as the first scientific research vessel with steam power to cross the 
Antarctic Circle, it was more ice capable than any preceding vessel in high southern latitudes. 
The Challenger expedition was also notable for innovative oceanographic research 
techniques and is considered the first Antarctic expedition with purely scientific, as opposed 
to mixed navigational or colonial aims (Conrad, 1999, p. 67). There was a break of twenty 
years before renewed interest in Antarctica resulted in fifteen significant exploring and 
scientific expeditions between 1897 and 1916. The historian J. Gordon Hayes coined the 
phrase “Heroic Era” to describe the period from 1906 to 1914. He justifies it thus:  
The footsteps of the British explorers were continually dogged by disaster and some 
of them purchased their discoveries with their lives. As a small tribute to these gallant 
men it is suggested that this period should be known as the Heroic Era of Antarctic 
Exploration.  
(Hayes, 1932, pp. 29-30)  
This expression is now in common use by polar historians, authors and commentators and is 
recognised by the reading public. It is often expanded in scope to describe the period from 
1897 to 1922, the year Ernest Shackleton (1874-1922) died, but the use of the phrase “Heroic 
Era”, obscures the significance of the scientific activity of expeditions of the time, and the 
contributions of nations besides Britain. During this period of scientific reconnaissance, some 
of the expeditions of the era (listed at Appendix I) had scientific research as their main 
purpose, Scotia and Aurora for example, but most, like Discovery, mixed science with 
exploration. During this period, further sections of Antarctica’s coastline were discovered and 
mapped, the first inland traverses were made and a broad range of physical and natural 
scientific investigation was undertaken. 
The intense period of activity of scientific reconnaissance between 1897 and 1914 
was a period of transition when the status of science began to match exploration in Antarctic 
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expedition objectives, and the manner in which scientific activities were planned and 
executed was elevated to a new level of professional practice. The focus of this thesis is an 
investigation of the drivers of scientific success on expeditions such as these. An in-depth 
case study of the research program into terrestrial magnetism on the Discovery expedition 
1901-04 serves as a lens through which the factors regulating scientific outcomes are 
dissected. 
1.2 A new era of Antarctic exploration and science 
Despite the success of Ross’s Antarctic campaign of 1839-1841, the RN switched its polar 
attention to the Arctic. There was a mercantile incentive to solve the riddle of the North West 
passage that could provide a navigable route across the top of Canada from Hudson Bay to 
the Bering Strait (Berton, 1988, p. 16). The same ships used by Ross in the Antarctic (HMS 
Erebus and HMS Terror) were fitted with modest steam engines and called into service again 
for an attempt on the passage by Sir John Franklin (1786-1847). The expedition became 
confounded in the maze of ice bound islands precipitating more than fifty search expeditions 
before the fate of the expedition was known with certainty (Berton, 1988, p. 151). 
In the meantime Professor Georg von Neumayer (1826-1909), a German physicist and 
geomagnetic specialist in Australia promoted the idea of southern hemisphere terrestrial 
magnetic science. He was director of the astronomical and magnetic observatory in 
Melbourne (Flagstaff Observatory) whose establishment in 1858 had been partly funded by 
Maximilian II of Bavaria (1811-1864). Neumayer returned to Germany in 1864 and “became 
a tireless promoter of exploration in the Antarctic” (Murphy, 2002, p. 66). Sir John Murray 
(1841-1914), of the HMS Challenger expedition was another influential figure and a keen 
lobbyist for a return to the Antarctic. He lectured to the RGS meeting in November 1893 in 
London, and his arguments in favour of renewing Antarctic exploration were reported in the 
society’s journal, along with those of a selection of eminent scientists and geographers whose 
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views he canvassed prior to the meeting. On the topic of terrestrial magnetism, Murray 
quoted Neumayer: “It is certain that without an examination and a survey of the magnetic 
properties of the Antarctic regions, it is utterly hopeless to strive, with prospects of success, at 
the advancement of the theory of the Earth’s magnetism” (Murray, 1894). Murray finished 
his speech with proposals that the work should be undertaken by the RN and suggested a 
regime of two ships working over three summers and two winters. In his summary, the broad 
sweep of Antarctic science that can be addressed by such an expedition included: 
For the more definite determination of the distribution of land and water on our 
planet; for the better determination of the internal constitution and superficial form of 
the Earth; for a more complete knowledge of the laws which govern the motions of 
the atmosphere and hydrosphere; for more trustworthy indications as to the origin of 
terrestrial and marine plants and animals, all these observations are earnestly 
demanded by the science of our day. 
(Murray, 1894) 
A turning point in the campaign for renewed Antarctic scientific exploring came at the 
International Geographic Congress of 1895. The congress was held in London and was well 
attended by geographers and scientists from around the globe. The congress passed a suite of 
twenty-one resolutions. The first two were procedural but the third set an International 
agenda. 
The exploration of the Antarctic Regions is the greatest piece of geographical 
exploration still to be undertaken. That, in view of the additions to knowledge in 
almost every branch of science which would result from such a scientific exploration, 
the Congress recommends that the scientific societies throughout the world should 
urge, in whatever way seems to them most effective, that this work should be 
undertaken before the close of the century. 
(Keltie & Mill, 1896, p. 780) 
Upon becoming President of the RGS in 1893, Sir Clements Markham (1830-1916):  
“resolved that the Antarctic expedition should be dispatched during my presidency. I began 
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work at once” (Markham & Holland, 1986, p. 5). Motivated by the positive response to the 
combined lobbying with Murray and Neumayer at the congress, Markham continued with the 
preparations already in train. Ultimately, the expedition became the BNAE and the 
expedition’s aspirations were modeled on those initially proposed by Murray in his landmark 
speech to the RGS. 
England was not the only country making preparations for Antarctic scientific 
exploration at the end of the nineteenth century. Germany had a history as the intellectual 
home of physical sciences, in particular terrestrial magnetism, since the days of polymath 
Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859), mathematician, astronomer and physicist Carl 
Friedrich Gauss (1777-1855) and physicist Wilhelm Eduard Weber (1804-1891) (Gurney, 
2000, p. 205). Gauss and Weber had established a magnetic observing network with forty-
four observing stations, formalised in 1834 as the Göttingen magnetische Verein, also known 
as the Göttingen Magnetic Union (Cawood, 1979).  
Planning for the First German Antarctic Expedition of 1901-04 had commenced in 
1895 under the patronage of a commission for South Polar Research. The German 
Geographic Society convened the commission and the project proceeded under the 
directorship of Neumayer (Murphy 2002, p. 68). In an example of International scientific 
collaboration the ships Gauss and Discovery were dispatched to opposite sides of Antarctica 
in order to obtain complementary sets of data (Lüdecke, 2003). The Discovery was 
dispatched to the Ross Sea region, widely considered by Britain to be their exclusive field of 
exploration since its discovery by Ross. By mutual agreement the Gauss was sent to a sector 
south of the Indian Ocean, to maximise the exploratory and scientific value of the joint 
project and to test Neumayer’s prediction of open sea at high latitudes in the sector. The 
abundance of expeditions between 1897 and 1916 is an indication of the success of the call 
for the renewal of south polar exploration and science that had been championed by Murray, 
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Neumayer and Markham.  
1.3 The potential for success of the Discovery expedition 
The program of the BNAE was ambitious, but the prospects for success, both in the 
geographic and scientific objectives, were excellent. Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton (1829-
1912) said later in his review of Scott’s narrative of the expedition “No polar expedition has 
ever been better equipped for exploration amidst ice” (Hamilton, 1906). During Markham’s 
planning for the expedition between 1893 and 1901, he consulted with the experienced 
members of Arctic expeditions and scientists (Yelverton, 2000, pp. 32-38) and upon 
embarkation the ship was stocked with a comprehensive library of over twelve hundred 
volumes, of which nearly half were treatises on polar exploration (Fogg, 1992, p. 120). In 
addition, the Antarctic Manual published for the expedition contained numerous first hand 
accounts by polar explorers. This was intended as a guide for the officers, civilian scientists 
and crew (Murray and RGS, 1901). There was also a fine selection of popular literature 
(Baughman, 1999, p. 64). 
A team of civilian scientists was recruited for research into the physical and natural 
sciences and ship’s officers were trained as observers in meteorology, oceanography and 
magnetic science. The construction of the vessel was the single greatest expense of the 
BNAE. The Discovery was constructed as a floating laboratory for the investigation of 
terrestrial magnetism and oceanography. It was timber hulled in a time when steel hulled 
ships were more common and the vessel was equipped with features for ice work (Bernacchi, 
1938, p. 11). The German expedition ship was also custom built and although not specifically 
fitted out for magnetic survey, the Scottish expedition, the Scotia under Dr William Speirs 
Bruce (1867-1921) and the Swedish, Antarctic under Dr. Otto Nordenskjöld (1869-1928) also 
committed to share scientific results. This coordinated International effort into terrestrial 
magnetism using purpose built vessels, the most modern instruments available and employing 
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sophisticated coordinated observing regimes was big science of its time. Markham’s plan to 
send out a new British expedition looked set for success.  
1.4 The significance of this field of study 
The Discovery returned to London in September of 1904. The publicity campaign included 
lectures by ship’s officers and civilian scientists and an exhibition displaying sledging 
equipment, instruments, memorabilia, flags and pennants, photographs, watercolours and 
pencil drawings was mounted at the Bruton Galleries in London. (‘Discovery’ Antarctic 
Exhibition Illustrated Catalogue. n.d). There were banquets and official functions. King 
Edward VII entertained Captain Scott at Balmoral and heard his lecture accompanied by 
photos and watercolours (Yelverton, 2000, p. 328). Scott’s official narrative, the Voyage of 
the Discovery was written and published within months of the return of the ship (Scott, 
1905b). Hamilton reviewed the two-volume work in the Geographical Journal and confirmed 
what the frequent print runs and numerous editions indicated (Rosove, 2001, pp. 337-342), 
that narratives of polar travel telling of exploration and drama, as well as descriptions of life 
in the far south, were popular with the general public (Hamilton, 1906).  
This research considers the success factors for Antarctic science in a structured 
manner and addresses a gap in an important topic in the history of science. Works focusing 
on the Discovery expedition make up a small proportion of polar literature and, of that, the 
scientific work is poorly represented. Terrestrial magnetism is an untapped field of research 
as a case study by which to judge success of scientific research on pioneer expeditions.  
1.5 The research question 
The elements of the Discovery expedition that made it ripe for abundant, quality outcomes in 
science and geography have been established above in Section 1.3 but there are a number of 
indications that opportunities may have been squandered, or that plans went awry. This 
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research addresses a central question: Did the Discovery expedition achieve its potential in 
the research program into terrestrial magnetism and what were the drivers of scientific 
success that influenced that outcome? To answer that question it’s necessary to consider the 
ways in which scientific outcomes can be measured in the most objective manner possible. 
Are these measurements or indicators of scientific success relevant to other disciplines, and 
of utility for assessment of the outcomes of other expeditions?  
The Discovery expedition is of special interest because of its pathfinding role with respect 
to geographical, scientific and technical elements of Antarctic expedition organisation, 
especially for the Ross Sea sector. The geographical achievements now seem modest by 
comparison to the later overland journeys, but they significantly exceeded all previous efforts 
in south polar regions. The Discovery expeditioners made the first forays onto continental 
Antarctica and laid the foundation for explorations on later expeditions. Was the same true in 
relation to scientific programs? The key elements informing the research question are, for the 
expeditions of the Edwardian era, and for the Discovery expedition in particular: 
• What were the indicators of scientific success in 1904? 
• What were the drivers of scientific success at the time? 
• How adequate were planning, recruitment, preparations and training? 
• How was geomagnetic science performed? 
• What were the Discovery expedition’s magnetic science outcomes, how did they 
contribute to new knowledge in the discipline and how did each fare against the 
indicators of scientific success? 
• Was the magnetic science on the expedition a scientific success and if so, what factors 
contributed to that success? If not, why? 
• Did the Discovery magnetic science outcomes meet objectives and expectations, and 
could it have achieved more? If so, by what means? 
 
The thesis question is examined through a framework of the success factors of 
scientific work on Antarctic expeditions of the era before World War I. Main elements of the 
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framework are the historic and cultural contexts, patronage, finance and institutional support, 
leadership and governance, preparations, instructions and expectations, international 
collaboration, recruitment, training and knowledge acquisition, equipment and instruments, 
logistics, the work of the scientist, the social and intellectual climate on the expedition, luck 
and the post-expedition handling of data and collections in preparation for publication. 
Recently published narratives concerning heroic era expeditions continue to debate 
Scott’s leadership (Aldridge, 1999; Crane, 2005; Huntford, 1999; Yelverton, 2000). Although 
this research analyses and discusses the importance of planning, leadership, guidance and 
mentoring, the investigation is about the relationship between leadership and the quality of 
scientific output. Comparison of the characters of leaders of expeditions is irrelevant to this 
research, except where they intersect with the productivity or effectiveness of scientific 
inquiry. 
 This thesis investigates whether the efforts of magnetic work on the Discovery 
made a significant, genuine addition to knowledge and whether the proposed international 
collaboration bore fruit. A prospective outcome of this research is a guide for more objective 
assessments of the scientific programs on other expeditions.  
1.6 Shape of the thesis 
This research sits in the realm of history of science. The current perceptions of the scientific 
success of the expedition are consolidated into the next chapter that reviews conclusions 
found in current and significant literature related to the history of Antarctic science. The 
starting point for the body of research is consideration of the notions of scientific success in 
1904. Indicators of scientific success are then identified, providing a set of standards against 
which the results of the Discovery can ultimately be measured. The central question of the 
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research concerns the identification and assessment of the drivers of scientific success for 
expeditions of the era. These are also tentatively identified.  
The third chapter outlines the methodology of the research and the theoretical basis 
that draws together the scientific and historic threads of the work. The thesis moves to the 
fourth chapter with examination of the cultural and historic contexts for the magnetic 
research on expeditions of the late Victorian and Edwardian eras. These determine the ways 
in which the intellectual traditions and the state of knowledge set the research agenda and 
shaped the preparations for the Discovery. The nature of the expedition preparations and their 
performance are then examined in chapter five to commence teasing out information that 
informed whether the scientific objectives were well served by pre expedition activities. 
Following the model established by Endersby (2008), the detail of the work of the scientists 
and observers on the expedition, firstly at sea, then in Antarctica, is investigated in detail with 
analysis of the magnetic observation program being the central focus through chapters five 
and six. Investigation of post expedition arrangements at the close of chapter six then reveals 
the manner in which the outputs (raw data and collections, publications, lectures etc.) were 
handled and whether the scientific outcomes such as new theory, paradigm shifts, altered 
intellectual traditions influenced the scientific community of the period.  
The match between the outputs or outcomes, and the indicators of scientific success is 
reviewed in the first section of chapter seven to address the question about whether the 
expedition met its potential according to the expectations of its time. Finally, the second 
section of the chapter analyses of the relative impact of the drivers of success on the scientific 
outcomes as a test of the veracity of those drivers as a framework for objective analyses of 
other pioneer scientific exploring expeditions. Consideration of the validity of rankings of the 
drivers of success according to their relative influence on the expedition’s outcomes is a key 
element of chapter eight. The roles of managing institutions and key players are revisited and 
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an overall assessment of whether the current perceptions of the Discovery’s success are in 
agreement with the findings of this research are discussed. The thesis concludes with 
commentary on the enduring legacies of the Discovery expedition and consideration of the 
suitability of magnetic science as a case study to investigate the drivers of scientific success 
on pioneer polar expeditions. 
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Chapter 2: Current perspectives of Discovery expedition science 
An overview of the historiography of the Discovery and related Antarctic and scientific 
sources is provided in this chapter to relate current perceptions of Discovery’s scientific 
achievements. One purpose of this research is to ultimately test the veracity of those 
perceptions, so the conclusions of authors and commentators about the overall success, the 
scientific success and in particular the success of the magnetic science program on Discovery 
form the core of this chapter. 
The historiography of the Discovery expedition is generated from an almost finite set 
of materials. There is a suite of well-known repositories that includes the Scott Polar 
Research Institute (SPRI, Cambridge), the Royal Geographical Society (RGS, London), the 
Royal Society, (RS, London), the Alexander Turnbull Library, (Wellington, New Zealand), 
Canterbury Museum (Christchurch, New Zealand) and the State Library of New South Wales 
(Sydney) that collectively preserve the core of documents relevant to the Discovery and other 
Antarctic expeditions of the late Victorian and Edwardian eras. These institutions keep 
primary sources (journals and diaries, scientific reports, expedition narratives, official 
committee records, correspondence, autobiographies, photographs and ephemera) and 
secondary sources (biographies, histories, academic journals etc.). The body of publicly 
accessible source material is expanding only incrementally as descendants of early 
expeditioners donate materials, or auction them publicly allowing institutions to expand their 
archive collections. Only a handful of expeditioners lived to ripe ages and provided 
contemporary historians with oral histories. Clarence Hare (1880-1967) of the Discovery was 
living in Queensland and corresponding with the historian Les Quartermain (1895-1973) 
almost until his death (Hare, 1966) and Eric Webb (1889-1984), magnetician on Douglas 
Mawson’s (1882-1958) Aurora expedition of (1911-1914) was interviewed for an oral history 
as late as 1975 (Webb, 1975).  
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The descriptions of the Discovery expedition developed from these resources are 
repetitive. Many Antarctic histories commence with chapters that are similar, using a 
chronological list of events as a format. These rarely add more than Scott’s Voyage of 
Discovery, the original and official narrative, (Scott, 1905b). History of Antarctic scientific 
research fills only a minor niche in the abundant polar literature. 
2.1 The modern sources of Discovery literature  
Journals, personal narratives, correspondence, scientific reports and official records are the 
sources that constitute the core data for the substance of this research, but this chapter 
analyses the more recent, secondary sources in order to build a meta analysis of how the 
scientific achievements of the expedition are commonly perceived today. These secondary 
sources fall into categories according to subject matter, intended readership and style. Many 
of these secondary sources review the same materials but vary in their purpose, providing 
opinion or commentary on specific themes, events, topics or biographies. They range in 
accuracy from the scholarly (Yelverton, 2000, Barczewski, 2007) to biased (Aldridge, 1999, 
Jones, 2011) and what could be considered romanticised accounts (FitzSimons, 2011).  
2.2 Antarctic scientific texts and reference sources 
There are few books written specifically about Antarctic science, and most of those have a 
post International Geophysical Year (IGY, 1957-1958) and space science focus that describes 
current science rather than its history. In 1959 no one was better placed to write a scientific 
history of Antarctica than Frank Debenham (1883-1965). He was a veteran scientist of 
Scott’s Terra Nova expedition (1910-1913) and the founding director of SPRI and had a 
lifelong interest in polar science. As a geologist he would have had a thorough understanding 
of terrestrial magnetic science. He describes the preparations for Discovery’s magnetic 
observations at sea but neglects the onshore magnetic work entirely (Debenham, 1959, p. 74). 
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His account condenses the narrative of the Discovery expedition into a few pages and the 
only reference to expedition outcomes is inconclusive: “Once again, as in the time of Ross, 
the British had sent a well-found expedition and a fine leader and had reaped the benefit” 
(Debenham, 1959, pp. 74-78). His colleague Raymond Priestley (1886-1974) was another 
veteran of Scott’s Terra Nova expedition who held a long time connection with Antarctic 
science. Antarctic Research provides an introductory chapter to build historic context stating:  
The twentieth century opened with an international effort: Swedish, British, Scottish, 
German and French ventures, all with decided scientific aspect, being undertaken in 
the first three or four years. Only three-the Swedish, the Scottish and the French-
concern us here, but these made major contributions. 
(Priestley, Adie and Robin, 1964, p. 4) 
Inexplicably there is no mention of either Discovery or Terra Nova expeditions and by 
omission the authors imply that the Discovery did not make a major scientific contribution.  
Robin’s chapter “International Cooperation and Geophysics” only reflects on post-IGY 
science. (Robin, 1964, pp. 254-264)  
Hatherton’s Antarctica is an edited collection of scholarly essays (Hatherton, 1965) 
most of which are solely concerned with the state of knowledge in the major scientific 
disciplines of Antarctic scientific enquiry at the time of publication. It is dense with scientific 
detail and has a focus on New Zealand’s Antarctic connections and scientific contributions, 
but is broad in its treatment of disciplines. The Discovery expedition is mentioned as being 
one of the expeditions during which the change from ship borne coastal mapping to 
continental (terrestrial) mapping was made (Miller, 1965, p. 88). Cullington’s chapter, The 
Polar Magnetic Field and its Fluctuations gives a brief history of magnetic science in 
Antarctica. The motivation for instructions to Wilkes, d’Urville and Ross to locate the South 
magnetic pole during their mid nineteenth century expeditions is clarified by the statement: 
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“Commerce across the seas was increasing and it was most important for the seafaring 
nations to have accurate magnetic charts showing the magnetic declination or variation of the 
compass” (Cullington, 1965, p. 463). The first Antarctic land based magnetic observing by 
Louis Bernacchi (1876-1942) and William Colbeck (1871-1930) on the Southern Cross 
expedition (1898-1900) is mentioned before the chapter moves directly to descriptions of the 
phenomenon of terrestrial magnetism and its theoretical background. No mention is made of 
the observations or scientific products of the Discovery expedition and the collaborative 
effort between the Discovery, Gauss and Antarctic expeditions is not acknowledged. 
Referring to observations made prior to the IGY, Cullington states: “As these measurements 
were not made simultaneously, and as they were confined to a limited sector of the Antarctic 
continent, it was not possible to derive synoptic patterns of the diurnal variation in the 
magnetic elements across the Antarctic continent” (Cullington, 1965, p. 468). The chapter 
provides a highly detailed synopsis of the ways in which features of terrestrial magnetic 
activity relate between Antarctic and lower latitude observations and is aimed at a 
scientifically literate audience. Although some conclusions are drawn from the results of 
Scott’s Terra Nova and Mawson’s Aurora expeditions, Bernacchi and the Discovery 
expedition are excluded from the discussion (p. 473). 
A Continent for Science is another portmanteau for a wide coverage of post IGY 
scientific activities in Antarctica (Lewis, 1965). This monograph is written in an accessible 
style, and for a wider audience than Hatherton’s edited collection. It has a focus on the U.S. 
contributions to science in Antarctica and is arranged by scientific discipline after the 
introductory historic review. The Discovery is dealt with in considerable depth compared to 
other books relating the history of Antarctic science (pp. 26-33) but unfortunately in his 
narrative of events Lewis confuses elements of the Discovery expedition with those of the 
Terra Nova. No conclusions are mentioned regarding the scientific outcomes of the 
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Discovery although the geographic exploits and “firsts” (balloon flight, furthest south) are 
mentioned. Lewis mentions the earth’s magnetic field later in the book in relation to post IGY 
developments in cosmic ray observing and space weather (p. 203).  
The preface to Harry King’s Antarctica states the intention to introduce the reader to 
Antarctic science, and to provide basic facts concerning geography, natural history and 
exploration (King, 1969, p. i). The Discovery expedition is described as “The first extensive 
scientific expedition on the mainland of Antarctica” (p. 217). The geographic successes of the 
expedition follow and “useful work” was done in meteorology and the natural sciences. 
Again, the physical sciences and notably magnetic science are omitted. King’s chapter on 
international collaboration covers the polar years of 1882-83 and 1932-33, then the IGY of 
1957-58. The internationally collaborative scheme for magnetic observations between the 
Discovery, Gauss and Antarctic expeditions goes unacknowledged (p. 230-31). In common 
with other post-IGY books, terrestrial magnetism is dealt with under the general heading of 
atmospheric physics (pp. 86-99). A concise synopsis of the elements of terrestrial magnetism 
and (then) current observing methods is provided for the reader’s education (pp. 88-90). 
King’s monograph is brief but authoritative and is written for a general, not necessarily 
scientific literate readership.   
John Béchervaise transports the reader to Antarctica and provides an imaginary tour 
of typical on base and scientific fieldwork activities (Béchervaise, 1978). Two centuries of 
the history of exploration and discovery are acquitted in one page (p. 93). Although a 
professional scientist and expedition leader himself, he condenses the history of science to 
such an extent that he skips from the Southern Cross directly to the Terra Nova expeditions 
without acknowledgement of the Discovery. Béchervaise deals with terrestrial magnetism in 
the category of Particles from Space (pp. 78-84). The operation of magnetic instruments and 
the relationships between terrestrial magnetism, lines of magnetic force, cosmic particles and 
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auroras are described in sufficient detail for the non-scientist. This is a fine book but 
produced with a tight restriction on length and for a broad audience, but it does not expand 
general knowledge of the Discovery expedition.  
International Research in the Antarctic is a thorough review of the state of Antarctic 
science at the time of its publication (Fifield, 1987). It dwells briefly on history and only 
mentions the names of expeditions and their leaders from the pre First World War era (pp. 
24-25). The central concern of this book is post-IGY (1957-58) activities and specifically the 
role of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR). Terrestrial magnetism is 
only mentioned in the context of solar wind and the earth’s magnetosphere (p. 93) and there 
is no assessment of the scientific work of early expeditions. Walton’s Antarctic Science 
(1987) also has a focus on the (post IGY) modern era of scientific investigation. It deals 
briefly with the historical background and devotes only a paragraph to the Discovery 
expedition. His general conclusion is that “…with six scientists on board and a strong 
scientific program, much was accomplished, and geographical exploration was not neglected” 
(Walton, 1987, p. 20). Erich von Drygalski’s (1865-1949) Gauss also gets acknowledged as 
having made “…valuable magnetic and astronomical observations” (Walton, 1987, p. 18). 
The science of terrestrial magnetism is dealt with in depth under the topic heading of 
geophysics where he accurately states: “The history of the physical, as contrasted with the 
geographical exploration of Antarctica is not yet well known…” (Walton, 1987, p. 35). A 
short history of the quest for the south magnetic pole follows, with reference to the 
expeditions of Wilkes, d’Urville and Ross, before the discussion turns to the links between 
auroras and terrestrial magnetism. Scientific contributions of the Discovery to the field are 
omitted here also. 
Fogg’s History of Antarctic Science is an exception to the trend that Antarctic science 
books focus on post IGY activities (Fogg, 1992). It remains the most significant publication 
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in the field and is the authoritative work on the history of Antarctic science. Terrestrial 
magnetism is dealt with in relation to the commencement of study of the upper atmosphere 
where the links between space weather and terrestrial magnetism are made explicit, before 
the work of the early expeditions is reviewed  (p. 315). The Discovery expedition is described 
and analysed under the appropriate banner of Naval Tradition versus science (p. 114). The 
preamble describes the lead-up to the expedition with a focus on the relationship between the 
RS and the RGS, the appointment of Scott and the resignation of Gregory (Fogg, 1992, pp. 
114-120). Detail of the exploratory and scientific success are wrapped up with: “Vast 
collections of biological material were made by Wilson and Hodgson, the descriptions of 
them eventually filling five volumes published by the British Museum” (Fogg, 1992, p. 121). 
Fogg provides some additional commentary on early magnetic science, stating: “The 
magnetic observations made on the UK, German and Swedish expeditions were carried out 
according to internationally agreed protocol but the extensive data obtained do not call for 
any particular discussion here” (pp. 315-317). 
In a more recent history of International scientific collaboration prompted by the 
jubilee of the Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR) Walton & Clarkson give 
a brief overview of the discovery and early science of Antarctica. Roald Amundsen’s (1872-
1928) South Pole expedition is contrasted against those “With clear scientific objectives, like 
the first German Antarctic Expedition led by Erich von Drygalski: the Australian Antarctic 
Expedition led by Douglas Mawson and the British National Antarctic Expedition led by 
Robert Scott” (Walton & Clarkson, 2011, pp. 1-2). They believe that the scientific reports 
from these and other expeditions of the time (Belgian, French, Scottish, Japanese and 
Swedish) provided the foundation for present Antarctic science, although the scientific 
legacies varied widely. 
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Larson’s Empire of Ice is a treatment of Antarctic science primarily confined in scope 
to the three British expeditions of Scott (Discovery and Terra Nova) and Shackleton 
(Nimrod) (Larson, 2011). Larson accurately states: “Books about the Heroic Age of Antarctic 
exploration could fill a library” (p. xi) and that  “…most of these books-including some of the 
best-say little about science.” The book is arranged by scientific discipline and the chapter A 
Compass Pointing South endeavours to cover the field with respect to terrestrial magnetism 
(pp. 27-60). A history of British maritime magnetic research, and the national and 
international context during the nineteenth century is laid out before the Discovery is dealt 
with in detail (pp. 27-49). A descriptive (rather than analytical) account of the activities of the 
Discovery follows (pp. 50-52) after which the focus shifts to Shackleton’s Nimrod. The 
considerable terrestrial magnetic science work of Mawson’s AAE and Scott’s Terra Nova is 
not acknowledged. This monograph is the only recently published work on the history of 
Antarctic science with a strong coverage of the Discovery expedition. It commences to 
provide some depth about the operations of Bernacchi’s magnetic observatory and the final 
published outputs (pp. 50-51). The uncritical, descriptive style makes the account accessible 
for non-scientists, but there is scope here for more critical analysis without loss of the flow of 
the narrative. Larson’s focus on the first trek to the area of the south magnetic pole during 
Shackleton’s Nimrod expedition betrays a lack of awareness of the potential of the 
Discovery’s at-sea observations and the possible scientific importance of the Antarctic winter 
station and sledge journey observations.  
The expeditions operating in Antarctica during 1912 are the subject of a recent 
addition to polar literature, 1912: The Year the world discovered Antarctica (Turney, 2012). 
It reviews the well-known polar bids of Scott and Amundsen, the scientific expedition of 
Mawson and the more obscure expeditions of Wilhelm Filchner (1877-1957) and Nobu 
Shirase (1861-1946). It has a strong focus on the scientific work of the expeditions and 
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covers the work of Discovery briefly as historic context to the main body of the book. Turney 
mentions the tangible results of Discovery and states: “Even today, though, the expedition’s 
success is fiercely debated”, but aside from controversy over the expedition’s extended stay 
in Antarctica and the need for a government backed rescue mission, the reason for current 
debate is not explicit (Turney, 2012, p. 32).   
In general, these monographs and collections dealing with Antarctic science and its 
history devote little space to the Discovery expedition’s contribution to terrestrial magnetism, 
and none extend to analysis of scientific outputs in other disciplines in any depth. With the 
exception of Larson’s Empire of Ice, all these science focused monographs make general 
statements about abundance of collections and valuable scientific contributions, but no 
criteria for the conclusions about scientific success are made explicit. 
The student of Antarctic history is familiar with a handful of key reference sources. 
The premier resource is Headland’s Chronology of Antarctic Exploration that compiles all 
known details of commercial, exploratory and expedition voyages to Antarctica. Headland’s 
commentary on the outcomes of the Discovery expedition is terse, stating “comprehensive 
scientific programme conducted” (Headland, 2009, p. 24). There are three bibliographies of 
relevance. Rosove’s Antarctica 1772-1999 deals with publication details of the literature 
related to expeditions in fine detail. In the case of the Discovery his focus is on Scott’s 
narrative and no evaluation or opinion of the expedition itself is offered (Rosove, 2001, p. 
343-344). Spence’s Antarctic miscellany provides a detailed, but not comprehensive, listing 
of publications related to the key Antarctic expeditions including narratives, journal 
publications, charts and maps. References to Discovery are scattered throughout the work but 
there is no description, discussion or personal assessment of any of the expeditions mentioned 
(Spence, 1980). Conrad’s Bibliography of Antarctic Exploration (1999) provides some 
introductory discussion with each significant expedition. He provides a detailed synopsis of 
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the evolution of the Discovery expedition (pp. 104-107) and specifically mentions the 
expedition objectives and the recruitment of the scientists and other key figures. Conrad’s 
descriptions of the scientific activities and sledge journeys are of interest but he does not 
provide analysis or opinion of the outcomes of either the scientific or exploratory program.  
Riffenburgh’s Encyclopedia of the Antarctic is a genuine reference tool. Discovery 
expedition science is cited in a positive light: “The British National Antarctic Expedition was 
one of the most important expeditions of the Heroic Age, and its scientific accomplishments 
indicate that this voyage was a first rate effort” (Riffenburgh, 2007, p. 201). The connection 
between RS patronage and Antarctic science of both of Scott’s expeditions is found later in 
the work: “The scientific output was outstanding, and Scott’s second expedition received 
advice and financial support from the Society” (p. 820). 
Two large illustrated encyclopedic volumes are in common circulation. Both attempt 
a wide coverage of Antarctic history and exploration, some current science, geopolitics, 
wildlife and landscapes. The Reader’s Digest Antarctica compilation includes a section 
devoted to the quest to locate the south magnetic pole where the voyages of d’Urville, Wilkes 
and Ross are described (Reader’s Digest, 1990, pp. 102-103). Some theoretical background 
regarding the sources of terrestrial magnetism and the influence of space weather provides 
context but no reference is made to either the Gauss or Discovery expeditions here. In the 
expedition history section the key exploratory achievements during the Discovery expedition 
are a focus but there is no mention of scientific objectives or outcomes aside from the fact 
that Edward Wilson (1872-1912) collected numerous zoological specimens. McGonigal and 
Woodworth’s Complete Story of Antarctica is a similarly informative and well-illustrated 
volume. It also provides a short history of the Discovery expedition and comments 
superficially on its scientific work: “Recent analysis has shown that Scott …achieved much 
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for Antarctic science, and documented some of the definitive events of the Heroic Age of 
Antarctic exploration” (McGonigal & Woodworth, 2001, p. 426).  
2.3 Biographies 
There are numerous biographies of Antarctic expedition leaders, especially Scott, Shackleton, 
Amundsen and Mawson. Murray cites estimates of more than 625 biographies of Scott alone. 
(Murray, 2006, p. 1). There is also a growing trend to publish biographies of less prominent 
Antarctic expedition figures like Bernacchi, (Crawford, 1988) Apsley Cherry-Garrard (1886-
1959), (Wheeler, 2002) Tom Crean (1877-1938), (Smith, 2000) Tannatt Edgeworth David 
(1858-1934), (Branagan, 2005) Reginald Koettlitz (1860-1916), (Jones, 2011), Frank Wild 
(1873-1939), (Butler, 2011) and Wilson (Williams, 2008). These biographies vary in quality 
but many are thoroughly researched and, although the scientific work of expeditions is 
generally not a central topic, observations and opinions of the authors scattered through such 
works can be instructive to the researcher of the history of magnetic science. Biographies of 
Scott are, understandably, strongly focused on the Terra Nova expedition. Laurence M Gould 
wrote: 
The brilliance and tragedy of the second Scott, or Terra Nova, expedition (1910-
1913), of which Wilson was a member and on which he, along with Scott and others, 
lost his life, has understandably obscured the significance of the Discovery 
expedition. Except for the experience and the achievements of the first expedition, 
however, the second one could hardly have been made.  
(Gould, 1967) 
The developments that culminated in the struggle, then death of Scott and his companions a 
century ago, after their attainment of the South Geographic Pole make up a master narrative 
that is rarely matched. Most biographies follow a chronological sequence and the Discovery 
expedition is often presented as a vignette that demonstrates Scott’s initial personal growth 
from RN career officer to heroic explorer. In response to attacks on Scott’s image (such as 
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the representation of Scott as incompetent in Huntford, 1999) his image has been re-crafted 
as a scientist who also did some polar exploration, rather than an explorer that engaged with 
science as a means to legitimise expeditions and maximise funding opportunities. 
Biographies reveal thoughts of historians, scholars and journalists regarding the Discovery 
scientific work. Some offer opinions regarding the success of the expedition, both in terms of 
exploration, and in terms of scientific outcomes. Others are silent on the matter of science.  
For those authors, science might be unimportant, irrelevant or off-topic. Alternatively, it may 
be too challenging for investigation and development of informed opinions or merely of little 
interest to the wider readership.  
During research for his biography of Scott, Pound worked with the approval of 
expedition descendants and had access to primary documents previously kept private. He 
brought a new light on the character of Scott, summing up the achievements of the Discovery 
thus: “The world was told through the news agencies that Scott had returned to England with 
more varied and valuable scientific information than had ever before been collected in the 
Antarctic regions” (Pound, 1966, p. 115). This glowing report is at odds with his own 
preceding comments about the competence of Scott’s naval staff to make scientific 
observations: “His reliance on the ability of his naval colleagues, in particular, to make 
scientific observations and deductions on the basis of brief training given them before leaving 
England was in some instances misplaced” (p. 40). Pound also hints at deficiencies in the 
dredging and trawling outcomes that were a consequence of limited opportunities to trial the 
gear (p. 46). Contrary to the assertion by Finkel (1976, p. 57) that the second season (1903) 
added little to the observations from the first (1902), Pound states “he [Scott] assured the 
learned societies that much of the best work was done during the expedition’s controversial 
second year in the Antarctic” (Pound, 1966, p. 116).  
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Crane’s biography of Scott is one of the few that addresses the scientific successes of 
the Discovery:  
On top of Discovery’s geographical, surveying and geological results, Wilson’s work 
on the fauna of the area and Bernacchi’s own observations –magnetic records for 
something like six hundred days collected under the most appalling conditions-were 
enough alone to ensure the scientific value of the expedition.   
(Crane, 2005, pp. 307-308)  
Crane also suggests: “The massive volumes of results and observations that came out … are 
the unarguable legacy of Discovery’s scientific work” (p. 308). 
Huxley’s biography of Scott covers the Discovery expedition at length. A positive 
view of the scientific results is conveyed in her description of the expedition’s return to 
England: “Word was beginning to get round that this had been outstanding, both in 
geography and in science” (Huxley, 1977, p. 168). She cites Markham’s speech at the East 
India Docks welcome home luncheon event of 16 September 1904: “Never has any polar 
expedition returned with so great a harvest of scientific results” (p. 172). This statement is the 
likely root of the oft-repeated view that the abundance of the specimens and data indicated 
success of the expedition. Huxley follows with a list of the achievements including 
acknowledgement of the two years of continuous meteorological and magnetic observations 
(p. 173). 
In Huntford’s Last Place on Earth magnetic science at sea and ashore on the 
Discovery expedition is not acknowledged and there are no assessments of scientific 
outcomes (Huntford, 1999). Acrimony between Scott and the RS over the first meteorology 
report is highlighted (p. 230) and comparisons between the lengths of new coastline charted 
by Bruce’s Scotia, Jean-Baptiste Charcot’s (1867-1936) Français and the Discovery cast the 
achievements of the latter in a poor light (p. 180). He states “Nordenskjöld was a model 
scientific leader; so was Drygalski” and his failure to comment here on Scott’s leadership 
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might imply a view that Scott was deficient in leadership skill (p. 180). Huntford’s earlier 
biography of Shackleton has one oblique reference to magnetic science on the Discovery. He 
reiterates a quote by Shackleton from the Illustrated London News supplement of 27 June 
1903, after he was repatriated: “For the furtherance of…magnetic research the Government 
had given £45,000 and…we have been successful in carrying out what was intended” 
(Huntford, 1985, p. 122). Shackleton was no physicist and demonstrated little interest in 
science, so it’s unlikely he would have known whether the magnetic results were of value.  
Balance against the negative portrayal of Scott by Huntford is achieved in Fiennes’ 
subsequent detailed biography. Magnetic science at sea on Discovery is acknowledged with 
mention of the investigation of “magnetospheric anomalies” at 65° S during the outbound 
voyage (Fiennes, 2003, p. 48). The southeastern (“Barrier”) sledge journey by Charles Royds 
(1876-1931) and Bernacchi of late 1903 is described as yielding “key data about the region’s 
magnetic characteristics” (p. 128). Fiennes summary of the scientific achievements are 
genrally positive.  
 Although, as with most successful scientific projects, the findings of the Discovery 
expedition would take many years of specialist work to analyze, it was already clear 
that Scott’s scientists had been hugely successful, especially during the second 
season…Scott’s Discovery achievements far outweigh those of contemporary 
scientific leaders Nordenskjöld in 1901 and Drygalski in 1902. 
(Fiennes, 2003, p. 128)  
Fiennes subsequent book, Race to the Pole, is part biography and part history, and 
reiterates much of the same content (Fiennes, 2004) and presents an even more positive view 
of the scientific work. Bernacchi’s synchronised magnetic observations (p. 71) and the 
Barrier sledge journey yielded “key data about the region’s magnetic characteristics” and  
“extensive new data had been collated” (Fiennes, 2004, p. 118). In terms of outcomes from 
the cooperative relationship between the German and English expeditions, Fiennes states: 
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Louis Bernacchi kept magnetic records, often synchronized with those of Drygalski’s 
German team. Which, when added to the observations of Armitage and Mulock, 
located the precise position of the south magnetic pole as accurately as if they had 
reached it. Their results, together with those of Drygalski, enabled the construction of 
a magnetic map of the Southern Hemisphere, which had been the Anglo-German aim 
and which proved key to the navigation of the southern trade routes until the evolution 
of satellite navigation.  
(Fiennes, 2004, p.135)  
Barczewski’s book describes the waxing and waning of the reputations of Scott and 
Shackleton in recent years is mostly concerned with tracking and interpreting opinions 
(Barczewski, 2007). Her monograph opens with examples of different portrayals of Scott and 
Shackleton from the body of literature and her assessment of the Discovery’s achievements is 
balanced. “The Discovery returned to England in 1904 to a professional and public reception 
in keeping with its accomplishments, which were impressive from a scientific point of view, 
but not particularly glamorous” (Barczewski, 2007, p. 4). She then states: “The British public 
quickly came to recognise that the expedition had added enormous amounts not only to 
human knowledge of Antarctica, but to scientific knowledge more generally” (p. 43). More 
specifically: “ Tremendous amounts of new biological, meteorological and geographic data 
were obtained. Precise observations allowed the creation of a magnetic map of the 
hemisphere, a great boon to marine navigation in the days prior to satellite mapping” (p. 43). 
In footnotes she states: “The importance of the Discovery expedition’s scientific 
achievements remains in dispute, but by any standard it added immensely to contemporary 
knowledge of Antarctica.”  Then, without explanation of her yardsticks for success, she 
writes: “Certainly the Discovery expedition accomplished far more than the German, Swedish 
and Scottish expeditions that explored Antarctica at the same time” (footnote 98, p. 323). 
Koettlitz was the senior surgeon to the Discovery expedition and his first biography 
has only recently been published (Jones, 2011). It focuses on the scientific contributions of 
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Koettlitz and there are no general conclusions regarding the achievements of the expedition. 
There are implications that the scientific work was not taken seriously by Scott, and was 
ineffective. Jones quotes correspondence from Koettlitz to Fritjof Nansen (1861-1930) near 
the end of the expedition, at sea on 29 August 1904:  
These naval and other officers look upon everything that happens and that they do as 
a ‘bit of fun’, as sport, and they do it in a sporting style. There is no backbone in it, 
and much of it is carelessly done. There is also too much of the official tradition in it, 
and too much ‘red tape.’ Never the less work has been done.  
(Jones, 2011, p. 178)  
Crawford’s biography and collection of her grandfather Bernacchi’s edited diaries 
from Carsten Borchgrevink’s (1864-1934) Southern Cross expedition, touches only briefly 
on the Discovery. Scientific work is mentioned in the context of visits to the Cape Adare site 
by the Discovery, at which time Bernacchi repeated magnetic observations at the same 
location he used during the Southern Cross expedition (Crawford, 1998, p. 219-221). 
Bernacchi is often cited in the literature related to the Discovery expedition, not because of 
interest in his terrestrial magnetism studies, but because he was a prolific diarist and post 
expedition author. Skelton has edited a similar work based on the diaries and photographs by 
her grandfather, Reginald Skelton (1872-1956), first engineer of the Discovery. In the preface 
she states: “Discovery can truly be said to have laid the foundations of scientific research in 
Antarctica” (Skelton, 2004, p. 5). Williams’ recent biography of Wilson, second surgeon to 
the expedition, repeats the message about quantity of outputs. “The Discovery expedition 
could claim success in terms of magnetic research, geology, biology, and meteorology; the 
scientists had gathered a large body of material about the Antarctic”  (Williams, 2008, p. 
177). This biography shows a strong bias towards geographical achievements and neglect of 
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scientific achievements. It highlights the value of Wilson’s artworks as a record of those 
achievements.  
In summary, the biographies add little critical analysis of scientific success on 
Discovery and the theme that abundance of data and material in natural science collections 
indicates success is perpetuated. In the rare cases where opinions are ventured about scientific 
success, the criteria for making the judgement are not explicit. 
2.4 Histories 
Finkel’s obscure but engaging book remains significant as one of the earliest pieces to 
directly criticise Scott’s decision making. Unfortunately the author does not cite the sources 
and the book has no index, so its value to scholarship is limited, but he had an awareness of 
the potential unpopularity of his opinions:  
There have been almost as many books written about Scott as there have been about 
James Cook, and for many years it was near heresy to question Scott or his methods. 
Any mistakes made were glossed over by the tragedy of the deaths of his party.  
(Finkel, 1976, p. 153)   
The book provides a descriptive narrative of events on the Discovery and Terra Nova 
expeditions, including appraisal of Scott’s achievements and failings. He comments on the 
scientific background to the Discovery:  
Most expeditions during the Heroic Age included a few scientists, but the great 
driving force of the day was geographical discovery. Much of the money they needed 
was raised by public subscription and the ordinary man was not stirred by the 
importance of magnetic research, or the nesting habits of penguins. 
  (Finkel, 1976, p. 42) 
This history is well balanced and with respect to the Discovery expedition, after listing a 
number of Scott’s progressive methods and geographical achievements Finkel writes:  
Scott made a mistake by allowing the ship to be frozen in. He did not have to do it and 
no other explorer of the Heroic Age did so deliberately, although it sometimes 
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happened by accident. The second, involuntary season added little to the brilliant first 
year of the expedition.  
(Finkel, 1976, p. 57)  
Finkel’s closing assessment is: “The Discovery Expedition was a success. Scott made 
mistakes, but he appeared to learn from them and on his first expedition he did not make the 
same mistake twice” (Finkel, 1976, pp. 153-154).  
Martin utilised his access (as librarian) to the resources of the State Library of New 
South Wales to produce an engaging illustrated history of Antarctica based on, and using, 
extensive quotes from primary sources. The history spans the first speculations about the 
existence of the continent through to the IGY. Various events from the Discovery expedition 
are related through nine pages of vignettes from journals (Martin, 1996, pp. 115-124). In 
summarising the Discovery achievements, he states: “The scientific work of this expedition is 
often overlooked in the aura of the romantic wonder which surrounds Scott and his 
expeditioners” and follows with: “Masses of data in meteorology, magnetism, geology and 
biology were collected” and then addresses magnetic science directly, but superficially 
stating: “The detailed magnetic records established a synchronicity with magnetism in the 
northern polar regions” (Martin, 1996, p. 124). 
Scholes’ saga of Australian exploration of Antarctica includes material on the 
Discovery expedition due to the contribution of Bernacchi who grew up in Australia. The 
history lends a great deal from Bernacchi’s own narrative Saga of the Discovery (Bernacchi, 
1938). Scholes provides a positive view of the outcomes of the expedition: “When the second 
summer was ended, the expedition knew much more about this new world. The men were 
rich with the treasure of knowledge, of geography and other scientific matters” (Scholes, 
1953, p. 85). Summing up, he concludes: “Scott’s first expedition was a tremendous scientific 
success” (Scholes, 1953, p. 89).   
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Nichol’s history from the same period mentions Scott’s sympathy with science: “…a 
man not only born to command, but in full sympathy with every branch of scientific work.” 
Nichol follows with the comment that the main objective on the Discovery expedition was “to 
conduct a magnetic survey” but he does not mention the results of the magnetic science, or 
those of any other discipline (Nichol, 1948, pp. 54-55). 
Kirwan was Secretary of the RGS from 1945 to 1975 (M. W. R., 1999) placing him 
well to access primary resources for the section on the Discovery history in his monograph 
(Kirwan, 1962, pp. 253-270). He understandably focuses on the geographical achievements 
of the Discovery but turning to science he wrote:  
During both seasons a massive accumulation of scientific observations was made. 
Their subsequent publication in a series of magnificent volumes remains to this day a 
tribute to the great stride forward made by the expedition in the development of 
Antarctic science.  
(Kirwan, 1962, p. 267) 
Another author that makes statements of success based on quantity of results is 
Church who, when reviewing the centenary of the connections of Dunedin and Port Chalmers 
with Antarctic expeditions, comments on the results of the Discovery expedition: “so much 
information had been collected that evaluation and publication were far from complete when 
Scott made his second expedition in 1910”  (Church, 1997, p. 17).  
Aldridge’s Rescue of Captain Scott does not paint a positive view of Scott’s 
leadership. He mysteriously reinterprets Kirwan’s history: “Like Hugh Mill, he concluded 
that the expedition of 1901-1904 was not a great scientific success: he regarded it simply as a 
dramatic adventure” (Aldridge, 1999, p. 171). His discussion of the Discovery opens with 
exploratory successes before shifting the focus to the science disciplines. Magnetic studies 
are covered haphazardly with a short introductory history of magnetic science but Aldridge is 
ignorant of the instruments used and fails to describe the nature of work undertaken by 
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Bernacchi. In spite of the chapter title, (‘Discovery’s’ Expedition Achievements) none of the 
achievements in the magnetic science discipline are mentioned (Aldridge, 1999, pp. 57-64). 
Spufford’s I may be some time is a cultural history of our obsession with polar history 
and figures. It is not a history of Antarctic exploration, but makes comments on the style of 
Antarctic histories. He is an acute observer of motivations and cultural contexts but does not 
express opinion about the outputs of the Discovery expedition (Spufford, 1996). Preston 
investigates the “mystique and enduring power of Scott’s last expedition” and describes the 
events of the Discovery expedition as a prelude to deeper analysis of the later Terra Nova 
expedition and its symbolism (Preston, 1997, p. 7). Like many commentators, she describes 
Bernacchi’s magnetic observations as “valuable” (p. 76) and that “Important magnetic, 
meteorological, geographical and zoological research had also been completed…” (p. 82). 
Describing Discovery’s reception on its return in 1904 as muted, she reiterates Markham’s 
comments about the great harvest of scientific results and notes Scott was gratified by the 
“growing climate of approval” to the achievements of the expedition that followed what she 
called pre-expedition uncertainty by the scientific establishment (Preston, 1997, p. 101).  
Jones’ Last Great Quest is a similar book in architecture and content. Quotes from news 
items around the September 1904 return of the expedition are used to demonstrate the 
prevailing mood that the expedition was successful in a general sense, as well as scientifically 
(Jones, 2003, p. 68). Referring directly to science, the author mentions that the expedition  
“…gathered detailed observations of natural phenomena and vast collections of samples.” 
These positive messages are tempered with a cautionary note: 
The claim that the NAE returned with ‘the richest results, geographical and scientific 
ever brought from high southern latitudes’, should certainly be treated with caution, as 
the expeditions of William Bruce, Jean Charcot, Otto Nordenskjöld and Erich von 
Drygalski, also produced a wealth of information about Antarctica.    
(Jones, 2003, p. 70)  
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Rosove’s Let Heroes Speak is contains accounts from expedition narratives spanning 
from Cook’s 1772 (Resolution and Adventure) to Shackleton’s 1922 (Quest) expeditions. The 
section on Discovery opens with a statement of achievements: “The significance of this 
voyage’s accomplishments cannot be overestimated. Well organised, the program was a 
logical and thorough extension of Ross’s geographic discoveries and research in all relevant 
branches of science” (Rosove, 2002, p. 83). Magnetic science at sea on the outbound leg is 
acknowledged: “Scott made a southward diversion to the sea ice to obtain magnetic 
readings.” (p. 85) and on the homeward leg: “Magnetic surveys were made in the Pacific as 
far as 56° to 60° S.” (p. 105). 
Griffiths gives a rich social history of Antarctic expeditions in his collection of essays, 
Slicing the Silence (Griffiths, 2007). Early polar magnetic science is acknowledged without 
direct reference to the Discovery, but he provides deeper context of magnetic and 
meteorological field research: 
The tending and reading of the essential instruments was, in Antarctica, heroic and 
fraught with danger…Both sciences required long, laborious runs of data so that 
variations over space and time might be mapped. Both were inspired by global 
Humboldtian science, by the desire to embrace the cosmos with measure and pattern. 
But they also had quite practical purposes: meteorology was a vital key to survival, 
and magnetism had long been a tool of empire because understanding terrestrial 
magnetism and its declination and dips was crucial to better use of compasses and 
navigational safety.  
(Griffiths, 2007, p. 45) 
Wilson timed the release of his compilation of photographs taken by Scott on his final 
journey to match the centenary of that event. There is a comprehensive preamble to the story 
of the Terra Nova expedition in which Wilson discusses the overlap between geographical 
exploration, adventure and scientific inquiry in the polar context. Referring to the Discovery 
expedition he states: “Once the expedition returned, the geographic and scientific findings, 
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while imperfect, were of undoubted value and the scientific cooperation was deemed a great 
success” (Wilson, 2011, p. 26). Hooper’s Longest Winter is an account of the eastern 
scientific party (later referred to as the “Northern Party”) of Scott’s Terra Nova expedition. It 
brings out the contrast between preparation and recruitment for the scientific programs on 
Scott’s two expeditions: “On Scott’s first expedition, some scientists had been selected on a 
fairly haphazard basis, and in certain cases results had been heavily criticised. This time men 
had been sought out with professional competence” (Hooper, 2010, p. 203). The reference to 
“heavy criticism” was written abut the struggle by Scott to maintain credibility with, and the 
support of the RS during preparations for the Terra Nova, at which time he was also in 
conflict with the Society over errors published in the first meteorology report of the 
Discovery (Meredith Hooper personal communication, 14 September 2011).  
Three recent publications focus on the history of the compass, terrestrial magnetic 
science and the quest to locate the south magnetic pole. Gurney’s Compass (2004) focuses on 
the technical development of compasses, especially those intended for maritime navigation. 
Although theories of terrestrial magnetism and its connection with navigation are mentioned 
throughout the book, there is silence on the Antarctic expeditions at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Turner’s North Pole, South Pole (2010) describes the quest to solve the riddles of 
terrestrial magnetism and paleomagnetism. This thorough work covers the long history of 
magnetic observing and theorizing, and connects those activities with geology and plate 
tectonics. The expeditions of Ross, d’Urville and Wilkes are not mentioned, nor are those of 
Scott, Drygalski or Mawson. These expeditions had magnetic science as core research or 
investigation but they are outside the scope of content. Mawer’s South by Northwest (2006) 
devotes a chapter to the Southern Cross, Gauss and Discovery expeditions. As with Turner 
and Gurney, significant background research underpins the monograph and the author shows 
an understanding of the science. Preparations for the expeditions, their expectations and their 
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operations are described in detail. While Mawer does not dwell on the scientific activities of 
Bernacchi on the Discovery, he notes that Scott provides only nominal coverage of it in his 
Voyage of ‘Discovery’ narrative, (Scott, 1905b, pp. 280-282). Although Mawer engages with 
the connection between the Discovery expedition and magnetic science, he fails to provide 
analysis or opinion regarding the value of the scientific results.  
Two monographs relate the history of the Discovery, from its construction in 1900-01 
until the end of its working life. The first of these is Bernacchi’s Saga of the Discovery that 
was published long after many of Bernacchi’s shipmates had passed away (Bernacchi, 1938). 
It provides a sentimental narrative of the ship’s history and his conclusion about the value of 
the Antarctic science of the expedition is generally sanguine: “Never had a polar expedition 
come home with so great a harvest of original research work, nor have such original results 
been surpassed by subsequent polar expeditions…” (Bernacchi, 1938, p. 113). His following 
statements are less committed in regards to quality or meaning of outcome.  
The extensive physical work, part of an international programme, for which I was 
responsible, was one of the principal objects of the expedition. It was completed. In 
due time the scientific work was reduced, discussed and published in many large 
volumes by the Royal Society. 
(Bernacchi, 1938, p. 114) 
The second work is a more recent and more scholarly account by Savours, a long serving 
member of SPRI. It provides a more scholarly version of the ship’s construction and 
operations during active service. Savours’ only personal assessment of the results of the 
expedition is: “Discovery had completed a rewarding first voyage, and the expedition she 
carried made a splendid contribution to Antarctic geography and science” (Savours, 2001, p. 
70). She quotes extensively from Bernacchi’s account without adding further analysis for the 
student of the history of science, in spite of her unrivalled access to primary resources. 
Tarver’s S.S. Terra Nova is written in similar style. The Terra Nova was one of the two ships 
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involved in the Discovery relief expedition of 1904. Tarver comments on Discovery’s 
outcomes: 
On the return of Discovery to Britain, the British National Antarctic Expedition was 
acclaimed an outstanding success both scientifically and territorially. Much new 
material was brought back for evaluation and important sledge journeys inland had 
been made including a journey ‘farthest south’- further than man had ever been 
before.  
(Tarver, 2006, p. 49) 
Holland’s Antarctic Obsession is an edited collection of Markham’s illuminating 
personal records related to the Discovery expedition. Holland’s introduction discusses the 
products of the expedition:  
Its main results were geographical, geological and biological discoveries in the 
Victoria Land region, and Markham was later to claim that ‘never has any polar 
expedition returned with so great a harvest of results!’ It was, nevertheless, conducted 
with a minimal scientific staff and its scientific results were modest beside those of 
some smaller and more efficient expeditions of the same period.  
(Markham & Holland, 1986, p. xv)  
Holland’s perceptive comments cast doubt on the dominant paradigm that an abundance of 
data and specimens implies success.  
Baughman’s Pilgrims on the Ice is one of a pair of complete histories of the 
Discovery expedition. The monograph is a concise chronological description with analysis of 
the social landscape and with some insights into the motivations of individuals. The scientific 
activities are not central to the narrative but some elements of interest are covered. 
Bernacchi’s scientific contributions in Christchurch, (Baughman, 1999, p. 84) at Capes Adare 
(p. 97) and Crozier, (p. 102) and his regime of observations at Winter Quarters (p. 152) are 
mentioned. Baughman also notes that in the second winter “Scientists in each department had 
both improved the methods of their research and added substantially more to the body of 
scientific data than could have been imagined at the close of the 1902-03 summer” 
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(Baughman, 1999, pp. 220-221). Baughman summarises: “The essential question about the 
expedition was settled before the first sail was set: adventure triumphed over science…” (p. 
261) then continues with some assessment of the outcomes. In respect of scientific leadership 
he states that: “Given Markham’s qualifications for the position, Scott probably was a better 
commander than the expedition deserved, for his ability as a scientific leader emerged as one 
of his strongest qualities” (p. 261). He sums up: “Mindful that the expedition was founded on 
the failed models of nineteenth century British Arctic exploration, the accomplishments merit 
great praise” (p. 262) and “the men of the Discovery accomplished a great deal in terms of 
science and adventure” (p. 263). 
Yelverton’s Antarctica Unveiled is the second in the pair and is the most significant 
single publication on the Discovery expedition since Scott’s own narrative. It provides a 
scholarly analysis of all elements of the expedition and (like Baughman) ties together 
information from primary sources. Yelverton is the only author to provide a truly meticulous 
analysis that follows the stepwise processes building towards his conclusions. For example, 
he describes the magnetic observing huts and instruments used by Bernacchi and the regime 
of term day and term hour observations (pp. 146-147). Although Yelverton does not make 
any strong closing statements in regards to the products of scientific work on Discovery, he 
states that it was the forerunner of later Antarctic scientific expedition work. In respect of the 
magnetic observations related to accurate location of the magnetic pole, only one element of 
the magnetic program, Yelverton states (referring to Scott):   
His own and Bernacchi’s and Mulock’s observations on their journeys would locate 
the magnetic pole almost as well as if they had actually been to it, certainly well 
enough to build the magnetic map of the Southern Hemisphere that had been one of 
the prime aims of the European assault, of which his expedition had been part. Their 
endeavours had surely reaped a rich harvest.  
(Yelverton, 2000, p. 311) 
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The outcomes of the magnetic research are not covered in Yelverton’s analysis or 
conclusions.   
2.5 Scholarly articles and proceedings of conferences and symposia 
To mark the centenary of the return of the Discovery, a symposium was held at the 
Southampton Oceanography Centre, the intellectual home of the Discovery expedition 
biologist, Thomas Vere Hodgson (1864-1926). It brought together scholars interested in polar 
sciences and the scientific history of the various voyages of the ship. The papers are collected 
in one volume of Archives of Natural History (Nelson, 2005, pp. 127-394). Disciplines 
covered include glaciology, meteorology, hydrology, oceanography, plate tectonics and 
geomagnetism and synoptic papers by Fogg and Walton bookend the collection (Fogg, 2005, 
pp. 129-143; Walton, 2005, pp. 394-401). The introductory note by the editor sets the scene 
for the collection: “In 1904 the steam yacht Discovery (I) returned to the United Kingdom 
after a highly successful voyage of scientific exploration” (Nelson, 2005, p. 128). The 
keynote address by the eminent historian of Antarctic science, G. E. (Tony) Fogg also cites 
the scientific achievements of the expedition: “The British National Antarctic Expedition 
(1901-1904) on the Discovery (I) became one of the foremost in scientific output among the 
several dispatched from Europe to the Antarctic about this time” (Fogg, 2005, pp. 129-143). 
This sentiment echoes his earlier paper on the RS and the Antarctic, where he states 
“Scientifically, as well as geographically, the expedition, which returned to England in 
September 1904, was a success” (Fogg, 2000, p. 90).  
Savours’ history of RN and private vessels named Discovery focuses on the 
achievements of Cook on his third (Discovery and Resolution, 1776-1780) expedition and 
here she does not venture an opinion on the scientific or exploratory achievements of the 
BNAE (Savours, 2005, pp. 144-160). On a related theme, the paper by Rice illuminates 
incidents of serious conflict between scientific staff and ships officers on voyages of 
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exploration and his omission of Scott or the Discovery in this context implies that there were 
no notable conflicts. (Rice, 2005, pp. 177-191). Headland’s synoptic paper covering the 
phases of history of Arctic and Antarctic exploration and science mentions that the Discovery 
expedition was “…successful in most of its objectives…” and the paradigm that the number 
of publications indicates scientific success is affirmed by: “Ten scientific reports, from 1907 
to 1911, resulted…” (Headland, 2005, p. 207-220). Rainbow quantifies and analyses the 
contribution of the natural science collectors on Discovery’s many scientific voyages that 
spanned between 1901 and 1931 (Bryan, 2011, p. 343). The significance of the collection 
from the BNAE as a reference collection in the BMNH, as well as numerous type specimens 
(examples of newly discovered species on which their taxonomic status was established), 
attest to the zeal of Hodgson, the biologist who compensated for the “limited oceanographic 
work” by working throughout the polar winters, dredging and netting through holes in the sea 
ice off Hut Point (Rainbow, 2005, pp. 221-230).  
McConnell’s Surveying terrestrial magnetism in time and space is directly relevant to 
this research (McConnell, 2005, pp. 346-360). McConnell is a pre-eminent historian of polar 
magnetic research and the evolution of related instruments. After tracking the intellectual 
development of terrestrial magnetic theory from the twelfth century to the First World War, 
she describes important voyages of exploration and scientific enquiry, and covers the 
development of some of the instruments used by the physicists Bernacchi of Discovery and 
Freidrich Bidlingmaier (1875-1914) of Gauss. It is here that the first clues about possible 
shortcomings of magnetic science on the Discovery emerge in the accessible literature. 
Referring to comments about the Lloyd-Creak dip circle in Louis Agricola Bauer’s (1865-
1932) report from the Carnegie Institution’s Department of Terrestrial Magnetism (Bauer, 
Peters, Fleming, and Ault, 1917, p. 19), McConnell states: “Because of the defects in the 
instruments issued to the Discovery, however, the intensity observations made at sea were not 
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published” (McConnell, 2005, p. 355). The contribution by the Discovery towards accurate 
location of the south magnetic pole, and the two years of almost continuous magnetic 
observations by Bernacchi at Hut Point, are not specifically mentioned within her review of 
efforts to locate and arrive at the magnetic pole (pp. 356-357). 
Walton’s closing paper of the symposium collection confirms the contribution of the 
Discovery expedition to the shift from exploration to science as the prime motivation for 
Antarctic expeditions of the twentieth century (Walton, 2005, pp. 394-401). Amongst a 
generally sanguine synopsis of these contributions he refers specifically to terrestrial 
magnetic research stating: “Whilst Scott’s first expedition did not make any major progress 
with magnetism the equipment limitations meant that even during later attempts on 
Shackleton’s expedition … they would be uncertain they had arrived at its exact location” 
(Walton, 2005, p. 397). 
Lüdecke is a historian that specialises in the scientific elements of Drygalski’s Gauss 
expedition and early polar international collaborations. Like McConnell, she adds doubt to 
the value of outcomes from the Discovery. In her article on the scientific collaboration 
between expeditions of 1901-04 she states: “Data of the magnetic field of the Earth measured 
by Discovery and Gauss improved the charts of the southern seas, but there had not been 
enough data to cover large areas” (Lüdecke, 2003). More recently she has reiterated her view 
of outcomes of collaboration between Discovery and Gauss: “Data on the magnetic field of 
the earth, measured by the British Discovery and the German Gauss, did not cover large 
areas, but improved the nautical charts of the southern seas.” In respect to the Antarctic base 
station observations, Lüdecke describes the arrangement between the British and Germans for 
term day and term hour observations but does not ciomment on outputs (Lüdecke, 2010, pp. 
128-132).  
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 The selection of academic papers and reports from symposia indicates that magnetic 
research on Discovery is generally dealt with in those forums in a superficial manner, and the 
measure of worth of outcomes is most often the number of official scientific reports 
published after wrap up of the expedition. There is little genuine analysis of the research into 
terrestrial magnetism. 
2.6 Other sources 
There are few theses based on research into the history of Antarctic science, and none that are 
specifically focused on either science of the Discovery expedition, or magnetic science in the 
Edwardian era. Hunt’s M. Phil. thesis is concerned with the development of magnetic 
instruments during the nineteenth century, and is focused on British Arctic exploration (Hunt, 
1995). Murray’s doctoral thesis investigates the enduring power of the story of Scott’s fatal 
polar trek and suggests that, like the abandoned Terra Nova polar hut on Ross Island, the 
story that gives the hut meaning also needs conservation (Murray, 2006, p. iii).  Scott, himself 
is at the centre of the research and Murray acknowledges that analysis of the narratives of 
Scott’s two expeditions, and the contributions of his colleagues is limited by the scope of this 
thesis (p. 8). The well-trodden path of quoting Markham’s welcome speech about the great 
harvest of scientific results, the list of geographical achievements and collection of 
information in various scientific disciplines is revisited briefly by Murray (p. 43). Critical 
analysis of the scientific results is outside the scope of Murray’s research, but like Hunt’s 
thesis, it is a valuable background resource.   
One scholarly work that aligns with, and informs this research is Salveson’s long 
essay, or mini thesis submitted as partial fulfilment of a M.Phil. in Polar Studies at SPRI, 
Cambridge (Salveson, 1998). It investigates and compares the scientific achievements of the 
seven Antarctic expeditions between 1895 and 1905. The criteria used for assessing the 
success of the expeditions includes data on one hand, and specimens (rocks, fossils, flora and 
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fauna) gathered for taxonomic analysis and to fill museum collections on the other (p. 8). 
Salveson uses proxies for scientific effort such as the time spent inside the Antarctic Circle, 
the range of scientific disciplines studied, the number of scientists involved, the publication 
output and the alignment between expedition objectives and achievements (pp. 9-10). 
Magnetic research of the Gauss and the Discovery are included in the geophysical category 
and viewed together in a positive light:  
They not only equipped themselves with the finest equipment and ships for magnetic 
work but they also coordinated with each other and other observatories world-wide 
who were recording term days to gain an understanding of the global variations of 
magnetic fields.  
(Salveson, 1998, p. 28)   
Salveson cites Fogg’s History of Antarctic Science (1992) for description of the 
observing regimes, but provides little detail. Achievements noted for Discovery include 
Hartley Travers Ferrar’s (1879-1932) first geological surveys of the Ross Sea region (p. 32), 
the 800 pages in three volumes of zoological reports (p. 35) and the discovery of new species 
of lichens and freshwater algae (p. 39). Salveson briefly discusses polar experience, finance, 
planning, scientific reports and the use of emerging technologies (pp. 41-48) and states “The 
British, Swedish and German expeditions coordinated their work during two years through 
the use of similar instruments, readings, methods of observations, and synchronous timing so 
that variables could be removed” (p. 51). In conclusion, Salveson refers to the magnetic 
research thus: “The first high southern latitude magnetic measurements were made, allowing 
for a scientific postulation of the location of the Magnetic South Pole” (p. 57). Salveson’s 
thesis pre-dates the paper by the magnetic science historian, McConnell, that brings to light 
deficiencies of the Lloyd-Creak instruments (McConnell, 2005). He was ideally placed as 
student at SPRI to find all relevant resources but he fails to cite the BNAE Terrestrial 
Magnetism report (Royal Society, 1909) or to include it in his otherwise thorough analysis 
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and tabulation of scientific publication outputs (Salveson, 1998, p. 67). This contribes to 
scholarship of the early Antarctic scientific exploring expeditions but, as an unpublished 
thesis, it remains obscure to historians.  
A small selection of examples of descriptions of the Discovery achievements on web 
sites is adequate to demonstrate that the generalizations found in print are repeated in 
electronic sources. The Antarctic Heritage Trust (NZ) gives a concise description of the 
Discovery expedition’s main and magnetic observation huts, and Bernacchi’s equipment 
housed within them. The final page comments on the success of the scientific programs and 
lists of the scientific disciplines investigated. “The National Antarctic Expedition was highly 
successful. In addition to the comprehensive scientific observations and geographical 
discoveries described, other research, observations and field work included meteorology, 
geology, glaciology, botany, marine biology and cartography” (National Antarctic, Discovery 
Expedition, 1901 – 1904, 2012).  
The National Library of Scotland website has a comprehensive biography of Wilson 
that provides some Discovery history:   
The expedition carried out groundbreaking meteorological, oceanographic, geological 
and biological research. They discovered hundreds of new marine species and mapped 
hundreds of miles of previously unknown coastline, mountain ranges and glaciers. It 
also reached a record 82º 11', the furthest South any expedition had been thus far. 
When the research had been analyzed on their return, the resulting body of work was 
massive. It made up 10 heavy volumes subsequently published by the Royal 
Geographical Society. 
(Edward Wilson [1872-1912], 2012)  
For history of the Discovery, the SPRI web site links to another web presence, South-
Pole.com. It describes the handing over of data and specimens by the scientific staff then 
reiterates Markham’s well aired comments about the harvest of scientific results followed by: 
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“Truly, this had been the most revealing of all Antarctic exploration as meticulous records 
were kept on the scientific work” (Robert Falcon Scott: 1868-1912 (n.d). Para. 72). The BBC 
entry, located in their history pages is succinct, describing Scott’s contribution: “He 
commanded the Government-funded Discovery expedition (1901-4), which undertook 
significant scientific work” (Flynn, 2011). The Discovery itself is the centerpiece of the 
Dundee Heritage Trust’s museum. The website’s descriptions of the products of the scientific 
work on the expedition are generous. The results are described as breakthroughs, not just 
achievements, and:  
The work was truly groundbreaking…The body of work was massive when the 
research had been analyzed and the Royal Geographical Society came to publish the 
results, ten large, weighty volumes were filled. It represented a major contribution to 
the understanding of the Antarctic continent, a feat made all the more remarkable 
considering the extreme conditions endured by the heroic scientists of Discovery.  
(Discovery, 2007) 
The final word in this category is that found in the Wikipedia entry that states:  
Its scientific results covered extensive ground in biology, zoology, geology, 
meteorology and magnetism. After its return home it was celebrated as a success, 
despite having needed an expensive relief mission to free Discovery and its crew from 
the ice, and later disputes about the quality of some of its scientific records. 
(Discovery Expedition, 2012) 
This selection of web pages is sufficient to demonstrate the majority public view that the 
expedition was highly successful and that the ten volumes of scientific reports are generally 
cited as a proxy for successful outcomes.  
One last piece of ephemera is worthy of mention. It is an illustrated catalogue 
published to accompany a recent exhibition of the Royal Collection of Antarctic photographs 
at the Canterbury Museum, Christchurch, New Zealand. The exhibition was comprised of 
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original prints of many iconic photographs from Scott’s Terra Nova and Shackleton’s 
Endurance expeditions. The catalogue describes Discovery’s return: “On Discovery’s return 
to New Zealand, and then to Britain, her captain and crew received heroes’ welcomes from 
both the public at large and, more particularly (and importantly), the scientific establishment 
and the Royal Navy” (Hempleman-Adams, 2009, p. 194). 
2.7 Honing the research question 
The accessible literature addressing the scientific outcomes from the Discovery expedition 
expresses a range of opinion. The majority of commentators describe the expedition as 
having been scientifically successful. That success appears to have been judged subjectively 
by quantity of data (meteorological, oceanographic, gravitational, magnetic and auroral) and 
the range and abundance of specimens (zoological, biological, microbiological and 
geological) collected. Confusion over the boundary between scientific research and 
exploratory achievements may be an additional factor. The Discovery was the first expedition 
to penetrate continental Antarctica, and one of the first to establish an overwinter base, so 
most material collected was novel, and the scientific data was unique. A small number of 
histories and biographies cast doubt on the value of the outcomes, but these are mainly 
commentaries on the leadership capabilities of Scott.  
There is little evidence in the literature that the magnetic science (or any other 
discipline) has been analysed critically and few commentators discriminate the difference 
between magnetic observations on land and those made at sea. Two credible sources 
comment directly on difficulties with instruments used at sea (McConnell, 2005; Mawer, 
2006) indicating scope for further investigation. Most commentators have failed to undertake 
any deep analysis of the scientific work and its outcomes, and appear to rely on the 
conclusions of those before them. There is a common perception that the magnetic science of 
the Discovery expedition was highly successful, but there is now sufficient evidence to 
  
61 
warrant investigation of the accuracy of this common belief. In nearly all cases statements 
about success are not based upon a thorough understanding of the scientific program or the 
scientific contexts of the era and there appears to be only superficial analysis. If there are 
more robust foundations to these statements, the underpinning criteria are never made 
explicit.  
This review of the reporting of Discovery’s outcomes suggested two main strands of 
inquiry for the body of this research. Firstly, there is a place for a deeper critical analysis of 
the perceptions or measures of success for scientific on early expeditions. Or, expressed 
differently, what is the full range of indicators of scientific success that might assist an 
objective analysis of expedition outcomes? The preliminary phases of this research suggested 
the following list of success indicators: 
• Achievement of stated objectives or expectations 
• Research carried out within budget 
• Research carried out on time 
• Access to funding for further similar research 
• Promotion, peer recognition or career advancement 
• Positive critical reviews and public perceptions 
• New knowledge developed or new directions for intellectual inquiry launched 
• Data and collections and the discovery of new species 
• Detection of valuable natural resources 
• Successful collaborations 
• Natural phenomena or features named in recognition of scientists 
• Technologies, equipment or procedures retained 
 
Secondly, what are the drivers of scientific success? What elements allow some expeditions 
to achieve excellence in their scientific programs and what factors can undermine well-
organised and well-intentioned efforts? The initial exploratory research and review of the 
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historiography of the expeditions of the era suggested a suite of factors, or drivers of 
scientific success around which the body of this research could progress. They are: 
• Historic and cultural context of an expedition 
• Patronage, funding and institutional supports 
• Leadership and governance 
• Preparations 
• Instructions 
• Collaborative relationships 
• Recruitment, training and development of skill and knowledge 
• Equipment and instruments 
• Logistics 
• The work of the scientist 
• Social and intellectual landscapes 
• Serendipity 
• Post-expedition handling and publication of data and collections    
Research along the two strands of inquiry, success indicators and success drivers, informed 
the core supplementary question that asks, with respect to the Discovery scientific program 
specifically, did it achieve it’s potential, and if not, why did that happen? 
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Chapter 3: Research design 
Revealing new knowledge in historic research should not be a chance event. If research is 
carried out in a random, non-systematic way, without a theoretical basis, how do we know 
when a defensible version of the truth is reached? This chapter discusses the theoretical basis 
and the framework that underpins this research. The work was initiated by exploratory 
research characterised by collection and analysis of a body of historical materials and, 
although that exploratory research was unstructured, it provided a sufficient footing in the 
subject matter to develop a set of research questions and potentially fruitful pathways for 
investigation of Antarctic science in the late Victorian and Edwardian eras.   
In order to develop defensible conclusions it was necessary to embark upon the core 
research using methods appropriate to the subject matter, that were rigorous and that had 
robust theoretical underpinnings. The research was qualitative in nature and mostly 
concerned with interpretation of published documents related to the scientific activities of the 
significant Antarctic expeditions prior to World War I. A framework evolved in the initial 
stages of research that is thematic in nature and arranged according to the identified drivers of 
scientific success on pioneer polar expeditions. The research is characterised by detailed 
analysis of preparations for the Discovery’s data and specimen collecting activities, the actual 
data gathering at sea and in Antarctica, and the subsequent analysis and publication of results 
then conclusions from the scientific enquiries.  
This chapter describes the methods used in this research and substantiates their 
selection and began in the context of the following assumptions: 
• The measures of “Success” for scientific programs in the physical sciences of 
meteorology and terrestrial magnetism can be defined for the pioneering Antarctic 
expeditions.  
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• Identified success indicators for the physical sciences are valid indicators of 
successful expedition science in other disciplines. General conclusions may be 
possible regarding expedition scientific programs without analysis of every science 
discipline. 
• It is feasible to identify and rank the drivers that led to success in frontier science 
enterprises and to develop a meaningful discourse on the nature and meaning of 
science against a backdrop of geographic discovery. 
 
The research progressed on the basis of these assumptions and development of a deep 
understanding of the scientific activities and outcomes allowed evolution of new knowledge. 
Jordanova confirms the value of initiating research with some theoretical foundation and 
some assumptions in her statement: “No empirical activity is possible without a theory, or at 
least elaborate presuppositions, behind it, even if these remain implicit, perhaps unconscious” 
(Jordanova, 2000, p. 63). 
3.1 Research question in context 
The set of questions that instigated this research were very general in nature and provided an 
initial stimulus to the exploratory literature research. A gap in the literature was identified 
early in the exploratory phase allowing the research to proceed with confidence that the 
outcomes would be of value and interest to Antarctic historians, scientists and general 
readers. The research questions that guided the exploratory research included the following: 
• Did the Discovery meet the stated objectives with respect to scientific research? 
• Did the Discovery achieve as much as it should and could have given the 
significant investment and institutional support it had? 
• Did other expeditions whose first priorities were scientific, not exploratory, 
achieve higher quality or more productive scientific work? 
• Would the outcomes of the science program on Discovery have been different if 
Professor Gregory had retained his scientific directorship?  
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Throughout this work the focus was on successful outcomes of Antarctic science and 
the contexts at the start of the twentieth century were kept in mind to assure the fairest 
possible assessments according to the standards of the time. Mitigating circumstances such as 
the extreme environment, the long polar night, cramped working conditions, no access to 
additional equipment or instruments, limited logistical support for fieldwork and confined 
social landscapes all influenced scientific productivity and quality on pioneering expeditions. 
There is an abundance of relevant resources that constitute the foundation or data being 
analysed, so definition of the scope is an important early step. “Too often beginners state the 
problem much too broadly, the experienced historian realises that historical research must 
involve a penetrating analysis of a limited problem rather than a superficial examination of a 
broad area” (Best and Kahn, 2006, p. 91).  
3.2 Defining the original sources of Discovery’s history 
The data sources under investigation are mostly comprised of documents written, and 
published around a century ago. The publicly available documentary resources constituting 
the data for this research can be classified into five main categories. They are: 
• Private: personal accounts in journals, correspondence and diaries that were never 
intended for publication or public distribution. 
• Official and institutional: formal reports to funding or sponsoring institutions, official 
correspondence, administrative paperwork, meeting minutes, financial records, ships 
log books etc. 
• Scientific: the outcomes of scientific work recorded in formal expedition science 
reports, field or lab notebooks, journal papers, learned society lectures and meetings 
and sometimes as significant elements of expedition narratives. 
• Public: expedition narratives, media reports (in this case primarily newspaper reports), 
lectures (both pre and post expedition), museum exhibits and promotional ephemera 
such as postcards. 
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• Secondary analyses: sources such as monographs, texts, journal articles, lectures and 
media productions (radio, television and electronic resources) that analyse or provide 
commentary on the activities or people engaged in the expeditions of interest. 
 
There is an alternative typology for classification of sources that relates to their proximity 
to the events that are the objects of the research. The division of sources into primary and 
secondary categories is required for discrimination of the importance or value of them to the 
process of inquiry, especially during the data gathering stage of the research. Cohen and 
Manion refer to primary sources as “the lifeblood of historical research” and secondary 
sources as supplemental to the primary data (Cohen and Manion, 1994, p. 50).  They split 
primary sources into two further sub-categories. Firstly, remains or relics that include tools, 
buildings and pictures. These artefacts are examples of material items where the load of 
meaning invested in the artefact increases through time. These remains may have almost 
religious significance for avid followers of the significant figures of Antarctic exploration 
(Hodder, 1994, p. 393). Secondly, items with a direct physical relationship to the events 
being reconstructed include written or oral testimony by the participants and documents such 
as manuscripts, records, letters, memoirs, biography, official publications, newspapers, 
magazines, maps, diagrams, film, log books and research reports (amongst others). 
Secondary sources do not have a direct physical relationship to the events being studied 
and are generated by persons who obtained descriptions from another person or source 
(Cohen and Manion, 1994, p. 50). This means secondary sources are accounts of an event not 
actually witnessed by the reporter (Best and Kahn, 2006, p. 91). Examples of secondary 
sources include monographs, textbooks, reproductions of material, journal articles and 
commentaries on events and chapter two is based on such sources.  
Some sources for this research are facsimile editions of expedition narratives. These 
contain contemporary introductions by editors of the new editions, but are otherwise identical 
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in content to the original publications. In these cases the introductions are viewed as 
secondary sources whilst the facsimile is considered a primary source. The nature of the data 
places this research firmly within the realm of qualitative research. Some numerical 
information is provided as a means of summarizing characteristics of certain expeditions 
only. The sources used in this research provide a rich textual background to the scientific 
work through the numerous personal diaries, journals, annotations in sledging records and in 
personal correspondence.  
3.3 Theoretical framework 
A generalised model of the processes required to complete a research project in the social 
sciences is provided by Punch (1998, p. 42) and is shown at Figure 1. It relates to the 
formation of the research question as well as the manner in which it is investigated. This 
simplified model addresses operations and processes, but fails to address any theoretical 
background in the realm of historiography of the sciences. The remainder of this chapter 
addresses the deficiency through discussion of the theoretical background, then the 
methodology, methods and processes that structured the thesis research. 
 
Figure 1: Elements of the research process (Punch, 1998, Figure 3.1 [a], p.42). 
 
This research was an iterative process similar to that described by Polkinghorne, with 
two operations. First is the collection of evidence and second is analysis and interpretation of 
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that evidence. “Narrative researchers frequently move between these two performances 
choosing further sources of evidence based on the needs derived from interpretations of the 
already gathered evidence” (Polkinghorne, 2007, p. 478). The core of data now exists for this 
research and is comprised of documentary evidence such as scientific reports, official 
expedition narratives, journals of mariners and scientists, and the commentaries upon them. 
In accord with Cole’s belief that: “Historical research reveals the pervasive influence of 
social, political and cultural factors on the conceptual bases of scientific thought” (Cole, 
1997, p. 47) the exploratory research for this project identified social, political and cultural 
factors as contributors to success of expedition science. 
3.3.1 Epistemology and ontology 
Establishing the epistemological basis for the research process provides a philosophical 
underpinning by which to recognise when knowledge or truth is acquired or identified. There 
are three dominant epistemological stances (Crotty, 1998, pp. 8-9). 
• Objectivism is a belief that objects have innate meaning in their own right. It is an 
episteme that articulates with the methods and methodologies of the natural 
sciences. The paradigms of positivism and post-positivism operate within the 
epistemology of objectivism and rely on a process of hypothesis testing through 
experiment or hypothetico-deductive enquiry.  
• Constructionism is the episteme operating on the belief that truth comes into being 
through the engagement between the observer and the world. Subject and object 
both contribute to the construction of meaning. The researcher is the subject and 
the object is the item undergoing analysis. Meaning is constructed rather than 
discovered, and different observers may construct different realities in relation to 
the same object or phenomenon. 
• Subjectivism is the third dominant episteme whereby the object does not 
contribute to the generation of meaning. The act of observing imposes meaning on 
the object that may be inspired by prior experience, beliefs or thoughts. The 
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generation of meaning is therefore completely subjective and totally reliant on the 
observer. 
 
This research operates from a philosophical stance of constructionism. The selection 
of source materials for the research, their classification, their interrelationships and the 
meaning distilled from each item of information carry some subjective bias of the researcher. 
Each item of data also carried some innate meaning derived from its development, whether 
it’s a document, an artefact or a set of scientific data for example. The interplay of those 
elements resulted in the generation of new knowledge throughout this research. Literature 
concerned with epistemology frequently deals with ontology at the same level of theoretical 
perspective. Ontology is the analysis of how we understand what is, compared to what it 
means to know in the case of epistemology (Crotty, 1998, p.10).  
Previous researchers have already undertaken the process of locating, annotating and 
analysing many, or all of the documents that make up the body of the research data. This does 
not diminish the value of this research, as many different versions of the truth are possible in 
history and reevaluation of data from alternative perspectives may lead to a different truth. 
Carr, in his landmark collection of essays entitled What is History? argues that any historic 
analysis will reflect the historian’s bias and cannot be objective, and he argues the case that 
there are multiple versions of truth that may be derived from one set of data. Historical truth 
lies between valueless facts and value judgements (Carr & Evans, 2001, p. 126). Personal 
bias may be introduced at any stage of the research process from framing the research 
question(s), the development of the research framework, selection of data sources, their 
interpretation and the manner of reporting in the final thesis document.  
Hexter argues the case that some forms of historical reporting can be objective but 
these so-called “true narrative explanations” do not provide an adequate historical story. The 
craft of the historian is to relate a story: “truest to the past, determined by the rules of 
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historical evidence and the rhetorical rules of historical storytelling.” Hexter’s example 
demonstrates that an objective version of a history, relating facts only, results in poorly 
written narrative that disregards context and causal factors (Hexter, 1972, p. 34). He agrees 
with Carr that it is essential to know something of the historian’s background when judging a 
particular version of history. He cites an example that demonstrates that, with discrimination, 
it is possible for a reader to find an accurate version of a history untainted by bias of the 
writer (Hexter, 1972, pp. 103-106). 
History is an epistemologically fragile discipline for four reasons. The content of 
history is virtually limitless and a historian cannot recount more than a small portion of it. No 
account of the past can be verified for absolute authenticity. History remains a personal 
construct that is influenced by personal predilections and viewpoints. History is written 
retrospectively by practitioners with knowledge that would have been unavailable at the time 
of the events, and that may distort the interpretation of events (Jenkins & Munslow, 2003, pp. 
13-16). The development of sophisticated thinking about the history of science grew from the 
belief in the nineteenth century that philosophical reflection could provide a general 
framework for that branch of history. Jardine describes the development from the rationalist 
thinking of William Whewell (1794-1866) through to the more recent debate amongst 
Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996), Karl Popper (1902-1994) and others over the mechanisms and 
philosophy of the history of science (Jardine, 2005, pp. 287-296).  
3.3.2 Paradigms 
A paradigm is: “A comprehensive belief system, world view or framework that guides 
research and practice in the field” (Willis, Jost & Nilakanta, 2007, p. 8). Although it is 
appropriate to use multiple methods within a research task, the work becomes meaningless if 
the research processes have no paradigms to provide guiding principles. A suitable paradigm 
developed according to the nature of the research data sources, the nature of the enquiry and 
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the manner in which data was aggregated and ultimately reported. The central paradigm 
informing this research is the “Interpretive” paradigm. It is concerned with interpreting 
events and understanding situations from the participant’s rather than the researcher’s 
perspective. It concentrates on local understanding of events and their cases. Interpretivism is 
a paradigm that operates in social sciences that rejects the research methods and empricism of 
the natural sciences (Willis et al, 2007, p. 54). Willis further adds: “Interpretivism proposes 
that we abandon the search for generalizable truths and laws about human behavior and 
concentrate instead on local understanding” (Willis et al, 2007, p. 61). The interpretive 
paradigm presupposes that knowledge is built with an understanding of the content and it is 
concerned with the creation of meaning. It aims to develop an understanding of how people 
make sense of their experiences by interpreting events, contexts and situations. The core 
belief of interpretivism is that reality is socially constructed, is multilayered and complex and 
the researcher acts as the primary instrument for both data collection and analysis and 
multiple interpretations (all valid) of single events are possible. Interpretive research is richly 
descriptive as it is concerned with process, meaning and understanding. The two threads of 
interpretivism are firstly, that the experience of the senses (empiricism) is not always the best 
way of knowing, and secondly, that the reality that we perceive is always conditioned by our 
experiences and our culture (relativism). Relativism is also known as antifoundationalism as 
there is no secure foundation that humans can use to discriminate truth from untruth (Willis et 
al, pp. 48-49). The use of a case study accords with the interpretivism paradigm and this is 
consistent with the inductive mode of inquiry used throughout the research to construct new 
knowledge. 
3.3.3 The diachronical approach 
The intellectual landscape for academic and professional scientists in the Edwardian era was 
unlike the present and judgements made regarding the conduct of scientific processes on 
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expeditions using current standards may lead to misguided conclusions. This anachronical 
view, that the science of the past ought to be studied in the light of knowledge that we have 
today, is an uncommon historiographical strategy (Kragh, 1987, p. 89). In keeping with the 
interpretivist approach, this research endeavours to make judgements of scientific and other 
matters in the context of the time of the events. This mode of interpretation is labelled the 
diachronical approach in which the historian is:  
…not interested in evaluating the extent to which historical agents behaved rationally 
or whether they produced true knowledge in an absolute of modern sense. The only 
thing that matters is how far the actions of the agent were judged to be rational and 
true by the agent’s own time. 
(Kragh, 1987, p. 90) 
This approach has also been labelled contextualism and described thus: 
For want of a better word, “contextualism” seems to have emerged as a positive label 
for the doctrine that one should study the ideas and theories of a period in terms of the 
scientific knowledge of that period, without regard for what came afterwards.  
(Brush, 1995, p. 219)  
This idealised standpoint intended to generate fair appraisals of the quality of scientific 
activities in a previous era was adopted for this research, but there are some circumstances in 
which the diachronical approach must be abandoned if fair appraisals of the total impact of a 
scientific activity are to be judged. Scientific discoveries that overturned existing paradigms, 
boosted the careers of scientists, opened new lines of inquiry paving the road to other 
significant findings or, that went unrecognised as significant at the time, warrant analysis 
using the broader context of an anachronical approach (Kragh, 1987, p. 106).  
3.4 Methodology 
Methodology is the structure or logic that leads to the choice of methods. It describes the 
elements of research design, data collection, analysis and interpretation. Crotty defines 
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methodology as “…the strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice of 
particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes” 
(Crotty, 1998, p. 3). This research uses multiple, complementary methods as a means to make 
the study more complete. 
3.4.1 History and historiography 
This section clarifies the terms “history” and “historiography” and the nature of the work of 
the historian. Seeking historical truths by gathering, then ordering sets of facts from various 
sources is a fundamental process of historical research. A chronological description of events, 
or themes of an event is inadequate when the intention is to test ideas and develop a new 
interpretation, or a deeper and enhanced understanding of an activity or process. Such a 
chronological (or otherwise arranged) account of events provides the raw material for 
theoretical reflection on the nature of history, in this case frontier polar expedition science. 
The work of the historian is: “To acquire the necessary background-not only to learn the 
dates, names, and key events, but also to master controversies amongst historians about 
whether, how and why those dates, names and events matter” (Tuchman, 1994, p. 314). This 
means finding sufficient reliable, relevant documentary or other evidence related to the topic 
under investigation. This evidence then informs interpretation of causal relationships between 
the factors regulating scientific productivity and quality in the case of this research. Kragh 
distinguishes between two common meanings of the word history. It can describe the actual 
phenomena or events that occurred in the past; that is, objective history, or it may be “the 
analysis of historical actuality, that is, of historical research and its results” (Kragh, 1987, p. 
21). There is also ambiguity in meanings of historiography. One version is: “The term 
“Historiography” has increasingly been used to mean the history of history writing: in effect, 
a branch of intellectual history or a sub branch of the sociology of knowledge (Hexter, 1972, 
p. 15). In this sense it is a form of meta-analysis of prior effort in researching and reporting a 
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topic. It involves investigation of the range of opinion concluded by other historians and the 
justifications for those conclusions. This process is relevant to the literature review process of 
this research but less so to the main body of the research. Hexter adopts the term 
historiography to mean the craft of writing history and/or the yield of such writing considered 
in its rhetorical aspect and Willis states it simply: “All the methods of history research are 
called historiography” (Willis et al, 2007, p. 259). Historiography can therefore be classified 
as one methodology in the hierarchy of elements of research theory, design and practice. The 
ambiguity of definitions of historiography is reviewed in Kragh’s monograph that specifically 
concerns the historiography of science (Kragh, 1987, p. 21). One meaning relates to 
professional writing about history. In this first interpretation the descriptive or objective 
history becomes the object of historiographical analysis that leads to deeper understanding. 
Her second meaning relates to a deeper study that involves the theory or philosophy of 
history, or theoretical reflections on the nature of history. This research adheres to the style of 
historiography promoted by Hexter and Willis and the first of Kragh’s interpretations. 
3.4.2 Inductive reasoning and analytical induction 
The research progressed using inductive processes that accord with the interpretivist 
approach. These processes are characterised by the search for meaning within disconnected 
qualitative data in a manner where interpretations were developed during the analysis (White, 
1978, p. 45). This process accords with inductive reasoning in which new theories or 
concepts are constructed after recognition of patterns within the data. Deductive processes, by 
contrast, are those where a theory or hypothesis is proposed at the outset of the research, then 
a series of controlled experiments are conducted to support, or disprove the hypothesis or 
statement. The methods of deductive processes are generally quantitative in nature and are 
unsuitable for this research. A historical event cannot be repeated although events that have 
common elements or similarities may be compared. 
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Analytical induction is a strategy for generating knowledge, rather than a research 
method. It commences with a question or problem and the purpose of the research is to deal 
with the problem. It involves a series of steps in data analysis that move from raw data 
towards possible answers or solutions and it is a process suitable for qualitative or 
quantitative analysis and may involve a multi-case approach. It is iterative and commonly 
involves the following steps: 
• Data collection 
• Data analysis from which a descriptive or explanatory model is developed 
• Gather data from another case 
• Apply the model to the new case 
• Revise the model if necessary 
• Complete the steps (looking for new cases that challenge the model) 
(Hicks, 1994, p. 88) 
Analytical induction has elements in common with grounded theory (described below). Both 
methods are recursive and both may have ideas, categories or a focus that change during the 
research. New theories or hypotheses may develop out of the research in either case. The 
process of constant comparative method (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 273) may be used in 
either grounded theory or in analytical induction. An important difference is that grounded 
theory does not necessarily progress to new cases whereas it is essential in analytical 
induction to do so.  
3.4.3 Elements of grounded theory 
Grounded theory is a general methodology used in the social sciences and is a distinctive 
research strategy aiming to generate explanatory theory grounded in data that is generally 
qualitative in nature (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, pp. 273-275). Grounded theory analysis refers 
to specific procedures in the analysis of data for the generation of explanatory theory and 
focuses on raising the conceptual level of the data (re-conceptualising). Open coding is one 
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step in the process by which such analysis may be undertaken where each item of data is 
classified in response to the general question “What is this piece of data an example of?” 
Substantive codes emerge and relationships between the items of data can be identified later. 
Emergent patterns can be interpreted to develop theory or explanation. Axial coding is a 
process of consolidating or clustering the items of open-coded data into groups or sub-sets. 
These new groups represent higher conceptual levels of data and explanatory theory might be 
suggested by these aggregations. This approach has been used to good effect in the detailed 
analysis of polar diaries by Mocellin and Suedfeld (1991) to draw conclusions about the 
psychological state of early expeditioners in relation to the level of hardships they endured.  
Grounded theory links data to theory directly, and the data drives the development of that 
theory. The following evaluation criteria were used when generating themes, conclusions or 
theories from the data. 
• Parsimony: does it provide the simplest explanation that is meaningful? 
• Scope: how broad is the theory? Can it be applied to a range of contexts? 
• Overall explanatory power: how much of the situation does the theory explain? 
• Degree of generalization: does at least some of the theory seem helpful when applied 
to similar situations? 
• Logical internal consistency: does it hang together? 
(Willis et al, 2007, p. 307)  
Deeper understanding of the events under analysis during this research has been made 
possible by application of a system of classification to items of data in a routine of open, then 
axial coding. One process derived from grounded theory that has been applied during this 
research is the constant comparative method, in which steps relate directly to the routines of 
open coding and axial coding. The method has six steps and is recursive: Start data 
collection, organise data into units, associate similar units and categorise, look for links, 
associations and relationships between categories, develop broader, more general 
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explanations from the categories and their relationships, then repeat the routine (Willis et al, 
2007, pp. 306-307). 
3.4.4 The unit of analysis 
Within the main body of this research the unit of analysis that defined the open coding 
categories was an event that that constituted part of the cycle of scientific research on the 
expedition. Examples included pre-expedition arrangements and preparations, the 
performance of scientific operations and the actions of post-expedition analysis then 
publication. They were as broad as the action of fundraising, or as specific as the operation of 
taking magnetic readings during a sledge journey. They all contributed to the ultimate 
scientific outcomes. Although the focus was on Discovery the other expeditions of the era on 
which notable magnetic science work was identified were also investigated throughout the 
research. These expeditions of the era are tabulated in Appendix I and cover the period 
between 1897 and 1914. Twelve categories of indicators of scientific achievement were 
identified during the exploratory research (see Section 2.7) and coding of documentary 
evidence proceeded accordingly. Examples from scientific disciplines other than terrestrial 
magnetism were also used to demonstrate particular points.  
3.5 Methods 
Methods are the operations used to collect and analyse data. Their selection depends on the 
types of data being analysed and the type of knowledge generation anticipated. They are the 
pragmatic tools utilised in the collection and analysis of data. Note that: “History does not 
operate in a closed system such as may be created in the physical science laboratory. The 
historian cannot control the conditions of observation nor manipulate the significant 
variables” (Best and Kahn, 2006, p. 87).   
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Although much of the subject matter of this research is the result of scientific 
research, the methods common to the natural sciences are unsuitable for research in the social 
sciences. This research is qualitative in nature and is concerned with the collection and 
analysis of the documentary evidence and sources relating to the work of Antarctic 
expeditions under review. The relationships between the theoretical framework and the 
methods and process of the research are shown in Table 1 that represents the manner in which 
the elements of epistemology, theoretical perspective, methodology, methods and processes 
inform one another (Crotty, 1998, pp. 4-6). 
 
Epistemology Paradigm Methodologies Methods Processes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constructionism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interpretivism 
 
Historiography 
 
 
 
Grounded theor 
 
 
 
Analytical 
induction 
 
 
 
Inductive 
reasoning 
Documentary 
analysis 
 
 
Open and axial 
coding 
 
 
Constant 
comparative 
method 
 
 
Interpretive 
Case Study 
 
 
Writing as 
inquiry 
 
 
 
Biography 
Define 
questions 
Identification 
of data sources 
Data collection 
Historical 
criticism 
Development 
of themes, 
theories or 
conclusions 
Testing 
themes, 
theories or 
conclusions 
 
Table 1: The theoretical research framework demonstrating the relationships between theory and process. 
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3.5.1 Documentary analysis 
The central task of this research involved accessing, recording and analysing the contents of 
numerous items of documentary evidence. The richness of the descriptions and analyses of 
events and activities related to the scientific activities provided abundant material for 
analysis. Particular note was taken of sources grounded in the setting (or context), reported 
successful scientific outcomes, demonstrated challenges encountered in the process, or that 
explained failure. 
The exploratory research revealed official scientific reports as rich sources of 
knowledge related to elements of the success of expedition activities, but the scientific 
reporting is objective in nature and relates facts with little context. There are some exceptions 
where the work of other expeditions is reviewed in introductory chapters of reports. The 
official narratives are generally chronologically arranged lists of activities and events that 
rarely describe the social landscapes of expedition life. They have generally been published 
as popular literature soon after the expedition’s completion and therefore neglect conclusions 
from the scientific work, as scientific results generally require extensive analysis before 
conclusions can be made and published, in many instances years after the expedition. Within 
the first-hand accounts in personal journals, diaries, letters and even column notes in 
logbooks, the rich textures of the social landscapes can be found and interpreted. As the 
events being analysed occurred around a century ago there are no survivors of these 
expeditions to interview although there are rare examples of oral histories relevant to this 
work like the interviews between the author Lennard Bickel and Webb from the AAE (Webb, 
1975). The literature review itself was an element of the research process. It functioned to 
position the research in the context of similar works and significantly, it represented the 
commencement of data location and gathering, and the discrimination of the relevance of the 
sources to the central questions under analysis. 
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3.5.2 Interpretive case study 
Although this research used one expedition as a case study, comparison against elements of 
other expeditions enhanced the authenticity of conclusions. Merriam gives one interpretation 
of how a historical case study might be characterised: 
This type of research employs techniques common to historiography-in particular the 
use of primary source materials. Historical case studies may involve more than a 
chronological history of an event…To understand an event and apply one’s 
knowledge to present practice means knowing the context of the event, the 
assumptions behind it, and perhaps the event’s impact on the institution and 
participants.   
(Merriam, 1998, p. 24)  
An alternate classification of methods is based on the way in which the data is used. 
The “interpretive case study” is a method to gather and analyse thick data sources. Such 
studies go further than descriptive studies by developing conceptual categories, by 
demonstrating support or challenging theoretical assumptions held prior to the data gathering 
(Merriam, 1998, p. 28). The focus is on understanding the intricacies of a particular situation, 
setting, organisation, culture or individual, but that local understanding must be related to 
prevailing theories or models. Merriam further defines case study as: “An examination of a 
specific phenomenon such as a program, an event, a person, a process, an institution, or a 
social group” (Merriam, 1998, p. 9). Characteristics of the case study central to this research 
are that the data is thick and descriptive, that the processes involved are inductive and 
generalizations, concepts and theories emerge from examination and analysis of the data.  
Case study is suitable for development of a full, rich understanding of the context of 
the study, based on Max Weber’s (1864-1920) concept of verstehen in the social sciences 
(Willis et al, 2007, p. 240). This deep understanding is generally attributed to participant 
observation during social science research (Platt, 1985. p. 448) but this research had a goal of 
developing deep understanding of events (the objects of research) rather than understanding 
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responses of study participants. There is some cross case analysis in this research for 
assessment of what acceptable levels of scientific performance were in the era under 
investigation. This research is essentially an interpretive case study that uses coding tools 
borrowed from grounded theory as a mechanism to keep processes of documentary analysis 
systematic. 
3.5.3 Writing as inquiry 
Writing as a process can allow reflection on ideas that develop during analysis. Writing as a 
method in research is virtuous: “Through writing, we usually process what we have 
discovered in the archives and, as we write, both generate new questions and see the holes in 
our research thus far” (Curthoys and McGrath, 2009, p. 48). It is an iterative process that is 
reflective in nature and allows development of themes as patterns become evident within the 
data. Placing thoughts to paper provides the substance for review and reflection and leads to 
clarity of argument. Writing as a method can lead directly to new knowledge: “Writing is also 
a way of ‘Knowing’-a method of discovery and analysis. By writing in different ways, we 
discover new aspects of our topic and our relationship to it. Form and content are 
inseparable” (Richardson, 1994, p. 516). Writing for different audiences, for example using 
the same material for a thesis chapter, a journal article, a magazine article or a conference 
presentation can bring out different elements of the topic and clarify understanding of the 
important features of the matter under analysis. Richardson provides practical guidance 
regarding conventions, formats and practice in the process of writing in the social sciences 
(1994, pp. 519-524) that add further utility to writing as a research method. 
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3.6 Other Considerations 
3.6.1 Historical criticism  
Historical criticism is the essential process of evaluating the worth of source material of data. 
Cohen and Manion describe the process for the historical researcher thus: “Evaluation of 
historical data and information is often referred to as historical criticism and the reliable data 
yielded by the process are known as historical evidence” (Cohen and Manion, 1994, p. 52). It 
falls into two main categories: external criticism is the process whereby the data is checked 
for authenticity while internal criticism is the process of determining the accuracy and worth 
of the data (Cohen and Manion, 1994, pp. 52-53). During data gathering for this research the 
criteria of authenticity and meaning were considered when locating potential sources and 
their contribution (Scott, 1990, pp. 19-28). This study referenced multiple sources describing 
single events wherever possible to promote reliability of facts, to add value to interpretations 
and to ensure defensibility of conclusions.  
3.6.2 Feasibility 
Research activity into the history of science must be informed by consideration of questions 
regarding the suitability of the researcher to the task. Is a scientist well equipped to undertake 
a rigorous piece of historical research and, is it necessary for the researcher working in the 
realm of the history of science to have any scientific training? Brush addresses these 
questions in depth concluding that: 
Scientists should write history of science if they are willing to acquire the skills and 
background knowledge of the historian of science; and the non-scientist historians 
should write history of science if they are willing to learn enough about science to 
understand what they are going to write about.  
(Brush, 1995, p. 215) 
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Additional threats to the authenticity of conclusions of this, and any other historical research 
included documents in languages other than English (such as the Gauss [German], Antarctic 
[Swedish] and Pourquoi-pas? [French] expeditions), limited access to materials in private 
collections, incomplete records, unfound but relevant documents and finally documents 
censored or sanitised to avoid embarrassment by the author or family. The author’s topic 
knowledge and familiarity with the range of relevant resources was critical in determining 
representative samples and those that were likely to yield new knowledge. Every effort has 
been taken to overcome risks presented by these factors and to ensure as much relevant 
material has been acquired within the constraints of the period of candidature. In addition, the 
work of the historian may not necessarily be entirely systematic as it is probable that new 
lines of enquiry open up throughout the research process and new resources may 
unexpectedly come to the attention of the historian also. Advantage has been taken of 
opportunities presented in this manner. 
3.6.3 Objectivity 
This research aims to create a modern reconstruction or re-interpretation of past events. 
Genuine objectivity is not possible due to bias of the researcher, bias of prior commentators 
and authors, the variable nature of the truth in history and the impossibility of confirming 
events as fact when participants are long dead. Triangulation of sources and cross-referencing 
personal accounts of events are strategies that assist arrival at the most authentic version of 
the truth of an event possible. Best and Kahn warn that a risk of historical research is “The 
tendency to accept the truth of a statement if several observers agree” (2006, p. 98). 
Reiteration of published errors of fact, or unsubstantiated opinion in the realm of Antarctic 
history may be due to the proliferation of publications that feed the public fascination with 
heroic deeds and figures. There are also examples among the official expedition narratives 
where bias is introduced through omission or misleading versions of events. 
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3.6.4 Authenticity 
There are four possible versions of history that may be extracted from the accessible sources 
for this dissertation and caution must be used when analysing their significance and veracity. 
They are: 
• Official or institutional history: formal reports to funding or sponsoring institutions, 
official correspondence, administrative paperwork, meeting minutes, financial records 
and the like.  
• Public history: expedition narratives, media reports (in this case primarily newspaper 
reports), lectures (both pre and post expedition) and promotional ephemera such as 
postcards. 
• Private history: personal accounts in journals, correspondence and diaries, not 
intended for publication. 
• Scientific history: the outcomes of scientific work recorded in formal expedition 
science reports, field or lab notebooks, journal papers, learned society lectures and 
meetings and sometimes as significant elements of expedition narratives.  
 
The criteria of authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning were considered 
when analysing the potential contribution of sources (Scott, 1990, pp. 19-35). This study used 
multiple data sources wherever possible to ensure data authenticity and robust conclusions. 
An additional element promoting authenticity is the first hand experience of the candidate in 
polar scientific fieldwork, oceanography between Tasmania and Antarctica and square-rig 
sailing that combine to provide an acute contextual understanding of the subject matter of the 
research. 
3.7 Models of research and scaffolding 
Many accounts of expeditions from the late Victorian and Edwardian era of Antarctic 
exploration have simple, chronologically sequential, descriptive narratives. Others take a 
biographical approach and focus on key protagonists such as Scott or Shackleton. This 
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research takes a fresh approach through deep analysis of scientific activities of expeditions 
and their intellectual and physical output. Although the core chapters are still related in a 
chronological sequence (to avoid a haphazard narrative style) the research is organised 
around investigation of the set of success drivers of the science programs. The analysis was 
inspired by models of the development of colonial science proposed by Basalla (1967) and 
MacLeod (1982). Basalla proposes a simple model describing three stages in the 
development of science in colonies (metropolitan, colonial then independent) with each 
representing a greater degree of autonomy (Basalla, 1967, p. 611). Antarctic science in the 
late Victorian and Edwardian eras mimics the first two stages. The first is characterised by 
collection and description. The second sees the emergence of an expanded range of scientific 
activities that eventually coincides with the spectrum of disciplines in the countries that are 
supporting the frontier scientific endeavours. The third phase is the emergence and 
consolidation of an independent colonial scientific culture (Basalla, 1967, pp. 613-617). 
MacLeod expands Basalla’s model (considered simplistic) to a five-phase model developed 
with consideration of social and political influences (MacLeod, 1982, pp. 7-14). The early 
twentieth century fits into Macleod’s “Efficient Imperial Science” phase characterised by 
scientific activities related to resource extraction at the periphery (that is, the colonies or 
Antarctica) and theoretical science seated firmly in the metropolis. Inkster (1985) reviews the 
models and distinguishes between three levels of support for scientific enterprise. These 
models were developed and applied in another thesis in the realm of history of science that 
analysed the early development of astronomy in colonial New South Wales: 
..first, the scientific superstructure which involves aspects such as the availability of 
trained scientists, laboratories, instruments and research programmes; secondly, the 
socio-economic base which provides the economic capability of supporting science 
given the existence of a more or less stable society; and thirdly, in between these two 
levels, and mediating them, is the cultural/institutional infrastructure.  
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(Saunders, 1990, p. 3) 
There are parallels between Antarctic expedition science and science in remote 
developing colonies. The isolation of the Antarctic expeditions far from the control of the 
institutional sponsors is analogous to the new colony of New South Wales a century earlier, 
in a time when an official communication and response by letter could take twelve months. 
Antarctic science in the Edwardian era differs from colonial science model in respect of the 
emergence of colonial scientists that ultimately break away from central control as no 
permanent colonial settlements were established in Antarctica until the 1950’s.  
An additional model for this research was provided by Endersby’s treatment of the 
nature of Imperial science (Endersby, 2008). He makes a thorough analysis of the elements of 
frontier science by close investigation of the actual procedures, processes and methods of 
botany in the metropolis (Kew Gardens) and at the periphery (Australia and New Zealand). 
This model stresses the maintenance of the intellectual analysis at a central location and the 
specimen and data collecting in the field, at the periphery. Control by the institutional 
arrangements or powerful figures, in this case Joseph Dalton Hooker (1817-1911), 
perpetuates the intellectual divide between metropolis and periphery (Endersby, 2009). The 
new knowledge generated by this research in relation to Antarctic science in the late 
Victorian and Edwardian eras was developed through detailed analysis of the scientific work 
at sea and on the ice following Enderby’s model.  
Many of the drivers of scientific outcomes are closely interrelated in most examples 
making their compartmentalisation within the thesis complex. One example is the difficulty 
separating the institutional support from the RN, RS, RGS and British Government from the 
task of arranging the funding of the Discovery. There were elements of power and control, 
national pride, territorial aspirations, conflicting agendas of key figures and the practical 
questions of settling on agreed expedition objectives. These elements were overlaid by the 
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themes of how preparations for the expedition progressed and how and why staff were 
recruited. In historical research: 
Often it is more difficult to discern patterns in qualitative data than in quantitative 
data, but qualitative data are richer: They are more likely to be meaning-ful(l)-more 
likely to let a researcher see how a social world seemed and felt to a variety of its 
members. 
(Tuchman, 1994, p. 312) 
The product of this research is in narrative form. Studies of events and activities on 
the Discovery have been used as lenses to focus on the elements of interest that address the 
research question. Presention of research findings in themes and typologies is consistent with 
scholarship using the interpretive paradigm. The narrative form also allows clarity to ensure 
unambiguous and meaningful interpretation of the work by readers that may not have a deep 
knowledge of the subject matter.  
In summary, the body of this research analyses the operations and outcomes of the 
scientific programs in the discipline of terrestrial magnetism on the Discovery. Exploratory 
research was undertaken that raised doubt about whether the Discovery expedition achieved 
the scientific quality and productivity that it could, and should have, given the background 
from which the enterprise evolved. The research design is based on inductive processes and 
the theoretical framework follows the episteme of constructionism and the interpretivist 
paradigm. The methodology of historiography using techniques of analytical induction and 
inductive reasoning were applied research methods included documentary analysis, open and 
axial coding, constant comparative method, interpretive case study, writing as inquiry, and 
biography. The data sources are primarily documentary in nature and focus on publicly 
available reports and narratives related to the science programs of the expeditions.  
The initial data collection, then analysis was guided by the themes of the drivers of 
scientific success that were developed during the exploratory research and inspired by models 
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related to developments in colonial Imperial science. The thesis narrative is the primary 
source of evidence demonstrating that the candidate has undertaken meaningful and effective 
research, a learning process has occurred, new knowledge has evolved and mastery of the 
subject matter has been achieved. This chapter is evidence of the research’s theoretical 
foundation and the rigor and integrity of its processes. The following chapter provides an 
overview of the historic, cultural and scientific contexts when the preparations for Discovery 
commenced, then describes the start of expedition planning and organisation. 
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Chapter 4: Historic and cultural contexts  
The scientific, historic and cultural landscapes of the late Victorian era influenced the ways in 
which science was planned and performed on the Discovery expedition. The (separate) 
instructions to the expedition commander and the director of the civilian scientific staff set 
practical logistical agendas and benchmarks for the ultimate assessment of outcomes. 
Comprehension of the social and cultural contexts in Britain at the close of the nineteenth 
century inform the understanding of motivations and processes in the expedition’s evolution. 
Markham’s extensive memoirs (Markham & Holland, 1986), detailed personal notes 
(Markham, n.d.b; Markham, n.d.g) and correspondence recall the personal and institutional 
challenges he faced in his quest to launch the new era of Antarctic exploration that resulted 
from the resolution of the 1895 World Geographical Congress (Keltie & Mill, 1895).  
4.1 Contexts 
4.1.1 Empire 
At the end of the nineteenth century Britain ruled large tracts of the known planet. The 
Empire extended over a quarter of the world’s land surface and in the twelve years prior to 
1899, Great Britain had territories equal to twenty four times its own area. Eighteen ninety 
seven was the jubilee year for Queen Victoria and the public rejoicing peaked on 22 June 
when eleven colonial premiers joined millions of happy people who cheered and waved “in 
an ecstasy of love and pride” at the procession of “cavalry from every quarter of the globe” 
that was followed by the Queen herself (Tuchman, 1966, pp. 54-56). The turn of the century 
marked “The end of the most hope-filled, change-filled, progressive, busiest and richest 
century the world had ever known” (Tuchman, 1966, p. 58). The German Krupp armaments 
manufacturing capability was swelling (Tuchman 1966, p. 229) and the Russian Tsar, 
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realising that the arms race was unaffordable and could not be won by Russia, was trying to 
negotiate a European pact to prevent, or at least slow the pace of competing arms production. 
International arms limitation talks during the first years of the new century failed to prevent 
the inevitable conflict in Europe. 
4.1.2 Class and the rise of socialism  
Queen Victoria’s death on 24 January 1901 ushered in a new, less conservative era amongst 
the sporting set, of which the Prince of Wales, (crowned King Edward VII in 1902), was a 
central figure. Within the two hundred families that had been governing England for 
generations everyone knew, or was related to one another. The King’s social group was 
considered vulgar by some intensely class conscious, long established families (Tuchman, 
1966, pp. 19-20). The upper classes partied but the lower classes were despondent. Britain 
had been suffering economic depression during the 1890’s. The first great dockworkers strike 
of 1899 threatened international trade and income to the wealthy as did competition from 
abroad that threatened British supremacy in foreign commerce (Tuchman, 1966, p. 352).  
Social unrest was characterised by three factions: “Trade Unionists wanted a legal right to 
strike, Socialists wanted to nationalise property and Anarchists wanted to abolish it” 
(Tuchman, 1966, pp. 4-5).  
4.1.3 Industrial and scientific revolution 
The nineteenth century was a time of rapid scientific, intellectual and technological 
developments and those relating directly to the preparations and operations of the Discovery 
are reviewed here. The capability and safety of ships bound for polar regions in particular 
was advanced by the invention and patenting of the screw propeller in 1835 (Kemp, 1979, p. 
671). Metallurgy and the evolution of reliable and powerful steam power were legacies of the 
industrial revolution that characterised nineteenth century Britain. As an example, the Erebus 
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and Terror were fitted with steam locomotive engines of about 20 horsepower for Franklin’s 
(1845) Northwest Passage expedition (Rondeau, 2010).  
Publication of the theory of natural selection as a mechanism of evolutionary change 
developed separately by Charles Darwin (1809-1892) and Alfred Russell Wallace (1823-
1913) brought about a paradigm shift for most of the British population where the 
immutability of species and divine creation were replaced by an understanding of the 
antiquity of the earth. The natural sciences started to shift away from mere cataloguing and 
description, and: “Science took away belief in God and certainty in a scheme of things…” 
(Tuchman, 1966, p. xiv). The life works of the eminent geologist Charles Lyell (1797-1875) 
culminated in publication of Principles of Geology: An Attempt to Explain the Former 
Changes of the Earth's Surface by Reference to Causes now in Operation in 1830 and its 
subsequent twelve editions, the last being published posthumously in 1876. Lyell’s works 
explained many elements of earth’s prehistory including glacial epochs, and founded the 
nomenclature for describing the recognizable phases of development in the fabric of the 
geological landscape and the nomenclature of stratigraphy still in use by geologists. Lyell 
affirmed the conclusions of Darwin (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1911). Ferrar, the geologist to 
the Discovery expedition, would have studied the works of Lyell in great detail during his 
studies in Cambridge (New Zealand Journal of Science and Technology, 1932).  
The American professor, Samuel Morse (1791-1872) invented the telegraph in 1837 
and his “Morse Code” the following year. By the 1860’s America had a transcontinental 
service. Expedition organisation and logistics were influenced by the utility of telegraph that 
allowed communication between Britain and the antipodes via overland and undersea cables 
installed progressively after 1866 (Abbot & Glass, 2010). Correspondence between Markham 
in London and Scott in Christchurch was possible, making the reach of control from the 
metropolis far greater than for expeditions prior to the Challenger of 1872.  
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The 1890’s ended a period of ferment in industrial and scientific developments. 
Britons: “…entered the twentieth century with his capacities in transportation, 
communication, production, manufacture and weaponry multiplied a thousandfold by the 
energy of machines” (Tuchman, 1966, p. xiv). Scientific instrumentation improved during the 
nineteenth century through better design, metallurgy and machining. The state of practical 
and theoretical knowledge in the science of terrestrial magnetism follows at section 4.3. 
4.1.4 Royal Navy 
The RN was an instrument of Empire and had many subsidiary duties to fulfill besides 
defense. Constant readiness to go anywhere and do anything was a basic requirement of the 
service but its pre-eminence was fading in strategic importance during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The long history of involvement in polar exploration by the RN, 
including the early scientific voyages of Edmund Halley (1656-1742) and Cook has been 
described in detail elsewhere (Berton, 1988; Coleman, 2006; Lewis-Jones, 2006). There had 
been a half-century gap since Ross commanded the most recent official RN (Erebus and 
Terror, 1839-43) expedition to the Antarctic. Subsequently Franklin became ice bound and 
perished with the same ships in his 1845-1848 attempt to locate and traverse the Northwest 
Passage. Of the numerous different expeditions sent to search for, or resupply Franklin’s lost 
expedition “…slightly more than half the maritime and overland search expeditions, and all 
of the supply expeditions, were planned and executed by one authority -the Admiralty” 
(Gillies Ross, 2004). Headland states: “Owing to the consequences of this expedition, and the 
Crimean War (1845-56), British naval interest in polar exploration diminished until later in 
the 19th Century” (Headland, 2009, p. 169). George Strong Nares’ (1831-1915) Challenger 
expedition of 1872-1876 circumnavigated the globe in high southern latitudes and crossed the 
Antarctic Circle, but it was a purely scientific voyage and was not intended to undertake 
Antarctic exploration. It was a RN expedition, but sponsored by the RS (Bryan, 2011, p. 
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117). It established oceanography as a discrete scientific discipline. Nares was recalled early, 
and left that expedition in Hong Kong to lead the (H.M.S.) Discovery (ex Bloodhound, an 
earlier vessel than S.S. Discovery of 1901) and Alert North Polar expedition of 1875-76, 
another purely navy enterprise (Headland, 2009, p. 201). With no naval conflicts during the 
second half of the nineteenth century the RN languished and lost form. In Markham’s plea for 
the renewal of Antarctic exploration he stated “Antarctic exploration has hitherto been 
conducted by the Navy, and belongs to it by right of noble work well performed during more 
than a century” (Markham, 1898a, p. 1). When the Discovery expedition embarked it was a 
private concern and Markham billed himself as the “Managing Owner” in his capacity as 
President of the RGS, and the ship was registered as a yacht in his name (Bryan, 2011, p. 
151). The majority of the officers and crew were lent to the expedition by the RN and 
remained on the payroll (Erskine, 1969). Naval involvement in exploration was not unique to 
Britain. A thorough description of a similar historic involvement by the American Navy in 
exploration, with a focus on Wilkes’ United States Exploring Expedition to the Antarctic and 
Pacific regions (1838-42) is detailed by Littlehales (1899). Dumont d’Urville’s expedition of 
1837-1840 was a naval enterprise intended to bring cause for self-congratulation to the 
French Navy and render services to science (Rosenman, 1992, p. 2).  
In the last decade of the nineteenth century Admiral Jackie Fisher (1841-1920) 
commenced a program of renewal for the Navy. His term was marked by changes in attitude, 
less time was devoted to ceremonial aspects and obsessive polishing, and more energy was 
put towards training with a renewed emphasis on speed, fighting efficiency and tactics as 
Fisher believed in peace though deterrence. Additionally there were numerous organisational 
changes in the navy and the culture of  “entrenched hierarchy that smothered any spark of 
initiative” was dismantled gradually. Promotion according to merit rather than length of 
service became possible. Fisher’s reform of the Navy as a world force culminated in 
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construction of massive, steel hulled dreadnoughts with steam turbine power after he became 
First Sea Lord in 1904 (Snow, 2011). Sailing ships were already obsolete in the Navy in 
terms of speed, manoeuvrability and firepower and timber hulled sailing ships were an 
anachronism (Barnett, 2010). In terms of social status, the Navy was a respectable career, but 
it was, like the clergy, for the less wealthy (Tuchman, 1966, p. 13).    
4.2 Scientific paradigms at the end of the Victorian era 
The scientific activities of interest in this research emerged as legacies of RN exploratory and 
scientific voyages during the two centuries prior to 1900. Ship-based science as an adjunct to 
voyages of exploration was the normal model for the RN during times of peace when 
hydrographic survey was the most meaningful employment for vessels and their crew that 
were otherwise idle.  Under Francis Beaufort’s (1774-1857) leadership as Admiralty 
hydrographer from 1829, the incidence of surveying expeditions increased as never before, 
establishing the paradigm of the RN as leaders in exploration, science and survey. A key 
difference between the British expeditions and those of the French and American navies was 
the recruitment of scientific staff. The British Admiralty encouraged dual roles of surgeons 
and surgeon’s assistants to act as naturalists and it was uncommon to have specialist scientific 
staff who were not members of the crew. In contrast (during the nineteenth century) the 
French and American navies commonly had specialist botanists, geologists and zoologists 
(Goodman, 2005, p. 9).  
Some well-known examples of exploration are also the most significant scientifically. 
These include the voyages of Halley, whose research concerned terrestrial magnetism and the 
determination of longitude (HMS Paramour, 1698-99). The three famous voyages of Cook 
followed: firstly to observe the 1769 transit of Venus (HMB Endeavour 1768-71), secondly 
to search for the unknown southern continent (HMS Resolution and HMS Adventure, 1772-
75) and finally to search for the North-West passage (HMS Resolution and HMS Discovery, 
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1776-80). Cook’s high regard by the Victorian public is demonstrated by Ross’s reference to 
him as “our great navigator” knowing that no further explanation was necessary, as all 
readers of the narrative would know to whom he referred (Ross, 1847, Volume I, p. 183). 
Ross took part in a privately funded voyage to the Arctic during which he undertook 
magnetic survey work in the region of the north magnetic pole serving under his uncle, John 
Ross (1777-1856) in the steam powered Victory. He was an obvious choice for the HMS 
Erebus and HMS Terror Antarctic campaign (Berton, 1988, p. 114) whose objective was to 
sail to the region of the south magnetic pole. The scientific harvest was great in the physical 
and natural sciences, and Hooker, assistant surgeon and botanist and Robert McCormick 
(1800-1890), surgeon and naturalist, carried out fieldwork that established their reputations as 
natural philosophers (Erskine, 2009, p. 27). There was a 30-year break from Antarctic 
exploration before Nares’ HMS Challenger expedition (1872-76) but many commercial 
voyages touched on the Antarctic Circle in their search for whaling and sealing grounds in 
the nineteenth century. The Norwegian whaling voyage of Svend Foyn’s (1809-1894) 
Antarctic for example, nudged into the Ross Sea and made a landing at Cape Adare in 
January 1895 (Borchgrevink, 1895). 
4.2.1 Imperial contributions to scientific operations 
The spread of the British Empire in the nineteenth century was vast. Without the Empire, 
access to the natural world beyond Britain’s shores would have been very limited for 
naturalists (Endersby, 2008, p. 312). Wherever RN exploring expeditions travelled there were 
friendly ports for resupply and provision of support for scientific enterprises. Replacement of 
sailors who were unfit, who didn’t fit in socially, were unenthusiastic or who had perished 
was another reason to visit ports that were part of the Empire, or were regularly visited by RN 
vessels. On the first Franklin Arctic expedition of 1819-1822 shelter, food, equipment, local 
knowledge and local manpower were all supplied by representatives of the Hudson’s Bay 
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Company that controlled trading outposts in the Canadian Arctic. Strangely, for a RN 
expedition, this odyssey was mostly an overland trek in the interests of exploration and 
science. Physical observation instructions obliged Franklin to:  
Not neglect any opportunity of observing and noting down the dip and variation of the 
magnetic needle, and the intensity of the magnetic force; and should take particular 
notice of whether any, and what kind or degree of, influence the Aurora Borealis 
might appear to exert on the magnetic needle… 
(Franklin, 1823, p. 2) 
These were sophisticated observations for an overland party on the move in the high Arctic. 
Further evidence of the role of Empire in expedition logistics and science is demonstrated by 
the local support provided to the expedition of Ross in Cape Town, en route to the Antarctic. 
The main building of the Cape Observatory was commenced in 1825 and functional by 1830, 
but it was not until Ross’s visit in 1840 that the magnetic observatory was established. Ross 
was subsequently well received at Hobart, Van Diemen’s Land (now Tasmania) by Franklin, 
who arranged convict labour to construct a magnetic observatory at “Rossbank” within the 
grounds of the current Governor’s residence (Savours & McConnell, 1982). The scene is 
recorded by the artist Thomas Bock (1790-1855) who portrayed Captains Franklin, Ross and 
Crozier together amid the array of magnetic instruments in the rudimentary observatory 
(Image 1).  
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Image 1: Rossbank Observatory, Hobarton by Thomas Bock (1842). Captains Ross, Crozier and Franklin in 
foreground with observatory buildings in background and a selection of magnetic survey instruments on 
pedestals and tree stumps. Reproduced with permission of the Tasmanian Museum & Art Gallery, Hobart, 
Australia (AG241). 
 
4.2.2 Scientific staffing on expeditions 
Prior to the twentieth century it was normal for scientific work on RN expeditions to be 
performed by officers, and scientists who were wealthy gentleman. Science as a profession 
was barely coming into existence, as explained by Endersby: “…during the first few decades 
of Victoria’s reign, British men of science still saw themselves as disinterested gentlemen, 
not as scientific tradesmen, much less as servants of centralised government, as were their 
French colleagues” (Endersby, 2008, p. 2). Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries science and scientists were adjuncts to voyages, not the rationale for them, except in 
the rarest cases. Edmund Halley’s Paramour voyages (1698-99) were mounted in the cause 
of magnetic science. Halley, acting as commander and expedition leader had poor leadership 
qualities, and after this experience the RN never allowed a civilian to take command of one 
of their vessels (Fulford, Lee & Kitson, 2004, p. 162). 
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The best known example of the gentleman scientist was the natural philosopher 
Joseph Banks (1743-1820), who travelled with Cook to Tahiti for the transit of Venus of 
1769 and beyond to New Zealand and Australia. Banks “focused his money and influence on 
turning the voyage into a grand scientific adventure-with stunning results” (Erskine, 2009, p. 
17). Cook’s subsequent Resolution and Adventure expedition (1772-1775) carried the civilian 
naturalists Johann Reinhold Forster (1729-1798) and his son, also Johann, but known as 
Georg (1754-1794) in place of Banks, after a famous falling-out between Banks and Cook. 
Forster was paid for this service and was not part of the ship’s crew (Forster & Hoare, 1982, 
pp. 48-52). Ross’s Erebus and Terror expedition was based on a program of inquiry into the 
physical sciences and, in line with normal practice, a naturalist was part of the crew. Hooker 
joined as assistant surgeon and botanist then later, as a fellow of the RS and through his 
membership of the Joint Committee that managed the affairs of the Discovery expedition, had 
the chance to influence the development of the scientific program for that expedition. In 1846 
Captain Owen Stanley (1811-1850) of HMS Rattlesnake made preparations for a voyage of 
exploration and survey of northern Australia and New Guinea. He had a personal interest in 
science and was a fellow of the Royal Astronomical Society, the RGS and the RS (Goodman, 
2005, p. 15). The naturalists on the expedition were John MacGillivray (1821-1867) and 
Thomas Huxley (1825-1895). MacGillivray was a (civilian) naturalist and Huxley was the 
assistant surgeon to the ship. Huxley and Hooker both had eminent post-voyage scientific 
careers and influenced the thinking of Darwin during development of his ideas about natural 
section.  
The Challenger expedition of 1872-76 represented a turning point in RN scientific 
enterprises. Not only was it the first purely scientific expedition since Halley’s Paramour 
(Conrad, 1999, p. 67), it was the first to have a scientific scholar as the director of a dedicated 
civilian scientific team of naturalists, a chemist and an artist. Thompson, the director and 
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promoter of the expedition was a professor of natural history. A committee of the RS selected 
the six civilian scientists who worked with ships officers in the performance of scientific 
enquiry in physical oceanography. The navy considered that regular training of officers made 
them fit to perform the duties of deep sea sounding and the collection of water and sediment 
samples, as well as the routine meteorological, magnetic and navigational observations (Jones 
& Jones, 1992, p. 217). Steam propulsion facilitated probing the ocean depths at specified 
sampling points along latitudinal or longitudinal transects by allowing the ship to hold 
station. Detailed, serial measurement of deep ocean temperatures allowed latitudinal or 
longitudinal cross sections, or vertical profiles of oceanic basins. The expenditure on the 
expedition was recouped by the discovery of the phosphate deposits of Christmas Island by 
the oceanographer Murray (Jones & Jones, 1992, pp. 216-235).  Later in life Murray was a 
strong supporter and advocate for Markham’s Antarctic expedition, being one of the key 
delegates at the 1898 RS meeting where he spoke on the benefits of such an expedition.     
These men operated within the paradigm of RN sponsored science on exploratory 
voyages in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although science was often incidental 
and scientific activities relied on the interest and goodwill of the commanding officer, many 
of these well-salted natural philosophers (Darwin, Huxley, Hooker and MacGillivray) proved 
their scientific credentials and became influential fellows of the RS and other august bodies. 
Their examples set the model for polar frontier science at the turn of the twentieth century.  
4.2.3 Metropolitan vs. Colonial (Centre and periphery) science 
Antarctic science around 1900 can be described in terms of the model proposed by Basalla 
describing the diffusion of western science introduced at Section 3.7. His model represents 
three phases in the evolution of scientific practice at the periphery (away from Western 
Europe) and the progress towards independent scientific cultures in remote locations. It 
describes how western science was introduced to Eastern Europe, North and South America, 
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India, Australia, China, Japan and Africa. Aside from the element of nationhood, the model 
fits the evolution of Antarctic science. Phase 1 is characterised by: 
the European who visits the new land, surveys and collects its flora and fauna, studies 
its physical features, and then takes his work back to Europe. Botany, zoology, and 
geology predominate during this phase, but astronomy, geophysics, and a cluster of 
geographical sciences-topography, cartography, hydrography, meteorology-
sometimes rival them in importance. 
(Basalla, 1967)  
At that stage science is an extension of exploration and assessment of natural 
resources, and the periphery serves as a source of material for the further development of 
European scientific theory (Inkster, 1985). Phase 2 sees the emergence of local scientific 
traditions and engagement in scientific practice by colonial scientists. The range of scientific 
activity increases to match that of the nation supporting the activity. The final stage is 
characterised by the development of an independent scientific tradition. The practitioner’s 
orientation shifts from looking outwards to external scientific cultures towards one bounded 
by the “country” in which he or she works.  
Basalla acknowledges the model must be modified to meet specific situations. The 
Antarctic example diverges from the model, as no single national identity has evolved, but a 
coherent community with a distinct scientific intellectual tradition has taken its place. 
Indicators of the highest stage include social prestige, state funding, science education, the 
foundation of scientific organisations and the establishment of scientific journals (MacLeod, 
1982) and the current state of Antarctic science fits these characteristics. MacLeod refined 
Basalla’s definitions of metropolitan science and colonial science. The former is “a way of 
doing science, based on learned societies, small groups of cultivators, certain conventions of 
discourse, and certain theoretical priorities set in eighteenth-century Western Europe.” In 
contrast, “Colonial” science was carried out by collectors working on problems set by savants 
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in Europe: it was “low” science and was identified with fact gathering. The work of 
theoretical synthesis took place elsewhere (MacLeod, 1982). 
Hooker left a number of legacies germane to the Discovery expedition and its 
scientific program. He continued the entrenchment of the metropolis / periphery model of 
scientific practice by his carefully controlled relationship with the botanical collectors around 
the world such as Ronald Gunn (1808-1881) in Van Diemen’s Land and William Colenso 
(1811-1899) in New Zealand, and his discouragement of their efforts to undertake taxonomic 
analysis or publication of findings. These intellectual activities were performed at Kew on the 
specimens they had identified as significant and had collected, preserved and sent to him 
(Endersby, 2009, p. 75). Basalla and MacLeod’s model provides context to the performance 
of science on the Discovery discussed in the following chapters. 
4.2.4 Scientific thinking and the performance of science in 1900 
Science was not a professional activity in 1800 but it emerged as such over the next century. 
In America in 1802, for example, there were only twenty-one individuals earning a livelihood 
as a scientist and, in a catalogue of thirteen hundred books printed in the US, only about 
twenty were considered works of science, and most were textbooks rather than theoretical 
works. The publication of journals is a proxy indicating the expansion of science prior to 
1900. The first two scientific journals, one of which was the Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society were first published in 1665. In 1700 there were about thirty scientific and 
medical journals in regular production. By 1900 this number had ballooned to around 2000 
(Shamos, 1995, pp. 36-37). Scientific practice has not always been considered a virtuous 
pastime. Endersby’s analysis of the Imperial scientific tradition opens with: 
…during the early decades of the nineteenth century, being paid to do science put one, 
not among the elite, but in the same category as Banks’s servants, the people he paid 
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to collect, illustrate, and curate for him. The association between receiving payment 
and low social standing lingered well into the second half of the century. 
(Endersby, 2008, p. 2-3)  
Clear definitions of what constitutes “science” are elusive. Key elements of scientific literacy 
include: bodies of useful or practical knowledge about the universe, methods of inquiry, 
searches for order in nature or first principles and sufficient understanding to explain and 
make predictions about natural phenomena (Shamos, 1995, p. 47). In terms of process: 
Science is not merely a matter of accurate and detailed descriptions of things, or of 
extending our senses through the use of scientific instruments….These are merely 
steps –important ones but nevertheless only a means to a much larger objective: the 
design of conceptual schemes, models and theories that serve to account for major 
segments of our experience with nature, and ultimately form the bases for all 
explanation in science.  
(Shamos, 1995, p. 46) 
Nineteenth century magnetic science in Britain was dominated by the efforts of Major 
Edward Sabine (1788-1883) whose approach was similar to that of Halley, following a 
process of gathering data then looking for patterns and meaning within it: 
Global certainty rested on the accumulation of data. Halley, for instance, was 
uncertain about how magnetic declination2 operated but was confident that once 
sufficient observations had been accumulated it would be possible to attain certainties 
such as the determination of longitude by magnetic means. Getting the data became 
the priority. 
(Fulford et al, 2004, p. 154)   
Sabine was obsessed with data gathering, and used the resources of Empire to acquire 
data from colonial outposts. Sabine published many Contributions to terrestrial magnetism in 
the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society that were mostly summaries of the trends 
in raw data acquired from observatories and vessels. It’s true that a long term, sustained 
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  The magnetic elements of declination, dip, intensity, deviation and their synonyms are defined in section 4.3.1 
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sampling effort was required in terrestrial magnetic studies (as with meteorology) to yield 
meaningful results, but Sabine’s publications did not progress the development of theory. 
This analysis was criticised by the astronomer John Herschel (1792-1871) as “chartism” in a 
scathing attack during his Presidential address to the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science in 1845, especially with regard to analysis of the outputs of Ross’s Erebus and 
Terror expedition (Endersby, 2008, p. 235). This is at odds with Sabine’s speech to the 
seventh meeting of the association, in 1837, where he argued for the expedition to carry out 
experiments to test the popular hypothesis of four magnetic poles. Here he stated that 
previous observations had been made without reference to theory (Cawood, 1979). It was 
exactly the results of this expedition (Ross’s Erebus and Terror) that Herschel was criticising. 
Humboldt, the German polymath, whose travels to South America between 1799 and 
1804 had inspired Darwin to join the Beagle for its epic journey, was another significant 
influence on Victorian scientific traditions. Humboldt’s journey included magnetic 
observations and ensured “magnetism would be on the agenda for British arctic explorations 
of the early 19th Century” (Lambert, 2009, p. 8). Humboldt joined the magnetic lobby’s 
agitation in Britain for Ross’s expedition and it’s associated network of observatories. His 
influence in Britain shifted the focus of magnetic research away from the north magnetic pole 
and introduced a broader approach: “Consideration of the magnetic field as a cosmic 
phenomenon helped to broaden the subject and break down the barriers which the narrower 
interests of the Navy might have imposed” (Cawood, 1979).  
Extensive cooperative magnetic observing was promoted by the German physicists 
and magnetic experts Gauss and Weber with the establishment of the Göttingen magnetische 
Verein in 1834. They applied a more abstract mathematical approach to the science than 
Humboldt’s cosmical tradition, which was underpinned by an astronomical approach to 
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terrestrial magnetism, reliant on concepts of apparently interrelated phenomena such as 
volcanic activity, atmospheric electricity and heat of the earth (Cawood, 1979). 
There was a clear hierarchy within scientific disciplines in the nineteenth century and 
the physical sciences were perceived as superior. “In the early decades of the nineteenth 
century, botany was looked down on by the practitioners of more prestigious and demanding 
sciences, like physics and astronomy” (Endersby, 2009. p. 77). “In the years following the 
appearance of The Origin, [Darwin’s Origin of Species] physical geography, in common with 
other earth and life sciences, was transformed” (Stoddart, 1975). The publication of T. H. 
Huxley’s Physiography in 1877 transformed popular thinking about geography and laid the 
foundation for the natural sciences to become incorporated into common understanding and 
the school curriculum in Britain. Huxley was a highly influential scientific thinker and his 
view of science was based on three levels: observational science (the collection of facts), 
classificatory science (arrangement of facts) and inductive science (facts reasoned and laws 
deduced) (Stoddart, 1975). Victorian science was mostly descriptive, not predictive and prior 
to the publication of Huxley’s Physiography, physics, chemistry, botany and zoology went 
untaught in British schools. The geographer (and polar specialist) Hugh Robert Mill (1861-
1951) included geology, astronomy, geography, meteorology, biology and chemistry within 
Huxley’s new discipline. James Dana (1813-1895), geologist aboard Wilkes’ United States 
Exploring Expedition (1838-42), included magnetism as one element of the natural world in 
his version of physiography published in his influential Manual of Geology (Stoddart, 1975). 
Physiography as a discipline disappeared by the turn of the twentieth century, as it was too 
broad in its own right. The scientific disciplines mentioned above (with the addition of 
geomorphology that was spawned directly from physiography) stood alone.   
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Endersby sums up: “The transformation of Britain’s men of science into modern 
scientists had been a slow, uneven process that had taken most of the nineteenth century, and 
whose course had varied according to discipline and institutional setting” (2008, p. 311).  
A feature of late nineteenth century science was its release from obligations to either seek a 
solution to a practical problem or to illustrate a biblical text. Theoretical science was now 
practiced as an intellectual pursuit and applied science was considered a lower form of 
intellectual activity. Prior to Darwin’s paradigm shifting thoughts on evolution and natural 
selection, science education had been confined to religious and utilitarian aims, but 
publication of his Origin of Species opened the door for free thinking (Shamos, 1995, pp. 39-
40).   
The scientists on the Discovery were embarking at a time of rapid development in 
scientific disciplines and their practice. The intellectual legacy they worked within was 
overwhelmingly dominated by “inductive” methods, in which theory is derived from 
observations. Hypothetico-deductive methods that generated theory by first developing 
hypotheses, then designing experiments to test them, were outside their intellectual 
landscape. 
4.2.5 Cooperative magnetic observing networks 
The idea of cooperative scientific observing at numerous locations around the globe and by a 
mix of nations was entrenched by 1900. Humboldt left Paris in 1827 after a stay of seventeen 
years, during which he wrote the findings of his South American trip, then in 1829 he took 
part in an expedition to Siberia and “managed to persuade the Emperor, Nicolaus I, to 
establish a string of magnetic observatories across European and Asiatic Russia” (Cawood, 
1977, p. 584). He then returned to Germany to participate in the establishment of Gauss and 
Weber’s Göttingen magnetische Verein. On Sabine’s prompting, Humboldt wrote to the RS 
in 1836 seeking to join the combined magnetic observing networks of France, Russia and 
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Germany into a global network. There was no action on this matter until Herschel returned 
from Cape Town in 1838 and brought his influence to bear. Arrangements for a global 
network of coordinated magnetic observatories were in place in time for Ross’s Erebus and 
Terror expedition (Cawood, 1977, pp. 583-585).  A further example of global data collecting 
in the physical sciences is the first International Polar Year of 1882-83. The Austrian, Karl 
Weyprecht (1838-1881), at a meeting of German naturalists and physicists in Graz in 1875 
proposed the formation of a ring of scientific stations around the Arctic Circle, where 
synchronous weather, terrestrial magnetism, and other geophysical observations would be 
made over the span of a year. This scheme led to the first International Polar Year during 
which scientists from ten European nations cooperated with the US, who operated fourteen 
stations. French and German bases added southern hemisphere data from Cape Horn and 
South Georgia respectively (Belanger, 2006, pp. 10-11). Cooperative global observing 
networks in the physical sciences were an element of the Victorian scientific tradition that 
informed the development of the magnetic science program for the Discovery and Gauss 
expeditions. 
4.3 Terrestrial magnetic science in 1900 
4.3.1 The elements of terrestrial magnetism 
Research into terrestrial magnetism, also known as geomagnetism, remained an observational 
scientific activity at the end of the Victorian era. The phenomena could be described 
mathematically but the causes of the observable phenomena remained a mystery. Secular, 
seasonal and diurnal changes in the measurable elements were recognised, but not 
understood. A leap forward in comprehension of the phenomenon was anticipated from the 
scheme of synchronous observations planned during the Discovery and Gauss expeditions. 
This section describes some aspects of development of the science of geomagnetic research 
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especially during the Victorian era, and discusses its place in the art of traditional navigation 
and the linkage to selected high latitude expeditions.  
    There were two stimuli for magnetic research: commercial and intellectual. The 
mercantile products of scientific magnetic research at sea were charts showing magnetic 
features that assisted navigators in the days of sail. Secondly, scientific intellectual inquiry 
was informed by better determination of the location of the magnetic pole, data to assist 
solving the causes of terrestrial magnetism, confirmation of the global synchronicity of 
secular and diurnal changes in magnetic elements and finally, the synchronicity of magnetic 
disturbances and their relationship to magnetic storms on the sun and the appearance of 
auroras. With a few exceptions, systematic observations had been confined to the northern 
hemisphere prior to 1900 and the first and only voyages to the proximity of the south 
magnetic pole were those of Ross, Wilkes and d’Urville around 1840. No systematic long 
term magnetic observing had been undertaken on those voyages so Antarctica was a blank 
sheet in terms of research into magnetism. 
There are three elements of terrestrial magnetism of interest to physicists that could be 
determined using the instruments available in 1900. These are declination, dip and intensity. 
Declination is the angular difference between true (or geographic) north and the magnetic 
meridian at any place on the surface of the globe. Physicists use the symbol “D” for this angle 
between “H” (magnetic north) and “Y” (true north) (Jonkers, 2003, p. 25). Declination is also 
referred to as “variation” by mariners. This is the simplest measure of a locality’s ambient 
magnetic field and instruments have been available to make determination of variation since 
before the time of Halley’s Paramour voyages. Charts showing lines of equal magnetic 
variation, isogonic lines, indicate the magnetic meridian at any place on the chart. The 
isogons converge toward the magnetic poles and this type of chart was of some use in 
practical navigation.  
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Figure 2: Elements of terrestrial magnetism reproduced from Jonkers (2003, p. 25), with author’s permission. 
 
As the source attracting the magnetised needle appears to be within the earth, not on 
its surface, a measure known as magnetic dip is used to describe the angle that the 
magnetised needle makes with the horizontal when free to move vertically and is aligned 
along the local magnetic meridian (H). This angle is also referred to as inclination and 
physicists define it as “I”, being the vertical angle between “H” (magnetic north) and “F” (the 
full magnetic vector). Charts of lines of equal magnetic dip are called isoclinal lines and the 
magnetic equator is found along the line of zero dip. The magnetic pole is the locality where 
the dip is 90° causing the dip needle to point directly downward. The notional points known 
as the Geomagnetic Poles are points that best fit an antipodal magnetic dipole, a theoretical 
arrangement only that is of no utility in research into terrestrial magnetism (Mawer, 2006, p. 
157).    
“Intensity” represents the strength of the magnetic field of the earth. The symbol “Z” 
is used to represent the radial force of the field relative to its source. Total magnetic intensity 
“F” may be calculated for any locality and time then expressed as a single number by 
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combining the vectors of horizontal and vertical intensity. Although determination of the 
direction of the vectors was possible, determination of the absolute field strength was not 
possible until the invention of the magnetometer by Gauss in 1832 (Jonkers, 2003, p. 26). 
Previously, relative field strength in the horizontal plane could be determined by the rate of 
oscillation of a compass needle but comparison was rarely valid as each needle had a unique 
magnetic signature.    
Deviation is a mariner’s term to describe the measure of the influence on ships 
compasses caused by ferrous materials in the ship’s fabric or it’s cargo. Hard iron in ships is 
permanently magnetised and soft iron can vary in its magnetic polarity and strength over 
time. Deviation changes according to the ship’s direction and the heeling angle. “Swinging” 
the ship is the process that determines the values of compensation for deviation required, 
according to direction of travel. Mariners also refer to “compass error”, an angular value that 
combines the variation and the deviation to provide an angle that may be applied by the 
helmsman to stay on a true course.   
4.3.2 The development of terrestrial magnetic theory and practice 
The eighteenth century commenced an age of magnetic data collection promoted by the 
expansion of more numerous and more sustained seafaring and improvements in the 
technology and sophistication of instruments. This followed a period of numerous theoretical, 
but mostly unsubstantiated postulates about the nature and causes of terrestrial magnetism 
developed during the seventeenth century (Jonkers, 2003, p. 126). There were four phases of 
development of geomagnetic theory concepts. The first theory consists of a static axial dipole 
interpreting the earth as a magnet with the magnetic poles opposite and fixed at the 
geographic poles.  The next phase was a tilted, but still static dipole. The third phase has a 
tilted dipole that is no longer static, but precessing. The fourth stage recognises that the 
magnetic poles are not diametrically opposed as in the dipole models, but independent, and 
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dynamic. The fourth represents reality. Many theories along these lines replaced a 
cosmological view that had the magnetic poles were the same as the celestial poles (2003, pp. 
33-38). A brief synopsis of the significant milestones in magnetic research and development 
of theory from earliest records follows, and a more detailed, annotated chronology of theory 
and research into terrestrial magnetism is found at Appendix II.  
Between 1799 and 1804 Humboldt surveyed magnetism in South America at more 
than one hundred locations and determined that magnetic intensity increased with increasing 
latitude on land, as well as at sea. He used a site in the Peruvian Andes as his reference 
station as it was on the magnetic equator (McConnell, 2005, p. 353). During the same years 
Matthew Flinders (1774-1814) surveyed the coast of New Holland (Australia) and took 
thousands of observations including details of compass bearings, date, time, ship's heading, 
magnetic dip and geographic latitude and longitude. He noticed that the iron on board ship 
caused deviation and showed that swinging the ship around the points of the compass and 
recording the apparent declination on each heading could allow compensation to be made at 
sea (Gurney, 2004, p. 153; Mawer, 2006, p. 12). John Churchman (1753-1805) had initially 
proposed this solution in 1796 (Jonkers, 2003, p. 169). On his return to England (after 
incarceration by the French) in 1812, Flinders proposed the Admiralty carry out a series of 
experiments related to deviation after which he devised a solution known as the “Flinders 
bar”, which was composed of soft iron and placed vertically and below the ship’s compass in 
the binnacle (Gurney, 2004, p. 171).   
After 1818 the British Admiralty sent numerous expeditions on the quest for the 
North-west passage, affording opportunities for magnetic science as an adjunct to 
exploration. Theoretical background progressed when Norwegian Christopher Hansteen 
(1784-1873) published Magnetismus der Erde in 1819, postulating that there were two 
principal magnetic axes, and therefore four principal points of convergence of the direction of 
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the magnetic needle, all constantly moving. Sabine published data in 1825 indicating its 
"incompatibility with the hypothesis of a single magnetic axis." Hansteen further developed 
methods of determination of total intensity using values from the horizontal component and 
the inclination rather than the old dip needle method (Turner 2010, p. 108). Between 1825 
and 1835 Humboldts comprehensive observing network took simultaneous observations in 
France and Russia, Sitka (Alaska) and Peking. On six "term days" each year simultaneous 
observations were made every five minutes for twenty-four hours (Mawer, 2006, p. 11).  
Ross established a camp at the locality of the North Magnetic Pole on the Boothia 
Peninsula in 1831 using a magnetometer and dip circle to determine its location (Mawer, 
2006, p. 3-4). The following year Gauss improved technique with:  
a method for measuring intensity absolutely, in units of mass, distance and time, 
rather than by comparison between the number of oscillations of the same needle in 
different locations. The observational technique, devised with his collaborator, 
Wilhelm Weber, involved counting oscillations, as before, then using the dipping 
needle to deflect the compass needle. 
(Mawer, 2006, p. 12) 
Weber and Gauss opened the observatory in Göttingen that became responsible for 
coordinating term days and the collection and publication of observations for the Göttingen 
Magnetic Union collaboration after 1834 (Mawer, 2006, p. 12). A turning point in practical 
application of theory occurred when George Airy, Astronomer Royal (1801-1892) used 
magnets to successfully correct compass deviation on the Rainbow after swinging the ship in 
the basin at the Deptford victualling yards at Greenwich. This was followed by his 
engagement to carry out the same procedure for the new ship Ironsides, the first iron-hulled 
sailing ship (Gurney 2004, pp. 200-203). In 1838, the magnetic observatory was added to 
Greenwich Observatory by Airy who realised the practical work of the observatory up to that 
time was mainly chronometer rating (Gurney, 2004, p. 197). On the theoretical side, Gauss 
used data collected by Sabine to determine mathematical formulae to describe earth 
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magnetism and predicted the magnetic poles would be at 77° 84' N, 296° 30' E and 77° 8' S, 
116° 30' E. Published as Allgemeine Theorie des Erdmagnetismus, it also postulated 
(correctly) that nearly all normal magnetic force came from the earth but daily, seasonal and 
irregular disturbances were probably cosmic in origin (Turner 2010, pp. 122-123; McConnell, 
2005, p. 353). The intense activity in research in terrestrial magnetism was continued by the 
“Magnetic Crusade”, in which three major national expeditions touched on Antarctica in 
search of the south magnetic pole (Cawood, 1979). They were Ross’s (Erebus and Terror, 
1839-43), d'Urville’s (Astrolabe and Zelee, 1837-1840) and Wilkes’ (U.S. Exploring 
Expedition consisting of Vincennes, Peacock, Porpoise, Sea Gull, Flying Fish and Relief, 
1838-42). Ross determined south magnetic pole to be located at 75° 5' S, 154° 8' E and 
published charts of variation, dip and intensity (McConnell, 2005, pp. 354-5).  
Development of theory continued and Sabine showed in 1851, after mining his mass 
of magnetic data, that the intensity of geomagnetic disturbances varies in concert with the 
eleven-year periodicity of sunspots confirming the findings of Heinrich Schwabe (1789-
1875) seven years earlier. Awareness was growing that frequency of magnetic storms also 
followed the sun spot cycle (Kivelson & Russell, 1995, p. 6). Richard Carrington (1826-
1875), while sketching sunspots in 1859, observed a great flare of white light on the sun. 
Kew observatory had been running continuous magnetographs since the previous year and at 
that moment they recorded a disturbance of the magnetic field then, eighteen hours later, one 
of the strongest magnetic storms ever recorded broke out. Auroras were seen at lower 
latitudes than previous records showed, and the speed of the solar wind was determined to be 
over 2,300 km/s (Kivelson & Russell, 1995, pp. 6-7).  
Instruments for navigation were also becoming more sophisticated and reliable. Sir 
William Thomson, later known as Lord Kelvin (1824-1907) developed the compass binnacle 
in 1876. It incorporated soft iron spheres whose location could be adjusted and a Flinders bar 
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installed below the compass. It also incorporated a dry pivot compass of Thompson's own 
design. This binnacle pattern came into popular use (Gurney 2004, pp. 240-242).  
The first journal dedicated to reporting studies in the discipline (Terrestrial 
Magnetism) came into existence in 1896 under the editorship of the American, Bauer, who 
had a doctorate on the secular variation of geomagnetism. Soon after, its scope was expanded 
and it was renamed Terrestrial Magnetism and Atmospheric Electricity (McConnell, 2005, p. 
357). The (British) National Physical Laboratory was established in January 1900 as a 
separate entity from its parent institution, Kew Observatory and in 1904 Bauer, across the 
Atlantic, was appointed director of the newly formed Department of Terrestrial Magnetism at 
the Carnegie Institution in Washington, D.C. (McConnell, 2005, p. 357). The quest for the 
south magnetic pole closed initially in January 1909 when Mawson, David and Alastair 
MacKay (1878-1914) reached the locality of the southern magnetic pole in the Antarctic at 
72° 25' S, 155° 16' E during Shackleton’s Nimrod expedition. The link between perturbations 
in the magnetic field (also referred to as “disturbances” or “magnetic storms”), auroras and 
space weather were also being investigated in the early twentieth century by the Norwegian 
physicist, Kristian Birkeland (1867-1917) (Jago, 2001). 
4.3.3 Sir James Clark Ross and Sir John Franklin 
Ross and Franklin were giants in the arena of polar magnetic studies in the nineteenth century 
and their work deserves mention as it related directly to the research aboard Discovery. Ross 
was first to the north magnetic pole, located at the time on the Boothia Peninsula (70° 05’ N., 
96° 46’ W.), where he made magnetic observations. On arriving in June 1831 he wrote: 
It almost seemed as if we had accomplished everything we had come so far to see and to 
do; as if our voyage and all its labours were at an end and that nothing now remained for 
us but to return home and be happy for the rest of our days. 
 (Savours, 1962) 
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Ross was then selected through Sabine’s influence with the admiralty to take the Erebus and 
Terror expedition to attempt to sail to the South Magnetic Pole. This expedition was 
dispatched at a time when cooperation in magnetic science research was balanced against 
scientific rivalry (Cawood, 1979). Ross’s introduction to the narrative of the voyage is an 
important document for the student of the history of research into terrestrial magnetism as it 
touches on many of the success factors of voyages of scientific exploration. It includes the 
justifications for the expedition, the institutional support and how governmental support was 
requested and granted, the state of theoretical and practical knowledge in the discipline at 
the time, an overview of the protocols for observing and finally, the Admiralty instructions 
to Ross (1847, pp. xxii-xxviii). Scott’s introduction to the narrative of the Discovery 
expedition provides a short piece referring to the magnetic research of Ross which 
erroneously implies that it was more about navigation than science: “its practical 
importance in connection with the navigation of ships was now fully realised” (Scott, 
1905b, p. 15). Ross makes it clear that his expedition was founded on pure scientific 
research with the intention of gathering data on which to build theory. He acknowledges 
that the only observations likely to be of any utility to navigators are those of variation 
(declination) but he lists the numerous additional elements of the scientific inquiry (Ross, 
1847, p. x).  In addition to his post as a RN officer, Ross was a scientist who demonstrated 
his understanding of the theoretical elements of the scientific work at hand. 
Ross’s expedition was the product of a meeting of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science (BAAS) in August 1838 at which Sabine spoke to the desirability 
of expanded research into terrestrial magnetism. A committee of scientific leaders formed 
with the intention of approaching the government to start an expedition. The objectives 
included extending the Göttingen Union’s network of magnetic observatories to British 
dominions for hourly magnetic measurements and more frequent observations on selected 
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term days. The committee recommended a naval expedition to high southern latitudes 
especially for declination and intensity measurements, and especially in the longitudes 
between New Holland and Cape Horn. Results were to be sent for compilation to Professor 
Humphrey Lloyd (1800-1881) in Dublin, the inventor of Lloyd’s needles for measuring 
magnetic force. On receipt of the British Association’s recommendations the government 
referred it to the RS (as advisors to the government on all scientific matters), who agreed 
with the proposed scheme (Ross, 1847, pp. i-vii).  
The RS then developed their own report that provided background and guidance for the 
magnetic research on the expedition. It opens with a statement of purpose: “…completing 
our knowledge of the actual state of the magnetic phenomena, and furnishing accurate data 
for the construction and verification of theoretical systems.” (Ross, 1847, p. viii). Some 
theoretical background follows, including the following key points that summarise the state 
of knowledge of terrestrial magnetism at the time: 
• A magnetic cycle of several centuries may exist based on unknown internal 
movements or relations 
• A periodic effect of the sun may be related to heating and cooling 
• Auroras affect the compass needle 
• The existence of minute and irregular movements of the needle 
• Laws of terrestrial magnetism are not so simple as to allow a simple summary and 
the gist of the inquiry is deep and depends on complex relations 
• Temporary changes are observed across the globe simultaneously 
• Our knowledge of the actual and past state of the dip over the face of the earth’s 
surface is lamentably deficient 
• Dip can now be observed with considerable approximation at sea 
• Intensity can be determined with exactness and this branch of magnetic knowledge 
has made rapid progress 
• In order to provide precise descriptions of any observing station all three elements 
(declination, dip and intensity) must be recorded 
• Declination is the only element of any practical use to navigators 
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• It is now known that all three magnetic elements are in a constant state of fluctuation 
(Ross, 1847, pp. viii-x) 
Ross continues by stating the rationale for the investigation: 
• Thorough analysis of progressive and periodic changes is only possible by collecting 
sufficient data to allow elimination of transitory changes 
• Secular magnetic changes cannot be concluded from a comparatively short series of 
observations 
• Discordances between different magnetic observers may be due to transitory 
fluctuations, not observer (or presumably instrumental) errors 
• A theory of transitory changes is of prime interest and should be found to contribute 
to general theories of terrestrial magnetism 
(Ross, 1847, pp. xi-xii) 
He continued with notes about the desired outcomes of government support that 
included the establishment of several observing stations with funding for staffing and 
instruments. The stations were to make observations of declination, dip and intensity using 
magnetometers hourly for three years and every five minutes over the twenty-four hour 
period of select term days and measurements were to be absolute, not relative, allowing easy 
compilation of data. On the assumption that the plea for a naval Antarctic expedition was 
successful, the observations at fixed stations (proposed for Canada, St Helens, Cape Town, 
Van Diemen’s Land and Ceylon or Madeira) should be arranged through correspondence 
with the commander of the expedition (Ross, 1847, pp. xii-xv).  
The grounds for the RS belief in the value of the expedition and scheme of observing are 
as follows: 
• Great and notorious deficiencies exist in our knowledge of the curves of the variation 
lines generally, and especially in the Antarctic 
• The true position of the south magnetic pole or poles can scarcely be determined with 
current data 
• Knowledge of dip is completely deficient in these regions. Observations at sea and on 
the ice would be especially valuable 
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• There is little data on intensity lines and there is good reason to believe in the 
existence and accessibility of two points of maximum intensity in the southern, as in 
the northern hemisphere 
• That correct knowledge of the courses of these lines, especially where they approach 
their respective poles, is to be regarded as a first and, indeed, indispensible 
preliminary step to the construction of a rigorous and complete theory of terrestrial 
magnetism. 
• The importance of aligning observations with the fixed stations and the necessity for 
quality data are re-iterated here as these localities “…are unlikely to be revisited for 
any purpose, except those connected with scientific inquiries.” 
(Ross, 1847, pp. xv-xvi) 
The RS Council resolutions that follow (Ross, 1847, p. xxvii) urged that the above report be 
approved, that the Council recommended to the government that the expedition should 
proceed, that fixed observatories be established and that a deputation was to be made to Lord 
Melbourne requesting adoption of all the proposals. After some detail of the vessels and their 
provisioning, Ross’s introduction closes with the Admiralty’s official instructions to him as 
commander.   
After the return of the expeditions of Ross, Wilkes and d’Urville there were no further 
Antarctic expeditions concentrating on the physical sciences until the international campaign 
of the early 1900’s. Franklin, who had been governor of Van Diemen’s Land and had assisted 
Ross establish the magnetic observatory there, was a magnetic scientist himself. Franklin had 
been a midshipman on Matthew Flinders’ Investigator voyage of 1801 and it’s probable that 
Franklin’s scientific interest in terrestrial magnetism was piqued by Flinders’ own 
preoccupation (Erskine, 2009, p. 19). He was selected to lead the North-West passage 
expedition (Erebus and Terror, 1845) from which no one returned. His importance in the 
historical context of magnetic studies is related by Lambert:  
Arctic and then Antarctic naval commanders were left in no doubt that magnetic studies 
were scientifically the most important part of their mandate. Franklin had been at the 
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heart of the magnetic crusade from the outset. He took command in 1845 because he 
had impeccable credentials, extensive arctic experience, proven leadership and above 
all because he was a first rate magnetic scientist.  
(Lambert, 2009, p. 61) 
After the loss of the Franklin expedition there were numerous search and relief missions to 
the Arctic, but none with a scientific program that took priority over exploration.  
4.4 Getting started: Patronage, institutional support and finance 
Institutional prestige, personal patronage and funding are bound together in the case of the 
Discovery, as they were for all expeditions of its era. Funding and support for expeditions has 
always presented a challenge, but Markham showed his mettle by using his personal 
connections with the wealthy, management of the will of committees and, to some extent, 
management of the will of the government of the time. Markham also called in favours from 
acquaintances to speak on behalf of the expedition when it was expedient.  
The funding was ultimately abundant, allowing it to follow the RN Arctic traditions of 
the nineteenth century and become “…cumbersome, overmanned and inefficient” (Markham 
& Holland, 1986, p. xxiii). In this case there were five prospective sources of funds and 
support. The prime source was the government, in the form of direct grants or through naval 
support. Another significant source was institutional grants, especially from the RGS. 
Philanthropy was the third in the suite of financial sources. Subscriptions circulated through 
the membership of institutions like the RS and RGS was an additional way to glean funds, 
but from sympathetic and not necessarily wealthy individuals. The last source was through 
direct public appeals circulated in newspapers. Corporate sponsorship was a minor source of 
support that generally came in the form of gifts of equipment of consumables such as food 
and coal.  
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Markham’s personal notes track the chronology of fundraising and sponsorship efforts 
described here (Markham, n.d.b). The campaign opened at the 27 November 1893 RGS 
meeting where Murray delivered his paper on the Renewal of Antarctic Exploration (Murray, 
1894). After the 6th International Geographic Congress in July 1895 Markham wrote to the 
George Goschen (1831-1907), First Lord of the Admiralty in November, proposing an all RN 
expedition. The secretary to the Admiralty replied promptly offering only the loan of 
instruments, and stating that, although it would take an interest in the expedition it could not 
lend officers. During 1896 Markham sought approval for the expedition from the influential 
RGS expedition committee, but it was denied, then, in his Anniversary Address to the RGS 
for Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee he argued that Antarctic work has always been 
undertaken by the government and is of great value to the training and readiness of the navy 
during peacetime (Markham, 1897). In April 1897 the Council of the RGS agreed to allow 
Markham to appeal for funds and opened the subscription list with a grant of £5,000 (Huxley, 
1977, p. 25). At the end of that year Markham was still struggling to get momentum with 
funding so he invited the RS to join the enterprise. He reflected: “It was a fatal error, but I did 
so under the impression that the great name of the Royal Society would bring in funds” 
(Markham & Holland, 1986, p. 8). In October 1897 Markham wrote to Lord Salisbury (Prime 
Minister) asking for the expedition to be government sponsored and financed but on 9 June 
following (1898) there was a note of refusal but, undeterred, on 12 June Markham compiled a 
list of prospective ships available in Norway or that had seen polar service. The pamphlet, 
Antarctic Exploration: A Plea for a National Expedition was published by the RGS 
(Markham, 1898a) and private letters and appeals to fellows and members were circulated. 
Markham tried to snare funding from Australian premiers who were visiting Britain and 
secured a promise of £1000 from the Victorian Government (Yelverton, 2000, p. 9). After a 
February 1898 meeting of the Joint Committee of representatives from the RGS and the RS 
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(13 from each) that had been established to oversee the expedition, a small sub-committee 
was formed to arrange an application to the Government for a grant. In May 1898 the final 
rejection for an exclusive RN expedition was received from Goschen, so Markham set about 
reconfiguring it as a private, RGS enterprise. The publisher Alfred Harmsworth (1865-1922) 
promised another £5,000 (Mill, 1905, p. 408) and by the year’s end £14,000 had been raised. 
Markham recorded that “he kept writing letters to rich people” (Markham & Holland, 1986, 
p. 9) and this strategy was successful, as he received an offer of £25,000 from the industrialist 
Llewellyn Longstaff (1841-1918). Once the funding had momentum and the credibility of the 
enterprise had been established, the Prince of Wales agreed to become patron of the 
expedition, lending his name in support of the fundraising effort. In earlier times “The 
science of geography was consistently funded by the princes and kings of Europe” 
(Sorrenson, 1996) but neither Queen Victoria nor her son (the Prince of Wales, later King 
Edward VII) assisted financially. In April 1899 Markham again appealed for government 
support with a letter “signed by some of the leaders of British science, headed by Lord Lister 
(1827-1912), president of the RS, and more than forty others ranging from the Astronomer 
Royal to university vice-chancellors” (Yelverton, 2000, p. 11). This paved the way for 
Markham’s June 1899 deputation to Lord Balfour (1848-1930) who was acting on behalf of 
the Chancellor. He had a personal interest in science and read incessantly: “a book on science 
was propped open on the mantelpiece while he dressed.” He also enjoyed mixing with 
scientists: “When visiting his sister, Lady Rayleigh, and asked by her what he would like in 
the way of entertainment, he replied ‘Oh something amusing; get some people from 
Cambridge to talk science’ ” (Tuchman, 1966, p. 53). Balfour was sympathetic, and a 
commitment was made of £45,000, based on his belief that the science would reap rewards. 
Longstaff held the same expectation. The involvement of the RS had been crucial in 
persuading Balfour’s cabinet to underwrite the venture (Baughman, 1999, p. 21). The RGS 
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then provided a further £3,000 to bring the donations up to the matching £45,000 of private 
funds required to meet the provision of the government grant. The final total of funds raised 
was £93,000, very close to the estimate of £95,000 for three (austral summer) seasons of 
exploration with a single ship, (Yelverton, 2000, p. 420) but short of Markham’s higher target 
of £100,000 (Baughman, 1999, p. 18).  
After allowance for construction of the vessel, £25,000 had been put aside for wages 
and voyage expenses (Savours, 1992, p. 25). The RN exploration model was to send ships in 
pairs to polar regions to ensure a line of retreat was available in case of misadventure (James 
Clark Ross Erebus and Terror, Nares’ Discovery and Alert, Cook’s Resolution and Adventure 
for example) but Markham’s campaign was established as a “one ship” expedition. Markham 
probably always intended the acquisition of a second ship as he hastily commenced 
fundraising for the relief expedition soon after the Discovery had embarked. He was 
disingenuous by not revealing to the British Government the need for a relief expedition in 
the first instance.  
The total funds available for selected expeditions and the relative costs of their vessels 
expressed as actual figures at the time (in British Pounds) and converted to current value are 
shown at Table 2. These values were determined using a calculator for major project costs in 
history that includes factors for wage levels, purchasing power, gross domestic product and 
opportunity cost (Officer & Williamson, 2006; MeasuringWorth.com, 2012). The table 
demonstrates that Discovery was the best-funded expedition of its time by a significant 
margin and that it was normal for around half of the expedition funds to be spent on the 
vessel.  
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Expedition Total Funds  
(converted to £) 
Vessel Cost 
(converted to £) 
Total Funds 
2012 
equivalent 
Vessel Cost 
2012 
equivalent 
Belgica 1 £13,648 £5,648 £10,600,000 £4,370,000 
Southern 
Cross 2 
£40,000 £5,000 £30,900,000 £3,870,000 
Discovery 3 £93,000 £51610 £72,000,000 £39,900,000 
Morning 4 As above £3880 As above £3,003,000 
Terra Nova  As above £20,000 9 (1903 cost) As above £15,480,000 
Gauss 5 £60,000 £29000 £45,300,000 £22,400,000 
Antarctic 6 £6,018 £1368 £4,660,000 £1,060,000 
Scotia 7 £36400 8 £16,730 £28,200,000 £12,900,000 
Table 2: Relative cost of expeditions and vessels 1898-1904 using historic “Project” value calculator 
(Measuring Worth, 2012). (Bryan 2011, p. 129 1, 138 2, 145 3, 155 4, 174 6, 183-5 7; Drygalski 1989, p. ix 5; 
Salveson 1998, p. 61 8; Pound, 1966, p. 107 9). 
 
The German South Polar Expedition’s fundraising effort also relied on institutional 
support, patronage and the potential national prestige attached to possible geographical and 
scientific achievements. After a meeting of the German Joint Committee in April 1897 a 
three-man action committee was formed to raise funds through the country’s centres of 
learning but the strategy failed to raise any significant funds (Yelverton, 2000, p. 9). The 
German expedition ultimately received funding of DM1.2m (about £60,000 at the time) 
directly from the Reichstag (Murphy, 2002, p. 72).  
The end of the Victorian era was a time of small, individual ship-based expeditions 
that were financed on a case-by-case basis by philanthropy or government grants. This was 
the pattern until after World War II when there was shift to permanent, national bases 
founded for scientific and strategic reasons with secure government financial backing 
(Fanning, 1981, p. 14). For the Discovery, the donation offered by Longstaff represented a 
turning point in confidence in the project, after which more support was forthcoming. The 
copious funds allowed construction of a custom designed ship for polar scientific exploration 
with sufficient set aside to purchase the best equipment, supplies and consumables available, 
and for handsome wage rates for the civilian scientists.  
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4.5 The expedition vessel as a scientific platform 
There were few constraints on the construction of the Discovery and the abundant funding 
allowed an open hand for innovation. The vessel had three main functions. Firstly, the vessel 
was a system to deliver the expedition to Antarctica, so it had to be seaworthy under extreme 
conditions when required, with capacity to ship the crew of forty-six with materials and 
provisions for an extended stay in the Antarctic. Secondly, it had to be fit for coastal 
exploration in polar conditions, and able to endure the rigours of navigating in ice. Thirdly, it 
was to provide a suitable and well-equipped platform for science at sea, especially 
meteorology, oceanography and magnetic science. The utility of the ship for these functions, 
especially the last, is a success factor for polar frontier science. 
Using Cook’s voyages as examples, Sorrenson makes the compelling case that vessels 
used for geographical exploration and scientific enquiries are scientific instruments. “Just as 
the telescope expanded the science of astronomy and allowed astronomers to explore new 
worlds and make images of them, so too did the ship for geography and geographers” 
(Sorrenson, 1996). Ship borne exploration included science research at the periphery but 
relied on the metropolis for instruments (sextant, theodolite, telescope and timepiece), 
mathematical theory and the almanacs required for navigation. In Cook’s case, longitude 
determination was by one of four methods available. They were an eclipse or a transit, 
eclipses of the moons of Jupiter, position of the earth’s moon or the use of a timepiece. 
Longitude itself was an expression of location with respect to the metropolis, Greenwich, and 
could have only been developed by global series of observations upon which the almanac 
tables were developed. Accurate observations and charting of the elements of terrestrial 
magnetism were only meaningful if the location of the observation was known with 
precision. The link to the metropolitan centre was maintained throughout any voyage of 
exploration by the regular reference to Greenwich Mean Time as the standard for navigation 
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calculations of longitude. In reference to Cook’s Resolution and Adventure, Sorrenson states 
“… these ships were more than just vehicles or platforms for observers and instruments; they 
shaped the kinds of information observers collected”  (1996). The same was true of the 
Discovery.  
The following analysis of the ship’s construction features was developed in the light 
of its prime purposes as an observing platform at sea and as a tool for exploration and 
delivery of the expedition to the planned field base. The German expedition ship Gauss was 
constructed at the same time and for the same purpose, so analysis of both ships informs the 
question regarding the extent to which scientific success relies on the expedition vessel. The 
German expedition vessel Gauss was appropriately named after the famous German 
polymath and magnetic expert who had developed new theory and mathematical descriptors 
for earth magnetism (Turner, 2010, pp. 114-123). It was designed to be large enough to 
accommodate men, stores and equipment for three years, but small enough to be agile in the 
ice. The construction philosophy for Gauss was seaworthiness for high seas and heavy 
weather of the South Atlantic and Southern Oceans, but with sufficient strength for ice 
navigation. It had a “peg-top” shaped hull similar to that of Nansen’s Fram, designed and 
built by Colin Archer (1832-1921) in Norway. This hull shape was intended to prevent the 
vessel being crushed if icebound (Savours, 1992, p. 19). The barquentine rig, with fore and 
aft sails on the main and mizzen masts allowed a smaller crew, as less manpower was 
required for sail handling than on a fully ship-rigged (square rigged) vessel. On Gauss the 
magnetic instruments for observing at sea were adjacent to the bridge. Both ships had 
biological laboratories and winches with drums of wire for deep-sea sounding and water 
sampling. Gauss had a photographic dark room (Bruce, 1901). 
In contrast, a conservative approach to the design of Discovery was implemented. 
Scott wrote: “The committee, therefore, after due deliberation, decided that the new vessel 
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should be built more or less on the lines of the old Discovery” (Scott, 1905b. p. 46). The ship 
committee included admirals, many of whom were Arctic veterans (Savours, 1992, p. 14) and 
the Chief Constructor of the Admiralty designed and oversaw construction. He wrote that a 
“peg top” design was considered for Discovery but:   
After full consideration it was decided that, having regard to the many thousands of 
miles of tempestuous seas the new vessel would have to traverse both outwards and 
homewards, it would be better to have an ordinary ship-shaped section, as being more 
conducive to general goodness of behaviour under trying sea conditions.  
(Smith, 1905, p. 4) 
Table 3 provides details of the vessels for comparison expressed in the dimensions used by 
constructors. 
Feature Gauss Discovery 
Length 151 feet (46 m) 172 feet (52.5 m) 
Beam 37 feet (11.3 m) 33 feet (10 m) 
Tonnage 1450 tons (1473 tonnes) 1570 tons (1595 tonnes) 
Rig Barquentine (Square 
rigged on fore mast, fore 
and aft sails on main and 
mizzen masts) 
Barque (Square rigged on 
Fore and main masts, fore 
and aft sail on the mizzen 
mast) 
Power 325 hp (242.5 kW) 450 hp (336 kW) 
Engine type Triple expansion steam  Triple expansion steam 
Speed 7 knots (13kph) with a 
predicted consumption 5 
tons of coal per hour. 
7 knots (13kph) with a 
predicted consumption 6.5 
tons of coal per hour. 
Ship yard Howalt’s Works, Keil, 
under direction of the 
Construction Department 
the German of Imperial 
Navy 
Dundee Shipbuilders’ Co. 
in the Panmure shipyard, 
under superintendence of 
W. E. Smith, Chief 
Constructor of the 
Admiralty with direction 
from the Ship Committee  
Ship’s Complement 30 46 
Table 3: Ship details (Drygalski, 1989, p. ix; Savours, 1992, p. 9; Markham & Holland, 1986, p. 26) 
 
Both ships had three layers of planking making over 25 inches (64 centimetres) thickness at 
the waterline. On Gauss there were additional steel plates to protect the stem and the stern, 
whereas on Discovery plates protected the stem only. The twin bladed propellers, and rudders 
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that both could be detached and withdrawn into wells in the ship to protect them from ice 
damage were common features. The advanced triple expansion steam engine built for the 
Discovery was rated at 450 horsepower (Smith, 1905) but actually generated 570 indicated 
horsepower when on sea trials (Bryan, 2011, p. 147). 
Gauss had a system to circulate hot water near the seawater intake for the boilers, a 
mechanism to prevent freezing of the feed water and blockage of the pumps. Discovery was 
considered unsinkable, having numerous watertight bulkheads that ensured buoyancy if ice 
breached the hull. Tanks on Discovery served a dual purpose as coalbunkers on the outward 
trip, and then as water ballast after the ship was unloaded. The primacy of magnetic 
observations at sea was the rationale for the timber fabric of both ships. Figure 3 from the 
Sphere newspaper shows the generalised layout of the ship, but note that the magnetic 
observatory is incorrectly illustrated as an independent structure on the fore deck. Its correct 
location is illustrated at Image 2 below. 
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On Discovery, the magnetic observatory was a deck cabin (8’ x 6’ 6”, or 2.4 m x 2.0 
m) on the upper deck directly below the bridge deck. The bridge and observatory were 
interconnected by a speaking tube to facilitate alignment of the dip circle on its gimbal stand 
along the magnetic meridian determined from the ship azimuth compass. Measurements of 
magnetic dip and intensity using the Lloyd-Creak dip circle issued to the expedition required 
accurate alignment. The magnetic observatory was removed during the refit of 1923-24 and 
the arrangement of the bridge is now vastly different to the original construction. The original 
can be seen on the builder’s model at the RGS (Image 2) whereas the ship in the Dundee 
Discovery Museum retains the configuration from the refit.  
 
 
 
Image 2: Builder’s model of the Discovery in the RGS, London. On the right hand side is the bridge deck, with 
life preservers visible on its rails. The magnetic observatory is below the bridge deck, directly beneath the brass-
capped compass binnacle amidships. Note all metal fittings in vicinity of magnetic observatory are non ferrous 
and the shrouds of the standing rigging are hemp (not steel cable) and the deadeyes are wooden. Note also the 
biological laboratories below the forward facing returns of the bridge deck (with portholes) and the drums for 
sounding cables on the forecastle (author’s photo). 
 
The features of the magnetic observatory were described in detail at the lecture of the 
Forty-sixth Session of the Institution of Naval Architects in 1905, quoted in Appendix III, 
where the specifications are also found (Smith, 1905, p. 9). In common with Gauss, there was 
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a zone of thirty feet (nine metres) radius around the magnetic observing station where only 
non-ferrous materials were used. No internal photos of the observatory exist, probably due to 
insufficient light for successful photography with equipment of the time.  
Neither of these ships were perfect specimens of the shipbuilder’s craft and both were 
examples of the compromise between seaworthiness and the capability to withstand ice 
pressure. Discovery’s faults included the famous “Dundee Leak”, a persistent inflow of water 
that was primarily due to the use of unseasoned timbers that shrank allowing ingress of water. 
The specified timber, greenheart oak, requires ten years of seasoning before use. In addition, 
the timber used was found to have abundant wormholes that allowed water to seep between 
the planks indicating: “…inadequate supervision during construction as the affected wood 
should have been rejected” (Bryan, 2011, p. 151). The builders recommended ironwood 
sheathing but they were overruled. Dundee had no stock of seasoned greenheart, whereas 
Archer, an alternate choice of builder, had an abundance of seasoned timber in Norway. 
Although the Discovery was designed after more than two centuries of development of design 
and construction of wooden ships, there were design flaws. The masts were incorrectly 
placed and were too short, making the ship under-canvassed and therefore underpowered 
under sail. Scott mentioned that the ship would have been better for more headsail, and the 
masts should be stepped further forward as the ship carried more weather helm than 
desirable. The designer defended the sail plan stating that it was normal for polar vessels to 
be under-canvassed due to the difficulty of sail handling in polar conditions and the risk of 
losing top hamper in storms (Smith, 1905, pp. 14-15). The location of the masts was rectified 
during the refit of 1923-24 and before Mawson used the ship for his British, Australian, 
Antarctic Research Expedition (BANZARE, 1929-31). The steam power was adequate, but 
there was alarmingly high coal consumption that ultimately limited some of the exploration 
work. Internal strengthening made Discovery a stout vessel, able to survive the two years in 
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the ice at Hut Point (Jones, 1980). Short masts and lack of top hamper meant the Discovery’s 
roll was more pronounced than it would have been with the stabilising influence of more sail. 
The incorrect placement of the masts and the short sail plan also meant that the helmsman 
had to compensate for unbalanced power between the fore and aft of the ship under sail. The 
small rudder, limited in size by the need to draw it into the deck well, made this 
compensation a challenge. 
Introductory notes to the translation of Drygalski’s narrative of the German South 
Polar expedition reveals that the Gauss had shortcomings also. She was underpowered and 
slow, averaging only four or five knots, compared to the predicted speed of seven. She was 
unstable at sea, very dark below decks, the pitch insulation between decks melted in the 
tropics and dripped tar into the living spaces, the steam winches were too underpowered to 
lift the main anchor and, critically, the funnel interfered with the boom of the main mast. In 
addition, the ship steered poorly, mainly due to the small size of the rudder whose dimensions 
(like Discovery’s) were regulated by the size of the well into which it could be retracted 
(Drygalski, 1989, p. x). 
Bruce, after farewelling the Gauss, predicted that she would be the more iceworthy 
ship, and the Discovery would be more seaworthy (Bruce, 1901). Both ships were seaworthy 
for the long passages to Antarctica and back, but extreme rolling caused discomfort, 
especially on Discovery, and both were slow, even under sail and steam. Both ships survived 
being ice-bound, but Gauss suffered a more rigorous test having been caught in unprotected 
waters.  
4.6 Instructions and expectations 
Instructions to the expedition came from a number of official and non-official sources. The 
top level of guidance to the operations of the Discovery was in the two sets of instructions 
drawn up for commander and scientific director respectively. These documents were 
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instruments of the RGS and RS joint organising committee and were countersigned by 
members on 20 May 1901 (British National Antarctic Expedition, 1901).  
4.6.1 Evolution of the official instructions 
Instructions such as these are germane to the success of the scientific or exploratory elements 
of any voyage of reconnaissance and inquiry. The boundaries of responsibility and power of 
the leaders are specified and the agenda for activities and logistics is explicit. In the case of 
Ross, the instructions (drawn up by the Admiralty, but most likely formulated by Ross 
himself) leave no doubt regarding the high value placed on accurate, complete and sustained 
performance of magnetic science throughout the expedition. The Discovery instructions do 
not provide the same wealth of theoretical or practical background information related to the 
performance of magnetic science, but they do clearly stress the operations of the magnetic 
program and its priority over other disciplines. 
4.6.2 Gregory’s plan of operations 
During 1900 Gregory was developing plans for the scientific program of the expedition even 
before his appointment was confirmed. In a series of letters during that year he outlined his 
intentions for the scientific program (and recruitment of the civilian scientific staff) that vary 
greatly from the final instructions, and from the operations that resulted under Markham and 
Scott’s leadership. One cannot gauge whether Gregory misunderstood Markham’s 
motivations and supreme control over the expedition preparations (this is unlikely) or 
whether he was optimistic that his own agenda might prevail. It was inevitable that there 
would be direct confrontation and it was a confrontation between the RS and Markham of the 
RGS, rather than between Gregory and Scott (Leake, 2011, pp. 65-70).  
The first and most detailed outline of Gregory’s proposed program was by letter to 
Edward Bagnall Poulton (1856-1943), the senior RS representative on the expedition’s Joint 
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Organising Committee, on the assumption that the RS was in control of matters related to 
science (Gregory, 1900a). His subsequent correspondence to Markham conveys a tone of 
surprise that Poulton is not the conduit for communication on scientific matters. Gregory’s 
follow up correspondence seeks confirmation of many of the elements laid out in his 
proposed planning and logistics in the Poulton letter. Markham failed to respond in a manner 
that clarified Gregory’s concerns and he assumed that silence on certain matters indicated 
agreement. A schedule of five cruises in a campaign spanning 1901 to 1904 included the 
possibility of the ship only overwintering in the Antarctic ice pack during one winter season, 
after dropping a scientific party in McMurdo Bay. Explicit separation between work of a 
landed party and work of the ship at sea is detailed and Gregory is clear about his intention to 
gain the maximum benefit of the vessel’s utility for marine science. The schedule of proposed 
cruises was: 
• Cruise A-October 1901 to March 1902 coasting Wilkes Land 
• Cruise B-After resupply in Melbourne, depart in April 1902 and continue along 
former line, or follow a similar but more northerly transect until September 1902.  
• Cruise C- After further resupply in Melbourne depart in November 1902 and steam to 
McMurdo Bay and land a party to remain until early 1904. In the meantime the ship 
carries on scientific work in the high latitudes south of the Pacific, returning to 
Melbourne or New Zealand by January 1904. 
• Cruise D-Work of the land party is described here and includes establishment of high 
altitude meteorological stations on Mount Erebus or Mount Terror, and a sledge 
journey to the south magnetic pole. Land party to be ready for pick up by 8 February 
1904. 
• Cruise E-Voyage back to England with remaining scientific work in the zone north of 
the ice pack and across the Atlantic or Indian oceans. 
Cruise A was intended as a shakedown trial for all equipment and sledging kit if a brief 
landing of less than ten days was made in Wilkes Land. The remaining work at sea would 
include magnetic and meteorological observation, geographical surveying, biological 
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collection from all depths, chemistry and temperature of seawater and the collection of deep-
sea deposits, boulders and erratics dropped by icebergs. The landing party would concentrate 
on meteorological observations at the Winter Station, magnetic observations and 
determinations of the precise locality of the south magnetic pole, geodetic work, records of 
tidal variation, seismic observations, biological collecting, investigation of the physics of 
glacier ice and determination of the geographical and geological structure of the Antarctic 
land mass. After some notes regarding recruitment of the scientific staff the proposal moves 
to equipment and logistics. Dog teams are considered vital and, in the event of a “naval 
party” being landed as well as a scientific party, there must be provision for the scientific 
party to have first call on sledges, dogs and equipment. Gregory stressed the importance of 
early recruitment and preparation: 
I should not care to join the expedition unless it be possible to secure a scientific staff 
of men who are equipped with the training of experts and who are inspired by 
scientific enthusiasm, and unless the conditions are as favourable as possible to 
efficient work. And efficiency in this expedition seems to me to depend on an 
adequate grant for scientific equipment, sympathetic cooperation with the naval staff 
and ample time before hand for preparation study and experiment. 
(Gregory, 1900a) 
Gregory then commented on the manner in which an early agreement regarding scientific 
analysis and publications of the scientific collections should be handled and expressed the 
opinion that editorship of the publications should be managed jointly by a member of the 
scientific staff with a member of the Joint Committee. He proposed that the relations between 
the Captain and the head of the scientific staff should be precisely defined and explicit, in 
written form, and addressed to both. The acquisition of instruments and polar equipment and 
recommendations for inclusions in the expedition library are mentioned before closure of the 
proposal. Although this scheme is not strictly a set of instructions, it is a guiding document 
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that, in other circumstances, might have been used to formulate comprehensive instructions 
similar to the Admiralty instructions to Ross. 
Disagreement over the instructions to the expedition, especially with respect to the 
leadership and control, was the issue that precipitated Gregory’s resignation in May 1901. 
Gregory had always imagined that the task of the ship’s commander was to provide support 
and logistics for the scientific program and that the commander would act in a subordinate, or 
at least a collegial role with director of the civilian scientific party.  
The captain would, I hope, be instructed to give such assistance from the crew as may 
be required in dredging, low [sic] netting etc., to place boats when required at the 
disposal of the Scientific Staff, if possible, and to consult with the Scientific leader as 
to the route to be followed, in case deviations may be advisable to pursue any line that 
promises to yield interesting results.  
(Gregory, 1900a) 
Gregory’s assumptions are further revealed in a subsequent letter to Markham where he 
wrote: “I presume that I should be in command of the land station & the sledge work” 
(Gregory, 1900b). His final letter to Markham in this correspondence about work and 
management of the expedition was written in London after Gregory returned from his 
professorial post in Melbourne to finalise planning and organisation for the expedition 
(Gregory, 1900c). Gregory discussed the limitations that landing a shore party early in the 
Antarctic summer would place on the capability of the ship to carry out coastal exploration 
and science. He raised the possibility that the ship might be caught in pack ice early in the 
season in which case nominal scientific results would be gained, and although it was possible 
they might be brilliant, the scope of operation would be limited. Gregory viewed the land 
party as only one element of an extensive scientific program covering a range of disciplines.  
Only one reference appears in his correspondence regarding an attempt to achieve a sledge 
journey to high southern latitudes, and this is regarding the advisability of using dog teams 
for transport as “every extra pound of food that we carry will enable us to go four miles 
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further south.” Gregory also suggests a sledge journey to the south magnetic pole in the 
austral spring of 1903 as an activity of his proposed “Cruise D” (Gregory, 1900a).  
Markham almost immediately moved to cut off Gregory’s control of, and involvement 
with, the expedition when he responded in a sarcastic tone clarifying his own conceptions of 
the arrangements for the leadership and management, and effectively inviting Gregory to 
resign.  
I am exceedingly sorry if you have been inconvenienced and led to suppose that the 
organisation of the expedition was other than what it is, and must be. I thought my 
views were perfectly well known through my many addresses and lectures. 
I have always maintained that the expedition should be a naval one. 
 
He continued “I much regret the loss of your services if this is to be” (Markham, 1901b). This 
was not the final example of control over the official expedition instructions exerted by 
Markham.  
4.6.3 Directives in the official instructions 
The final official instructions to the scientific director are brief and provide little practical 
guidance. Point three states “You will direct the scientific work of the gentlemen who have 
been appointed to assist you” and point four names them. The subsequent points encourage 
cooperation between the scientific director and the Commander “to secure the success of the 
enterprise” but there is no statement of objectives so there is no guide as to what might 
constitute “success.” All collections, logs, journals, charts, drawings, photographs, 
observations and scientific data would be the joint property of the two societies and the 
scientific director was expected to superintend their distribution, analysis and preparation for 
publication, as well as making contributions to the official narrative of the voyage. Staff 
could not communicate with the press and no personal narratives, magazine or journal articles 
may be published until six months after the official version was released. The scientific 
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director, with concurrence of the commander may fill any vacancies arising, and scientific 
staff travel at their own risk (British National Antarctic Expedition, 1901).  
The sections of the instructions to the commander relevant to scientific programs are 
paraphrased here. The objectives are firstly, to determine the nature, condition and extent of 
the polar lands within the scope of exploration and secondly, to make a magnetic survey of 
southern regions to the south of the fortieth parallel and to carry out biological and physical 
researches. Executive officers of the ship under the commander’s immediate control would 
be responsible for magnetic and meteorological observations, astronomical observations, 
surveying, charting and sounding operations.  The scientific director and the civilian staff are 
“under your command” but open communications and consideration as a colleague was to be 
maintained. The success of the expedition as a whole would rely on “harmonious work and 
hearty cooperation.” Point seven addresses magnetic science and notes that magnetic 
instruments for use on board and ashore have been provided, and that Captain Ettrick Creak 
(1835-1920) had drawn up instructions for their use, and he, and Kew observatory had 
provided training. This refers to the section on magnetism contained in George Murray’s 
(1858-1911) Antarctic Manual (Murray & RGS, 1901, pp. 19-30). Comments regarding the 
specialised construction of the ship and its magnetic observatory led to “We, therefore, 
impress upon you that the greatest importance is attached to the series of magnetic 
observations to be taken under your superintendence, and we desire that you will spare no 
pains to ensure their accuracy and continuity.” Mention is made of desired observations at sea 
between the Cape and the Antarctic base station, and south of the fortieth parallel. Some 
points on exploration and other disciplines follow then at point eleven magnetic and 
meteorological work are again mentioned as “you will follow the programme arranged 
between the German and British Committees, with the terms of which you are acquainted.” 
Deep-sea soundings, dredging, water sampling and biological collection were to be carried 
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out as often as possible according to the directions contained in Murray’s Antarctic Manual. 
Instructions regarding logistics include proceeding to Melbourne or Lyttelton then coastal 
Antarctic exploration and identification of a suitable landing place. Points 17 and 18 relate to 
the work to be carried out in the event of overwintering the ship in Antarctica. Support for the 
scientific team was to be provided by allowing “all facilities for the prosecution of their 
researches.” Point 19 discussed operations in the event of the ship not overwintering but 
leaving behind a landed party on the ice. Hints regarding outcomes were contained in the 
Point 21 statement “…we fully confide in your combined energy and prudence for the 
successful issue of a voyage which will command the attention of all persons interested in 
navigation and science throughout the civilised world.” Instructions regarding ownership of 
the intellectual properties are similar to those stated in the instructions to the scientific 
director. After some details of ship registration, insurance and alternate leadership in case of 
misadventure, the instructions close with motherhood statements to impress the importance of 
the venture on the commander including “The Discovery is the first ship that has ever been 
built expressly for scientific purposes in these kingdoms” and “The Expedition is an 
undertaking of national importance: and science cannot fail to benefit from the efforts of 
those engaged in it” (British National Antarctic Expedition, 1901). 
The instructions became as confused as the roles of the commander and scientific 
director after the considerable wrangling between the two societies regarding the contents of 
the instructions between January and May of 1901. The main issue of contention was 
regarding the commander’s prerogative to overwinter the ship in Antarctica, and the balance 
between exploration and science that would be tipped by any decision on the overwintering 
decision. Gregory had indicated that the investment in the vessel would best be repaid by 
dropping a land party for continental exploration and science, thus freeing the ship to make 
the various marine surveys he detailed in his proposed plan of operations. Overwintering the 
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ship in the ice limited the science program at sea but served Markham’s unspoken agenda of 
a geographic South Pole bid, or at least high southern latitude trek. 
Markham’s personal notes record the sequence of committee activities and 
correspondence between the societies regarding the disagreement over his first draft of 
instructions presented in January 1901. He detailed his version of events in his memoirs as 
The Attempt to Wreck the Expedition (Markham & Holland, 1986, pp. 133-141). The Joint 
Committee was in disarray, and the balance of power shifted to the RGS by resignation of 
three key members in response to their disapproval of the proceedings of the committee 
(Yelverton, 2000, p. 49).  
Minutes of the RGS Council meeting of 17 April 1901 provided the justifications for 
rejection of the RS version of instructions. They comment on the issue of landing a separate 
party then retreating north with the ship: 
 The existing difficulty has mainly arisen from the fact that only a 
single ship is to be employed; but as the funds of the Expedition do not at present 
admit of the employment of a second vessel, it seems essential to make the best of the 
situation and to adopt such a policy as will not practically defeat either of the two 
primary objectives, for the attainment of which the Antarctic Fund has been 
subscribed. 
 In making the above remarks, the Council of the RGS do not ignore the 
importance of a geological investigation of the volcanic regions, or of biological and 
other researches on shore. On the contrary they are inclined to believe that these 
objects may be more fully secured by the entire strength of the Expedition than by a 
very small detached party, which may be thrown out of action by the death or sickness 
of one or two of its members.  
(RGS, 1901) 
The matter of the intent of the instructions and the free hand of the expedition commander 
regarding logistics was finally settled in early May 1901 with the collateral damage to the 
prospects of the expedition being the resignation of Gregory. Yelverton covers the episode in 
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detail and concludes that with just eight months left before departure “The entire debilitating 
diversion from the business of organising the expedition, which nearly robbed it of the man 
chosen to lead it, had effectively removed the man who would have been Scott’s most 
influential aide at the most crucial stage of procurement” (Yelverton, 2000, p. 51). Scott was 
also on the verge of resignation, but they both rose above the acrimony between the societies 
and remained on cordial terms (Leake, 2011, p. 70). 
4.6.4 The Antarctic Manual 
The second level of instruction to the scientific program is found in Murray’s Antarctic 
Manual (Murray & RGS, 1901) with a section on terrestrial magnetism written by Creak 
(Creak, 1901d). The objective of securing the most complete set of observations as 
circumstances permit is explicit and general comments regarding the magnetic observatories 
for determination of the constants of the instruments (Kew and Melbourne), and 
establishment of an Antarctic base station are followed by:  
observations of the magnetic elements at sea are of great importance. It is with this 
view of the value of such observations that the ship has been specially designed, with 
every cause of disturbance from iron eliminated within a radius of 30 feet from the 
centre of the ship’s observatory. 
(Creak, 1901d, p. 20) 
Separate lists of instruments provided for the on-board and ashore work precede general 
instructions for making the observations.  
For low latitude land station observations the techniques for operation of the unifilar 
magnetometer, Barrow’s circle, the Lloyd-Creak Circle and Fox circle are not provided as 
they were available in the Admiralty Manual of Scientific Enquiry, and special instructions 
for the Eschenhagen variometer would be supplied separately. Reference is made to 
standardising instruments at the Cape of Good Hope (although the Cape is not mentioned as a 
waypoint in the Joint Committee official instructions) and Melbourne. These operations were 
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critical as “The value of the observations of Intensity in Antarctic regions with Lloyd’s 
needles is dependant upon the accuracy with which these base observations are made.”  The 
Antarctic base observations and those to be made on sledging journeys are specified, with 
mention of the term days agreed for synchronous observations. “As complete a magnetic 
survey of the neighbourhood of this Southern base as possible should be made…”  (Murray 
& RGS, 1901, p. 22).  Recommendations regarding the best instruments to use in different 
circumstances complete the section on Antarctic land observations. 
Guidance regarding observations on board ship commences with reflection on the great 
value of observations to be made across the large tracts of open ocean. Observations on board 
would show the extent of deviation caused by ferrous elements of the ship, so methods of 
computing the corrections for declination, inclination and total force are included. Preferred 
areas of operation for magnetic observations at sea are specified, notably between the Cape 
and Melbourne at a latitude of 40° S. and the general instructions include a number of items 
of importance to the magnetic program: 
• Swing the ship for compass deviation as often as possible 
• Declination should be observed twice daily at sea when the sun’s altitude is below 30° 
• Methods of operation for the Fox circle at sea are specified 
• Dip and Force should be observed daily at sea, and twice daily in high southern 
latitudes 
• Charts of declination and total force are supplied and must be considered 
approximations of the truth, but may be an aid to determining the appropriate weights 
to be used on Lloyd’s needles for force 
• Comparison between disturbances of the needle on board compared to on the ice is a 
worthy enquiry 
• Forms are supplied for recording observations with sufficient quantity to send 
duplicates back to England as opportunity arises 
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The final section of the terrestrial magnetism instructions in the manual relates to 
international cooperation for the years 1902 and 1903. This section mentions the 
simultaneous observations of the magnetic condition of the earth using observing stations 
“…distributed over the globe with a uniformity never before attained” (Murray & RGS, 
1901, p. 28) and the continuous and term day observing regimes are specified.  
Further instructions for the physicist regarding seismology, pendulum studies for gravity, 
atmospheric electricity, astronomy (including special instructions for the solar eclipse of 
September 1903) and observations of the aurora are found amidst lengthy notes on climate 
and meteorology, chemical and physical seawater analysis, geology, vulcanism, ice 
observations, zoology, botany, sledge travel and geography. Although the volume includes 
selections of narratives from earlier explorers including Wilkes and d’Urville, no extract 
appears from the narrative of Ross.  
4.6.5 Agreed protocols with the German South Polar expedition 
A third level of documents providing guidance to the scientific team on Discovery is 
correspondence and records of agreement between the organising committees of the BNAE 
and the German South Polar Expedition. These are detailed agreements regarding 
instruments, planned observations at sea and at land-based observatories, term days and hours 
for synchronous observations, general background comments and the formulae to be used for 
data reduction.  At the International Geographical Congress of 1899 in Berlin, the German 
Commission announced that, with respect to cooperation between Germany and England  “a 
perfect understanding exists regarding the proposed terrestrial-magnetic and meteorological 
programme for the South Polar expedition. As regards the Magnetic Programme the 
differences are of little or no importance” (International Geographical Congress, 1900). The 
minutes of the (German) sub-committee of the Scientific Council for Meteorology and 
Terrestrial Magnetism from the 24 November 1899 meeting (translated by Mill) contain the 
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protocols for observations of the three magnetic elements at sea on a daily basis. 
Arrangements for the land stations in Antarctica, such as maintaining constant temperatures 
in the observation huts and determining the constants for the registering apparatus precede 
guidance about measuring intensity during overland journeys. The kit of instruments for the 
land stations (Kerguelen and Antarctica) as well as those considered suitable for overland 
travel are all specified. Prospective cooperative relationships with Argentina (Staten Island), 
the US (Alaska and Honolulu) and the Swedish expedition are discussed, in addition to the 
British contributions from Melbourne and Cape Town observatories. Detailed instructions are 
provided in relation to meteorology (Sub-Committee of the Scientific Council for 
Meteorology and Terrestrial Magnetism, 1899).  
A more detailed report by the English including the exact make and quantity of 
magnetic instruments and prospective observing sites was written about the same time (but 
the archive is undated), and assumes the ship (Discovery) would not remain in the south over 
winter (Antarctic Expedition, n.d.). The header specifically stated this information is to be 
communicated to the German Antarctic Committee. The invention of the Lloyd-Creak 
magnetometer to solve the difficulties in determining the magnetic force (intensity) at sea and 
the design of the magnetic observatory on board were both mentioned. This document 
indicates the intention to make Melbourne the expedition’s magnetic base station and that the 
land party in Antarctica would probably be in the vicinity of Cape Adare. This report has 
similar conclusions to the German sub-committee’s regarding instruments and types of 
observations, but meteorology is not included. Drygalski’s letter to Markham of 25 February 
1901 indicates that German vessels in the Southern Ocean during the observing period will be 
requested to maintain observations for magnetic deviation and meteorology and he asks that 
Markham request similar arrangements for British vessels (Drygalski, 1901). No archival 
material confirms Markham made any formal arrangements opf this type. 
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All the elements of the British magnetic program are condensed into one 
comprehensive document, the Programme of Scheme of International Observations of 
Terrestrial Magnetism During the Period of Antarctic Research. 1902-1903. The object of 
observations is to “…procure a series of synoptic charts which will allow of the variations in 
the magnetic condition of the whole earth being traced in detail during a definite period, and 
so to provide the necessary basis from which alone the fundamental problems of terrestrial 
magnetism can be more clearly approached” (British National Antarctic Expedition, n.d. b). 
The historic and cultural contexts reviewed early in this chapter influenced the 
ultimate success or failure of the scientific program of frontier polar expeditions of scientific 
exploration around the turn of the twentieth century. The RN expeditions on which the 
Discovery was modelled were mostly large expeditions, focused on exploration, not science 
and related to the mercantile interest in a North-West passage trading route to the Orient. In 
spite of their long tradition of British scientific exploration, the RN and the British 
government were disinterested in Markham’s vision of an Antarctic expedition until it 
became clear that there was strong institutional and philanthropic support, and that other 
nations might cause embarrassment by pre-empting the British. 
Terrestrial magnetic science had grown more sophisticated during the Victorian era 
with advances in mathematical modelling and better instruments, but there had been no leaps 
in theory to explain the sources of the observed phenomena. Patronage and institutional 
support for the expedition were necessary elements used by Markham during the evolution of 
the expedition to acquire funding. The expedition was lavishly funded by virtue of the 
prestige brought by the RS involvement and the initial prospects of abundant, high quality 
scientific research. Significant investment was made in the vessel to support both exploration 
and research and commissioning the construction of the vessel was the first operational step 
of the expedition.  
  
144 
International collaboration with the German program in meteorology and terrestrial 
magnetism commenced well through frequent and clear communication between the 
organising committees. The prospect of combining data from the Swedes, Americans and 
Argentinians added opportunities for an unprecedented network of magnetic observations 
across the southern hemisphere. There was no shortage of general instructions to the physicist 
regarding the magnetic program but the contribution by the RS to the scientific program 
diminished progressively from the moment of its first involvement. Instructions to the 
commander of the expedition (as ultimate leader) gave an open hand regarding logistics and 
the program of operations. The thesis now moves to description and analysis of operational 
matters commencing with recruitment and training of the scientific practitioners before 
progressing to the first phase of the expedition work, science at sea. 
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Chapter 5: Commencement of operations and maritime science  
Dr Charles Chree (1860-1928), Superintendent of the Observatory Department of the 
National Physical Laboratory, stated in his 1908 presidential address to the Physical Society 
of London: 
When referring to any British national undertaking, such as a war or a scientific 
expedition, one is expected to apologise for a greater or less amount of preliminary 
muddle. Perhaps as a variant I may be allowed to say a few words as to what should 
in my opinion be done when the next National Scientific Expedition is being 
prepared…All the apparatus for the expedition should be ready and thoroughly tested 
at least three months before the expedition sets out, and the observers should use this 
apparatus sufficiently to become entirely at home with it. A programme [for each 
subject] should be drawn up and the observers practised in its execution…The 
necessity for a programme would no doubt be lessened if the expedition were under 
the command of a Physicist of resource and ripe experience…It might also serve a 
useful purpose [] if, on the return of the expedition and after a general examination of 
its results, something equivalent to a scientific court-martial were held by a competent 
judicial body whose expressions of approval or blame would carry weight. 
(Chree 1908b) 
Chree was among the first rank of physicists in Britain and although he had contributed 
significantly to the the scientific report on terrestrial magnetism from the Discovery (Royal 
Society, 1909) these comments were directed at what he perceived as deficiencies in 
preparations and they probably disturbed Scott, as they came at a time when his second 
(Terra Nova) expedition was in preparation and fundraising relied partly on scientific 
credibility.  
With the exception of construction of the expedition vessel discussed above, this 
chapter considers the first active operational steps of the expedition including the recruitment 
and training of key scientific staff. It then moves to the events that unfolded during the 
outbound voyage to New Zealand, the first phase of the expedition’s scientific work. 
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Research commenced soon after the departure from Cowes on 6 August 1901 and evolved 
during the passage through the Atlantic, across the Indian and Southern Oceans, then south 
from Christchurch to the Ross Sea. The mettle of the scientists, the ship and the equipment 
were tested early in the voyage.  
5.1 Pre-departure preparations, recruitment and training 
It is self evident that the quality and quantity of an expedition’s scientific work relies on the 
skills, knowledge and diligence of the scientific staff. Skill can be assured by selection and 
training but experience must be gathered: both are necessary for quality scientific inquiry. 
Recruitment commenced in Markham’s mind long before the funding was secure or 
construction of the vessel had commenced. He had been considering potential RN officers 
since at least 1887 (Markham & Holland, 1986, p. 3) and secured the services of Scott as 
commander in mid 1900, about six months after Gregory had been offered the scientific 
leadership position. This marked the commencement of a “top down” process to fill the 
positions of the officers, crew, civilian scientific staff and a handful of others. This section 
reviews the recruitment criteria and training strategies, then assays the effort made to find 
competent scientists that were well suited to fieldwork in an extraordinary environment.   
5.1.1 Recruitment processes 
Appointment to the scientific staff of a large, well funded polar expedition supported by 
sponsorship from learned societies was a prestigious position in 1901, as it is now. Such a 
position provided opportunities for personal scientific achievement and public recognition. 
For the Discovery, staff were mostly brought to the attention of the management committee 
by interested parties and most were engaged by direct offers. No public or transparent process 
was undertaken to find applicants for key positions.   
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5.1.2 Positions 
The complement of the Discovery for most of the expedition was around 45. The commander 
of the vessel became the overall leader of the expedition but the position of director of the 
civilian scientific staff had initially been at the top of the hierarchy. The commissioned 
officers who made up the wardroom were the commander, lieutenants, and the chief engineer. 
There were two surgeons who doubled in a scientific research capacity. The dual role of these 
men reflected the tradition of RN naturalist surgeons, although in previous times they would 
have been officers, not civilians. Other scientists included a marine biologist, a geologist, and 
a physicist. Ships officers had duties in relation to meteorology, sounding, dredging, seawater 
analysis, hydrography and cartography. Non-commissioned crew (the lower deck) ultimately 
took on a range of scientific duties at sea and ashore in Antarctica, especially for 
meteorological observations. Members of the expedition’s Joint Committee countersigned 
official letters of appointment, but neither that committee, nor the sub committees 
demonstrated any real influence in the selection process.   
5.1.3 Selection of leaders 
There are different versions describing Scott’s recruitment as commander of the expedition. 
In his narrative, Voyage of Discovery he describes an accidental encounter with Markham on 
the streets of London, an invitation back to Markham’s rooms where he was made familiar 
with the position, then a subsequent successful written application (Scott, 1905b, Vol. 1, p. 
32). Markham’s notes show that he mused at considerable depth on the qualities required for 
the role of commander and who amongst the crop of RN officers might fit those criteria and 
who might also be released from the Navy at the time (Markham, 1898b). Gregory had 
proposed that an ice master and crew with high latitude experience might best be found 
amongst the Dundee whaling fleet (Gregory, 1900a) but Markham was explicit in his 
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preference for an RN commander and crew. Markham’s archives contain his criteria for 
selection: 
The appointment of a leader to the Antarctic Expedition is the most important 
step of all. He should be a naval officer, he should be in the regular line and not in the 
surveying branch, and he should be young, not more than 35; but preferably some 
years younger than that. 
 All previous good work in the Polar regions has been done by young officers 
in the regular line; those in the surveying branch who have been employed on polar 
service, have been failures. Old officers, all past 40, have failed and have been unable 
to take the lead in expeditions they nominally commanded. They are physically unfit.  
(Markham, 1898b)  
Markham’s analysis covered a dozen potential RN officers and Scott was not his first choice. 
Captain George Egerton (1852 –1940) is described by Markham as “ the ‘beau ideal’ of a 
polar commander in every respect, a born leader of men” and “the best man afar and away” 
except for his age (46). He declined Markham’s offer. Commander John de Robeck (1862 –
1928) was the second choice but the Admiralty declined to release him. Scott fitted 
Markham’s preference for a young lieutenant trained in the torpedo school. “All the 
experience of the past warns us against selecting a commander who is over 35, or who has 
been brought up in the surveying branch” (Markham, 1898b, p. 38). Scott admitted having no 
inclination towards scientific or polar exploration. He was supporting his mother and sisters 
after his father and brother had died. Scott was only interested in forging a successful career 
in the Navy, and his best prospects were as a specialist in torpedo warfare. Markham worked 
alone to arrange the appointment of Scott. He wrote directly to the Admiralty specifically 
requesting the release of Scott for the expedition (Leake, 2011, p. 66). The Joint Committee 
had not been consulted but Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty, assumed it was official, and 
that the request was the result of committee deliberations. The RS took umbrage at this slight 
of hand and it was an issue that almost caused their withdrawal from involvement with the 
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expedition (Jones, 2011, p. 120). Scott’s appointment was confirmed on 25 May 1900 
although one harsh assessment states he had “no scientific training or expertise, had never led 
any expedition anywhere, had no experience in polar travel or skiing, had been chosen 
primarily to lead the race to the Pole and bring glory to the navy and the nation” (Leake, 
2011, p. 66). The previous day had seen a factional fight in the Sub-Committee of Naval 
Officers, with a motion by the influential bloc comprised of Wharton, Tizard and Creak, that 
an alternate choice be appointed. The motion was lost and Scott was confirmed (British 
National Antarctic Expedition, 1899).  
There were two ideal candidates for the scientific leadership: Bruce and Gregory. 
Bruce had an impeccable scholarly, expeditionary and field research background. He had 
developed an interest in natural history early in his academic career and, while studying 
medicine at the University of Edinburgh, he spent a great deal of time with the oceanographer 
Murray, analysing the collections from the Challenger expedition. This provided “invaluable 
training in both the taxonomy and the method of collating scientific data, and in assisting 
with the preparation of scientific reports and the necessary academic rigour that goes with the 
presentation of scientific findings” (Johnson, 2010 a, p. 18). Bruce joined the Dundee 
Whaling Expedition of 1892 (Balaena, Active, Diana and Polar Star) as oceanographer. In 
1895 and 1896 Bruce gained extensive practical training in meteorological observing in 
extreme climates at the high altitude Ben Nevis observatory in Scotland with sub zero winter 
average temperatures. Bruce then joined the Jackson-Harmsworth Arctic expedition (1894-
1897) as naturalist, travelling on the Windward relief voyage of 1896. On that expedition he 
performed considerable polar fieldwork and registered travel and survival experience. 
Subsequently, Bruce was engaged in scientific work (four hourly meteorological 
observations, seawater temperatures and some trawling) on the 1898 Arctic voyage of 
Blencathra. That expedition encountered Princesse Alice, the research vessel of Albert I, the 
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Prince of Monaco (1848-1922) by chance. Bruce learned a great deal from the meeting as the 
Prince was an avid oceanographer and his vessel was well equipped for the work (Johnson 
2010a). Bruce wrote to Markham early in the Discovery expedition’s preparations offering 
his services to the RGS expedition and summarizing his suitability for a position: 
For the past seven years I have been training myself with a view of making myself 
more efficient for Polar Service. I have spent one summer in the Antarctic Regions 
three summers and one winter in the Arctic Regions, and more than a year on the 
summit of Ben Nevis in charge of the observatory. I am a ‘ski’ runner and have taken 
part in sledging expeditions. 
In addition to my ordinary University training in mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, 
Botany, Zoology, Human anatomy, Physiology and Embryology, I have served in the 
Challenger Office under Dr. (now Sir) John Murray; as Demonstrator in Botany in the 
University of Edinburgh; and, as Demonstrator and afterwards assistant in Zoology in 
the School of Medicine of the Royal College of Surgeons and Physicians.  
(Bruce, 1899) 
Markham responded on 17 April 1899 that no decisions had been made regarding personnel 
(Baughman, 1999, p. 29). Bruce waited for further advice from Markham, but in the 
meantime committed the faux pas of presenting his preliminary findings from the Jackson-
Harmsworth expedition to the Royal Scottish Geographical Society, not the RGS. Mill wrote 
advising that the action was naïve:  
The RGS naturally wished to have the first news of your arctic work and as you went 
in my place I had expected you would have given the paper to the society that would 
not let me go! …But you don’t realise how necessary it is to keep on cordial terms 
with such powerful corporations as the RGS if you hope to enlist their aid in helping 
you to subsequent expeditions.  
(Mill, 1899)  
This partly explains Markham’s poor treatment of Bruce as after nearly a year of waiting, 
Markham offered Bruce an assistant’s place as naturalist on 21 March 1900, but not a 
leadership position (Bruce, 1900). Bruce declined then made his own expedition plans public. 
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Markham berated Bruce, “I am very sorry to hear that an attempt is to be made in Edinburgh 
to divert funds from the Antarctic Expedition; in order to get up a rival enterprise” 
(Markham, 1900b). Bruce successfully secured funding and the Scottish National Antarctic 
Expedition (Scotia) of 1902-04 was developed with almost purely scientific in its objectives 
(Johnson, 2010b). Bruce had been an ideal prospective scientific director for the Discovery 
expedition. 
Gregory was also well suited to the work at hand. He was aged 35 and already had a 
considerable research and publication track record as well as extensive field experience when 
offered the post as scientific director of the expedition. He completed his First Class Degree 
in Geology in 1891 with a range of natural science subjects. He also studied simultaneously 
at the Royal School of Mines, wrote scholarly articles and lectured on geology and 
palaeontology (Leake, 2011, p. 6). Through a competitive process he gained a position as 
assistant at the BMNH in 1887 describing, cataloguing and collecting specimens. The scope 
of his publications broadened to include glaciology, coral reef formation and Darwin’s 
theories, then he undertook a study tour of museums and geologised around North America in 
1890-91. He joined an expedition to East Africa in 1892-93 that was really a covert 
intelligence gathering and mapping enterprise, covertly sponsored by the British War Office. 
Gregory’s main role was surveying and mapping, and investigation of possible sources of 
mineral wealth (Leake, 2011, p. 20). Gregory had a personal interest in finding the cause of 
the trough that runs from the Dead Sea, down through the Red Sea and into Tanganyika. The 
“Great Lake Rudolf Expedition” fell into disarray through poor disorganisation and rampant 
ill health amongst the large cohort of indigenous porters and their leaders. Gregory, using his 
own funds, re-formed the remains of that campaign into a new scientific expedition. He 
headed inland from Mombasa to the region of Lake Baringo where he surveyed key features 
of the rift valley walls, recording topography, geological and archaeological features during a 
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1,650-mile (2,640 kilometre) trek over five months. This exploration and research generated 
many publications and coined the phrase “Great Rift Valley” (Leake, 2011, p. 27).  
His DSc was awarded in his absence in 1893 on the strength of a major paper he 
wrote describing the geological history of the region extending from Malta, through France, 
Corsica, Italy, Switzerland and Austria using evidence from microfossils (Leake, 2011, p. 
29). On his return from Africa he continued active involvement in learned societies, then 
joined Conway’s expedition to explore the interior of Spitzbergen (Svalbard) in 1896. 
“Gregory’s talents as an all-round biologist, geologist, geographer, mountaineer, skier and 
enduring walker, together with his keen interest in glaciation and its effects, his general 
amiability and proven toughness, undoubtedly explained his inclusion” (Leake, 2011, p. 42).  
Gregory was in England when the executive granted approval of Gregory’s 
appointment to the expedition in November 1899 as scientific director of the Discovery, then 
departed for Australia to take up his new appointment as Chair of Geology at Melbourne 
University. Gregory arranged leave from his position at the university from November 1901 
to March 1902, then from November 1902 to March 1904, in accordance with his proposed 
research voyages and assuming an overwintering party during 1903.  
Scott’s appointment as commander in May 1900 brought a shift in Gregory’s status, 
his position was thereafter referred to as “Head of the Civilian Scientific Staff.” As a result 
his status in the expedition hierarchy became unclear, especially with respect to the 
supervision of the ship’s officers who were to be engaged in scientific work. Gregory 
continued planning from Melbourne then returned to England in October 1900. He travelled 
to Dundee to meet with Scott to clarify their roles. Gregory gave Scott a copy of his outline 
of the program sent to and believed that the return of the document the following day without 
comment indicated Scott’s assent, but Gregory’s confusion continued. Behind the scenes the 
Joint Committee was split into factions over the conflicting aims of the expedition. The 
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essential problem was that the RGS under Markham’s control was promoting exploration by 
making a polar trek the highest priority, which demoted the scientific program to second 
rank. This contradicted the intentions of the RS whose priority was naturally the scientific 
program. This matter also caused an internal split amongst the RGS members (Leake, 2011, 
p. 66). With the exception of a brief trip to the United States, Gregory remained in England 
until mid February 1901 and continued preparations and his attempts to clarify the program 
and leadership roles. During January 1901 Gregory had drafted the instructions he expected 
would become embedded as official by the Joint Committee, but was given a clear message 
of disapproval by Markham and Scott to the effect that Gregory would be subordinate to 
Scott and the civilian scientific staff were accessory and subordinate (Leake, 2011, p. 67). 
Gregory wanted to resign but representatives of the RS convinced him not to do so, as it 
would have been a complete victory for Markham. Just before Gregory was due to sail for 
Melbourne, a compromise was reached that included landing a small scientific party under 
Gregory’s control. During the voyage he wrote a revised provisional version of the expedition 
plan that was published in Nature (Gregory, 1901c). A number of meetings of the Joint 
Committee were held after he left concerning whether or not there should be an 
overwintering party, and if so, should the ship remain in Antarctica? The RGS saw any 
obligation for the ship to install an overwintering party, then retreat north, as a possible 
hindrance to exploration, but the RS could not see how the main scientific objectives (a 
year’s continuous magnetic and meteorological observations) could be achieved without a 
landed party. In the end “The RS gave way largely because the RGS had raised the major 
financial contributions, the impasse seemed unbridgeable, and no-one at the RS had the 
determination to match that shown by Markham” (Leake, 2011, p. 68). The Joint Committee 
approved the amendment at its 26 April meeting leaving it the commander’s prerogative to 
decide whether there would be a landing party and whether the ship would stay in Antarctica 
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over winter. Markham wrote to Alfred Kempe (1849-1922) the treasurer of the RS explaining 
the situation:  
As to the conference the main points we urge are 
1. Freedom for the commander to prosecute exploration during both navigable 
seasons 
2. Freedom for the commander to winter if he considers it necessary in the interests of 
the expedition and can find safe quarters. 
 The order to land a party at the beginning of the season, and so waste precious 
time, is due to ignorance of Antarctic navigation on the part of Gregory and his 
friends.            
(Markham, n.d.e) 
Gregory resigned his position after receiving a cable from Poulton with news of the 
committee’s final decision. He later lamented that the quality of the scientific work would 
suffer greatly as a result. Believing that Koettlitz would be offered the position he wrote: 
In regards to your remark that had I been in England it might have been arranged for 
me to keep on with the expedition, I doubt whether it could have made any difference. 
As soon as the essential requirements of the magnetic and meteorological sub 
committees were disregarded & the geographical work made supreme, there was 
nothing to justify so long an absence for me. The fact that Koettlitz is good enough 
for the post shows that the work to be done is completely elementary. 
(Gregory, 1901b) 
George Murray, editor of the Antarctic Manual was appointed acting head of the scientific 
staff of the expedition on Gregory’s recommendation (Yelverton, 2000, p. 56). The memo 
from Ray Lankester (1847-1929), Director, Natural History Department, British Museum, 
confirmed Murray’s release from museum duties, probably on the expectation of receipt of 
material for their collections.  
Mr George Murray, F.R.S., Keeper of the Department of Botany, has been invited by 
the Joint Committee of the National Antarctic Expedition to act as head of the 
scientific staff of the expedition until the ship “Discovery” reached Melbourne, where 
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charge of the scientific staff will be taken over by Professor J. W. Gregory, F.R.S: its 
regular head. 
In view of the fact that much natural history knowledge is expected to result from the 
expedition, the Trustees have agreed to Mr. Murray accepting the temporary 
appointment… 
 (Lankester, 1901) 
It is true that Markham considered Koettlitz as understudy to Murray to take over scientific 
leadership in Melbourne (Markham n.d.d). Murray took the role seriously and raised his 
concerns about slow progress with preparations, writing to Markham “it’s high time 
somebody did things.” Murray also noted his confusion over the appointment process as: “At 
present it is bewildering. I have Gregory has appointed me; that the Joint Committee has 
appointed me; and that I may be appointed by the two presidents and the Commander” 
(Murray, 1901a). Soon afterwards he reported progress with preparation of the scientific gear 
for work at sea, indicating his belief in his own organisational capability. 
I have spent the last two days in Dundee with Scott, Armitage & Skelton. We have 
arranged all laboratory fittings and the deck arrangements for windlasses, reels etc. for 
trawling, dredging, sounding, tow netting and physical work in temperatures etc. We 
stuck to it and got it done. 
 I have seen Hodgson, Koettlitz & Shackleton [presumably William] today & 
on Monday we begin taking stock of the scientific stores ordered and of all that will 
be needed in that way. They are all inclined to over estimates but I shall see to that. 
There will soon be order in that department.  
(Murray, 1901c) 
Arrangements for the scientific leadership had gone awry at an early stage in the relationship 
between the RS and the RGS, and had not been satisfactorily resolved when the ship 
embarked. 
  
156 
5.1.4 The physicist 
Bernacchi had been selected for the Discovery expedition on the strength of his polar 
experience. He never undertook formal university education but learned the arts of astronomy 
and terrestrial magnetic studies with Pietro Baracchi (1851-1926), government astronomer at 
the Melbourne observatory in Australia. This was informal, unstructured learning carried out 
between 1896 and 1898. In a letter of reference Baracchi describes Louis’ traineeship thus: 
Louis Charles Bernacchi had frequented the observatory for the last 24 months, 
during which time he has acquired practical knowledge in, 1st Sextant work for the 
determination of geographical position, 2nd The making of magnetic observations 
with a magnetic theodolite and dip circle (Kew pattern), 3rd The general routine of 
Meteorological observations. He has some preliminary practice in Meridian 
observations with a portable Transit Instrument, and other miscellaneous astronomical 
work. 
(Baracchi, 1898) 
Bernacchi’s father Diego, who knew Baracchi socially, brokered the arrangement (Crawford, 
1998, p. 21). Bernacchi was to have joined the Belgica expedition (1897-1899) of Adrien de 
Gerlache (1866-1934) in Melbourne, but the itinerary changed when the vessel became ice-
bound, so the re-supply, and Bernacchi’s involvement never eventuated. That opened the 
door for Bernacchi to join Borchgrevink’s Southern Cross (1898–1900) expedition on which 
he spent a full year on the Antarctic continent as physicist and meteorological observer 
(Bernacchi, 1901a).  He recorded an extensive set of magnetic data in rudimentary conditions. 
After the Southern Cross expedition he delivered a paper to the RGS in July 1900 on the 
topography of South Victoria Land and was awarded the prestigious Cuthbert-Peek grant and 
fellowship of the society (Bernacchi, 1901b). Markham had noticed Bernacchi during the 25 
June 1900 presentation to the RGS by Borchgrevink on results of his Southern Cross 
expedition. He wrote to Scott: “There is a very intelligent young man named Bernacchi who 
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had charge of the magnetism, meteorology and photography under Borchgrevink. You should 
also make a point of seeing him. He will be here for some months” (Markham, 1900d). 
The minute book of the Magnetic sub-committee records no involvement in selection 
of the physicist, and on the few occasions that it met, the business was concerned with the 
ship and instrumental arrangements at a superficial level. Creak, as chairman of that 
committee, wrote an official note to the Joint Executive Committee on 7 May 1900, stating 
the case for a civilian magnetic observer in addition to the officers with magnetic observing 
skill. 
I write to inform you of a resolution unanimously adopted at the last meeting of the 
Magnetic Sub-Committee. 
 ‘That the Civilian Staff should include a trained observer for Magnetic and 
Meteorological work.’ 
I should explain that the object of this resolution is to provide an observer when the 
Naval Officers are necessarily absent on Executive duties and especially for the 
magnetic and meteorological work at the Southern land station. 
(British National Antarctic Expedition, 1899) 
Bernacchi’s appointment was preceded by numerous false starts in the recruitment. 
Markham disregarded Gregory’s initial nomination of  “Professor Miers”  (presumably Henry 
Miers, 1858-1942) in the first instance. After this, the Joint Committee agreed at its 15 June 
1900 meeting to recommend James Pollock (1865-1922), Professor of Physics at Sydney 
University but Pollock’s request for leave for the duration of the expedition was declined 
(Yelverton, 2000, p. 54). George Simpson (1878-1965) was eventually recruited as physicist 
around Christmas 1900, but he was unfit and failed the medical test (Admiralty, 4 June 1901). 
Simpson later became the meteorologist on the Terra Nova expedition and his scientific 
achievements led to directorship of the Meteorological Office in London. Simpson’s 
replacement was William Shackleton (1871-1921) from the Solar Physics laboratory. 
Shackleton had expedition experience including one polar excursion in 1896 when he 
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travelled with Sir George Baden Powell (1847–1898) to “Novaya Zembla” to view a solar 
eclipse, where he captured the first solar corona and chromospheric spectra photographs 
(Royal Astronomical Society, 1922). He was appointed on 30 January 1901, then dismissed 
shortly before the expedition embarked on the pretext of dental problems and with a payout 
of £50. He had argued with two of the officers about stowage of stores in the hold in the 
vicinity of the magnetic observatory and had made himself “objectionable” by disagreeing 
with Markham’s view of the role of the civilian scientific director (Baughman, 1999, p. 54; 
Shackleton [W] 1901a). 
Bernacchi was working for the RS on the results of the Southern Cross and writing 
his narrative of the expedition To The South Polar Regions (Bernacchi, 1901) when he was 
recruited to the Discovery at the last minute in late July 1901. He only accepted the position 
on 27 July after clarifying that Shackleton’s position was irreversible (Yelverton, 2000, p. 
65). Shackleton wrote of his concern about Bernacchi’s lack of opportunity to become 
familiar with the instruments for the expedition: “I had a wire from Mr Murray this morning 
informing me that the post had been offered to Mr Bernacchi…” then “Mr Bernacchi & I 
have been pretty friendly + the ordinary magnetic work will be in good hands, but I don’t see 
how he can possibly manipulate the Eschenhagen instruments without instruction, also the 
seismograph + sea–water work which I had undertaken” (Shackleton [W] 1901b). 
Bernacchi was experienced with the standard magnetic instruments but needed 
training and practice in the use of the new instruments, the Lloyd-Creak dip circle and the 
Eschenhagen magnetometer. Bernacchi was told to report to the National Physical laboratory 
(known as the Kew Observatory prior to 1 January 1900) for training in use of the German 
instrument on 15 August, but it had been delivered without the instructions. This precipitated 
a lightning trip to Potsdam to meet Professor Max Eschenhagen (1858-1901) and learn the 
operations of his magnetometer. Bernacchi then returned to continue training and calibrating 
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the instruments at Kew. To rectify his ignorance of seismology he also visited Professor John 
Milne (1850-1913), inventor of the seismograph, at his home and observatory on the Isle of 
Wight (Image 3). 
 
Image 3: Left to Right, Louis Bernacchi, unidentified gent and Prof. Milne, with Mrs Milne seated at rear. 
Photographed at Milne’s residence and seismic observatory at Shide, on the Isle of Wight, 1901 (Rucker 
collection of Bernacchi family materials). 
 
Bernacchi was still in training when the Discovery embarked on 6 August 1901 so he stayed 
behind, and later joined the mail steamer Cuzco to catch the Discovery in Melbourne 
(Bernacchi, 1938, p. 4).  
There was a great contrast in the academic backgrounds of the physicists for the 
Discovery and Gauss expeditions although the work was the same. Bidlingmaier’s 
scholarship prepared him perfectly for polar magnetic work with its combination of practical 
and theoretical background (Vanhöffen, 1915). He commenced work for Drygalski’s 
expedition in May 1900, soon after completing his PhD dissertation then continued his 
preparation for research in terrestrial magnetism over the next fifteen months at Potsdam 
observatory (52° 23’ N, 13° 04’ E).  
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5.1.5 Civilian scientists 
Recruitment to positions on the civilian scientific staff was not through advertisement or 
expressions of interest. The process was opaque and mostly based on personal 
recommendations from senior figures in the expedition management. Unlike the German 
expedition, the Discovery’s scientific staff were not doctoral scholars. They were recruited 
under pressure from sponsors or by personal recommendation. The sub committees for each 
scientific discipline had little influence in the selection process and the civilian scientific staff 
for Discovery was small.  
Koettlitz was the only member of the civilian scientific staff aside from Bernacchi 
with any prior polar experience. He had been a member of the Arctic expedition to Franz 
Josef Land. Having Harmsworth, one of the Discovery expedition’s major sponsors, as a 
referee did not disadvantage Koettlitz. Markham wrote to Gregory seeking his approval to 
appoint Koettlitz and proposing Bruce as “Chief Assistant” at the same time (Markham, 
1900a). Gregory agreed to Koettlitz in April and he was appointed on 26 May 1900. Aside 
from his duties as surgeon he was responsible for botany, bacteriology and had a keen 
interested in geology (Jones, 2011, p. 126). Koettlitz prepared for the expedition by working 
at the BMNH “on the scientific aspects of phytoplankton” with Murray, and in the 
bacteriology department of Guy’s Hospital (Jones, 2011, p. 126). He also took on the task of 
procuring various scientific instruments and items of medical kit.   
Wilson had a BA degree from Cambridge, having read the Natural Science Tripos and 
was a qualified doctor of medicine, but had never practiced after completing his M.B. 
(Savours, 1966, pp. 13-14). He was also an amateur naturalist and wildlife artist. He was 
assisting with analysis of zoological specimens from Borchgrevink’s Southern Cross 
expedition at the BMNH when his influential uncle, Major General Sir Charles Wilson 
(1836-1905) and Philip Sclater (1829-1913), president of the Zoological Society both 
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recommended him to Markham (Baughman, 1999, p. 34). Markham wrote to Scott, “I 
enclose a letter from General Sir Charles Wilson about his nephew who wants to go as 
Second Surgeon. Poulton has seen him and likes him as regards scientific attainments. I told 
Sir Charles to tell him to write to you” (Markham, 1900c). Wilson’s medical examination 
was delayed as he had an abscess related to blood poisoning, but when finally examined, was 
found by the Admiralty medical officer to be unfit due to disease (tuberculosis) in the right 
lung (Admiralty Medical Board, 1901). Scott disregarded this matter and allowed Wilson to 
join the expedition after he offered to go on his own responsibility (Baughman, 1999, p. 34).  
Hodgson was recommended to the expedition by Gregory on the basis of his 
experience in which he had “done a good deal of dredging in the channel” and had studied 
lower crustacea “on which he has published” (Gregory, 1900a). Hodgson had worked in a 
minor position at the Plymouth Biological Laboratory and as a curator of the Plymouth 
Museum, from where he was recruited to the Discovery (Yelverton, 2000, p. 52).  
Ferrar was twenty-two when he completed his honours degree at Sidney Sussex 
College in Cambridge in the Natural Science Tripos in June 1901. He was recruited to the 
Discovery expedition after meeting Markham for luncheon on 21 July 1901. He sailed with 
the ship in early August, just three weeks after his recruitment (Yelverton, 2000, p. 62; Scott, 
1905b, Volume 1, p. 70). Gregory had urged that appointments should be made as soon as 
possible so that members could get study time on their particular subjects and “gain 
experience in ice work and on ski in Switzerland during the coming summer” (Gregory, 
1900a). 
5.1.6 Officers 
Appointment of the officers also hinged on personal recommendations and favouritism. The 
officers for the expedition were a mix of RN and Merchant Navy men. Markham would have 
preferred an all RN wardroom but Harmsworth, a significant benefactor, made his donation 
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conditional on the acceptance of Albert Armitage (1864-1943) and Koettlitz. The Admiralty 
was not generous with the provision of officers, although they were considered to be on duty 
during their polar service, thus ensuring they did not lose promotion priority. Correspondence 
from the Admiralty implies that their wages were compensated from the expedition funds 
(Macgregor, 1903).  
Lieutenant Armitage, RNR was, like Koettlitz, a veteran of the Jackson-Harmsworth 
expedition. He was recruited in May 1900 and commenced service with the expedition in 
January 1901 as navigator, icemaster and second in command. His background included 
considerable polar experience and four round trips to India under sail (Walton, 1984, p. xxiii). 
As part of Markham’s strategy to maintain a line of command in keeping with RN protocols, 
Armitage became a lieutenant in the Royal Naval Reserve in February 1901. His scientific 
contribution was in the magnetic science research, mainly at sea.   
Ernest Shackleton was the other member of the wardroom from the merchant service. 
He had extensive experience in square-rigged ships and gained his master mariner’s 
certificate in 1898 (Baughman, 1999, p. 32). Like Armitage, he was commissioned into the 
Royal Naval Reserve, as a sub-lieutenant prior to departure. He had become acquainted with 
the son of the major benefactor of the expedition, Longstaff, during a troop ship voyage to 
South Africa. He used that relationship as a lever and joined the crew in mid February 1901. 
He was “the only officer appointed without an interview” (Yelverton, 2000, p. 58). His 
experience indicated his suitability for the position, but Scott charged Armitage with the task 
of checking Shackleton’s background (Huntford, 1985, p. 29). Shackleton’s scientific role 
was to measure seawater density and salinity, and he received training from Mill in these arts 
(Baughman, 1999, p. 67). He also took on observations of the characteristics of waves in the 
open ocean (Markham & Holland, 1986, p. 80). Shackleton’s formal training was one day 
with the Royal Engineers in Aldershot (25 July 1901) where he, Skelton and one of the 
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stokers learned to operate captive balloons, as the expedition was to be equipped with two 
(Yelverton, 2000, p. 60). He also spent a short time testing detonators that may have been 
called into service to free the ship from ice (Huntford, 1985, p. 39).  
Lieutenant George Mulock (1882-1963) of the relief ship Morning replaced 
Shackleton when he was repatriated on the relief ship Morning in 1903. Mulock was one of 
many applicants for a position on the relief ship. Markham knew Mulock’s family, and 
although this may have swayed Markham in favour of his selection, he became a great asset 
to the expedition, being a talented surveyor and cartographer (Baughman, 1999, p. 201; Scott, 
1905b, Volume 1, pp. 71-72). 
Charles Royds had achieved the rank of lieutenant in the RN in 1898 (Scott, 1905b, 
Volume 1, p. 67). Again, Markham had a personal connection, having travelled on the 
outward leg of the North Polar Expedition (1875) with Charles’ uncle, Commander Wyatt 
Rawson (1853-1882) (Caswell, 1977). Royds volunteered to serve on Discovery on 3 April 
1899 and Markham requested his services from the Admiralty. His appointment was 
confirmed on 6 June 1900. Royds was First Lieutenant of Discovery, and charged with 
responsibility for meteorological observations (at sea and ashore) and was intended as an 
understudy to assist with magnetic observations. After the compass magnetics course with 
Scott (September 1900) Royds travelled to Scotland to train in meteorological techniques in 
winter conditions at the observing station on the summit of Ben Nevis. He remained there 
until February 1901, then went directly to Kew Observatory for a course in procedures for 
magnetic observing using some of the sophisticated instruments that would be available to 
the expedition (Yelverton, 2000, p. 53).  
Two of Scott’s former shipmates were appointed to Discovery. Markham negotiated 
Michael Barne’s (1877-1961) release from the Admiralty and the Joint Committee appointed 
him second lieutenant in June 1900. Barne was “Scott’s special choice” from the Majestic 
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(Bernacchi, 1938, p. 216). His scientific responsibilities were deep-sea sounding and support 
for Armitage in magnetic research at sea (Savours, 2001, p. 21). Barne also attended training 
at the Ben Nevis observatory during February 1901 before attending the compass course at 
Deptford (Yelverton, 2000, p. 58). Reginald Skelton joined the Discovery as her engineer, 
and qualified for his engineer’s certificate in 1901. Skelton’s release from regular naval duty 
came in September 1900, allowing his involvement in construction of the Discovery in 
Dundee. Skelton’s oversight of the installation of the engineering hardware of the ship was 
invaluable at a time when Scott was overloaded with responsibilities (Skelton, 2004, p. 8). 
Skelton supported Bernacchi’s physical science research on numerous occasions by assisting 
with construction and repair of apparatus and by taking observations from time to time. Scott 
also charged Skelton with duties as official photographer to the expedition (Skelton, 2004, p. 
9). The Admiralty confirmed the appointments of Scott, Royds, Barne and Skelton to the 
expedition commencing in July 1901 by letter to the Presidents of RS and RGS (Macgregor, 
1901).  
Not all personal recommendations bore fruit. Creak, who had contributed to the 
magnetic reports for the Challenger expedition, also proposed a RN officer as a candidate for 
the magnetic research, but his recommendation was not acted upon, possibly as a result of 
Markham’s strong prejudice against recruits from the survey branch of the Admiralty.  
I would strongly recommend Commander Jas. W Combe R. N. as a valuable officer 
for Antarctic exploration. He is an experienced officer in the use of magnetic 
instruments both on land and on board ship & an excellent observer. In addition to 
this as an experienced hydrographic surveyor he is now serving in his third command. 
He is physically strong & energetic & has been most zealous in making magnetic 
observations. 
(Creak, n.d.a) 
The magnetic training received by the Discovery’s officers intended to support the 
work of the civilian physicist was inadequate. The magnetic expert Chree, of the National 
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Physical Laboratory (previously Kew Observatory, and generally referred to as such in 
correspondence), wrote to the secretary to the Discovery expedition, explaining that a fee for 
training the officers in the use of magnetic instruments was enclosed but that “As regards the 
instruction, the fees have been reduced, partly owing to the comparatively small time some of 
the officers have attended” and “Other of the instruments sent were apparently intended only 
to afford members of the Expedition an opportunity of learning their use, an opportunity 
which has I think been somewhat imperfectly utilised” (Chree, 1901). Richard Glazebrook 
(1854-1935), director of the Laboratory, shared Chree’s concern over inadequate attendance 
at the training. In a further letter to Cyril Longhurst (1878-1948), secretary to the expedition, 
he explained that the 15 guineas for instruction of the officers “represents a considerable 
reduction from the charge usually made to Naval Officers for a course of instruction” 
(Glazebrook, 1901). Scott and the other officers (Royds, Armitage and Barne) went to the 
Deptford Compass Depot for training with Creak, in addition to their course of study at 
National Physical Laboratory in Kew, under Glazebrook (Yelverton 2000, p. 354). This was 
about magnetic work related to navigational aspects of the expedition rather than the 
terrestrial magnetic research. Markham’s close interest in the selection of the Executive 
Officers and civilian scientists is indicated by his record of biographic details of each, 
including drinking habits of most, as shown at Table 4, below (Markham, n.d.c).  
Name Participation 
Barne One glass of spirits per day 
Shackleton [W] Do not take either wines or spirits except 
dinner claret 
Wilson None, unless required as medicine for a short 
period 
Koettlitz Small quantity of Whiskey once daily 
Hodgson Rarely drink 
Skelton Very moderate consumption-no particular 
choice 
Royds Can drink anything, Port, Claret, Whiskey + 
beer being the most usual of my beverages, 
also burgundy at times. 
Table 4: Average Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages by wardroom (Markham, n.d.c). 
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5.1.7 Information gathering 
Markham was alert to the value of specialist advice during the critical months of preparations 
and while grooming Scott for the leadership. It was his habit to take summer holidays in 
Norway and on 11 July 1900, soon after Scott had commenced work, Markham wrote 
advising that Dr Johan Hjort (1869-1948) who he described as Head of Fisheries “here” 
[Norway] was in charge of a vessel, the Michael Sars, especially built for research between 
Norway and Iceland. Hjort was actually director of the University of Jena Biological Station 
in Drøbak at that time (Hardy, 1950). Michael Sars was equipped with modern deep sea 
trawling and sounding gear. Markham knew that Drygalski was taking a cruise with Hjort in 
September and that it was crucial that Scott should visit when the ship returned.  
A hundred little things will occur to you in examining all the arrangements and 
fittings and the various instruments and gear. You can get full information about 
Nansen’s electric light installation, cooking apparatus, his views on the best form of 
sledge etc; and will be glad to see you about anything else you may think to get in 
Norway. 
(Markham, 1900e)   
Markham also suggested to William Wharton, Admiralty Hydrographer (1843-1905) that “It 
will be very desirable that the Antarctic ship should be supplied with the latest & best of 
everything as regards appliances for scientific investigation” (Markham, 1900f). He later 
described the successful demonstrations of the sounding and trawling apparatus, and wrote 
that Hjort could help supply equipment such as nets, dredges, Pettersson water sampling 
bottles and that “An instrument for ascertaining gases in salt water and salinity by chlorine 
test must be supplied; and Scott can get it from Knudsen in Copenhagen” (Markham, 1900g). 
At the same time the famous polar explorer, Nansen, was friendly towards the expedition 
through correspondence and advice to Koettlitz. In June 1896 Nansen had been returning 
from his North Pole bid and, by chance, found the Jackson-Harmsworth Arctic expedition of 
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which Koettlitz was a member in Franz Josef Land. They became firm friends. “By 
November [1900] Koettlitz was asking Nansen’s advice on sourcing additional equipment -
sledges, ski, sleeping bags, gloves, footwear, in particular the reindeer fur boots called 
finesko” (Jones, 2011, p. 122).  
There were positive outcomes from Scott’s visit to Scandinavia and Germany. First 
was the acquisition of knowledge and recommendations regarding polar techniques and 
equipment, especially “furs, skis, sledges and cookers, the latter two of Nansen’s own 
design” (Baughman, 1999, p. 53). The second was the realisation there were many matters 
still to arrange and that Drygalski’s expedition was much further advanced in recruitment, 
training and preparations. Scott later acknowledged Drygalski’s kind welcome and freely 
given assistance.  
In Berlin I found the work of equipment in full swing: provisions and stores had 
already been ordered, clothing had been tried, special instruments were being 
prepared, the staff of the expedition had been appointed and was already at work, and 
the ‘Gauss’ was well on towards completion. I was forced to realise that this was all 
in marked contrast with the state of things in England, and I hastened home in 
considerable alarm.  
I found, as I had expected, that all arrangements which were being so busily pushed 
forward in Germany were practically at a standstill in England; many of them, in fact, 
had not yet been considered. 
 (Scott, 1905b, Volume 1, p. 33) 
Murray was also concerned. He confided in Markham about his own correspondence with 
Poulton of the RS: 
I have written to him very plainly indeed stating I find the scientific preparations in a 
very backward condition and that there must be less disputing in the future. I know 
Poulton and how to deal with him. He makes me swear but the best way is to do it in 
his presence!  
(Murray, 1901b) 
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There are notable omissions from the scientific staff of the expedition. Although they 
were destined to a land they knew was ice covered and where there was sea ice for most of 
the year, they took no ice specialist. Also, knowing that the expedition would most likely 
overwinter in the deep south, there would have been opportunities for an astronomer to view 
regions of the winter night sky never before studied in any detail. Bernacchi had some 
training in astronomy but his other responsibilities as physicist aside from magnetic studies 
(including auroral observation, atmospheric electricity, pendulum experiments for 
determination of a value for gravity, seismology, solar eclipse observations and calibrating 
timepieces by observations of occultations) scarcely allowed opportunity for additional 
duties. 
Gregory had suggested Swiss alpinists on the assumption that overland journeys 
would require experienced ice and snow travellers, not to mention the utility of alpine 
climbing skills. Armitage took the place of Gregory’s proposed Dundee whaling ice master. 
The history of the expedition showed there was little call for this specialist, although the case 
has been put that it was only by the skill of such an ice master (Captain Harry McKay [1857-
1925]) that the Discovery was eventually released from Hut Point in 1904 (Aldridge, 1999). 
Although they took a number of dogs, there was no experienced dog handler amongst the 
crew. 
Recruitment of the lower deck was by application. Notes on the RN applicants record 
full name, official number, rate and badges, age and the ship in which they were currently 
serving. There are no special notes about prior polar or expedition experience, but sailing ship 
experience, accomplishments in trade, musical, theatrical, sewing, knitting, shoemaking and 
haberdashery are recorded as the selection criteria (Royal Geographical Society, n.d.). 
In summary, the notable features of the recruitment process were 1) a general 
disregard for relevant polar or field research experience 2) a lack of transparency or 
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systematic processes 3) a disregard of scientific research track record 4) control by Markham 
over the process 5) nominal involvement by specialist committees 6) factional acrimony 
between the RS and the RGS and 7) lateness of recruitment. The last factor may not have 
been especially critical for the geologist, Ferrar, as his preparation was mainly expansion of 
his knowledge through the reading he undertook that during the voyage to Antarctica 
(Susanna Ferrar personal communication, 6 September 2012).  
The German expedition’s sub-committee on meteorology and terrestrial magnetism 
determined that the magnetic observer should “have at least a year of preliminary practical 
study, from about 1st April 1900” (Sub-Committee of the [German] Scientific Council for 
Meteorology and Terrestrial Magnetism, 1899). Bernacchi’s recruitment just a fortnight 
before the Discovery departed for Antarctica was insufficient time for even a seasoned 
scholar, let alone a journeyman, to become familiar with new apparatus and a range of new 
physical science responsibilities. Training, like recruitment, had been late, and in some cases 
nominal, but did the enthusiasm and diligence of the scientific staff compensate for those 
apparent shortcomings? 
Chree’s comments in his 1908 Physical Society presidential address accurately reflect 
the lack of organisation that resulted as a consequence of the scientific leadership vacuum 
created by Gregory’s absence in Melbourne, then his resignation during the critical 
preparation phase. Departure of the expedition commenced to test the quality of recruits, their 
preparations and training, and their instruments and equipment.  
The evidence presented here indicates Markham applied the criteria of youth and 
family lineage in his talent scouting for officers and scientists, rather than considering the 
scholarship, experience and research track record of prospective scientific staff. Recruitment 
for the Discovery had no formal governance and as a result it became haphazard and 
unsystematic. Scientific work on the expedition was planned with scientists and officers 
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acting in the roles of technicians, collectors and observers and following the metropolis/ 
periphery paradigm of evolving scientific practice at the edges of the British Empire.  
5.2 England to Cape Town 
5.2.1 Departure 
The outward voyage to New Zealand signified the start of a grand adventure for the young 
and inexperienced scientists. The expedition departed London Docks on the Thames on 31 
July 1901 and moored at Stokes Bay the following evening. This was downriver from 
Portsmouth and close to the ceremonial departure point of Cowes on the Isle of Wight. It was 
in Stokes Bay that, in line with common navigational practice and as part of the magnetic 
science operation, the ship was swung for deviation (error induced by ferrous elements of the 
vessel) before embarking. The purpose of the operation was to determine the values of 
compass error indicated (normally at the steering compass, but in this case also at the 
compass in the observatory) according to the direction of travel. The measurements can be 
made if the vessel steams in a path describing either an octagon or a rosette so that the 
variance between the true and indicated headings can be determined on each of the cardinal 
and intermediate points of the compass. If the ship is moored, the operation may be 
performed by towing the stern of the ship in a full circle with a whaleboat. A table and a 
graph are then produced to represent the error according to the direction of travel. These 
inform watch-by-watch decisions regarding correction to the compass bearing to which the 
helmsman must adhere. This important procedure was also the first and last scientific 
operation of the expedition and was carried out from time to time en route. Bernacchi 
described the procedure. “On 1st August, Discovery anchored at Spithead to carry out that 
most important requirement, swinging the ship-that is, the ship was turned slowly round, 
whilst errors in her compass at each point were determined” (Bernacchi, 1938, p. 16). The 
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Discovery was relocated on 5 August 1901 to Cowes, where the new monarch King Edward 
VII and Queen Alexandra inspected the ship and it’s scientific equipment. Scott was awarded 
the MVO (Member of the Royal Victorian Order), presumably in anticipation of outcomes 
(Skelton, 2004, p. 18).  
5.2.2 Scientific operations and logistics in the Atlantic  
The first leg of the journey to Madeira lasted eight days and the scientific work in some 
departments commenced immediately the ship put to sea. Armitage’s responsibilities for 
magnetic observations were prescribed in the Antarctic Manual and included: “The 
declination or Variation should, when practicable, be observed twice in the day at sea, and 
when the sun’s altitude is below 30°” and “The dip and force should be observed daily at sea. 
In the high Southern latitudes the observations should be repeated during the day, the hours 
between 9 and 11 a.m., and 5 p.m. and 7 p.m., being recommended” (Murray and RGS, 1901, 
p. 26). At sea, Lloyd-Creak dip circles were used to determine dip and intensity. Declination 
was calculated on board ship from the vessel’s azimuth compass by reference to the apparent 
bearing of the sun at its noon zenith, in accord with common navigational practice.  
Creak developed Lloyd-Creak dip circles from the common Fox dip circles, to allow 
determination of magnetic force (or intensity) as well as dip (McConnell, 2005). This was 
achieved by inclusion of Lloyd’s needles for intensity, which expanded functionality of the 
basic unit (Image 4). He wrote to the expedition’s Ship Committee (probably in 1899): “I 
have also a working model of a magnetic instrument for observations of force and dip at sea-
utilizing Lloyds method, which I wish to submit to the committee for approval” (Creak, 
n.d.a). The Admiralty supplied these instruments (Armitage, 1905, p. 302). 
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Image 4: Lloyd-Creak Dip Circle used on Drygalski’s Gauss expedition (Drygalski, 1925, p. 113, Plate II, 
figure 3b). 
 
Innovations included finer graduations, improved needle mountings and a circular 
glazed metal case. On the Lloyd-Creak instrument the length of the needle is designed to 
bring its tip into close proximity to the scale for easy viewing of both at the same time. The 
Discovery and Gauss were both issued with these instruments. On the Discovery a gimbal 
stand made of non-magnetic gunmetal was installed in the magnetic observatory, located on 
the centreline of the ship (the Fox position) and in a manner that allowed the dip circle to be 
rotated for alignment. Gauss had a timber pedestal for this purpose. During observations the 
dip circle had to be perfectly aligned on the magnetic meridian, stable and horizontal, with 
the needle coming to rest before an accurate reading could be made. When movement of the 
ship did not allow the needle to come to rest “a mean of the oscillations on each side of the 
wire should give good results” (American Geophysical Union, 1901). The “wire” is a cross 
hair, visible through the microscopic viewfinder that the observer must align with the 
needle’s point. This is achieved by rotating the outer ring of the apparatus that carries the 
microscopes for viewing both needle and the vernier scale from which the angle of dip is 
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read. These features are shown in detail on a similar instrument, Amundsen’s Barrow dip 
circle (Image 5) used in the locality of the North Magnetic Pole during his Gjøa	  Arctic 
voyage (1903-1906) although on this instrument a separate eyepiece is used to read the 
vernier scale. Creak tested the prototype in the observatory, where it performed well, and 
Glazebrook of the National Physical Laboratory certified the two used on Discovery (No.143 
and No.149 by Dover, Charlton) as accurate (National Physical Laboratory, 1901). There is 
no record or evidence of the instrument being tested at sea under normal operating conditions 
and it’s a surprise that both expeditions accepted them without final proof of utility. 
 
Image 5: Amundsen’s Barrow dip circle used in the locality of the North Magnetic Pole during his Gjøa Arctic 
voyage (1903-1906) (author’s photo). 
 
The Admiralty was generous with a loan of the standard ship’s compass and 
compensation spheres for the binnacle, but these were for navigation, not the magnetic 
science research program. The schedule of magnetic instruments supplied by the Admiralty is 
reproduced at Appendix IV. The conditions of loan were explicit: “I am to add that the 
compasses, etc. will be lent on the understanding that your committee will pay all expenses of 
carriage as well as for any loss or depreciation that may occur” (McGregor, 1900). A small 
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but formal booklet entitled “List of Instruments Provided” also lists magnetic instruments for 
research and navigation. The purpose of this booklet is unclear and it contains full lists of 
scientific instruments for all the disciplines and its magnetic apparatus schedule is also 
reproduced at Appendix IV. It is unlikely to be an inventory as serial numbers are routinely 
used to identify high quality instruments, but none appear in this booklet. It may represent an 
early wish list, or a list for non-scientists of the equipment in use. In any event, it shows the 
intention for the magnetician to be well supplied with sufficient and spare tools of trade (List 
of Instruments Provided, n.d.). 
Mill had recently resigned from the position of librarian at the RGS and was able to 
make arrangements with his new employer, the British Rainfall Association, to travel with 
the vessel to Madeira in a mentoring role. He was a doctoral scholar with an extensive 
knowledge of oceanography and meteorology. He had already provided invaluable assistance 
to the expedition during preparations, had contributed the bibliography for The Antarctic 
Manual and had been a member of the meteorology sub-committee. Four days before 
departure Scott offered him the opportunity to travel on the expedition’s first leg (Huntford, 
1985, p. 45). “He gave daily instruction to those members of the expedition who had charge 
of the instruments employed to find out the temperature at various depths … Dr Mill, too, as 
an enthusiastic meteorologist, was of great service to Royds…” (Armitage, 1905, p. 17). Mill 
reported his activities in two parts, published in the Geographical Journal, that combine to 
provide a picture of active research in the biological and meteorology departments. 
Shackleton developed skill in the analysis of seawater for density and chlorine content; Ferrar 
determined atmospheric carbonic acid (CO2), and Royds installed the various meteorological 
recording instruments at suitable locations around the vessel. Microscopes were mounted 
securely in the laboratory and collections for inspection were provided by frequent pumping 
of seawater through a plankton net. Aside from the exclusion of ferrous materials from the 
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vicinity of the magnetic observatory, the magnetic work gets no mention (Mill, 1901; Mill, 
1902).  
Armitage’s own narrative also makes no mention of magnetic work on this first leg in 
spite of his responsibility for the work (Armitage, 1905, pp. 16-17). Huntford implies that 
Mill was charged with the responsibility to train up the scientists “from scratch” (Huntford, 
1985, p. 45), but Mill notes the care and accuracy with which the work was carried out and, 
in the case of Royds, he especially notes the considerable experience of the observer. Murray, 
referred to as the “Scientific Director”, personally presided over the biological work of 
Hodgson and Koettlitz. Wilson’s task was to monitor changes in the colours of the seawater 
(Mill, 1902).  
Royds’ kept a diary as a record for his family and, of the various narratives and 
diaries of the expedition, his provides the most candid account of proceedings. While 
Wilson’s diary describes test flights of several box kites during which “two were lost” 
(Savours, 1966, p. 32), Royds tells us that a school of porpoises took the attention of all on 
deck away from the task at hand. The result was that two kites dipped into the water 
unnoticed. Royds also notes here the influence of biological tow nets on the speed of the ship. 
Although under way with sail and steam, the three nets deployed halved the ship’s progress to 
three knots  (Royds, 2001, p. 30). On 14 August the ship was hove to and Barne tested the 
(Lucas) deep-sea sounding equipment and Garstang dredge. Mill stated: “the result of the 
trials, which lasted for several hours, was to suggest various improvements in the 
arrangements” (Mill, 1901). Skelton’s diary records an average speed for the trip to Madeira 
under steam and sail at 6.5 knots, or around 155 miles (250 kilometres) per day (Skelton, 
2004, p. 18). Scott’s narrative records early concern over the slow progress of the ship after 
this first leg and therefore the prospect of being unable to practice sounding and trawling 
operations as preparation for work in Antarctic waters (Scott, 1905b, Volume 1, p. 90).  
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After a brief interlude in Madeira during which repairs were made to rectify defective 
ironwork the expedition departed on 16 August bound for Cape Town. The ship’s track took 
them towards the south and west across the North Atlantic, across the equator, then, after 
approaching the coast of South America, a track to the south-east with following trade winds 
to the Cape. Although the scientists were settling into routines, the journey was not incident 
free. On 20 August, against Royds’ advice, Scott arranged for a large tow net to be deployed 
while the ship progressed under sail only. Royds correctly predicted that the fastenings of the 
net to the frame were inadequate and that the brake on the drum could not control the 
deployment. Hodgson and Murray were experienced with the operation and also advised 
against it. The net was lost and the “social barometer was decidedly below par that evening” 
(Royds, 2001, p. 34).  
Soon afterwards, on 23 August, Scott noticed the excessive seawater leakage into the 
vessel. Skelton had been aware of this since he discovered water entry under the engine bed 
while the ship was still in the Thames. It was dry docked then to find the cause, but nothing 
definitive was found and the consensus was that shrinkage of the planks would seal the leaks 
once at sea (Skelton, 2004, p. 16). Royds also seems to have known of the matter and took 
some delight in the panic suffered by Scott and Shackleton when the water level in the bilges 
was discovered. Royds had reported the leak previously but his concerns had been dismissed 
(Royds, 2001, p. 36). The ingress of water had implications for the magnetic science. In the 
hold of the ship were tons of tinned foods. William Shackleton’s remonstrations about the 
loading of provisions were surely about the stacking of these below the magnetic observatory. 
The water leak submerged most of the tinned provisions so they had to be brought on deck 
and either condemned, or cleaned of rust and filth from the bilge, then oiled. The 
consequence of shifting the tinned goods was a change in the ship’s magnetic signature. 
Armitage later wrote “those wretched tins made themselves felt, especially after leaving New 
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Zealand for Victoria Land, when apparently some considerable alteration must have taken 
place in their stowage” (Armitage, 1905, p. 304).   
 
Figure 4: Outbound voyage track of the Discovery, England to New Zealand (Murray, 1902). 
 
Following the example of Ross from 17 December 1839, the expedition stopped at 
South Trinidad Island on 13 September 1901. Previously it had been visited only rarely, but 
Royds mentions the visit by Ross with Erebus or Terror (Royds, 2001, pp. 43-45). No 
magnetic survey was made ashore by the Discovery, a decision possibly informed by Ross’s 
experience where he found: 
As a magnetic station, our observations here were utterly valueless, but the results 
may be useful by pointing out, in a striking manner, the great amount of error to 
which those made on shore are liable. Three dipping needles placed at only just 
sufficient distance apart to ensure their not influencing each other, indicated as much 
as three degrees difference of the dip, and all of them considerably less than that 
corresponding to the geographical position.  
(Ross, 1847, p. 23) 
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While the expedition members were ashore collecting natural science specimens, Armitage 
took advantage of the opportunity to again swing the ship for deviation in accordance with 
the instruction to do so as often as opportunity arose. The magnetic signature of any soft iron 
in the ship changed as the ship moved through the earth’s magnetic field and the physical 
relocation of the tinned food would have also altered the ship’s magnetic deviation. The 
following table (Table 5) is constructed from pencil notes on the reverse side of one of the 
magnetic observation record sheets from Discovery (Armitage, 1901 a). Although the 
magnetic observation record is dated 25 September, the data for swinging the ship is undated. 
It is probable that this is an informal record of the operation at South Trinidad Island. The 
data and the deviation card derived from it follow.  
 
 
Figure 5: Deviation card from swinging the Discovery for compass error, South Trinidad Island. 
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True heading  Deviation (Seconds) 
N 26 
NE -50 
E 26 
SE 71 
S -18 
SW -94 
W -16 
NW 54 
Table 5: Discovery’s magnetic deviation swing data, South Trinidad Island (Armitage, 1901a). 
 
Scott does not mention the motivation for making the landing in his narrative but he 
was already aware they were falling behind schedule. The Discovery’s schedule was to depart 
from New Zealand on 4 December (Yelverton, 2000, p. 74). He had decided at Madeira that 
“Most of the oceanographic work would have to be abandoned” as the ship could not 
possibly travel the 12,000 miles (19,300 kilometres) to New Zealand in the scheduled 70 days 
remaining (Yelverton, 2000, p. 75). Each sounding station required the ship to heave-to and 
lose up to four hours of travel. There was no utility in making magnetic observations at South 
Trinidad and it was not in the instructions to the expedition to make landings on isolated 
islands to gather specimens. Scott might have responded to requests from Murray and Wilson 
to make the landing and collect specimens for the BMNH.  
The passage to Cape Town was scientifically uneventful. Scott’s narrative deals with 
the next twenty days in half a paragraph (Scott, 1905b, Volume 1, p. 96). Armitage’s account 
is almost as brief, describing only the birds caught and the weather. He does not mention the 
magnetic science work but his signed magnetic observation data sheets for days during this 
period attest to the fact that he was applying considerable time and effort to the task 
(Armitage, 1901a). The annotations also indicate the ship was rolling through an arc of 60°. 
Wilson had little medical work and spent most of his days after the landing at South Trinidad 
skinning and illustrating the bird specimens (Savours, 1966, p. 53). Identification of the 
abundant southern hemisphere pelagic wanderers (petrels, albatross, prions, shearwaters etc.) 
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also occupied his time and tow netting still provided work for Hodgson and Murray. On 22 
September, a few days out from Cape Town, the crew were informed of the decision to 
bypass Melbourne and head to Lyttelton, the port adjacent to Christchurch, New Zealand 
(Royds, 2001, p. 48). 
5.2.3 Cape Town and Simon’s Bay 
The stop at Cape Town was always on the schedule for the purpose of calibrating the 
magnetic instruments (Scott, 1905b, Volume 1, p. 96) and now there were other strong 
motivations for the visit. Aside from the need to acquire more coal, there were repairs to be 
made. Twenty tons of water a day was now entering the hull obliging pumping every eight 
hours, so caulking the seams to compensate for the shrinkage of the unseasoned timbers was 
necessary (Baughman, 1999, p. 70). The stop provided respite for most of the crew and 
scientific staff, but not for Armitage and Barne, who had been assisting with the magnetic 
observations at sea. It meant a shift in the nature of the magnetic work and the instruments 
being used. After a day’s halt at Cape Town for coaling, the ship steamed overnight around 
the Cape to Simon’s Town where the naval facilities were located. A temporary magnetic 
observatory was established on the rifle range on Red Hill behind the base. While work 
continued on the ship, Armitage and Barne worked daily in the observatory with the 
assistance of Professors John Beattie (1866-1946) and John Morrison (1863-1944) and their 
assistant. Calibrations using the expedition’s and the Cape Town Observatory’s absolute 
instruments, the Kew pattern magnetometers, would have taken about a week of normal work 
(Armitage, 1905, p. 24). The circumstances of the continuing guerrilla war with the Boers 
meant that use of lamps after dark and away from settlements was unwise so the work took 
longer. Skelton took three photographs of the tents, and of Barne, Morrison and Beattie at 
work with the magnetometer. The candidate’s visit to Red Hill on 29 September 2011 
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revealed that Skelton’s photographs of the long view of the tent scene at the rifle range 
(Skelton, 2001, p. 31) were reversed during printing and publication.  
Armitage wrote at length in his official report and in a personal letter to Captain Scott 
during their stay at Cape Town regarding difficulties he was encountering with the Lloyd-
Creak dip circle at sea. His letter accompanied submission to Scott of the magnetic 
observations: 
1.Variations taken at sea by the standard compass, including the swinging of the ship 
off South Trinidad Island 
2. Magnetic Dip & Deflections observed with the Fox circle 
3. Magnetic Dip at sea with the L.C Circle  
 
Data for magnetic force specified in the instructions and for which the Lloyd-Creak dip circle 
had been specifically developed, are omitted. Armitage explains it thus: 
The ‘Discovery’ being very ‘lively’ even in moderate sea, I find it required a 
considerable amount of practice to attain that degree of clarity, confidence and 
accuracy in observing with the Fox and L.C. Circles which is desirable, and hope to 
much improve on these samples. This is especially the case with the L.C. Circle: due I 
believe in part, to the greater magnifying powers of the lenses in use with it, so that 
the needle appears to oscillate in a more erratic manner than of the Fox seen through a 
lower powered lens… I find that in any sea way it is impossible to use the ‘Statical 
weighted needle’ supplied with the L.C. Circle, for it then acts as a pendulum and 
swings entirely out of the field.  
(Armitage, 1901a) 
He continued with description of slight damage to the supplied needles and his management 
of rusted needle pivots. In a separate letter he stated: “it was found impossible to use the 
Lloyd-Creak Circle” (Armitage, 1901e). The report found its way to Creak who responded 
that Armitage was lacking experience (Creak, 1901b) but that was not so as Armitage was 
experienced at polar magnetic work after the Jackson-Harmsworth expedition and, being a 
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navigator, he knew magnetic observing routines at sea. Armitage continued to struggle with 
the observing on the passage from Cape Town to Lyttelton, where Bernacchi joined the ship.  
Bidlingmaier, the physicist on Drygalski’s Gauss also struggled with the Lloyd-Creak 
dip circle observations at sea. He overcame the difficulty by replicating the observations 
many times. “He was not satisfied that he had taken a sufficient number until the mean value 
was within the margin of error of each observation” (Mawer, 2006, p. 170). The American 
magnetic expert Bauer later recorded that there were defects in the instruments and that 
Bidlingmaier had been highly dissatisfied with their performance (Bauer et al, 1917, p. 19). 
Bauer’s obituary of Bidlingmaier states: “Handicapped as he was by lack of certain 
instrumental appliances … he sought, with splendid success, by theoretical and experimental 
investigations, to make the contributions to terrestrial magnetism of the German Antarctic 
Expedition noteworthy ones” (Bauer, 1915). Bernacchi may have also had sufficient 
theoretical knowledge to enhance the Lloyd-Creak data by similar means. The Carnegie 
Institution later rectified the shortcomings of the Lloyd-Creak dip circle to make what they 
called the “Sea dip” that remained in use for the successful voyages of their non-magnetic 
research vessel, Carnegie (Bauer et al, 1917, p. 19). In the magnetic results for Mawson’s 
AAE, Webb wrote “In addition, it is generally accepted by competent observers that a Lloyd-
Creak circle tends to give high dips and is a difficult instrument from which to obtain good 
results under the best conditions.” This was in reference to the improved version (Webb & 
Chree, 1925, p. 55). Repairs to Discovery were finished before the magnetic work ashore was 
completed, and the expedition finally departed the Cape on 15 October, after again swinging 
the ship for deviation (Armitage, 1905, pp. 22-24).   
5.2.4 Leadership at sea 
There were two layers of leadership on Discovery: overall expedition leadership and 
leadership of the scientific programs. Expedition leadership had been handed to Scott after 
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Gregory’s resignation. Aside from the imperatives in the instructions to the expedition from 
the Joint Committee, Scott’s command was absolute. The Discovery was a merchant vessel 
and the most correct titles of the officers were Scott: Master, Armitage: Mate, and Royds: 
second mate. These designations were replaced with the RN equivalents (Armitage: 
Navigator and Royds: First Lieutenant, for example) and the vessel was operated with a strict 
hierarchy as if it were a RN vessel. Under this arrangement the scientific work of those 
officers in charge of meteorology, seawater analysis, sounding, dredging and trawling fell 
under Scott’s direct control. 
The second layer of leadership was related to the civilian scientific staff. It involved 
fostering the productive work of the scientific team, maintaining their coherence and 
allowing the intellectual space for their own inquiry. The official instructions to the scientific 
leader do not specify how the responsibilities of the role should be acquitted, only that “You 
will direct the scientific work of the gentlemen who have been appointed to assist you” 
(British National Antarctic Expedition, 1901). Most of the instructions are concerned with 
ownership of the collections, observations, records, logs, journals, charts, drawings and 
photographs. A cooperative relationship with the “Commander of the Expedition” was to be 
fostered, but there is no doubt where the prerogative sat for decisions about logistics and the 
use of the vessel for scientific purposes. Successful scientific outcomes at sea relied on 
frequent monitoring and consultation between the commander and the scientific staff about 
their activities. An example was the negotiation to have the ship hove-to for sounding and 
sampling with nets and trawls. For the magnetic program at sea, keeping a steady helm and 
reducing the ship’s roll (if possible) would have greatly assisted the magnetic observations. 
There was a scientific leadership vacuum in the initial stages of the expedition. It had 
commenced when the services of Gregory were no longer required and extended through to 
the stop at the Cape. Mill provided practical guidance in his areas of skill (meteorology and 
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oceanography) as far as Madeira. The Antarctic historian Baughman sums up the contribution 
of the stand-in director, Murray thus: “For the most part the scientific staff were concerned 
with their own branches of inquiry, with Murray giving an occasional bit of direction or 
advice” (Baughman, 1999, p. 67). Murray originally intended to travel as far as Melbourne 
but returned to England from Cape Town. It’s important to note that he believed his role had 
been an extension of the training program, rather than active leadership of research. 
For reasons of haste it would not be possible to stop for deep sea work between 
Simon’s Bay and Lyttelton, and considering the fact that the training in surface work 
was complete and there was nothing more to be learnt from my experience, my 
proceeding to Lyttelton was useless.  
All the deck gear and apparatus was rehearsed and I felt no hesitation in leaving the 
ship’s company to their duties, so far as my guidance was concerned. 
(Murray, 1901f) 
Irrespective of the difference in capability of Murray and Mill to provide leadership in 
their own disciplines during the voyage to the Cape, Armitage and Barne were completely on 
their own with the magnetic science observations. Murray knew nothing of magnetic 
observing operations and his capability to demonstrate scientific leadership was limited to his 
own discipline. He was a botanist who, according to Scott, was only able to inform the work 
of phytoplankton analysis. Mill’s opinion of the quality of the meteorological data collected 
by Royds at sea was high:  
Scott sent home the meteorological observations from the Cape. I sent them to Dr 
Mill who reports that the work done so far has been well done, and he is surprised to 
find how good it is. He has written his remarks and observations and sent them to 
Scott. Captain Creak has had the magnetic observations taken during the voyage and 
at the Cape, and he has also sent his remarks to Scott.  
(Markham, 1901c) 
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The scientific leadership vacuum was not confined to Armitage and his physical observations 
at sea. Scott expressed his opinion of Murray’s capability as a scientific leader candidly to 
Markham, who then passed it along to Kempe of the RS. 
The return of Murray is a very embarrassing business. In a private letter Scott says-
‘Murray leaves us at the Cape … I don’t think his best friend could call him a 
practical man or an organiser, and as director of science on this ship the best that can 
be said of him is that he has not been in the way… By reputation and his own 
showing he came with experience in oceanography to teach us the use of our various 
apparatus. We find that he knows nothing atall about the greater part of it.  
(Markham, 1901c) 
This opinion about Murray’s deficiencies is detailed further in another item of Scott’s 
correspondence: 
To suit his book he must be the Deus ex machine [Latin: god from a machine] of the 
expedition, which would not be improper if he really had been of practical use to us. 
But, as a matter of fact, from a practical point of view he was really an impediment. 
The little he did do would have been better done if he had left it alone. Of three 
quarters of the scientific work of the expedition he is far more ignorant than I am.  
 He has absolutely no training or knowledge of the use of instruments with the 
single exception of the microscope.  
(Scott, 1901b) 
The first leg was viewed by Mill and Murray as an extension of the training regime 
but it also served as a settling period for the social climate on board. Mill provided a positive 
view of Scott’s involvement of the scientific work to Madeira. His “Interest in every branch 
of science pursued on board is of the most practical and personal kind” (Mill, 1901). Then in 
his subsequent article he states: “The essentially scientific turn of Captain Scott’s mind 
impressed me strongly, and the rapidity with which he mastered the details of 
oceanographical and meteorological work was remarkable” (Mill, 1902). At sea, Ferrar the 
geologist was unemployed, Hodgson and Koettlitz were busy with the zoology of the surface 
waters while Wilson enjoyed the new bird life and preparation of museum specimens. Royds 
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was actively engaged in the meteorological observations while Armitage was engaged in the 
task of procuring magnetic data from the outset. The next leg of the journey, from the Cape to 
New Zealand, marked the commencement of the extraordinary operations of the Discovery 
expedition. 
 
5.3 New Science: Cape Town to Christchurch 
5.3.1 Shifting scientific leadership 
Murray tried to invest Koettlitz with the scientific leadership before his departure from the 
Cape, but Scott took over this responsibility for the balance of the expedition (Jones, 2011, p. 
134). Murray had interpreted the official instructions to the scientific director, which 
provided the power to appoint replacement scientists, rather broadly as he had no authority to 
make the decision to appoint a replacement scientific director. Scott explained his principles 
of scientific leadership to Markham and detailed the ways in which Murray was an unsuitable 
choice as director. Although Murray was reported to be a good messmate, he had not 
provided the intellectual space that fostered research. 
I have now had to take the whole direction of scientific work into my own hands. My 
principal is to leave each man a maximum amount of freedom in his particular job, 
and I find it works admirably. 
 As regards supervision, all that I require is that each individual keeps a 
summary of his work in my cabin, and writes it up weekly. 
 These books are open to every one’s inspection: so that each man knows at 
once where to get any information as regards the work of other departments and can 
correlate his own work when he wishes.  
 In regard to special work which men wish to do on points of interest that may 
occur to them, I take opportunities of having quiet talks with them, and they know 
already that I am always ready to help their work when it is possible. 
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 I feel that nothing could be more satisfactory than the genuine feeling of 
loyalty and good comradeship that exists. 
(Scott, 1901b)  
 
5.3.2 Southern Ocean operations and logistics 
The task at hand for the magnetic research at sea in the high southern latitudes had been well 
defined as early as September 1899. Creak wrote recommendations on behalf of the “Sub 
Committee on Terrestrial Magnetism, held at the Royal Society, July 14th 1899” that defined 
the preferred areas of operation for the work at sea: 
8. The distribution of the places of observation depend largely on the form of the 
terrestrial is-magnetics, and these are likely to be most complicated in the 
neighbourhood of the two magnetic foci. Observations at sea are therefore of primary 
importance in this neighbourhood which is included within the limits given below 
under (a), (b) and (c).  
a) As far South as possible, between the longitudes of 160° W, & 115°E. 
b) Especially in the region comprised between Lat 65°S & 80°S. Long 160°E 
to 160°W. 
c) Also between 45° S and 60° S & Long 120° to 140° E. 
(Creak, 1899) 
After the Cape, the next critical destination from Armitage’s point of view was defined by 
Creak’s area “c”, far to the south of central Australia. This was the region believed to be an 
area of maximum magnetic intensity, or total force, which does not coincide with the area of 
maximum dip, the magnetic pole. The ship progressed eastward from the Cape, passing the 
vicinity of the Kerguelen Islands in late October 1901. The activities of kite flying for 
meteorology, bird collecting and deep-sea sounding continued intermittently with similar 
results to the first leg. Kites were again lost on 20 October (Royds, 2001, p. 56) depleting the 
stock severely, leaving few for later use in high latitudes. Discovery had record days travel 
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under sail thanks to the fair winds, but the ship handled poorly in the Southern Ocean in spite 
of these generally favourable westerly winds. On 28 October a wave “as high as the upper 
topsail” overtook the ship and flooded the laboratories, including the magnetic laboratory in 
which Armitage was trying to work (Duncan, 1901). Everything was drenched (including 
instruments and notebooks) and, although only the small window was open, Armitage had 
two feet (61 cm) of water in the observatory (Armitage, 1905, p. 20; Yelverton, 2000, p. 86). 
The record sheets during this time show that Armitage was generally making four sets of 
observations each day, sometimes five, each taking between three and four hours. Armitage 
regularly made the observations during the afternoon watch. On 7 November 1901 at Latitude 
57° 19’ S, Longitude 109° 43’ E and using the Lloyd-Creak Circle No 149 with Needle No 1, 
he clearly annotates the record sheet for dip observations with  “Needle constantly out of 
field of vision” and “Impossible to obtain deflections with this instrument in any sea way” 
(Armitage, 1901c). 
On 12 November the ship met the “radius of greatest magnetic force” and commenced 
the first magnetic research of any substantive significance. Up until this point all the 
magnetic observations for declination and all the meteorological observations and wildlife 
collecting could have been made from any ship on this commonly traversed route. Royds was 
pleased: “I believe that no one has run down this line [of no variation] before, so that at last 
we are doing something new” (Royds, p. 64). Scott headed south to make a high latitude for 
magnetic observations around the predicted area of maximum magnetic intensity at 51° 49’S, 
130° 18’ E. and Skelton raised steam so the ship could be held as steady as possible during 
magnetic observations (Skelton, 2004, p. 25). These observations were most likely easier than 
those at lower latitudes as the ship was amongst pack ice, which subdues wave motion. As 
the ship was hove-to, Wilson and Skelton were able to shoot birds for the collection that were 
recovered by the whaleboat (Skelton, 2004, p. 26). Armitage described the conditions in 
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annotations on the observing sheets thus: “Ship hove to in loose pack (sounding) Gentle roll. 
Moving gradually & steadily through 35° of azimuth’s back, taking 5 to 10 minutes each 
way” (Armitage, 1901c). Sounding wire and instruments were lost due to kinked wires on 15 
November at the edge of the ice pack then on 16 November the ship reached its most 
southern point for this leg of the journey (62° 50’ S, 139° 40’ E). 
In the open ocean, south of Macquarie Island on 20 November they “adjusted 
compasses at 8pm” (Duncan, 1901). Skelton’s account differs slightly “Raised steam in the 
early morning, & swung ship for compasses & magnetic work from 6.30 to 8.30, then 
sounded with Port forward Lucas machine.” He then laments the amount of sounding gear 
lost in the previous four soundings including 4000 fathoms of sounding wire (about 7,300 
metres), “3 or 4 driver tubes, one thermometer & sundries, so we can hardly be said to have 
been very successful so far with our soundings” (Skelton, 2004, p. 27). Heading north and 
east towards New Zealand, Scott agreed to the request to stop for more natural history 
collecting at Macquarie Island (54° 37’ S, 158° 51’ E). Armitage convinced Scott to do so 
after Wilson offered a bottle of spirits if he succeeded (Savours, 1966, p. 77). In four hours of 
hunting, the stock of birds for museum preparation was expanded considerably. Ferrar went 
off on his first serious geologising effort since his graduation.  
All of these activities could have been undertaken by less sophisticated vessels with 
similar results except Armitage’s magnetic research. The shipboard magnetic observatory 
work was the only unique element of the scientific program and it proved to be the most 
troublesome. There was no mentor for Armitage to advise on use of the Lloyd-Creak dip 
when he needed it, and his reports on the difficulties with the instrument were dismissed. 
5.3.3 Christchurch 
In the meantime Bernacchi had been chasing the Discovery. He was detained in England by 
training and practice on the Eschenhagen magnetometer then travelled overland to meet the 
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mail steamer Cuzco in Marseilles, bound for Melbourne. Once in Melbourne he had to make 
arrangements to tranship tons of equipment (including the expedition’s pre-fabricated hut, 
later known as “Gregory Villa”, the two magnetic huts, 23 dogs and their food consisting of 
dog biscuits and dried fish, 30 pairs of Canadian snow shoes and a miscellany of other items) 
across to Lyttelton (Materials and equipment list, n.d.).  
Bernacchi had a near disaster and almost missed his passage to New Zealand, then 
Antarctica. He was arrested in Melbourne on 13 November, the day of his intended departure. 
In May 1898 he had purchased shares with a promissory note to the value of £100 but had 
never acquitted the debt. The Melbourne stockbroking company Ellison and Everard sought 
Bernacchi’s detention and he was booked to sail that afternoon on Waihora. The plaintiffs 
stated that, as the expedition was fraught with danger, Bernacchi might perish and in any 
event there was little prospect he would return before three years had passed and it was 
unlikely he would travel via Melbourne (Explorer Arrested for Debt, 1901). Bernacchi must 
have struck a compromise. He did join the expedition in New Zealand and the RS archives 
have records of quarterly payments of £62.10/- being made in his favour during 1902 that 
probably went towards acquitting the debt (Longhurst, 1901b). This is in contrast to other 
expeditioners who did not receive wages incrementally. The magnetic research program 
would have been severely compromised if Bernacchi had failed to make such an 
arrangement.      
Bernacchi arrived in Christchurch on 13 November 1901 and immediately started 
work with the local magnetic specialist, Coleridge Farr (1866-1943), and his assistant, Henry 
Skey (1877-1947) to establish a new magnetic observatory in the grounds of the current 
Botanic Gardens (43° 31’ 50” S, 172° 37’ 18” E) comprised of separate absolute and 
variation houses fabricated from timber with a slate roof and fixed by brass screws and 
copper nails (Farr, 1903). The utility for magnetic work at this site was later diminished by 
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the installation of Christchurch’s electric tramway. The present hut is a slightly newer 
structure on the same site and is still used as a site for standardising gravity observations. 
They had sufficient time to test and compare the expedition’s instruments against those of the 
Christchurch observatory, a necessary part of the instrument calibration routine, but 
Bernacchi did not set up the expedition’s Eschenhagen instrument at this time. The RGS, 
London, keeps archival holdings of many of the magnetic observation records for variation, 
dip and total magnetic force for this period which attest to the painstaking nature of the work 
(Armitage, 1901d). Some examples of the observation records are reproduced at Appendix V. 
The experience for the scientific team in Christchurch was similar to their stay in 
Cape Town. The magnetists had a great deal of work to do while the other scientists were 
allowed recreation, social outings and easy paced visits to colleagues at the Canterbury 
Museum to improve local knowledge, especially, in Wilson’s case, of southern ocean birds. 
Even though Melbourne had been bypassed, the arrival in New Zealand on 28 November 
1901 meant only a fortnight was available before the revised 12 December departure date. In 
spite of dry docking in London, then re-caulking at Simon’s Town and months at sea during 
which the seams should have closed up, the water leak was still an issue. Scott arranged for 
the ship to be dry docked to find and rectify the cause before turning south. Meanwhile, all 
the stores were removed from the ship and re-tallied, then stowed along with the additional 
stores brought from Melbourne. Various factors including wormholes, unseasoned timber, 
incorrectly drilled bolt holes, loose fasteners, overly snug fitting of the steel plates on the bow 
and a leaking flange were all blamed for the water ingress (Yelverton, 2000, pp. 93-96; 
Bryan, 2011, p. 151). The leak was still not solved after dry-docking, so the process was 
repeated. After further work was undertaken, the leak was still as bad as ever but Scott could 
delay no longer.  
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The highlights of the passage from England for the scientists had been the unplanned 
visits to South Trinidad and Macquarie Islands. Neither of these were suggested in the 
instructions and neither were related to the magnetic science program. The schedule had 
always been tight if the Discovery was to make a timely departure for the Antarctic summer 
season, and the slow rate of progress of the ship intensified the matter. The outward passage 
was a joy for Wilson, who observed and, wherever possible collected birds whose detail he 
recorded in drawings and watercolours but these activities did not require a purpose built 
polar ship and were peripheral to the core business of the expedition. 
The magnetic science program at sea had not been successful. Armitage had struggled 
throughout with instruments unfit for the task and on a ship that rolled excessively, rather 
than providing a stable platform. He later stated: “Discovery was another word for perpetual 
motion (Armitage, 1905, p. 303). In addition, the observing schedule was probably 
impossible to maintain given his prime responsibilities of watch keeping and navigation. 
Haphazard recruitment processes and Bernacchi’s last minute engagement meant he missed a 
potentially significant contribution to the critical, at-sea magnetic observations on the 
outward voyage when his theoretical knowledge and experience might have enhanced the 
value of the observations. 
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Chapter 6: Science on the ice and Discovery’s scientific outputs 
Christchurch was a turning point for the expedition. Bernacchi joined the ship and a major 
shift in the activities of exploration and science was looming. The vessel had not proved 
satisfactory in many ways and there had already been a number of disappointments in the 
scientific program. These included the difficulties Armitage had with the magnetic 
instrument, the loss of meteorological kites, the reduced opportunities for oceanography and 
the loss of miles of sounding wire with the apparatus, including valuable Pettersson water 
sampling bottles and specialized thermometers. Departure towards the ice represented a new 
beginning and the chance to commence substantive new scientific inquiry. 
The visit to New Zealand had cost the expedition four weeks (Skelton, 2004, pp. 30-
33) and the next destination was Cape Adare, the location of Bernacchi’s initial Antarctic 
encounter during Borchgrevink’s Southern Cross expedition. This chapter focuses on the 
scientific practices of the physicist, Bernacchi as a means to demonstrate the operations and 
challenges of frontier polar science during the era. The stay in Christchurch had provided 
opportunities for socialising, a little science and preparation of the vessel for the next tests in 
the Southern Ocean, the ice pack and the Ross Sea. It was crucial that the ship was swung for 
compass adjustment again. The weather had been cloudy on arrival so, although the magnetic 
force was measured by the vibration method at that time, no sun sights were possible for 
accurate determination of true north. This meant that compass adjustment could not be 
completed at that time (Armitage, 1901d).  
The Discovery was heavily laden even before the extra supplies from Melbourne were 
added. As the ship consumed coal at a much faster rate than calculated, and to maximise the 
opportunity for coastal exploration an additional forty tons of bagged coal were added as 
deck cargo, along with dogs and sheep. At the last minute an offer of further coal, a gift, was 
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received via the Mayor of Dunedin, so a further twenty-five tons were acquired during an 
unplanned stop at Port Chalmers near Dunedin. Armitage wrote a last letter to John Scott 
Keltie (1840-1927) at the RS, posted from there. It reiterated the potential commercial 
benefits of the Discovery magnetic observations as an argument for further fundraising.  
Get more authoritative statement from Capt. Creak if possible, as to the value (to 
shipping) of the magnetic work done: of the tremendous force about to be placed at 
Capitalists disposal by the Discovery … say it’s worth another £10,000 to secure it to 
Britishers by means of British enterprise backed by British fold.  
(Armitage, 1901b) 
The body of this chapter concerns the operation of the magnetic research program in 
Antarctica and the ways in which the outputs were handled and ultimately published. 
6.1 South to Antarctica 
After a relatively smooth passage south, the first iceberg was sighted on 2 January 1902. The 
ice pack was entered the following day close to the Antarctic Circle and the ship was through 
the fringe of pack ice quickly, entering the Ross Sea polynya on 8 January. During the time in 
the ice pack, many seals (including three rare Ross seals) and birds were collected and a 
number of deep soundings and trawls were also made. Skelton confirmed the value of support 
by crew to scientific programs when, on 3 January 1902, Hodgson neglected to put sufficient 
swivels on the dredge, leading to kinked wires: “These scientific people may be alright at 
looking through a microscope & making theories, but as a rule they are devilish little good at 
the practical work or catching their specimens.”  The activity had cost a significant amount of 
time and Skelton thought that Scott would be “scarcely likely to waste another 6 hours on 
dredging for nothing” (Skelton, 2004, p. 37). 
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Figure 6: Map locating continental Antarctica and sites mentioned in the text (Base map Priestley, Adie & 
Robin, 1964). 
 
A landing was made at Cape Adare on the morning of 9 January and the magneticians 
were first ashore to set up equipment and make observations to determine the amount of 
change in the magnetic signature of the area since Bernacchi’s first visit. “The observations 
were taken over exactly the same spot as those of 1899, and the values obtained show little 
sign of secular change” (Bernacchi 1908, p. 132). This work was completed at 10 p.m., after 
which Bernacchi and some others visited the grave of Nicolai Hanson on the hillside above 
the cape. Most of the scientists and crew spent time ashore but Hodgson took the opportunity 
to use one of the ship’s whalers to dredge the sea floor for fauna (Skelton, 2004, pp. 40-41). 
  
196 
The next four weeks were utilised for coastal exploration in the Ross Sea. The Discovery 
steamed south from Cape Adare, entering Wood Bay where Bernacchi believed that a 
suitable landing place with easy access to the interior could be found. Armitage reported the 
bay to be “almost full of heavy ice” so they returned to clear water where they again “swung 
ship for compass variation” (Armitage 1905, p. 47). They proceeded to coast Victoria Land 
as far south as Ross Island, then turned east, following the Ice Barrier where they ultimately 
discovered new land on 30 January. Scott named it King Edward VII Land, in deference to 
the expedition’s patron.  
Scott called a meeting of the wardroom on 2 February 1902 just after they had 
discovered land and he shared his plans to assemble the huts and overwinter, then make 
spring journeys to the south and west. The relief ship would coal up Discovery, which would 
then try to connect the unexplored stretch of coastline to the west between Cape North and 
Adelie Land. “The relief ship would remain behind & land a sledging party near Wood Bay 
with the object of reaching the magnetic pole” (Royds, 2001, p. 88). This is the only mention 
of any prospective sledge travel to the magnetic pole. Skelton recalls the same meeting but 
does not mention the magnetic pole idea, although he does refer to sending a sledge party 
inland from Wood Bay, an obvious starting point for such a journey due to its proximity to 
the pole (Skelton, 2004, p. 50). Turning back, the ship halted at an inlet in the barrier and the 
manned, tethered hydrogen balloon, was sent aloft on 4 February, showing Scott, Antarctica’s 
first aeronaut, that the barrier was extensive and featureless. Bernacchi and Armitage were in 
the party of six that made a 34 mile (55 kilometres) overnight sledging journey on the barrier 
to a record 79° S. In spite of their polar experience neither were able to operate the primus 
stove (Skelton, 2004, p. 53).   
It was Scott’s decision to keep the ship in the south rather than send a party ashore 
then retreat to lower latitudes for further exploration and oceanography. This decision was in 
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accord with the final version of “Instructions to the Commander” (British National Antarctic 
Expedition, 1901). There was no consideration of the alternative plan to drop a land party 
then proceed with scientific ship work and exploration at lower latitudes over winter 
(Markham, n.d.e). Nosing south past Ross Island (and again swinging the ship for compass 
adjustment) they discovered that Ross had been in error naming McMurdo a bay, when in 
fact it is a strait or sound. Bernacchi recorded the revelation: 
McMurdo Bay as charted by Ross we soon found to be totally wrong. We soon sailed 
right over the land laid down as the southern extremity of the Bay and discovered that 
it was not a bay but a strait or channel about 20 miles wide at the narrowest part and 
beyond.  
(Bernacchi 1903b) 
The transition from exploration and science at sea to a mostly sedentary polar research base 
camp meant a massive shift in the roles of most on board the Discovery. Oceanography 
ceased and geology and glaciology began. Meteorology intensified from the shipboard watch-
keeping routine to a more complex and comprehensive, but spatially static enterprise. 
Wilson’s work soon switched from collecting and skinning to his secondary role as artist to 
the expedition as the supply of novel vertebrate life forms became exhausted.   
6.2 The Hut Point magnetic observatory and scientific practice on the ice 
Winter Quarters were located in a sheltered cove at the far south-western tip of Ross Island 
on 8 February. Within a few days good progress was being made on the erection of the main 
living hut, whose design was based on Peary’s Greenland hut (Gregory, 1906) and the two 
magnetic observatory huts. These were assembled by affixing asbestos slabs over a wooden 
frame using non-magnetic (probably brass) screws (Bernacchi, 1908, p. 130). They were 11’ 
(3.35m) square, 9’ 8” (3m) high at the front and 7’ 4” (2.25m) high at the rear, and cost £100 
(Markham, n.d.g). They were ordered from the German company, Calma Co. “at the last 
moment & were at my suggestion, & my specification, so of course I hope they will prove 
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satisfactory” (Skelton, 2004, pp. 55-58). Bernacchi’s imperative was to have the magnetic 
observatory operational in time for the agreed term day observations on 1 March, so he was 
taking part in construction of the observatory huts. The ship’s carpenter had to finish the 
construction on 22 February as they “didn’t understand the job” (Duncan, 1901). Skelton 
reported success: “Bernacchi got his Eschenhagen magnetic instruments fixed up in one of 
the asbestos observation huts today & started it working” (Skelton, 2004, p. 59).  
The two magnetic observation huts were located adjacent to the main expedition hut 
on Hut Point Peninsula. The huts were known as the “absolute” and “variation” huts. Each 
had a specific function and different instruments were housed within each accordingly. In the 
variation hut a stable platform was constructed by burying, then freezing in a 24” (61 cm) 
diameter concrete pipe into the permanently frozen ground, then arranging an oak slab on its 
top. The component parts of the Eschenhagen magnetometer (Feinregistriergerät) were 
mounted on the slab as shown in Figure 7. On the left, three variometers are illustrated, one 
for declination and one each for horizontal and vertical force. On the right hand side of the 
view is the mechanism that contains a drum onto which photosensitive paper is attached. A 
small lamp on the side of the drum mechanism casts light that was reflected off the polished 
end or a plane mirror on the end of the magnets in the variometers, the beams then pass 
through a hemi-cylindrical lens to make traces on the photographic paper on the drum (Royal 
Society, 1909, p. 75). 
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Figure 7: Eschenhagen variometer arrangement in variation hut Discovery expedition (Bernacchi, 1909, p. 3). 
 
An important feature of the new instrument was the clockwork drive to the drum 
carrying the photosensitive recording paper whose speed could be adjusted to vary the 
sensitivity for the observations, and which otherwise allowed continuous recording (Image 
6).  
	  
Image 6: Eschenhagen magnetograph clockwork drum, Geoscience Australia, Canberra (author’s photo). 
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This was a recently developed, innovative instrument and copies were also being used on 
Drygalski’s Gauss, at his base station on Kerguelen Islands and at the Potsdam magnetic 
observatory where Professor Max Eschenhagen (1858-1901), the inventor, oversaw the 
operations.	  	  
The absolute hut contained a standard Kew pattern unifilar magnetometer whose 
purpose was to make “specific measurements of the earth’s magnetic field” (Riffenburgh, 
2011, p. 126). Those observations of declination and force were the standards against which 
the Eschenhagen magnetometer results were calibrated. The Kew magnetometer in the 
absolute hut was situated on a brick pillar for stability (Bernacchi, 1908, p. 130). It consisted 
of a hollow cylindrical magnet suspended by a fine silk, brass or (in this case) quartz filament 
that allowed the magnet to rotate freely. In a description of magnetographs at Scott Base, the 
fibre is described as “so fine that even against a black velvet background it is difficult to see” 
(Roper, 1983). The end of the magnet carried an etched glass scale that was viewed through a 
telescopic eyepiece. Image 7 shows the construction of the instrument. 
 
 
Image 7: Kew pattern unifilar magnetometer, University of Queensland physics museum (author’s photo).   
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Determination of the declination is according to a routine whereby:  
the instrument is rotated about its vertical axis till the centre division of the scale 
appears to coincide with the vertical cross-wire of the telescope. The two verniers on 
the azimuth circle having been read, the magnet is then inverted, i.e. turned through 
180 about its axis, and the setting is repeated. A second setting with the magnet 
inverted is generally made, and then another setting with the magnet in its original 
position. The mean of all the readings of the verniers gives the reading on the azimuth 
circle corresponding to the magnetic meridian.  
(LoveToKnow 1911 Online Encyclopedia, 2004) 
Determination of force was a two-step process. Firstly, the period of vibration of the freely 
suspended magnet in the horizontal plane is determined accurately using an accurately rated 
chronometer. This gives a value known as the magnetic moment. A deflection experiment is 
then carried out. The angle by which a secondary magnet is deflected by the magnet used in 
the first part of the experiment at a known distance is determined. This provides a value for 
the horizontal component of the magnetic field. These values can be combined to calculate 
the total of the horizontal component of force. There were various challenges to the 
operations. Compensations had to be made in the calculations for the torsion of the filament, 
the inductive effect of the earth’s magnetic field, the ambient temperature and the rate of the 
chronometer (LoveToKnow 1911 Online Encyclopedia, 2004). The geographic meridian 
must be known with pin-point accuracy. Rather than re-calculate the meridian with each set 
of observations, it was normal practice to make a visible target on an immovable object 
outside the hut for alignment. This was a complex operation that could only be performed by 
an experienced and knowledgeable observer who understood the underpinning theory. Image 
8 shows Barne, Beattie and Morrison at work with a Kew pattern magnetometer in the tent 
observatory on Red Hill, behind Simon’s Town, South Africa. 
Bernacchi’s working conditions were superior to those of many other physicists of the 
era. Bidlingmaier on the Gauss had an observatory on an ice floe constructed from snow 
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blocks. Although an absolute hut was constructed for Mawson’s AAE at Commonwealth 
Bay, the observer was required to stand outside the hut as the magnetometer was accessed 
through small sliding doors (Riffenburgh, 2011, pp. 126-127). Performing these tasks out of 
the wind was a luxury for Bernacchi compared to his efforts at Cape Adare using only a tent 
as an observatory in 1899. 
 
 
Image 8: Michael Barne operating the Kew magnetometer at Red Hill, Simons Town, South Africa on 11 
October, 1901. (RGS negative # B3541). Reproduced with permission (c) Royal Geographical Society (with 
IBG). 
 
Bernacchi described part of his daily winter routine in his June 1903 diary, by which 
time he was recording events of a few days at a time in each entry. “Uneventful monotonous 
days … Took a complete set of absolute measurements on the 28th. Preparations are already 
being made for the spring sledging.” Then the menu for the week is followed by a full 
description of normal daily routine: 
Rise and stow. At 8am Dr K called to examine the food, milk etc for the men & 
officers breakfasts … the hunt for ptomaines. Personally I find the greatest difficulty 
in turning out & am generally one of the latest to breakfast. Perhaps it is because I do 
not go to sleep until late & perhaps one’s blood is in rather a torpid state during the 
long winter.  
(Bernacchi, 1902c) 
  
203 
After breakfast nearly all members of the wardroom indulged in a pipe and read for a half 
hour before setting about the day’s various duties. The men (sailors) had dinner at 1.30 p.m.  
then were exempt from work in the afternoon. Bernacchi explains in his narrative account 
that “the magnetic observations were my personal responsibility, and as no one else 
understood the adjustments of the delicate instruments employed, there was no relief” 
(Bernacchi 1938, p. 43) but his daily routines were not constrained to magnetic observations, 
as he also had responsibility for a range of other physical science observations. A set of 
apparatus for pendulum observations inside an evacuated cylinder, by which the value of 
gravity and thus the oblate shape of the earth could be determined was supplied for 
Bernacchi’s use. Skelton provided considerable assistance with repairs to get the apparatus to 
hold its vacuum, then with the actual observations. Bernacchi also had a seismograph for 
which he had received training from the inventor, Milne. Bernacchi was also to required 
record features of auroras and he had a set of recording sheets onto which assistant observers 
(generally the night watchmen) could enter the details of any auroras seen during the polar 
night. During winter he was often being called in the early hours of the morning by the 
nightwatchman to observe the auroras. As physicist, another critical duty was to make 
astronomical observations for precise location of the observatory and to determine the exact 
time for the calibration of timepieces. One example is on 7 July 1903 when, after opening his 
diary entry with the usual synopsis of recent weather he states, “Observed successfully with 
Mulock on Sunday night an occultation of a star ϒ Librae & the moon. It was a good 
observation & should give a fairly accurate longitude” (Bernacchi, 1902c). Atmospheric 
electricity measurement and operation of the sunshine recording instrument also fell to 
Bernacchi, and a spectral camera was used (unsuccessfully) from time to time. On 22 August 
1902 Bernacchi noted another attempt at solar spectroscopy with the prismatic camera on 
first sight of the returning sun marking the end of the long (120 days) polar night (Bernacchi, 
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1902a). As a consequence of the magnetic science obligations, the lack of an understudy who 
knew the operation of the Kew and Eschenhagen instruments, and the numerous additional 
tasks, Bernacchi had little opportunity to travel “off-base.” The training of officers at the 
National Physical Laboratory should have been sufficient for them to take a supporting role 
in the magnetic observations, but the normal course was only three weeks for officers and 
those sent from Discovery did not attend the full course. None were entirely competent, 
although Skelton assisted during Bernacchi’s sledge journeys.  
Once the huts were constructed and the magnetometers established, Bernacchi fell 
into a cycle of work dominated by the demands of the agreement for synchronous “term day” 
observations. Daily visits to the variation hut were described by Bernacchi thus: 
The Observatory was entered at between 11 a.m. and noon each day, the light-shutter 
of the magnetograph closed, and the time of doing so noted by means of a 
chronometer watch. The thermometer inserted in the Vertical Force instrument was 
then read. 
After changing the paper on the recording cylinder, filling and trimming the lamps, 
the thermometer was again read, the light-shutter dropped, and the time of doing so 
noted as before by means of the chronometer. The whole operation occupied about 30 
minutes, and times of stopping, starting, temperatures and error of watch on mean 
time were entered in a note book.  
(Bernacchi, 1909, p. 2) 
During 1902 Bernacchi tried (unsuccessfully) to keep the hut temperature stable by means of 
a heating lamp, so this required refuelling daily. On the term days, the first and fifteenth of 
each month, Bernacchi had to perform sets of fast run observations. During these he adjusted 
the clockwork drive of the Eschenhagen instrument to rotate the drum at a much faster rate, 
giving a higher resolution of the changes in the local magnetic elements. The routine also 
included processing the photosensitive paper magnetograms, then interpreting their traces. 
With three variometer traces, a base line for each, then a further trace for temperature, there 
was a total of seven trace lines on each magnetogram, making interpretation a challenge. An 
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example trace from a magnetic disturbance on 3 April 1903 follows (Figure 8) showing the 
complexity of traces that often became confused with each other and the tendency for traces 
to go off scale on magnetically disturbed days.  
 
Figure 8: Magnetogram, Winter Quarters, 3 April 1903 (Royal Society, 1909, Plate XXVI, following page 274). 
 
As the weather got colder with approaching winter, Bernacchi found he needed to alter the 
chemistry of the processing solutions for the magnetograms as the developing time was too 
slow. He later complained in his diary that the huts provided little insulation against 
temperature fluctuations, especially during summer. On 1 January 1903 he wrote: 
 Have had much trouble of late with magnetic instruments. It is impossible to keep a 
uniform temperature within the hut & the temp simply fluctuates with the daily 
outside range. The asbestos huts are very ill adapted for this purpose. They are more 
like ovens inside. Inside the living hut where the seismograph is now placed the 
temperature is much more uniform, but then there is another difficulty from water 
continually drips down upon the instruments due to the snow melting which has 
accumulated between the roof & the lining or ceiling.  
(Bernacchi, 1902c) 
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Within three months Bernacchi reported the hut becoming too cold. On 21 March he noted 
the temperature within hut was very low and handling instruments was a “cold business”. 
From 23 to 25 March 1903 a snow wall was constructed around the variation hut. “Have built 
up snow wall 2ft 3in [68 centimetres] thickness well above the roof + also covered over roof 
so may be able to keep something approaching a uniform temperature within. All instruments 
working satisfactorily” (Bernacchi, 1902c). He still wrote long entries throughout the second 
winter in comparison to many other diarists that abridged or neglected their entries in the 
second year as there seemed to be little novel activity. Bernacchi went into the details of daily 
life routines at one stage and continued to comment on the scientific work and its difficulties, 
and offered some ideas about the meaning of results. He did not mention much about the 
social landscapes or his personal relationships.  
Neither the physical structure of the huts, or the construction techniques appear to 
have been to the highest standard. Bernacchi reports an accident within the variation hut that 
caused a break in the record in mid January of 1903: 
Had a very unfortunate accident within the magnetic hut during the night of the 16th. 
On entering on morning of 17th found that one of the asbestos slabs had fallen from 
the roof upon the instruments. I thought at first that they must be completely 
demolished but on examination found that only two thermometers had been broken & 
quartz fibre of H instrument. The slab had entirely missed the declination instrument 
& record had continued without interruption, [illegible] the baseline magnet being 
thrown out of adjustment. Had the instrument under way again on the 19th. 
(Bernacchi, 1902c) 
Regular calibration of the variometer by comparison against the results of the Kew pattern 
absolute magnetometer was a task undertaken roughly each fortnight. On the first term day 
for synchronous observations with the Gauss and other observatories (1 March 1901), 
Skelton had predicted that their observatory would be a site of numerous magnetic storms. 
“The records, which will be continuous, show most remarkable magnetic storms to be the 
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normal state down here” (Skelton, 2004, p. 59). This proved correct as Bernacchi often 
records the trace going off the scale.  
Getting from the Discovery to the magnetic huts was not always easy. Before the 
sound froze it required a boat trip across to shore, then, once the sea froze and the Antarctic 
night enveloped the expedition a ropeway to the shore was established when it became clear 
how easily men could become disoriented and lose their way in a blizzard. Bernacchi’s diary 
demonstrates this on 12 August: “Blowing a blizzard so furiously that it’s impossible to get to 
magnetic observatory” (Bernacchi, 1902a). On one occasion Bernacchi and Skelton were lost 
for nearly two hours within a short distance of the ship when, as Skelton recorded, a section 
of the safety rope was missing (Skelton, 2004, P. 101). They wandered around and were only 
saved by chance when men returning to the ship from practice for theatricals in the main hut 
heard them calling (Royds, 2001, p. 154).    
Meanwhile the meteorological observation program proceeded with records taken 
every two hours. This onerous procedure involved an excursion to the weather screens aft of 
the ship on the sea ice. Michael Barne, under the nom-de plume of “Fitz-Clarence”, was 
prompted by the “eternal round of magnetic and meteorological observations” to contribute to 
the mid-winter edition of the in-house journal, The South Polar Times: 
An observation! What is that?” I think I hear you say. 
‘A scientific function that is practiced every day?’ 
Not only every day, I fear, far oftener than that, 
A useless entertainment, and it fairly knocks me flat. 
To ascertain the object of this idiotic game 
Of taking measurements, is my everlasting aim. 
 
To be aroused from slumber at the deadest of the night, 
To take an observation, gives us all a morbid blight: 
How in the name of all that’s blank, can temperatures down here  
Concern those scientific men at home, from year to year? 
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To us alone they matter, for it’s cold enough alas! 
To freeze the tail and fingers off a monkey made of brass 
(Bernacchi, 1938, p. 50)  
The Eschenhagen magnetograph ran reliably, except in the most extreme cold 
weather, when the rotating drum stopped. This only occurred on a handful of occasions such 
as midwinter 1903 when Bernacchi recorded: “Clockwork of magnetograph stopped through 
cold & I could not coax it to go again until today” (Bernacchi, 1902c). The instrument 
provided a continuous record of changes in the magnetic field for nearly two years. Bernacchi 
tapered back the frequency of observations around September of 1903 when his supply of 
photosensitive paper was getting low. On 11 September 1903 Bernacchi wrote: “Found 
yesterday that there are only 50 magnetograms remaining so have not worked instrument 
yesterday or today, & must miss days so as to make the paper cover as long a period as 
possible” (Bernacchi, 1902c). 
Other problems encountered by the physicist were ingress of drift snow into the 
magnetic huts requiring hours of removal and clean up. On 16 and 17 July 1902 Bernacchi 
described having to clear out the variation house after the hut including the instrument bench 
became drifted up with powder snow. He stressed the importance of cleaning all drift snow 
out of the instruments so as not to throw them out of adjustment (Bernacchi, 1902a). From 
time to time the lamp burned incorrectly, creating smuts that soiled the apparatus. On 22 May 
1902 he spent the day cleaning out the hut after a “Difficulty with hut smoking badly” 
(Bernacchi, 1902a). Blizzards often created additional tasks of digging away snow to access 
the hut doors. The physicist records that after an overnight blizzard on 13 August 1903, it 
took him all morning to dig out snow to gain access to the observatories.  
Bernacchi’s diary provides evidence that he put considerable effort into preparing for 
the forthcoming solar eclipse, on top of his normal range of activities. 
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Have just finished computing the times etc for Solar Eclipse on Sept. 21st. It is rather 
a long & cumbersome computation but very interesting. 
Find the first contact will occur at 3h. 39m.54 s PM M.T. & the last at 5.37.8 PM So 
the duration of the eclipse is 1h.57m.14s. + magnitude of maximum phase = .94 total 
being = 1. So it will not be far from total. Magnetic curves for last week are very 
highly disturbed, especially that for 26th when bright aurora was witnessed. Also 
curves for 22 day the sun returned are very highly disturbed. Endeavoured to take 
absolute observation on several occasions during last 8 days but had to abandon 
attempt on account of disturbance. Observed two occultations of stars successfully 
this evening & took time observation with Mulock.  
(Bernacchi, 1902c) 
He recorded that unfortunately things did not go perfectly on the day of the eclipse: 
We got everything ready for [measuring] eclipse in one of Hodgson’s biological 
shelters viz. Prismatic camera, telescopes, Spectrometer, half plate camera etc. but 
towards noon cloud came up from the NE & by 1PM the sky was completely overcast 
& remained so all afternoon & did not allow us to catch even a glimpse of the sun. It 
was a bitter disappointment, after all the preparations we had made. A perceptible 
darkness was observed during the eclipse but not very marked-the only observations 
we were able to take were magnetic and meteorological. 
(Bernacchi, 1902c) 
The experience on Drygalski’s Gauss could not have been further from that on 
Discovery as the Gauss never landed a shore party. The ship became ice bound at a high 
latitude at sea (66° 02’ S, 89° 38’ E) and physicist, Bidlingmaier had to accommodate his 
magnetometer on the sea ice. For the first term day observation he set up his equipment on a 
floe, in the open air, as shelter had not yet been built. An icehouse was constructed later on 
the floe, but due to snowfalls it began sinking, the water level rose and Bidlingmaier worked 
standing in a pool of saline slush at -5° C. A second icehouse observatory was built later but 
movement of the floes caused it to continuously move further away from the ship. 
Bidlingmaier made a sledge journey from the ship in the interests of science. He travelled to 
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the coast to take observations on solid land that allowed him to calibrate the instruments, 
enhancing the value of results (Drygaski, 1989, p. 233; Vanhöffen, 1915). 
6.3 Sledging journeys and scientific operations 
There were four sledging journeys undertaken during the Discovery’s period in the ice that 
are of particular significance to the magnetic research. These were: 
• Scott, Wilson and Shackleton’s southern journey between November 1902 and 
February 1903 
• Armitage, Skelton and Ferrar’s western (polar plateau) journey between November 
1902 and January 1903 
• Scott’s western summit party between October 1903 and December 1903 
• Bernacchi and Royds’ southeast barrier party between November 1903 and December 
1903   
(Yelverton, 2000, pp. 381-383) 
These journeys provided data on declination that became data points used in Chart 1, plate 17 
of the Physical Observations report that located the magnetic pole and that displays lines of 
variation in the Ross Sea vicinity (Figure 9). The western journey of Armitage, then the 
Barrier journey of Bernacchi and Royds provided complete sets of magnetic observations for 
declination, dip and total force. 
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Figure 9: Chart showing magnetic data collect points at sea, at Winter Quarters and on significant sledging 
journeys 1901-1904, south geographic pole near top (Royal Society, 1908, Chart 1, following page 156). 
 
The terminology used in the diaries and narratives hints that the sledging journeys 
were an extension of maritime exploration in practice, except that instead of liquid water the 
substrate was a frozen sea, river (i.e., a glacier) or ice cap. Armitage mentions that they  
“unshipped the wood” from the sledge runners early in his western mountain journey in 
spring 1902. In his sledging diary during the “Barrier” trip, Bernacchi stated on 14 November 
h’ationul Antarctic Expedition, 1901-1904. Plate 17 (Magnetic 0bsei.vations). 
Chart I. Lines of equal magnetic declination. (See p. 165.) 
From observations inadc by the Oficers of the National Antarctic Expedition, 1902-1904. 
By Commander L. W. E’. CII~GTWYND, Royal Navy. 
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1903: “Mt. Erebus and Terror now well astern” and on 2 December 1903: “One is entirely 
dependant upon astronomical sights and compass for position. In this respect similar to a ship 
on the open sea” (Bernacchi, 1903c). Scott himself alludes to maritime practice when 
describing the use of a tent floorcloth as an aid to sledging: “This floorcloth spread on 
bamboos likewise made an excellent sail, but could be used in this capacity only when the 
wind was abaft the beam” (Scott, 1905b, Volume 1, p. 429). These allusions, along with the 
use of sledging pennants to identify the commander of each of the sledges, follow historic 
maritime practice rooted in antiquated RN Arctic traditions from the previous century. Scott 
did not know at the time, but the whole of his southern journey on this expedition was across 
floating barrier ice. Royds found evidence that it was afloat when he determined higher 
temperatures deep in crevasses on the Barrier, indicating proximity to seawater during the 
south-eastern barrier journey. 
In accord with normal maritime practice, spot checks of position were made at least 
daily, especially solar zenith observations for latitude at local noon. Sextant observations rely 
on a clearly defined sight of the horizon or the use of an artificial horizon as, in polar 
environments it’s often impossible to discriminate the horizon from sky. The artificial 
horizon consisted of a small mercury bath offering a horizontal surface that reflects an image 
of the sun. The theodolite would have been the more accurate instrument but sextants were 
more portable. Correct technique for use of the artificial horizon is shown at Image 9. The 
low sun and atmospheric effects further complicate observations and reduce accuracy 
(Littlehales, 1904). The compass was of little practical use in navigation due to proximity of 
the magnetic pole where the weak horizontal force meant that the needle was sluggish and the 
declination was great.  
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Image 9: At 65 miles, Southern journey. Bage instructing Hunter in the use of the artificial horizon (McLean, 
1912). Reproduced with permission of Mitchell Library, State Library of NSW. 
 
Scott’s southern journey was purely for exploration. Armitage’s spring 1902, western 
mountain journey turned out to be a pathfinding journey in support of Scott’s 1903 longer 
summer journey that penetrated the Royal Society range and made considerable mileage 
across the polar plateau towards the west. Armitage’s journey was minor by comparison to 
those of Scott in total distance but significant in geographic achievement as he discovered the 
Polar Plateau and found the way through the range. His last outward camp, on the polar 
plateau, was 101 miles (160 km) from the coastline and 134 miles (216 km) from the ship 
(Armitage 1905, p. 182). Armitage stated his intention to make numerous, full sets of 
magnetic observations en route. On the sea ice on the western side of McMurdo Bay, and 
before commencing the ascent of the Ferrar glacier, Armitage and Skelton detached from the 
main party to make the first set of magnetic observations (dip, total force and declination). 
The full instrument kit and tripods together made a significant addition to the weight of the 
sledges of 47 lbs., or about 21.5 kg (Armitage, 1905, pp. 158-162). The value in respect of 
magnetic science was that “we had, by fortunate coincidence, travelled on a circle of equal 
‘dips,’ thus greatly aiding Commander Chetwynd, R.N., who undertook the ‘working up’ of 
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the observations on our arrival in England, in fixing the present locality of the Magnetic 
Pole” (Armitage, 1905, p. 187).  
Scott’s western journey was also exploratory, not scientific. It’s a mystery that the 
declination chart published in the Physical Observations volume of scientific results shows 
observation points with longitude and latitude on that track, yet Scott acknowledges that his 
means of accurately calculating his position from sextant or theodolite observations, the Hints 
for Travellers booklet, “containing essential data and tables for finding latitudes and 
longitudes” was lost from the supply depot at the top of the climb onto the polar plateau. 
Armitage quotes a letter from Scott that explains he extrapolated the curve of magnetic 
declination then navigated by compass, working out “how far we got, and, roughly, what the 
variation was at different points” later after returning to the ship (Armitage, 1905, pp. 278-
280). Bernacchi, in contradiction, states that he applied his “fine knowledge of Nautical 
Astronomy” to compile from his existing observations a workable version of the necessary 
data (Bernacchi, 1938, p. 94). These were probably the least reliable data points for location 
from time on ice.  
Beyond the ramparts of the mountain range Scott’s outward and return tracks lie on 
much the same latitude. He appears to have used the ancient sailor’s method of using the 
height of the sun at its zenith to determine the latitude and his data points for longitude must 
have been determined by dead reckoning using sledgemeter records. This data is summarised 
in Table XVII of the Physical Observations and is expressed in degrees, minutes and seconds 
of longitude and latitude, or an accuracy of better than 10 metres, but there is no commentary 
regarding the true limitations to the accuracy of the positions (Royal Society, 1908, p. 154). 
The data from Armitage’s western mountain journey appears in Tables X and XI of the 
Physical Observations volume and is expressed in degrees and minutes only, meaning 
accuracy to within about 500 metres (Royal Society, 1908, p. 143). One would have expected 
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the accuracy of these positions to be reversed in the light of Armitage being equipped with 
navigation instruments and tables, while Scott was estimating longitude by dead reckoning 
and determining latitude by zenith observations. On 22 November 1903, on the outbound 
journey, Scott’s party crossed a point exactly between the geographic and magnetic poles, so 
the magnetic declination was 180° and the south geographic pole appeared to be due north by 
the compass (Scott, 1905b, Volume 2, p. 257).  
The final and most significant of the sledging journeys was that undertaken by 
Bernacchi and Royds in late spring of 1903, referred to as the “Barrier” journey. This journey 
was towards the south-east, across the ice barrier from Hut Point. Bernacchi had lobbied 
Scott for this journey during July of 1903: 
Had an interview with the Captain yesterday & requested him to allow me to 
undertake a sledge journey out on the barrier in a SE direction. The journey to last 30 
days & party to consist of 6 in all.  
As I had not got away on sledge journeys last year on account of the physical work to 
be done, would like to get an opportunity this year. The sensitive paper for the 
magnetograph will not last the whole year. There will be a break of at least 2 months 
so might as well employ that time in sledging. Captain seemed much [unintelligible] 
with the scheme, but there is some difficulty in getting men + equipment. However he 
is going to think it over + let me know in a few days. 
(Bernacchi, 1902c) 
Bernacchi does not mention whether he used the scientific utility of the journey as an 
argument to gain Scott’s agreement, but his prime purpose was to make magnetic 
observations away from the influence of the rocks on Ross Island that he knew were affecting 
the results. He had previously established a tent observatory out on the sea ice, to the west of 
Hut Point, to escape the magnetic influence of the substrate. His 5 October 1903 diary entry 
records: “Large tent erected 1 ½ Geo miles in a W direction for magnetic work in November” 
(Bernacchi, 1902 c). In the introductory note to the Physical Observations report, Bernacchi 
noted:  
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The results differ considerably from those taken on shore, and indicate a larger dip 
and a smaller value for the Horizontal Force, whilst the Declination seems less 
easterly. These observations were the standard sets taken as being most undisturbed, 
and used as the base to which all the observations on board the ‘Discovery’ were 
reduced. 
(Bernacchi, 1908, p. 131) 
The Barrier journey was also exploratory in nature and to investigate the form of the 
ice barrier in that direction. Royds also wished to supplement his Hut Point meteorological 
data as it was known that there was a distinct microclimate operating in the vicinity of Winter 
Quarters. Scott recorded the objectives of this sledging party and there is no mention of 
magnetic studies.  
Objectives for Sledge Parties 1903 
Royds & Bernacchi 
Careful examination of Barrier surface, examination of crests, temperature in holes, 
spaces between crests, nature of crystalline structure especially under crests, dig 
holes, take cooker water from various depths & examine snow by measuring resultant 
water. 
The main problems 
1) To obtain evidence as to the packing due to supercumbent snow, a problem 
mostly connected with the thickness of barrier & bergs. 
2) To ascertain if the crusts and stratification in general can be considered 
seasonal 
3) To determine the depths to which the surface temperatures penetrate below the 
surface. 
4) To discover any inequality of level  
(Scott, n.d.c) 
Bernacchi’s objectives for the journey were recorded quite differently before departure and 
stress scientific, not geographical objectives. This is evidence that Scott may not have been 
completely in touch with the work of the scientific programs. 
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Scientific Programme Barrier Sledge Journey 1903 
1. Magnetic observations! Inclination & total force with Barrow Circle declination 
with prismatic compass. 
      2. Specimens of air for dust & chemical analysis 
Specimens of snow from various depths in [illegible] 
Specimens of solid ice (if found) from the furthest point for Ferrar  
3. 2 holes that are dug measure with tape width of respective bands, icy layers … of 
any kind such as ‘blue veins’ ‘white veins’, ‘dust bands’ etc. 
4. Observe any effects of thaw on surface + below temperature in holes 
5. If possible observe structure of ice grains below surface /size, form, arrangement + 
time to separation when exposed 
6. Observe direction of crevasses & sastrugi + depth & height respectively 
7. Observe crusts; hollows; & uplifts 
8. Rock, moraines etc 
9. Careful observations at lowest point of barrier (if reached)  
(Bernacchi, 1903a) 
This note confirms that Bernacchi used the Barrow dip circle in preference to the Lloyd-
Creak dip circle that had given Armitage trouble on the outbound voyage. The eyepieces and 
adjusting controls would have been fitted with leather covers to protect the skin of the 
observer. Once past Cape Armitage the track extended away from the magnetic pole in a 
south-easterly direction. A complete record of the journey and the magnetic science 
undertaken is accessible in the form of Bernacchi’s sledging diary, the original notebook 
being held at the Thomas Manning archive of the SPRI, Cambridge (Bernacchi, 1903a) and 
an expanded, typed version in a private collection of a descendant (Bernacchi, 1903c). 
Although he provides little description of the social landscape and only nominal detail of the 
geographical landscape, the diary offers a great deal of information about the navigational 
and scientific work. 
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Figure 10: Detail from Mulock (1904) showing path of Bernacchi & Royds south-eastern Barrier Journey. 
 
The following segments from one day’s entry (17 November 1903) are typical: 
Tried to get sun sight at noon for latitude but failed through cloud obscuring sun… 
Took sight for longitude about 5.30 PM but not the best through sky being partly 
cloudy…After supper took set of magnetic observations in tent. Both dipping needles 
and total force.  Dip has increased (sic) to about 85° 46’ & total force appears to have 
considerably decreased indicating increase in horizontal force. Lat approx. 78° 33’ 
South by 170° 22’ 15”  
(Bernacchi, 1903a) 
His comment that the dip has “increased” is in error as the previous dip measurement on 14 
November stated: “Magnetic dip about 85° 58’ ”, so the dip, as expected (moving away from 
the magnetic pole) has decreased.  
The expeditions had a variety of “portable” observing instruments for use on sledge 
journeys. The instruments were a significant part of the weight to be shifted, and man hauling 
was the only transport option as all the adult sledge dogs had perished on Scott’s southern 
journey in the previous season. Royds stated that the Barrow dip weighed 18 lbs. (~8 kg.) and 
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its tripod added 10 lbs. (4.5 kg.) to the sledge weight (Royds, 1903). This is a lower estimate 
than the kit used on Armitage’s western trek. Bernacchi was using a sextant and an artificial 
horizon to determine position, as way finding on the Ice Barrier was no different to 
navigation at sea, there being no landmarks for reference or any visible horizon. He noted 
that, at the end of each third day’s sledging he took his full round of magnetic observations in 
the tent, usually before cooking and camp preparations commenced. In addition, Bernacchi 
was making the time to perform all the necessary calculations related to position finding and 
the magnetic observation results. Webb provides the most succinct description of conditions 
and operations during field magnetic observing activities in his memoirs of the journey 
performed with Bob Bage (1888-1915) and Frank Hurley (1885-1962) during Mawson’s 
AAE. The men sledged from the Commonwealth Bay base station to the region of the South 
Magnetic pole, but this was not reproducing Mawson, Mackay and David’s earlier trek 
(reached initially on 16 January 1909 at 72° 25’ S, 155° 16’ E). Bage, Webb and Hurley 
approached from the north, on this occasion crossing completely new territory. Mawson had 
the advantage of an advance copy of the Discovery magnetic report as a source during his 
earlier journey (Shackleton, 1932, p. 307). 
Each full set of observations entailed a minimum of 2½ hours actual observing, when 
250-300 instrument readings would be made: at the extreme south station, where dip 
in planes at right angles had to be followed, the readings were nearly doubled. When 
allowance is made for unpacking, setting up, organising windbreaks and waiting for 
workable conditions of visibility or wind, each station absorbed at least 4 hours-rather 
a back-breaking feat of endurance for the observer and perishing cold for the recorder 
who always had my profound sympathy. 
 (Webb, 1965, p. 5) 
Bernacchi mentions that, as the party progressed away from Hut Point the dip and total 
magnetic force decreased, and the horizontal force and declination increased. The navigation 
calculations alone required sextant observations in the morning and afternoon for longitude, 
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and midday, solar zenith measurements for latitude. Bernacchi was troubled by snow 
blindness from time to time and comments on his state of exhaustion and constant hunger. 
Gregory had written that man hauling sleds and performing scientific surveys were 
incompatible. Man hauling exhausted the participants, dulling their senses and reducing their 
capacity for inquisitive observation or scientific activity: “Secondly, one cannot expect men 
who are harnessed to heavy sledges to keep sufficiently alert mentally to observe accurately 
and solve the new problems that will be presented to them. Travellers have often been blamed 
for errors due to their having seen things with perceptions blunted by continued manual 
labour.” Gregory also comments on the need for shelter and rejected Peary’s ideas that tents 
are unnecessary. The scientists needed the capacity to write up daily results and observations 
in an environment that was conducive to intellectual activity (Gregory, 1900a). 
Webb’s memoir of the sledge journey to the region of the magnetic pole in 1912 
further describes care required by the operator of a dip circle in the field and some challenges 
faced in the interests of quality results.  
The dip-circle is a delicate mechanical instrument, depending for precision on the 
skill, care and experience of the manipulator, even in a favourable environment. 
When competing with low temperatures and high winds involving dust, snow and ice, 
these attributes are at a premium. Because of its design (for use on ship-board), the 
Lloyd-Creak type is the more difficult to handle and is less dependable for accurate 
results than the Kew.  
(Webb, 1965, pp. 2-3) 
Murray Levick, of Scott’s Terra Nova expedition (under the pseudonym of “Bluebell”) wrote 
a humorous but instructive poem that well describes the process of taking dip readings in the 
field with the Barrow dip circle. 
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The Barrow Dip 
The day being calm we take occasion 
To make magnetic observation 
With Poles direct and B end dipping, 
We don’t care how the frost is nipping. 
With instruments first facing east,  
Who minds such hardships in the least? 
So merrily we crack our quip, 
The while we work the barrow Dip. 
And, stamping on the creaking snow, 
Shout, “Right away, boys! Let her go! 
 
With face of instruments now west 
The little needle seems possessed. 
Ye gods! The fun is waxing warm: 
This must be a magnetic storm. 
We stop to find the reason and 
Find some one’s been and kicked the stand. 
For though a tripod was at school 
Declared to be a three-legged stool,  
This toy would seem to have indeed 
Enough legs for a centipede. 
 
The instruments being once again 
Adjusted on a level plane, 
And the offender roundly cursed, 
We start again with poles reversed, 
And watch the swinging needle bend 
Its upper then its lower end, 
And noting twice which way it lean, 
First take the sum and then the mean. 
 
The worker’s hands are numb with cold, 
His nose a wonder to behold, 
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All this we’ve done, but don’t forget 
The fun’s not nearly over yet, 
Because there still remains of course,  
The three times cursed magnetic force, 
The jest this time is much increased 
(With both the needles facing east). 
We fix (as we are told to do) 
The north end near the tangent screw, 
Nor do we heed the chilly air, 
But note each reading down with care, 
Then on our frozen limbs we rise, 
And fill the air with joyous cries. 
We’ll go and make a huge repast- 
The beastly thing is done at last!   
(Priestley, 1915, pp. 189-190) 
 
On 28 November, after eighteen days travelling, the party under Royds’ command 
turned for home at 79° 35’ 2” S, 175° 55’ 30” E, after making a complete set of magnetic 
observations and various meteorological and glaciological activities, including air sampling 
and taking ice crystal samples from a deep snow pit. They had travelled a “distance of exactly 
155 miles = 178 statute miles” (286 kilometres). Bernacchi describes the landscape thus: “At 
the present we see nothing, on our horizon the barrier is one uniform dead level, no inclines 
nor declines & scarcely an irregularity” and “One huge white waste all around with less 
diversity than the Great Sahara desert” (Bernacchi, 1903c).  The return journey was a bolt for 
home and is barely recorded by Bernacchi. The return was characterised by following winds 
that allowed use of the tent floorsheet as a sail on the sledge. The party had averaged 10.2 
miles per day (13.2 Km) for the journey (Skelton, 2004, p. 191) and achieved a significant 
amount of scientific work in spite of the nine hours daily sledging and the usual time spent 
making and breaking camp. 
  
223 
6.4 Organisation and leadership on the ice 
6.4.1 Hierarchy 
Once south of New Zealand Scott had the weight of responsibility for the whole expedition 
firmly on his shoulders. He was then operating according to the Joint Committee’s official 
instructions, any unofficial instructions that Markham may have given him, and his own wits. 
He was truly at the periphery and enacting the first stage of the model of colonial science 
recognised by Basalla (1967) and Macleod (1982). Scott maintained the RN hierarchy 
throughout the period when the ship was south of New Zealand, even though there was no 
RN authority. As mentioned previously at section 4.1.4 (p. 92) the ship was privately owned 
by the societies and registered as a private yacht to Markham, to avoid the Board of Trade 
regulations about loading (Bryan, 2011, p. 151). The RN fiction was especially tenuous when 
the expedition became essentially a land party. The scientific party was not part of the chain 
of command although the participants were treated as if they were officers. Bernacchi 
believed that the officer/crew divide was conducive to social harmony and reflected later that 
this system worked: “The traditions of the naval service, which in some things might have 
proved a disadvantage, in the trivialities of day to day living, were of infinite benefit” 
(Bernacchi, 1938, p. 44). 
Once at Winter Quarters the ship became the lodging. Scott maintained routines that 
were familiar to the officers and crew including deck scrubbing, Saturday afternoon “make 
and mend” sessions for the lower deck, Sunday morning ship inspections and divine service. 
For the officers and scientists there was the maintenance of formal wardroom evening dining 
routines, including appointment of a president to oversee mealtime behaviour (Bernacchi, 
1938, p. 44). Skelton blanched when Scott acted outside the normal chain of command 
protocol and publicly reprimanded a member of his engineering section. The windmill 
constructed for power generation when the ship was in Antarctica broke up in a gale on 13 
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April 1902. This device was a pet project of Scott’s so it’s demise upset him greatly. Scott 
blamed Dellbridge, Skelton’s second engineer, publicly and unreasonably, prompting Skelton 
to record “Most unfair, I call it, as I am responsible for it & if he wants to find fault he can go 
for me about it, not for men under me” (Skelton, 2004, p. 76). The scientific staff had 
considerable freedom to go about their business, which they did with the invaluable support 
and assistance of seamen.  
6.4.2 Scientific leadership on the ice 
Scott’s effectiveness as a scientific leader on this expedition remains an open question. His 
scientific leadership at this time could not be described as energetic or instructive, nor could 
it be considered obstructive. His scientific leadership on the ice was benign, only requiring 
the scientifics to note their weekly activities in a written record kept available for access by 
the other scientists who might be interested. He was ill prepared for the role as a consequence 
of his career as a naval officer in the period prior to the Admiral Jacky Fisher regime, when 
drill and presentation were the focus. The curriculum for trainee officers was focused on 
engineering and navigation, not science, and its status was equivalent to a “senior technical 
school” (Dickinson, 2007, p. 5). Even by 1914 the science component had not advanced 
further than “easy mensuration, hydrostatics, mechanics, heat, and the most elementary 
outlines of magnetism and current electricity” (Director of Naval Education, 1914). There 
was no natural science in the curriculum aside from the meteorology element of the 
geography classes. Any relevant scientific knowledge would have been acquired at torpedo 
school and during the brief spell of magnetic training prior to departure. Reading during the 
outbound voyage might have enhanced his depth of knowledge. He would have observed the 
methods of Mill and Murray in the Atlantic but his personal diaries rarely mention scientific 
operations (Larry Conrad, personal communication, September 2011; Ursula Rack, personal 
communication November 2012). The notable polar scientific leaders of the era (Mawson, 
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Bruce and Charcot) had personal scientific aspirations that fostered the intellectual climate 
amongst their experienced, well trained and well equipped scientists. Those leaders were 
highly motivated to get the best performance from their scientific teams, whereas Scott’s 
prime motivation (on the Discovery expedition) was geographic exploration. His later, Terra 
Nova expedition had a stronger focus on scientific outcomes and was staffed by scientists of a 
higher calibre than the Discovery. Bernacchi reflected: 
But Scott had a deep and reverent attitude towards nature and a most genuine love of 
science. He was interested in every branch of research carried on in Discovery, and 
frequently made original suggestions to the workers. He could have been a scientist 
or…  
(Bernacchi, 1938, p. 212) 
Bernacchi’s work was nearly all regulated by the strict observing routines of term day cycles 
and the requirement to keep the Eschenhagen magnetometer running continuously. He seems 
to have performed his non-magnetic physics work at his convenience and in a completely 
self-directed manner. Scott did design and execute one experiment of his own on the 
microclimate of the locality around Winter Quarters during the Discovery expedition. 
Bernacchi’s diary for 26 April, 1903 records Scott’s effort:  
… to find exactly where between thermometer in strait between C. Ar. [Cape 
Armitage] & ship the temp commenced to differ appreciably for there is generally a 
difference of something like 10° or 12° & found that as soon as he left the shore of 
Cape A. it commenced to drop … in proportion to the distance from it. 
 (Bernacchi, 1902c) 
Scott also developed the idea for a current indicating device similar to a wind vane, but 
embedded into the sea ice (Skelton, 2004, p. 87).   
Although Scott is widely credited as being interested and engaged with the scientific 
program and capable of posing big picture questions, it’s unclear whether he really assisted 
and promoted the scientific program on the Discovery as much as a leader who was a 
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scientific scholar, like Gregory, Mawson or Bruce might have done. Praise of Scott as a 
scientist is a phenomenon that commenced after the Terra Nova expedition had concluded in 
1912, and the evidence suggests that although he was naïve as a scientist at the 
commencement of his Discovery experience, he developed rapidly. Priestley, the respected 
polar scientist and member of both Shackleton’s Nimrod and Scott’s Terra Nova expeditions, 
praised Scott’s scientific acumen (Priestley, 1915, p, 25). 
One area of speculation is the consequences if Gregory had still been the scientific 
director when Scott decided to keep the ship in the ice over winter. It is probable that there 
would have been a clash of wills regarding the missed opportunities for coastal dredging, 
trawling and netting. In reference to US activities during the International Geophysical year 
(around 1957), Belanger states: “A dual command system, a reluctant compromise both 
civilian and military leaders deplored, proved generally workable and effective in the reality 
of polar camp life” (Belanger, 2006, p. 5). But there were some famously difficult 
relationships between scientific expedition leaders and ship commanders during the early part 
of the twentieth century, for example Filchner on Deutschland (Turney, 2012, p. 195) and 
Mawson on the BANZARE Discovery expedition (Rice, 2005). The scientific leadership 
vacuum evident on the outward passage of the Discovery continued to be evident on the ice. 
6.4.3 Logistics and transport on the ice 
Scott’s choice to keep the ship in Antarctica over winter of 1902, and thus unintentionally 
also 1903, was a logistical decision that had knock-on effects to the scientific achievements. 
The ship and adjacent huts became the home base for all exploration and scientific activity. 
The ship-based oceanography and zoological collecting ceased for the duration of the 
entrapment, and the sciences that were favoured by collection of continuous data sets at one 
site (meteorology and terrestrial magnetic studies) benefited from the enforced stay. The 
balance between exploration and scientific inquiry was regulated by the overwintering 
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decision. Scott had absolute control of scientific fieldwork through his allocation of the 
resources of equipment and men to the various sledge journeys. Scientific inquiry was a 
secondary consideration with only a handful of sledging trips being made specifically in the 
interests of science. 
If a shore party had been dropped in accordance with Professor Gregory’s plan it 
would most likely have consisted of about twenty men including Scott, Wilson, Skelton, 
Koettlitz, Bernacchi, Royds, Shackleton, Barne, Ferrar, some seamen and a cook. This would 
have left a skeleton crew commanded by Armitage to continue coastal exploration and 
scientific work at sea and to possibly undertake some opportunistic, short overland sledge 
journeys. In that case only a handful of expeditioners would have been available to travel off 
base. Of the total party of twenty overwintering, there would probably have been sufficient 
manpower available for three sledging outfits, assuming an emergency reserve at base and at 
least three persons remaining to tend to the magnetic and meteorological observations. The 
exploration and field science would have been nominal compared to the numerous sledging 
journeys actually achieved. Yelverton summarises the actual journeys in his appendix where 
he shows that during November 1902 up to six parties comprised of a total of twenty-four 
men were able to go off-base simultaneously and still have a reserve emergency team 
(Yelverton, 2000, pp. 381-383). Equipment such as sledges, tents, sleeping bags and cooking 
apparatus rarely seemed to have been limiting factors on the logistics of sledging operations, 
although Bernacchi notes on 3 July 1903 that this was the case for the Barrier journey of 
November 1903 (Bernacchi, 1902c). 
Ferrar turned to spending a great deal of time at meteorology and ice studies since he 
quickly collected all the samples and performed the analysis required on the geology of the 
Hut Point locality (Ursula Rack, personal communication, November, 2012). He also 
expanded his scope of geological work by taking part in nine sledge journeys during the stay 
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in Antarctica. Wilson lamented that he was taken away from the coast, the scene of biological 
activity in spring and summer, on the southern journey with Scott and Shackleton:  
I am afraid this long southern journey is taking me right away from my proper sphere 
of work to monotonous hard work on an icy desert for three months, where we shall 
see neither beast nor bird nor life of any sort nor land and nothing whatever to sketch.  
(Savours, 1966, p. 207) 
Hodgson might have been able to dredge and trawl on McMurdo Sound and expand the 
diversity of benthic organisms secured as specimens if a boat had been available and there 
was sufficient manpower to shift it to the ice edge. The ship’s boats were buried in the floe, 
open water was kilometres from Winter Quarters and the men were fully occupied with 
support to sledging parties.  
6.5 Ice-craft 
Survival and travel skills in polar conditions were not strictly operational elements of the 
scientific program, but they were factors contributing directly to the productivity of the 
scientists. Scott and his team were generally deficient in experience or acquired knowledge in 
most matters germane to life and work in the polar environment. At the end of the March 
1902 “Sledging had been a failure. Food, clothing-everything was wrong. There would be 
much to think about, and much to rearrange during the long winter night” (Bernacchi, 1938, 
p. 40).  The death of seaman Vince, whose demise resulted from a combination of factors, 
was a signal to the expedition leadership. He had incorrect footwear on an ice slope and there 
was a poor management decision (by Royds) to break a field party into two groups whose 
members were all novices and who were unfamiliar with the terrain across which they were 
instructed to make their own way home. Vince’s party had inexperienced and less senior 
leadership (Barne) and the decision to cache survival equipment and push on towards the ship 
in deteriorating weather was unwise. This preventable loss of life so early in the stay at 
Winter Quarters must have alerted Scott to the need for more caution and deeper 
  
229 
consideration of the challenges of day-to-day work in the harsh environment. Scott does not 
accurately record the extent of Barne’s own injuries but he was so frostbitten that his “hands 
were in slings for over two months during which time he had to be fed by others” (Bernacchi, 
1903b). It may have also alerted Scott to the fact that productive scientific work could not 
succeed unless the other support systems were securely in place to facilitate field operations. 
The management of the dogs on the expedition is an example that demonstrates 
inexperience and a failure to take advantage of readily accessible knowledge or learning 
opportunities. The use of dogs was a footnote in the Discovery’s transport and logistics 
strategy as nearly all of the work was traditional manhauling following the nineteenth century 
Arctic RN tradition. Bernacchi noted in his narrative Saga of the Discovery, that even in 
1902, manhauling was an outmoded form of polar transport and that Scott saw nothing 
incongruous in making men do the work of draught animals. Dogs were regarded more as 
pets and companions, not working animals (Bernacchi, 1938, p. 64).  Although dog teams 
were in everyday use in Siberia, Canada and Alaska, dog management and handling remained 
a mystery to members of the Discovery and no specialist dog handlers were included in the 
expedition membership. The dogs suffered through the cold of the first winter (in spite of the 
wasted effort on construction of dog kennels) as their body rhythms were still running 
according to northern hemisphere moult cycles. A great deal of effort was wasted when a 
decision was made that the Siberian harnesses were deficient in some way. New harnesses 
were developed and fabricated during the first Antarctic winter at great expense of time and 
effort. They were a dismal failure as they were “guaranteed to twist the dogs & chaff the hair 
off in a surprisingly short space of time” (Bernacchi, 1902a) and were abandoned after the 
trials (Bernacchi 1902d). Describing the departure of the Southern Party on 30 October 1902, 
he recorded that the new “patent dog traces carried away” so the “good old antiquated” traces 
were substituted (Bernacchi, 1902b). Ignorance was further demonstrated by having three 
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breeds of dog mixed together, leading to fatal fights. In mid February 1902, soon after getting 
snug at Winter Quarters, conflicting opinions about how to conduct dog-sledging operations 
resulted in a “competition” (no doubt attended by betting) between Bernacchi and Armitage. 
There are different versions of how the event transpired. Each trained up dog teams using 
different methods and different technologies for the equipment. Bernacchi won the race, but 
without any control of the team. He claimed complete victory. Bernacchi’s own journal 
account related the rules for the event:  
A discussion arose at dinnertime upon dog training & driving which resulted in my 
entering into a competition with Armitage to each break in a team of dogs after his 
own fashion. The later contended he would have his team in hand before I would 
mine. He was to use expedition harness, muzzles and whips. Whilst I was to make my 
own harness & use neither whips nor muzzle. 
 (Bernacchi, 1902d) 
Armitage potentially had the upper hand, having taken part in all the major sledging journeys 
of the Jackson-Harmsworth Arctic expedition where dogs and ponies were used. Although 
Bernacchi had overwintered with the Southern Cross expedition at Cape Adare, that camp 
was unfortunately sited adjacent to an insurmountable grade up to the Admiralty Mountains. 
Intended sledge journeys to the interior were not possible and journeys across the sea ice 
were not of great significance (and not science related) in spite of the ninety Greenland and 
Siberian dogs which were attended by two Lapp grooms who “were skilled in the 
management of dogs, and could work for hours beside the sledges without showing any sign 
of fatigue” (Bernacchi, 1901a, p. 89). Bernacchi describes the race in a sanguine tone 
although the diaries of Royds and Skelton show he had no real control of the dogs that had 
bolted without their driver. The description indicates a knowledge vacuum regarding 
arrangement of the dogs in the traces, construction of the harness, control of the dogs and a 
lack of foresight to break the dogs into harness during the winter: 
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The sledge competition came off today & my team of 12 dogs were victorious. The 
harness employed appeared to have some advantages over that used by Armitage. Had 
my dogs harnessed as follows two abreast to the long rope attached to the front of the 
sledge. A broad canvas collar fitting well down on to the breast at the bottom of the 
collar a trace made fast & running in between the legs: A belly band to keep the trace 
in position & a short line with a swivel at one end attached to leading rope & hooking 
into the collar to keep pairs of dogs abreast. 
The harness of the other team was more complicated. Was made in one piece but kept 
continually fouling the dog’s legs so frequently that they had to run along on three 
legs only. They were not fastened abreast but one in front of the other on alternate 
sides of the rope. Many of the dogs are young & not broken in to harness. 
 (Bernacchi, 1902d) 
Savitt thoroughly reviews the evolution of knowledge of sledging practice by polar 
expeditions. He concluded: “Robert Falcon Scott, in great part as a result of his naval 
heritage, did not fully understand the need for and the methods required to gain the 
operational knowledge required for sledging in Antarctica” (Savitt, 2004). This is surprising 
since Nansen had counselled Scott on the matter and there had been a very long history of 
RN Arctic expeditions where contact with Inuit and Canadian voyageurs (fur traders) could 
have informed expeditioners. Scott’s narrative (Scott, 1905b) does not indicate any 
acquisition of indigenous knowledges about polar survival or transport, or to learn from 
recent polar explorers, even from his visit to Nansen.  
Arctic Indigenous knowledge that would have been of great utility to the Discovery 
included the fact that great daily distances were possible using dog teams: “We made up to 
ninety-five kilometres a day, though our dogs were not in the best condition” (Freuchen, 
1935, p. 195). One continual challenge to Scott and others of the era was the difficulty of 
travel across soft snow. The indigenous communities of Greenland knew the answer that was 
to lash hide onto the sledge runners, then pour melted water over them (or urinate on them) 
allowing it to freeze into a thin layer of ice. The result is that “With such runners much 
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greater loads can be hauled over the loose snow….It took us twenty-four hours to prepare the 
sledges but when we finished the sledges were almost as easy to shove as a baby carriage” 
(Freuchen, 1935, p. 194). With this knowledge the course of history on Scott’s second 
expedition might have been dramatically different. Other simple techniques like leaving the 
dog traces short to allow faster turns and “an old trick … harnessing the bitches in heat 
among the forward teams; then the team of dogs where they really belonged could haul any 
load in order to catch up to them” (Freuchen, 1935, p. 192). As there were few dogs with the 
Discovery and they were not considered a primary transport choice, these points are of little 
relevance now, but opportunities were missed as a consequence of ignorance of these matters. 
Scott reflected after the first autumn sledge journeys “In one way or another each journey had 
been a failure; we had little or nothing to show for your labours. The errors were patent; food, 
clothing, everything was wrong, the whole system was bad” (Scott, 1905b, Volume 1, p. 
273). The critical point here is that scientific field work could have been more prolific and 
more successfully acquitted if effective dog transport had been used to support the field 
parties. Scott had been in favour of dogs after discussing the matter with Nansen during their 
meeting in Oslo in October 1900, but Markham subsequently dissuaded him from that view 
(Yelverton, 2000, p. 33). 
There was a failure to include certain titles that might have directly informed sledging 
practice and polar survival in the ship’s library. George Murray’s letter to Markham indicates 
that he and Scott assembled the library: “Scott and I start tomorrow on a raid on the 
publishers for general literature” (Murray, 1901e). The library catalogue was compiled onto a 
booklet (National Antarctic Expedition, n.d.). Bernacchi mentioned the deficiencies: 
…although Discovery possessed a library of several thousand books, and among them 
several on Arctic exploration, by some oversight those which would have been of 
most assistance had not been included. We could gain no advantage from the 
experience of the more recent explorers, Nordenskjöld, Nansen and Peary. 
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 (Bernacchi 1938, p. 56) 
Skelton must have acquired a private copy of Nansen’s First Crossing of Greenland as he 
was reading it in June 1902 (Skelton, 2004, p. 97) but Nansen’s Farthest North was not in the 
collection (Yelverton, 2000, p. 159). 
6.6 The human element 
The long outward voyage had allowed Scott to make judgements about the mettle and 
suitability for the work of crew members and eject them before turning south. At the Cape 
and at Christchurch crew who were incompatible were dismissed. At the Cape, the merchant 
seamen Mardon and Masterton were dismissed and at Christchurch the cook, Roper and the 
steward Dowsett were also discharged, the former listed as “objectionable” and the latter as 
“useless” by Markham (Markham & Holland, 1996, pp. 103-104).  
Bernacchi, when he was musing about the prospect of another winter in the south, 
recalled the effects of polar ennui and the social climate during the first year and described 
the social landscape during the severe winter conditions: 
I must say I dread another of these long, dreary and bitterly cold winters. I am sure 
you cannot conceive how desolate and lonely it is down here. However, I dare say we 
shall get through it all serene while there is not the slightest discord on board. Captain 
Scott is held in great respect by all and we are well capable of organizing 
entertainments for ourselves. Scurvy is the only thing we have to fear… 
The winter on the whole was severe and very windy. There were 120 days without the 
sun nearly twice as long as at Cape Adare. Day after day the temperature fell below -
40oF and very frequently below -50o. The lowest temperature was -62F or 92o below 
the freezing point. But it was a cheerful winter, all were in the best of spirits and all 
managed to do a good deal of work notwithstanding the cold.  
(Bernacchi, 1903b) 
During the polar winter various activities and entertainments and celebrations were 
used as a means of keeping men busy, warding off ennui and mental instability. These 
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included games, crafts, reading for pleasure, theatricals, sports days and production and 
publication of the South Polar Times. Most officers and men also tried photography as a 
recreation (Judith Skelton personal communication, 30 August 2011) and there was no 
apparent shortage of chemicals or paper. Koettlitz and Bernacchi both attempted colour 
photography but the difficulties of the technology were a great challenge (Jones, 2011, p. 
178). Winter routines followed old Arctic RN traditions of busy work for men during the 
period of darkness when sledge travelling was untenable. Most of the scientific activity 
slowed down and activities were required as the crew were relieved of afternoon duty during 
winter. Outbreaks of conflict were uncommon on this expedition but one notable event near 
the onset of the polar night deserves comment. Seaman Smythe became violent on the 
evening of 16 April 1902 and threatened to hack off the heads of his messmates before 
climbing up onto the awning cover. Dr Koettlitz gave him a sleeping drug when the affair 
was de-escalated. “It’s possible that he managed to get at some intoxicating beverage” 
(Bernacchi, 1902a). 
With no women or children on the expedition, homesickness led to diary writing even 
amongst the lower deck in the desire to share the experience with loved ones. Sport on ice 
featured often, mostly football (soccer) and ski running that was good for fitness and 
camaraderie, but bad for injuries. Scott was incapacitated with a hamstring injury and missed 
the first sledging attempts due to a downhill skiing accident on 27 February 1902 (Scott, 
1905b, Volume 1, p. 228). The diaries and narratives tell only a little about the intellectual 
landscape on the Discovery. The winter series of debates alternated between social concerns 
of the era and scientific topics. The former covered topics such as women’s rights, Britain’s 
waning commercial superiority, conscription, sport, spirituality and poetry. The scientific 
debates covered the existence of an Antarctic continent (or was it an archipelago bound 
together by a mantle of ice?), whether the ice barrier was afloat or grounded, predictions of 
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weather conditions and the lives of seals and penguins. The debate schedule commenced with 
two per week, then was reduced to a weekly routine, after which they died out completely. 
Hodgson concluded that the debates “are now dead, choked with ridicule and drawn to an 
idiotic length” and with respect to one lecture “Lecture geology-it was a poor affair and as 
usual Barne, Shackleton and Bernacchi made their characteristic disturbance” (Hodgson, 
1901). The positive side, from the point of view of the scientific intellectual landscape, was 
that “The dialogues had been useful by occasionally producing new ideas, helping to clarify a 
scientific point, and setting the problems out more clearly” (Baughman, 1999, p. 136). 
Science lectures were part of the expedition experience and on Discovery they were also a 
means of educating and enthusing the lower deck men about the scientific programs as well 
as providing survival and navigation skills. This knowledge sharing was no different to that 
found on modern expeditions, for example, on board the Aurora Australis during the 2012 
Antarctic shipping season:  
The onboard lecture series has fired up with people providing a half hour presentation 
on any topic they chose. These presentations are always popular and a good way for 
us to gain appreciation of the work our fellow passengers do, the wonderful places 
they have been or the interesting hobbies they may have.  
(Australian Antarctic Division, 2012) 
The novelty of adventure overcame the young expeditioners and any productive work, 
whether scientific or logistic, was seen as an achievement as they had no experience by which 
to benchmark their own productivity. Surviving and working in the polar environment 
enhances the appetite and the importance of good food to the morale of an overwintering 
polar party (where a thirty percent increase above the normal ration is required) cannot be 
overstated (Belanger, 2006, p. 23). Numerous dates for celebrations were recorded on a 
calendar by Markham to justify festive activities. These included the King’s birthday 
(coinciding with Bernacchi’s on 8 November), men’s wedding dates, laying of the ship’s 
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keel, the anniversary of the departure of the ship from Britain, Ross’s furthest south in 1843, 
birthdays of the wardroom members and, in line with polar tradition, the mid winter solstice 
(Markham, n.d.a). That occasion was treated as if it was Christmas, with Moët Chandon 
champagne, punch and cherry brandy accompanied by treats such as cakes, toffees, ices and 
puddings (Royds, 2004, p. 142; Savours, 1966, p. 155). Added touches of civilisation 
included (weekly) hot baths and the arrival of cups of tea brought by the steward to the 
officers’ cabins in the mornings. At times it must have seemed to the wardroom inhabitants 
that Discovery was a gentleman’s club on ice, but these are the highlights that get priority in 
the diaries and narratives. In contrast, Royds’ journal, written as a private record for his 
family only, provides a self-reflective and honest appraisal of many matters during the 
expedition. His entries around mid winter tell of monotonous discontent, irritability, lethargy 
and physical discomfort, boredom with lack of culinary variety and constant banter about the 
poor quality of the tinned fare.  “Physically, mentally and perhaps morally, then, we are 
depressed” (Royds, 2004, p. 143). Scurvy emerged at the end of the first winter amongst the 
Discovery crew and with Scott away from base. Armitage implemented his knowledge gained 
in the Arctic. The Jackson-Harmsworth expedition had suffered no scurvy and Armitage 
knew it was most likely a result of copious consumption of fresh polar bear meat. He 
instituted a diet of fresh seal meat and ensured the cook developed a method to make it 
palatable, as prior to that time he had been unable to do so.  
Another factor that facilitated productive work during winter was an effort to bring 
civilisation to Antarctica by the provision of light. During the first winter the officers enjoyed 
brief periods of electric lighting before the windmill was destroyed in a blizzard. The fall 
back was a cunning design of spirit lamp fed oxygen by a clockwork-driven fan in the base. 
These “Hitchcock” lamps were acquired during the stay in Cape Town. Candles were in short 
supply for the second winter but Skelton rigged an acetylene plant and piped gas for lighting 
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to the wardroom cabins. Bernacchi describes the first usage in April 1903 as the second 
winter approached: “The light is very white + powerful and vastly superior to the lamp light. 
It will be a great boon throughout the winter if it keeps working we have more than sufficient 
calcium carbide to last the time” (Bernacchi, 1902c).  
Bernacchi is a central figure in the social landscape of the Discovery, yet he entered 
the community at Christchurch after the expedition had been settling socially for six months. 
His messmates, who may have considered Bernacchi socially inferior due to his informal 
education, his European heritage, colonial upbringing and his somewhat supercilious air, 
ridiculed him from time to time. Koettlitz suffered the same, although he had been with the 
wardroom since the outset, but had the disadvantage of being intrinsically humourless 
(Skelton, 2004, pp. 178 & 183).  
Much of the scientific work could never have been achieved without the contribution 
of crew members whose labour generally went unacknowledged. The meteorological 
observations were on a two-hour cycle and they relied on the nightwatchman, a role taken in 
turn by officers and scientists, making an eleven-day cycle of duty. When the scientific staff 
was away from Winter Quarters, the full twenty-four hour cycle of meteorological 
observations became the responsibility of those left behind. Prepared forms for 
nightwatchmen to note details of auroras during the polar night were printed and Bernacchi 
was only called out when the displays were outstanding in brightness, colour, form or 
movement. Hodgson’s collections at sea and on the fringing sea ice relied on assistance with 
handling the nets, trawls and dredges as well as the occasional whaleboat excursion and 
seaman Weller assisted Hodgson at his holes in the sea ice during the winters. The ice holes 
needed to be reopened daily in winter so there was considerable labour before any collecting 
activity could commence. Sledging journeys that provided data on meteorology and 
magnetism, as well as glacial, geological and geographic intelligence and specimens, could 
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not have succeeded in most cases without the contribution of crewmen, especially for man 
hauling the sledges.  
 
6.7 Discovery released 
In total the Discovery was locked in the ice at Winter Quarters from March 1902 to February 
1904. Scott had no option regarding the second year, as the ship was firmly trapped in ice, 
miles from the ice edge, where open water met the frozen sea ice. The early 1903 relief ship 
Morning (Captain Colbeck) reported the situation back to London. In controversial 
circumstances, after Markham’s abortive efforts to secure further funding for a second relief 
expedition, the mission was taken over by the Admiralty who mounted a highly orchestrated 
relief mission for the navigating season of 1903-04. After news that the Discovery was locked 
in the ice for a further winter, Markham had again approached the government for funds to 
pay for refit, resupply, then return to Antarctica of the Morning. The government was 
reluctant and the RS distanced itself from the RGS. In Markham’s absence the RGS Council 
struck a deal with the government that included signing over ownership of the Morning to the 
Admiralty, which then took over complete responsibility for the rescue mission. Details of 
the controversy have been covered in detail by Yelverton (2000, pp. 243-249) and Baughman 
(1999, pp. 236-244) but it is sufficient to say that this propelled Markham to the nadir of his 
unpopularity and the Navy went to extreme lengths to make the mission successful. Mill 
described Markham’s efforts as “tactless and hysterical” (Mill, 1903) and Skelton wrote “Mr 
Balfour said in parliament that his confidence in the two societies had been rudely shaken, 
but he subsequently recalled that statement as far as the Royal Society was concerned” 
(Skelton, 2004, p. 193). The whaler Terra Nova was purchased and refitted in quick time, 
manned with a crew of well-salted Dundee whalemen, including Captain McKay, then towed 
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through the Mediterranean and Suez canal route to meet the Morning in Hobart in time for 
the relief in summer 1903-04 (Bryan, 2011, p. 158). 
New orders were issued to the effect that if Discovery could not be extricated from the 
ice at Hut Point that summer she was to be abandoned. There were insufficient funds to 
support another season of work on the ice, and the Navy’s generous loan of officers and crew 
to the expedition had already outstripped expectations. Matters seemed bleak when the Terra 
Nova and Morning arrived at the ice edge on 5 January 1904 as twenty miles of ice (32 
kilometres) separated the relief ships and the Discovery. All the spring sledging expeditions 
had returned and all efforts were turned to futile sawing of the ice to make a navigable lane. 
When realisation of the likelihood of abandoning the Discovery set in transhipment of all the 
scientific collections and equipment to the relief ships commenced and scientific activity 
ceased. McKay’s efforts at ramming with the powerful Terra Nova, and liberal application of 
explosives to create fissures in the ice, brought the relief ships closer, so that natural forces of 
wind and waves could finish the job on 14 February 1904. 
The responsibility for the extra cost was of great concern to the RS members who 
were unsure about the extent of their obligation and who held suspicions about Markham’s 
directions to Scott. William Huggins (1824-1910) wrote to Kempe, the treasurer of the RS: 
Quite Private 
My Dear Treasurer, 
 I send you the enclosed letter, and two enclosures from Markham. 
 It is satisfactory that the Discovery is safe and has done good work. 
 Were not our instructions to Scott clear & definite that he was not to remain a 
second year, unless unable to extricate himself from the ice? 
 I suspected all along that Scott had secret instructions from Markham to 
remain a second year, notwithstanding official instructions to the contrary. 
 Is the R.S. jointly responsible with the RGS for the additional £15,000? 
 (Huggins, 1903) 
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Markham had strongly suggested to Scott that overwintering would lay the foundation to 
achieve the objectives of exploration: 
The first object will be attained in voyages from the Cape to Melbourne, and from 
Melbourne across the Pacific to the Falkland Islands. The second object will be 
secured by penetrating through the pack to the ice barrier. The third will be ensured 
during winter quarters established as far south as possible. 
But the main object is geographical discovery and the interior of the supposed 
continent.  
(Markham, 1901a) 
The magnetic and meteorological programs benefited greatly from the additional opportunity 
for collecting data as the extended observations from a high-latitude fixed position were 
desirable. Separating long term secular changes from the daily, seasonal and annual cyclic 
changes in the magnetic signature was assisted by long-run recordings of the magnetic 
elements. The same was true for the meteorological data set. The second year of observations 
helped to determine what conditions were normal for that part of the world. “The second 
year’s work confirmed the results of the first, and from this point of view are valuable” 
(Bernacchi, 1938, p. 85).  
On the other hand a great deal more coastal exploration, oceanography and magnetic 
science at sea could have been acquitted if the ship had retreated north for winter. Hodgson 
spent two years sampling one locality by dredging and trawling through ice holes. His scope 
was confined to littoral species of the Hut Point locality. Through an error of judgement and 
in disregard of Bernacchi’s warning (founded on prior Antarctic experience) Scott decided to 
leave the ship’s boats on the ice when the wagon cloth winter cover was fitted to the ship in 
autumn 1902. Bernacchi correctly predicted that the boats would be buried in snow and 
pushed down into the ice floe. Bernacchi noted in mid November 1902 the  “Men still 
endeavouring to rescue boats but is seems almost a hopeless case, they are so deep down & 
so firmly wedged in the hard ice with water” (Bernacchi, 1902b). This created months of 
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back breaking labour with ice saws and explosives then the carpenter had the task of 
repairing the damage to the timber afterwards. Unavailability of the boats meant that, even if 
open water had been nearby, Hodgson would not have had the means for collecting aquatic 
organisms in McMurdo Sound. His collection, although abundant, was less diverse and 
smaller than it could have been. Rainbow (2005) describes the collection as “not 
representative of Antarctica as a whole, since they were taken mainly from shallow water and 
mostly from McMurdo Sound.” 
The location of the ship was fortunate as there was little risk from ice pressure. 
During the Southern Cross expedition ice pressure had pushed up a ridge of ice averaging 
sixty feet high (~18 metres) that formed against the shoreline (Bernacchi, 1901a, pp. 120-
122). The Discovery was well protected in the snug cove behind Hut Point but that protection 
was a factor in preventing the ice break out that was required to release Discovery. Bernacchi 
had sufficient photosensitive magnetogram papers for nearly two years of continuous 
operation, but why did he have that abundance if only a one-year stay was intended? It may 
have been a precaution against wastage or unsuccessful procedures, or to allow more fast 
runs of the drum recorder of the magnetometer to provide an enhanced set of more sensitive 
(higher resolution) records. 
6.8 Homeward passage 
Following considerable success on sledge journeys through spring and summer of 1903-04, 
the final operational phase of the expedition commenced. It involved the extrication of the 
vessel from the ice by the second relief expedition, then the journey that brought them back 
to England via New Zealand, the southern Pacific Ocean, the Falkland Islands and the 
Atlantic. Although scientific work was overshadowed by logistics, it did not cease 
completely, especially for the magneticians. Of all the civilian scientists and officers, 
Bernacchi had suffered the most demanding routine during internment on ice as he could not 
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share the load of his work. He must have felt great relief when he closed the magnetic hut 
doors for the last time. 
Magnetic work resumed on the northward passage in the Ross Sea and Mulock made 
a running survey of the hinterland as they travelled. Bernacchi again hoped to get ashore at 
Wood Bay to take magnetic observations, as it was the closest accessible locality to the 
magnetic pole but ice was still in the bay, so no landing was possible (Skelton, 2004, p. 200). 
The ship was swung for deviation (a navigational, not magnetic research function) but this 
was aborted as the sun became obscured. On 22 February there was a further fright. Water 
was rising in the bilges to such an extent that the fires had to be extinguished. The pump 
intakes had become clogged and the pumps were ineffective, even when there was sufficient 
steam to drive them. The blockages were cleared and a donkey boiler fired up to drive the 
pumps, thus averting a disaster (Skelton, 2004, p. 200). Cape Adare was revisited on 24 
February and the magneticians went ashore to repeat their observations after a two-year 
interval (Scott, 1905b, Volume 2, pp. 372-378). On 26 February a sounding was made and in 
the afternoon a trawl was set, but Scott recorded the haul disappointing with “some new 
species but the catch was not so satisfactory as we could have wished” (Scott, 1905b, Volume 
2, p. 383). After replacing the rudder that the carpenter found to have been damaged earlier in 
the ice, the Discovery proceeded west for some modest coastal exploration. The small supply 
of coal was diminishing, so the achievement was limited to disproving the existence of 
Wilkes’ features: “Ringold’s Knoll”, “Eld’s Peak” and “Reynold’s Peak”, then improving the 
chart of the Balleny Islands (Skelton, 2004, p. 202; Royds, 2001, p. 343). One consequence 
of the ship’s fit-out for magnetic work was that the foremast shrouds, made of hemp rather 
than steel wire, had become slack, posing a risk to the integrity of the standing rig overall 
(Scott, 1905b, Volume 2, p. 385). 
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There was a fortnight’s lay over at Port Ross in the Auckland Islands, where the ship 
was painted and cleaned. Koettlitz went botanising and Hodgson beachcombing. Royds’ 
diary for 23 March 1904 gives the scientific program: “Wilson, Mulock and Ferrar took the 
whaler … and Armitage and Barne took their dip instruments onshore for observations” 
(Royds, 2001, p. 348). The scientific collections and instruments were transhipped back to 
Discovery. On 29 March it took from 7 a.m. to 11.30 a.m. to swing the ship for deviation 
under steam, presumably by steaming in a rosette pattern to take readings for compass error 
at the cardinal and intercardinal points of the compass. A trawl was deployed for over an hour 
only to find that disappointingly, the net had torn from the frame and there was no catch at all 
(Royds, 2001, p. 349). The three vessels of the expedition sailed together for Christchurch, 
arriving to a festive welcome on 1 April. The overwhelming hospitality of Christchurch was a 
repeat of the outward journey experience. Royds’ diary describes a medley of socialising with 
no reference to ship work or science. The magneticians spent time calibrating instruments 
with Farr and Skey at the Christchurch observatory that, as the base station and a contributor 
to the pooled results for the magnetic term days, was an important link in the chain of 
magnetic data collection. Wilson spent a little time at the Canterbury Museum, but otherwise 
it was a chance for rest and recreation for scientists and crew after over two years in 
Antarctica.  
The Discovery departed Lyttelton Harbour on 10 June 1904 and diary entries for 
Skelton, Royds and Wilson become spare and infrequent. The ship touched at Punta Arenas 
on 8 July, then Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands on 12 July. It took all day to swing the 
ship on 19 July before leaving for England via the Azores. Aside from collecting more 
seabirds on the way, the only scientific event of note was a visit to see the Prince of 
Monaco’s vessel Princesse Alice at Ponta Delgada in the Azores. Royds and Skelton reported 
it was very well equipped for oceanography with the scientific arrangements on board “most 
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perfect” (Skelton, 2004, p. 221). Wilson wrote: “the ship is simply perfect in its fitting for 
scientific work” (Savours, 1966, p. 394). Bernacchi acquits the homeward passage in less 
than one page in his narrative (Bernacchi, 1938, p. 113) and Armitage takes two (Armitage, 
1905, pp. 296-297). Neither account mentions any scientific activities after the departure 
from Hut Point. 
Arrival in England brought a reminder to these men of the purpose of the ship and the 
institutional interest in the expedition. Mostyn Field (1855-1950), Hydrographer at the 
Admiralty wrote to Longhurst on 1 September 1904 thus: 
Captain Creak, who as President of the Magnetic Sub Committee of the National 
Antarctic Expedition, having represented to me the necessity of having the 
“Discovery” swung, and horizontal and vertical force observations made, on her 
return, before anything is done to alter her sea-going conditions; I request that I may 
be informed whether “Discovery” will touch at Portsmouth, and, if so, whether it 
would be convenient for an officer from the Magnetic Department of the Admiralty to 
carry out the necessary observations there, and that the Captain of “Discovery” may 
be informed. 
(Field, 1904) 
6.9 Managing data and collections 
The prime measure of success of any scientific enterprise is the match between expectations 
and actual achievements, but the overall success of any expedition may take many years to be 
fully revealed. The Discovery is mostly remembered for its exploratory achievements because 
they were immediately evident and surpassed expectations. Charts of newly discovered 
territory, photographs, artwork and the supporting evidence of sledging diaries with 
navigational observations were sufficient to support the credibility of claims of new territory.  
Data and collections from Antarctic scientific fieldwork did not rapidly translate into a form 
useful to either the scientific community, or the general public. When the scientific products 
of the expedition did appear in the normal forms of scientific publication, the fanfare 
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generated for the arrival home of the expedition had died and the members of the expedition 
had disbanded. This section describes the handling of the physical and intellectual products of 
the expedition’s scientific program with a focus on the research into terrestrial magnetism.  
Under normal circumstances the RS would have been involved in arrangements for 
the distribution and analysis of collections and data derived from the expedition they co-
sponsored, as dissemination of scientific research had always been a core activity of the 
society (Royal Society, 2010, p. 21). But the RS had withdrawn from involvement after the 
acrimonious episodes leading to Gregory’s resignation, the re-writing of the instructions to 
favour exploration and Markham’s mishandling of the relief expeditions. Initially, the natural 
history collections would have been shared between the BMNH and Melbourne University, 
according to Gregory’s plan (Gregory, 1900a). With Gregory out of the picture the organising 
committees failed to plan for the arrival of collections and data, and Markham gained control 
of their distribution, as he remained the central organising figure in England.  
6.9.1 Natural history collections 
Markham’s just-in-time management of the natural history material builds the general picture 
of how expedition outputs were handled. Murray’s engagement as deputy director of the 
scientific civilian staff included a general agreement that he would be involved in the 
management of the repatriated natural history materials (Lankester, 1901). In late 1901 
Murray sought Markham’s approval to hand over the first part of the marine collection, with 
the zoological and botanical collections from South Trinidad Island, to the trustees of the 
BMNH after he returned with them from the Cape (Murray 1901f). The pending arrival of the 
next batch of biological material triggered renewed correspondence. Markham wrote to 
Kempe of the RS at the end of June 1902, stating that the reports and collections sent from 
New Zealand were due: “As the reports and collections are now coming home from the 
Discovery it is desirable that there should be agreement between the societies with regard to 
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their disposal…” (Markham, 1902b). Markham then mentions the plankton, phytoplankton, 
zoological and geological collections that would be entrusted to Murray according to the 
minute appointing him, but mentions that neither he, the civilian scientific staff or Scott 
wanted the collections to be in Murray’s hands (Markham, 1902b). The responsibility for the 
expense of analysis and publication is notably absent from the early correspondence, but after 
the first relief expedition of early 1903, Markham wrote to Huggins to convey the news that 
the British Museum and the treasury had made provision for “publication of the results of the 
Antarctic expedition as regards natural history and geology” in their budget estimates 
(Markham, 1903a). 
6.9.2 Magnetic data 
The case of the magnetic data was more complicated than the natural history collections. 
Candidates for receipt, reduction, analysis and publication of the magnetic results could have 
been either the National Physical Laboratory at Kew, the Admiralty Compass department 
(that had been under the superintendence of Creak until June 1901), the Admiralty 
Hydrography department under the directorship of Wharton or the RS itself. All these 
institutions sponsored the expedition at some level and had some claim on the intellectual 
property generated from the expedition’s magnetic program. Adding to the complexity was 
the overlap between the potential utility of results to navigation (commercial or naval) on one 
hand, and to pure scientific research on the other. The Admiralty, through its extensive 
support to the expedition (during shipbuilding, by lending instruments, by lending officers 
and crew, by refitting Discovery and supplying materials at Cape Town, and finally by 
mounting the Terra Nova relief expedition) may have felt a majority right of ownership of the 
intellectual property. The RS had been a sponsor prior to the RN involvement and although 
the RS did not stay deeply engaged for the duration of the expedition, its contribution was 
significant. A complicating factor was the expectation of additional data from the Gauss 
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under Drygalski and a number of cooperating terrestrial observatories. It was unclear who 
had the prerogative to decide where the magnetic data should be sent, but Markham was in 
control. While Gregory was still the scientific director he stated the view that the “scientific 
results be placed in the hands of the Executive Committee and published as it directs, under 
the editorship of, say one member of the Committee, and one member of the Scientific staff” 
(Gregory, 1900a).  
The first data was sent from Cape Town with Armitage’s report of the difficulties 
with the Lloyd-Creak instrument. Markham commenced making arrangements for the whole 
of the data and collections and, with respect to the magnetic data:  
It is proposed, subject to alterations or other proposals made by the President and 
Council of the Royal Society that:  
1 The magnetic report & observations be referred to the Hydrographer and Captain 
Creak with a request that the two councils may be furnished with a report upon them. 
 (Markham, n.d.f) 
Huggins of the RS responded with agreement that the observations should be sent to 
Wharton, the hydrographer (Huggins, 1901). Creak had previously reviewed the data and 
nominated what he considered to be useful results, and: “As the Hydrographer has so 
thoroughly supported everything in the way of supplying the magnetic & other instruments to 
the ‘Discovery’… the observations marked in blue pencil should be sent to his department as 
being immediately useful.” He further suggested the greater part of the observations: “are 
tentative ones for practice & not much use beyond showing how the observers are handling 
the instruments” (Creak, 1901a). Even though Creak had retired, he had access to data 
initially and filtered the material passed on to Wharton, via Markham. Wharton sent a polite, 
though possibly sarcastic letter to Markham, requesting the full data set: 
We of course hope to have all observations … made by the Discovery, as it is mainly 
by this department that they will be utilized for general benefit. I hope what I have 
received is only an instalment as they are of little value… I understand that 
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observations were obtained on the passage also. These are of course the interesting 
ones to us so far, & should be of great value. I hope you can send them. 
(Wharton, 1901) 
Creak’s assessment of the observations made at the rifle range on Red Hill behind the 
Simon’s Town naval base were negative: “some work signed Morrison was defective the 
observations not being completed on account of darkness coming on. The Fox observations 
are for the most part very bad & I fear they will turn out useless” (Creak, 1901c). Markham 
must have agreed to Wharton’s request. In early 1902, when the cases of natural history 
specimens were beginning to arrive he wrote: “The magnetic observations have been sent to 
Captain Creak, eventually to go to the Hydrographer” (Markham, 1902a). Markham may 
have obstructed Wharton’s access to the data, as payback for Wharton’s earlier opposition to 
the appointment of Scott as commander.   
Later in 1902 Markham made further arrangements: “Magnetic observations and 
report on soundings to the hydrographer, also determinations of specific gravity of sea water. 
Meteorological observations to the meteorological office. Atmospheric carbonic anhydride 
determinations to Professor Letts” (Markham, 1902b). Note that throughout all this wrangling 
over the fate of the observations there was no mention of involvement by the National 
Physical Laboratory, a key institution working on terrestrial magnetism.  
Bernacchi sent home material with the Morning when it became apparent on 26 
February 1903 that the Discovery would be interred in ice for another year.  
Am preparing 12 magnetograms to send home. One for each month of the year 1902-
1903 being one of the least disturbed + most typical. Also sending data for reduction 
of the curves should this become necessary before I return home.  
(Bernacchi, 1902c) 
Markham’s letter to Bernacchi towards the end of the expedition refers to the magnetograms 
and adds a new twist: 
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The specimens sent home by the Morning I sent to the hydrographer provisionally. 
But it will be for Captain Scott to decide what is best to be done with the whole of 
your invaluable collection of magnetic observations, in order to ensure that they are 
dealt with to the greatest possible advantage for science; he will no doubt consult with 
you on the subject.  
 (Markham, 1903b) 
This was disingenuous, but not out of character, as Markham had already completed 
arrangements. The magnetic data finally went to both the Admiralty and the National 
Physical Laboratory and it was the RS who published the two volumes of official scientific 
reports. A magnetic committee had been established by the RS including the scientists Chree 
and Glazebrook, the Admiralty compass experts Creak and Louis Chetwynd (1866-1914)  
and others, then a sum of £300 was voted towards reduction and publication of the results 
(Royal Society, 1904). Chetwynd of the Hydrographic Department of the Admiralty was the 
lead author of the magnetic section of the Physical Observations volume, while Chree of the 
National Physical Laboratory was responsible for most of the Magnetic Observations 
volume. For his contribution Chetwynd explained: “All the available information has been 
through my hands, and the reduction of the observations has been made by me and checked.” 
The values from the magnetograms were tabulated at laboratory under Chree’s 
superintendence (Chetwynd, 1908, p. 134). 
6.9.3 Bernacchi’s post-expedition contribution 
Bernacchi expected to be employed on reduction and analysis of his own data:  
I hear, that on our return, we shall be employed as sub-editors in publishing the 
scientific work.  My own work, which includes at the present moment a year’s record 
with the Eschenhagen instruments – seismograph, pendulums, Auroral observation 
and atmosphere electricity, will take two years at least to bring out. 
 (Bernacchi, 1903b)   
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During the winter of 1903 there was a discussion in the wardroom amongst the 
scientists about the involvement of the observers and collectors in the working up and 
publication of results from the expedition (Ferrar, 1903). Creak was in favour of Armitage 
and Bernacchi being retained to work up their own data (Creak, 1903). Scott wrote to 
Bernacchi indicating the prospects of post-expedition employment were good: “Of course 
you ought to be employed for the whole show” (Scott, 1904). After the Discovery was sold to 
the Hudson Bay Company, Scott again reassured Bernacchi: “There will be a decent surplus 
now that the ship is sold and I’ve already stated that I think it ought to be diverted to the 
scientific work and primarily for the purpose of renumeration of the scientific staff …”  
(Scott, n.d.b). In reality Scott had no influence over this matter. 	  
Bernacchi worked at the Observatory Department of the National Physical Laboratory 
assisting with the reduction of his “Differential magnetic work” (Geikie, 1908, p. v). He 
knew what was required after his previous employment at the RS working on the Southern 
Cross magnetic data and preparations for publication. Glazebrook at the laboratory had 
offered him: “£30 per month for two or three months” (Bernacchi, 1904) and he was 
eventually employed for six months, mostly scouring his daily records and the register of 
watch and chronometer rates (errors) to determine the exact start and stop times of the 
magnetograms. This did not represent ownership of the intellectual property of that material 
as the results were not published under his name, although his involvement was 
acknowledged. 
6.9.4 Data from collaborating observatories 
Data from collaborating observatories was slow to arrive. Data from Cape Town and 
Christchurch was the most critical, being germane to the calibration of the ship’s magnetic 
instruments and as Christchurch was the magnetic base station for the expedition. There was 
an ongoing round of correspondence from 1902 to 1904 between Markham, Wharton, Creak, 
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Farr and Skey about the handling of the data from Christchurch and seeking clarification of 
the details of exactly where the magnetic observations were made on the ship during the first 
swing at Lyttelton. It was unclear whether they were taken on the bridge using the azimuth 
navigational compass, or in the ship’s magnetic observatory at the Fox position where the 
Lloyd-Creak circle was mounted (British National Antarctic Expedition, n.d.a). The 
Christchurch observations were reduced locally and the final data arrived shortly before 
publication of the Physical Observations report, so it was included hastily.  
Data finally appeared in the scientific reports of the expedition from Greenwich, Kew, 
Falmouth, Pola (Austria), Colaba (Bombay), Mauritius and Christchurch. All except two are 
from the northern hemisphere, so global coverage was not comprehensive. None appeared 
from Melbourne, Cape Town, Staten Island (Isla de los Estados), Potsdam (Eschenhagen’s 
home observatory) or from either the German base station on Kerguelen, or the Gauss itself. 
Data from Bruce’s Scotia expedition is included in the Physical Observations report (Royal 
Society, 1908, pp. 181-190) but it was not intergrated with data from other sources.   
6.10 Scientific outputs 
6.10.1 Lectures and journal articles 
The ship was welcomed home to the East India Docks with a splendid banquet in a quayside 
warehouse on 16 September 1904. Markham ensured that the media were well represented, 
reserving many seats for journalists (Markham, 1904b). Public speeches and lectures about 
the expedition’s achievements commenced here for the British public. Newspaper reports 
generally praised the work of the expedition, although one critical commentary stated: 
There is no system to it; the thing gets done in a haphazard way, chiefly by 
individual initiative and enterprise. That is the way we do most things. It is a way 
that has great drawbacks and defects, but still we ‘get there’…. Discovery is a 
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case in point, and quite in the old style. It has owed nothing to system, everything 
to individual initiative, capacity and liberality. 
(Arrival of the Discovery in London, 1904) 
Markham arranged a public lecture by Scott at the Albert Hall, delivered on 7 
November 1904 where seven thousand guests heard the message of geographical success and 
solid performance of the scientific staff (Fiennes, 2003, p. 134). Within the eighty-three 
pages of notes for the lecture, magnetic studies are barely mentioned, and then only the land-
based observing is cited. No results or difficulties encountered making observations at sea 
were mentioned, nor was there any new information about magnetic science, as one might 
expect in a lecture for general consumption. Bernacchi’s work during the barrier journey is 
also mentioned briefly, but as an example of the hardship facing sledge travellers, not as a 
reference to the magnetic work (Scott, n.d.a). Larmor of the RS had written to Markham just 
prior to this cautioning that public speaking engagements of this sort risked premature release 
of scientifically important and interesting results in a maner that was unfair to the expedition 
scientists. Markham’s handwriting on the letter indicates “no notice taken” (Larmor, 1904).  
Bernacchi gave a noteworthy lecture to the RGS on 8 May 1905, where he described 
the general trends of the magnetic and other physical science outcomes. This is the best 
synoptic account of the outcomes of the physical science research on Discovery as it was 
formulated for an intelligent, but not necessarily scientific audience. It was recorded in the 
Geographical Journal and was not confused by the onerous detail of the scientific reports 
(Bernacchi, 1905). He opened the paper with consideration of the scientific value of the work 
and the absolute necessity of observations in the Antarctic, then advised his awareness that 
theory in terrestrial magnetism could only be developed after comprehensive Antarctic 
observations of magnetic constants and changes (Bernacchi, 1905). He focused on the 
magnetic work at Winter Quarters and on the sledge journeys, then acknowledged that there 
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was still a mass of data to be analysed, including the contributions from collaborating 
observatories. Bernacchi made it clear that although data reduction had commenced, he was 
reporting his general observations of a preliminary nature and these should be viewed with 
considerable reserve. He mentioned the agreement for synchronous observing for term days 
and term hours. Creak was in the audience and, in the post-lecture discussion, noted the 
omission of the observations made at sea using his instrument. “I notice that the sea 
observations are excluded from this paper, but I may incidentally remark that a series of ship 
observations, which are possibly of great value, was taken after the ice-pack was entered” 
(Creak, 1905). 
Journal articles were an additional means of reporting scientific results. Although the 
primary method of reporting the outcomes of scientific work on Discovery was via the 
official reports formatted as compilations of research papers, most news of the Discovery 
expedition was circulated initially in Scott’s summaries of proceedings in the Geographical 
Journal, the organ of the RGS. The journal had nine pre-expedition articles followed by 
sixteen progress reports published during the course of the expedition.  
Only two articles could be considered post-expedition scientific reports on terrestrial 
magnetism, and both were reports of lectures by Bernacchi rather than scholarly papers. First 
was coverage of Bernacchi’s lecture at the RGS on the preliminary physical results 
(Bernacchi, 1905). The other appeared in the premier journal for magnetic science of the 
period, the American Geophysical Union’s Terrestrial Magnetism and Atmospheric 
Electricity that reported a lecture by Bernacchi to the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science (American Geophysical Union, 1908). One pre-expedition and two 
progress-report style articles appeared in Nature, and the Scottish Geographical Magazine 
contained seven progress-report style articles. Chree was a frequent contributor to 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, but his articles concerned the work at Kew, 
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not the Antarctic expeditions. The synchrony of magnetic storms across the globe was a topic 
of ongoing and vigorous debate between Chree and Bauer in the pages of Nature during 1910 
and 1911, but no references to the Antarctic expeditions appeared in the public interchange.  
6.10.2 Scientific reports 
Official scientific reports were the primary means of publishing results from expeditions at 
the turn of the twentieth century. From Discovery six volumes of natural history reports (Vol. 
I, Geology (Field-Geology, Petrography); Vol. II, Zoology (Vertebrata, Mollusca, Crustacea); 
Vol. III, Zoology and Botany (Invertebrata, Marine Algae, Musci); Vol. IV. Zoology 
(Various Invertebrata); Vol. V, Zoology and Botany; Vol. VI, Zoology and Botany) were 
published by the BMNH between 1907 and 1912. An album of sketches and photographs 
with a portfolio of panoramic views published in 1908 was of more general interest and 
supported the claims regarding new territory. The RS published the first volume of 
meteorological results in 1908 then the second volume followed in 1913 (Rosove, 2001, pp. 
345-350).  
The Physical Observations was the first scientific report published from the 
expedition’s physical research (Royal Society, 1908). The contributors were (George) Darwin 
(1845-1912), Milne, Chree, Chetwynd and Bernacchi, who made a significant contribution 
with introductions to the magnetic, auroral and pendulum and seismic sections. Its companion 
volume, Magnetic Observations, was released the following year, 1909. As a pair they 
described conditions and methods of operation of the physical researches and, for the land 
observations, an almost day-by-day account of the movements of the magnetograph pens. The 
first volume also includes tidal observations, pendulum observations, the results of the 
seismic surveys, descriptions and Wilson’s illustrations of auroras, then magnetic data and 
analysis from the ocean passages, swinging the ship and the overland sledge journeys. Some 
preliminary comments about the Winter Quarters observatory data appear in this volume, but 
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they are mostly dealt with in the second volume, Magnetic Observations (Royal Society, 
1909). 
The magnetic section of Physical Observations commences with a preliminary report 
of some of the absolute (Kew magnetometer) data from Winter Quarters. Observations were 
generally performed each month or six weeks to “afford the means of standardising the 
values indicated by the photographic curves” from the Eschenhagen magnetograph 
(Chetwynd, 1908, p. 134). The only results considered reliable enough to report were 
between December 1902 and January 1903, and of those ten observations, five were excluded 
from the analysis. It was determined that “... many of the absolute results to determine the 
magnetic axis are unreliable” (Chetwynd, 1908, pp. 138-139). The mirror on the end of the 
swinging magnet was out of alignment and the instrument was out of adjustment in other 
respects. It was necessary to assume that the azimuth mark adjacent to the absolute hut that 
served as the reference point for alignment of true north had not shifted during the two years 
of observations.  
The Physical Observations report also contains results of magnetic observations on 
some of the away-from-base sledge journeys. The data obtained during Bernacchi’s spring 
1903 Barrier sledge journey is found at tables VIII and IX on page 142. This journey and 
Armitage’s western journey of summer 1902-03 were the only overland journeys where 
specialised instruments were used for magnetic observing. The data obtained contributed to 
the Chart III (Plate 19) that shows the lines of equal inclination for the Ross Sea locality. 
Declinations were recorded with the aid of a prismatic compass, probably the same 
instrument on display at Canterbury Museum, Christchurch, shown in Image 10. The 
declination data from other sledge journeys, including the southern journey of Scott, Wilson 
and Shackleton (also taken using prismatic compasses) contributed to Chart I (Plate 17) that 
shows lines of equal magnetic declination (isogons) and Chart II (Plate 18), showing the 
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position of the South Magnetic Pole (Royal Society, 1908, following p. 156). These charts are 
confined to the Ross Sea locality. 
 
Image 10: Bernacchi’s prismatic compass on display in Canterbury Museum, Christchurch (author’s photo). 
 
The most striking feature of the Physical Observations report is that almost all of the 
at-sea observations were never reported or discussed, and their omission goes unexplained! 
Results for magnetic force at sea are non-existent. Results for inclination (dip) at sea are only 
reported for a handful of observations on the homeward journey and only at high latitudes. 
Commencing on 20 February 1904 there are three readings from the Lloyd-Creak circle 
(probably Bernacchi’s first experience with the instrument on a moving vessel) then a further 
seven observations were made with the Fox circle, ending on 4 March. These are 
observations from inside the line of pack ice and taken when sea conditions would have been 
moderate (Royal Society, 1908, p. 149). Compensation for deviation is discussed and results 
for the swings of the ship at Wood Bay, Auckland Islands, Lyttelton, Falkland Islands and 
Spithead are reported at Table XIV (p. 148). The data for Lyttelton was ultimately rejected 
due to inconsistencies. A “remarkable difference” in results for deviation was found between 
the 1902 and the 1904 ship swings in Wood Bay. This indicated “…the magnetic conditions 
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at the compass position in the observing cabin had, in the interval, undergone a very great 
change; possibly this change was due to alterations in the stowage of stores in the ship” 
(Chetwynd, 1908, pp. 147-148). This factor added uncertainty to all other at-sea observations 
as the tinned provisions were continually removed for consumption. Armigate noted also that 
ferrous objects such as a birdcage, a rifle and cookwear were sometimes left adjacent to the 
magnetic observatory (Armitage, 1905, p. 303). 
The daily observations for variation (=declination) are tabulated for the voyage at 
Table XVI (pp. 150-155). These only require knowledge of the ship’s deviation, (the 
compensation required to account for the influence of ferrous materials in the ship according 
to its heading), time, location and a solar azimuth reading to determine geographic or true 
north and a ship’s compass for determination. In short, this is data that could have been 
collected by any ship, and in the days of sail it would have been routinely recorded and no 
magnetic laboratory or specialised instruments were required. The contribution of the vessel 
as a floating magnetic laboratory paid no dividends. 
Section XIV compares declination values in the Ross Sea region against data from 
Ross’s campaign and concludes there was a long-term trend of declination increasing on 
average of 23’ per year. Between 1902 and 1904 the average was calculated to be a decrease 
of 26’. This unlikely result is not discussed. Likewise there is no explanation for the average 
annual change in inclination since 1841, being -1’ whereas the average from the two years of 
Discovery’s stay in the ice is -6.7’. The magnetic pole appeared to have moved about two 
hundred geographical miles towards the north and slightly east (Chetwynd, 1908, p. 157). 
Data from contributing observatories for the synchronous observing arrangements is covered 
in a section that covers hourly values for declination, horizontal force and vertical force. No 
acknowledgement is made here of the German expedition, or the Gauss (Chetwynd, 1908, p. 
159). This section is comprised of data sets with no interpretation or discussion. The final 
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section in this volume is a discussion by Chree of the magnetic observations on Bruce’s 
Scotia expedition. This is a surprise as Markham had unequivocally rejected Bruce’s offer of 
cooperation in magnetic observing before either expedition embarked.  
The second physics volume is the Magnetic Observations report, a lengthy technical 
volume reporting the observations made at Winter Quarters and representing the bulk of 
achievement in the magnetic science program (Royal Society, 1909). Bernacchi again 
provided an introduction on the arrangements of the observatory and instruments and aside 
from this, the report is almost entirely the work of Chree. Over sixty pages of tables of hourly 
data for declination, horizontal force and vertical force observations between 1 March 1902 
and January 1904 form the core of the report and there are some discontinuous sections after 
September 1903 due to shortage of papers for the Eschenhagen magnetograph. Many 
examples of the actual magnetograms (the traces from the Eschenhagen instrument) are 
provided in forty-three plates at the end of the volume to illustrate points made in the body of 
text. The data is dissected and described in minute detail and in technical language for the 
consumption of scientists. Discussion is mostly confined to descriptions of phenomena 
represented in the data, such as magnetically quiet or magnetically disturbed days, diurnal 
inequalities in the magnetic elements and Fourier coefficients, representing waves or long 
pulses (about twenty-four hour) in the magnetic signature. Cyclic (diurnal and seasonal) and 
the non-cyclic (secular) changes in terrestrial magnetic elements of declination, horizontal 
force and vertical force are the themes throughout. Note that there are three magnetic 
seasons: midsummer, midwinter and the equinoxes. Absolute daily ranges get special 
attention, as do the term hour records, results from the solar eclipse, magnetically highly 
disturbed days (magnetic storms) and records compiled from the cooperating observatories. 
Unfortunately there is little speculation on how the data fits with theory. 
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Chree’s opening statement in his Historical Note that: “under these circumstances few 
serious mistakes were discovered” is at odds with evidence revealed during this research that 
detected many errors and inconsistent results, and significant amounts of data were discarded 
(Royal Society, 1909, p. 5). The following material shows there were numerous difficulties, 
and that a great amount of data was either discarded, or reported with cautionary notes being 
considered unreliable. Chree opens his discussion of observations by noting that the 
Eschenhagen magnetometer arrived late in England giving no time for staff of the National 
Physical Laboratory to become familiar with it. One consequence was the quartz filaments 
for the suspension of the horizontal-force variometer magnets that were sent to Antarctica 
were too fine, and therefore too sensitive for observations close to the magnetic pole. 
Although Bernacchi reported that the Eschenhagen apparatus operated continuously for two 
years, it did not necessarily produce reliable traces. If the lamp on the side of the apparatus 
was disturbed when refilling the oil tank and trimming the wick the traces were displaced. 
“The number of ways in which the traces might have their positions changed on the sheet was 
very large, while the instruments were so light that a slight touch might cause movement” 
(Royal Society, 1909, p. 73). From time to time in the cold the oil would not burn well, 
producing only a feeble light that failed to register on the photosensitive paper. In his 
discussion of the absolute observations Chree refers back to Chetwynd’s note in the Physical 
Observations that the number of absolute observations available was “really very small” 
(Royal Society, 1909, p. 74). Inability to correlate the traces from the magnetograph against 
absolute standards diminished their value.        
Chree implies instrumental error and exonerates Bernacchi’s technique. “If the 
absolute observations had been faulty-a circumstance improbable in view of Mr Bernacchi’s 
experience-this would have shown itself through irregularity in the values given by the 
individual observations for the moment of [magnet] 25A.” Many days worth of the vertical 
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force trace were lost as “In some cases the magnet was evidently stuck” meaning that many 
days records were rejected. He further states: “In some months a good many days’ traces 
which were complete were omitted because there was reason to doubt whether the instrument 
was working” (Royal Society, 1909, p. 102). With respect to the daily ranges for declination 
and horizontal force, Chree stated: “the number of days when the record was incomplete was 
so considerable, and the cause was so frequently due to the limits of registration being 
exceeded, especially in Summer…” indicating that the traces frequently went off the scale on 
the 20 cm. wide magnetogram (Royal Society, 1909, p. 131). On 31 December 1902 
Bernacchi inadvertently reversed the direction of a magnet in the Vertical force variometer 
when he relocated it to compensate for the influence of a large summer temperature range 
within the hut. This affected the sign of 1903 records. This was yet another source of 
anomalous results that led Chree to fear: “that nothing could be made of the vertical force 
records” (Royal Society, 1909, p. 76).      
Chree discusses secular (non-cyclic) change in the magnetic elements in detail in 
chapter II. He concludes that if the figures are a “true measure of secular change, the natural 
inference is that the south magnetic Pole is receding from Winter Quarters-i.e., is moving 
northwards-at a rapid rate.” Then: “the declination figures are no less remarkable” and “Such 
a phenomenon seems hardly credible, and one cannot but suspect some instrumental source 
of error” (Royal Society, 1909, p 81). Chree concludes discussion of the force: “It is obvious 
from what has already been stated that the Vertical-Force base lines for individual months are 
affected by uncertainties which would render any deductions as to secular change or annual 
inequality of very problematical value” (Royal Society, 1909, p. 83). Chree does draw some 
conclusions from trends in the data. Equinoctial months are much less magnetically disturbed 
than midsummer (Royal Society, 1909, p. 138). Daily maxima for declination tend to be 
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clustered around 9 a.m. and minima around 6.30 p.m. indicating a single daily oscillation at 
Winter Quarters throughout the year (Royal Society, 1909, p. 101). 
Analysis of the amplitude and direction of the diurnal inequalities indicated a change 
in the direction of secular change for declination might be looming. Similar data trends had 
been found at Kew and Chree states: “Thus here again we appear on the threshold of a most 
suggestive line of inquiry” (Royal Society, 1909, p. 101). Chree enters into a little speculation 
about electrical currents in the upper atmospher and offers the suggestion that if diurnal 
inequality is due to atmospheric electricity, then the effect should be the same at the magnetic 
pole as it was at Winter Quarters. Following that premise, and connecting it with the trend 
that inclination was greatest “about 4 or 5 a.m. in the morning” and was “lowest from 2 to 3 
p.m.” it implies that the magnetic pole oscillated daily, being closest to Winter Quarters early 
in the morning and furthest from it in the afternoon (Royal Society, 1909, p. 103). Chree 
provides advice to observers of the next Antarctic expeditions to study annual inequality in 
particular, to confirm his interpretation that the location of the magnetic pole oscillates 
annually (Royal Society, 1909, p. 138). There is no speculation on a cause of these 
phenomena and he states “even in Europe two years is too short a period to give results of a 
really representative character for the annual inequality of magnetic elements” (Royal 
Society, 1909, p. 81).  
The analysis of data for Fourier coefficients, that indicate subliminal wave patterns in 
the changes of the magnetic elements, opens with a cautionary note that differences in values 
may owe as much to “accidental” disturbances as any real differences in magnetic conditions. 
The uncertainty over the “accidental” disturbances make it: “by no means clear how best to 
interpret the figures.” Chree concludes: “the 24-hour Fourier wave is largely dominant” and 
then seems to contradict himself saying that, although there are only two years of data from 
the Antarctic: “they present features which can hardly be regarded as the result of accident, 
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and which seem of much interest” (Royal Society, 1909, pp. 117-129). The Swedish 
researcher, Birkeland whose auroral researches were the most advanced in the discipline, 
wrote the lengthy discussion comparing his Arctic results against the Discovery’s Antarctic 
research. This was not a planned collaboration, just a post expedition overview made possible 
by the congruence of material becoming available.  
Outcomes related to global synchronous observations are of special interest and are 
detailed below at Section 7.1.10. but a separate discussion relates data from combined 
observatories showing the onset of a magnetic storm coincident with a volcanic eruption of 
Mount Pelée. Chree suggests a theory whereby the Earth is composed of a nucleus 
surrounded by a shell of material of different permeability, then an outer, non-magnetic crust 
of unknown thickness, but he concludes that the coincidence between the eruption and the 
magnetic storm was pure coincidence (Royal Society, 1909, pp. 171-180). He discounts the 
action of the Sun as the cause of disturbances, arguing that different observatories would 
encounter the magnetic storm at different times if it were the case but the evidence shows that 
disturbances are closely synchronised between the Antarctic observations and those 
elsewhere. Chree was considering ideas that are building blocks of current theories of 
terrestrial magnetism, but rejected the most promising lines of inquiry. Scientists now 
consider about ninety percent of the earth’s magnetic field is derived from the ferrous molten 
core that remains stable and whose minor variations are measured in years. A smaller, rapidly 
moving magnetic field is generated in the upper atmosphere and the changes are measured in 
minutes and seconds (Belanger, 2006, pp. 267-268).  
These published reports are the most concise analysis of the data from the Discovery 
and the cooperating observatories, so any new theory, or confirmation of existing theory 
should be evident here. None appear, although some new lines for future enquiry are 
suggested. The reports failed to provide any synoptic overviews of the meaning of results and 
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few general conclusions or insights are drawn from the data. The last word on theory is found 
in Chree’s discussion of disturbances: “It must be admitted that our direct knowledge of the 
Earth’s magnetic quality is very slight…How the Earth comes to be a magnet is a 
mystery…the source of the Earth’s magnetism is almost entirely internal” (Royal Society, 
1909, p. 171). 
The profession of science communicator did not exist in 1909 and the scientific 
reports were written for the information of other scientists, not the general public, media or 
sponsors. After reading the Physical Observations report Scott wrote to Bernacchi asking for 
interpretation of Chree’s style: “I am a bit disappointed with Chree’s contribution-it is very 
analytical as concerning the curves but I could wish there was more treatment of results” 
(Scott, 1908a). Scott probably thought the same about the contents of the second volume. 
 The Discovery expedition was long forgotten when the Physical Observations and 
Magnetic Observations volumes were published. Polar news at the time centred on claims of 
the attainment of the North Pole by both Robert E. Peary (1856-1920) and Frederick Cook 
(1865-1940) and the success of Shackleton’s Nimrod expedition. Scott was commencing his 
campaign to procure funding for the Terra Nova and probably preferred that there was no 
scrutiny of the quotient of scientific output compared to cost for the Discovery. 
6.10.3 Cartography 
There are various classes of chart or map produced as outputs from the Discovery expedition. 
Topographic maps and charts documenting new territory found during coastal exploration 
and sledge journeys are the most common cartographic product. Replacement of Shackleton 
by Mulock was an inspired decision as he was a cartographer of skill. His first chart 
published in the Geographical Journal shows the extent of new territory discovered with the 
ship’s track and the routes of all significant sledging journeys shown in detail (Mulock, 
1904). Mulock’s charts show the first ever surveys of Ross Island, the Western Mountains, 
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the Polar Plateau and the mountain range fringing the western coast of the Ross Sea south to 
82° S. Some new coastline was surveyed at the far eastern extent of the Great Ice Barrier 
where King George VII Land was discovered. A folio of six charts by Mulock was published 
in 1908 as a supplementary publication from the expedition. They show the geographical 
features and tracks of explorations, but no magnetic charts were included in the set (Mulock, 
1908). Skelton lamented the time wasted fabricating the plane table and sledgemeters, 
essential items of equipment for surveying that should have been brought with the expedition 
(Skelton, 204, p. 111). A plane table was also on Gregory’s list of necessary equipment 
(Gregory, 1900a). The reliability of Ferrar’s geological contribution was brought into 
question by the annotations by Griffith Taylor (1880-1963), who, during the Terra Nova 
expedition: “ marked all his Discovery maps ‘Wrong’” (Bull & Wright, 1993, p. 152).  
There is one obscure error on Mulock’s chart associated with magnetic conditions. On 
22 November 1903 Scott’s party crossed the line between the geographic and magnetic poles, 
where the magnetic declination (or variation) was 180° and the south geographic pole 
appeared to be due north by the compass.  
 
 
Figure 11: Detail of the chart showing the track of Scott’s 1903 western plateau journey (Mulock, 1904). 
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This point is incorrectly marked on the chart as a point of “no magnetic variation” rather than 
a point of 180° of variation as shown at Figure 11 (Mulock, 1908). 
A second category of chart is found in the scientific reports, where three plates show 
the magnetic elements of declination and inclination, as well as the location of the magnetic 
pole in the Ross Sea region at the time of the expedition. Figure 9, shown at Section 6.3 is an 
example. They were the only outputs from the expedition of potential value to mariners, but 
they were buried in the scientific reports. In practice they were of little commercial value 
being scientific, not navigational as there were no commercial or strategic voyages to the 
locality, other than Antarctic exploratory voyages. A further point is that magnetic data are 
stale by the time of publication, especially in the region close to the magnetic pole where 
there is constant change in the magnetic signature revealed by the isogons connected to it.  
A third category of charts was produced specifically for the use of mariners. Although 
Markham had promised that Discovery would provide new magnetic data leading to 
production of sea charts of utility to mariners, none were produced. The United Kingdom 
Hydrographic Office (UKHO) published editions of magnetic variation for the world (chart 
series 2598) from time to time. The editions relevant to the Discovery were those from 1895, 
1907 and 1912 and none were published between these versions. The UKHO did not keep 
records of the provenance of data for their charts prior to 1913 (Dr Adrian Webb, Archive 
Services Manager, UKHO, personal communication, 26 July 2012) so there is no traceable 
link between the data from Discovery and improvements in the regular series of charts. The 
1895 edition shows isogons above 60° S at 1° intervals whereas the next (1907) edition, 
published after the Discovery data became available, shows isogons above 60° S at 10° 
intervals (Figure 12). This means that even if data from Discovery had been incorporated into 
the newer edition, the resolution and therefore the value to high latitude mariners had actually 
diminished since the 1895 edition. In any event, competent navigators in the days of sail kept 
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a watch-by-watch check on the variation as they have done since latitude determination by 
chronometer became possible, so magnetic charts were unnecessary. Prior to that, magnetic 
charts were an extra check for mariners determining longitude by dead reckoning.  
Markham’s promise that Discovery would provide new magnetic data leading to 
production of sea charts of utility to mariners was not delivered. Charts of ice concentration 
in mid to high southern latitudes would have been of more utility to the wool, grain and 
nitrate trading vessels of the southern oceans.   
 
Figure 12: Comparison of detail from UKHO Magnetic Variation Chart series #2598, 1895 edition (left) and 
1907 edition (right).  
 
6.10.4 Narratives  
As with most expeditions, members were bound to not circulate personal accounts until a 
specified period after the official version of events was published. Scott’s narrative, Voyage 
of ‘Discovery’ sold well. It provided an exciting account of the operations and detailed 
Scott’s southward trek, the jewel in the crown of the expedition and other sledge journeys. 
These were the first ever incursions towards the interior of the continent and the significance 
was not lost on the reading public. In terms of new territory discovered and the attainment of 
a new furthest south, the Discovery was far more successful than Drygalski’s Gauss, Bruce’s 
Scotia, Nordenskjöld’s Antarctic, Borchgrevink’s Southern Cross and de Gerlache’s Belgica. 
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Access to the narrative restored national pride and, with many quality photographs, brought 
images of new landscapes and creatures into lounge rooms. Scott managed to weave some of 
the scientific elements of the expedition into the narrative, but it generally focused on day-by-
day events and the main sledge journeys. 
Armitage wrote a very readable narrative, Two Years in the Antarctic, which provided 
significantly more detail about the magnetic science research than Scott’s own account 
(Armitage, 1905). This account was published slightly before Scott’s, contrary to the terms of 
engagement, but there was no practical means for Scott or Markham to prevent this. Armitage 
gave a good account of the reasons for undertaking the magnetic research but with a focus on 
the maritime, not the theoretical aspects of the program. His Appendix B, Terrestrial 
Magnetism discussed the magnetic science program and gave the reader a good synopsis of 
the operations and challenges of the work. His closing comments about the way in which the 
data gathered from the expedition would: “enable those who go down to the sea in ships to 
navigate with a greater measure of confidence and safety those waters that wash the shores of 
our southern possessions and South America” seems like hyperbole in the light of his 
acknowledged difficulties taking observations at sea (Armitage, 1905, pp. 301-304). His 
predictions were baseless as the anticipated magnetic charts for mariners derived specifically 
from the efforts of the Discovery never eventuated.  
Bernacchi requested permission from Markham to publish a narrative shortly after the 
expedition returned but was refused: “no one in the ‘Discovery’ can publish anything in a 
journal or magazine until after Scott’s book is out” (Markham, 1904a). Saga of the Discovery 
is his history of the ship that was finally published in 1938. It was largely developed from 
Bernacchi’s journals and correspondence and provided a vehicle for the author to tell his 
version of the events. He mused on certain topics with the benefit of hindsight and in the 
knowledge that most of the protagonists had passed away, but does not describe the magnetic 
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research in detail. Lambert suggests the narratives of the British Arctic expeditions of the 
nineteenth century were published as a means to demonstrate to the world that the results 
were British and supported the notion of “Imperial exploration” (Lambert, 2009, p. 36). The 
narratives from the Discovery expedition are in the same mould. 
Chapter four provided the historical contexts and the background to the preparations 
of the voyage to the ice, including the state of knowledge in the discipline of terrestrial 
magnetism and the importance of patronage and funding. Planning for the construction of the 
vessel and the overall expedition program was discussed there in the context of the 
anticipated research into terrestrial magnetism. Chapter five described the scientific practices 
undertaken in the magnetic program on the outward passage to New Zealand and this chapter 
has investigated the key elements of the practice of terrestrial magnetic science on the ice by 
the Discovery’s physicist, Bernacchi, and the ways in which elements of life and work 
impinged or supported his ability to perform the science to the highest standards possible. 
This concise analysis of the research into terrestrial magnetism at sea, at the Winter Quarters 
ice station and on sledging journeys provides the basis for commentary that follows on the 
indicators of scientific success and the factors that drove the outcomes for the expedition. 
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Chapter 7: Success indicators and the drivers of scientific success 
7.1 Indicators of scientific success 
A truly successful hypothetical expedition might achieve all scientific objectives, return on 
time and within budget, receive public acclaim and provide a basis on which to secure 
financial support for another similar enterprise. The scientific staff might have new career 
opportunities opened to them on the back of new theories or phenomena discovered, new 
species identified or notable collections repatriated. The scientific publications might become 
the foundation for subsequent development of new theory and there might be commercial 
opportunities arising from discovery of new resources. Scientific collaborations, especially 
international collaborations in a context of national rivalry are another hallmark of success if 
they produce outputs. This first section of this chapter discusses the match between indicators 
of scientific success (identified in section 2.7, p. 60) and the outputs and outcomes of the 
Discovery expedition in relation to research into terrestrial magnetism in particular. Analysis 
of the significance of the contribution of each of the drivers of scientific success (identified in 
section 2.7, p. 61) forms the second key element of this chapter. The achievements and 
shortcomings of the scientific program are reviewed to inform conclusions about the 
significance of the research program of the Discovery, how outcomes might have been 
different and the significance of the expedition’s legacies.  
7.1.1 Objectives achieved? 
Bernacchi wrote to his parents from Antarctica early in 1903 including a list of 
achievements of the expedition to date: 
Now with regards to the results of our expedition I had better give you them in order. 
(1)  The discovery of extensive land at the east extreme of the Great Ice Barrier 
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(2)  The discovery that McMurdo “Bay” is not a “bay” but a strait and that Mts. 
Erebus and Terror form part of a comparatively small island. 
(3) The discovery of good winter quarters in a high latitude 77o 51’ south with 
land close by suitable for the erection of the magnetic observatories etc. 
(4) An immense amount of scientific work over twelve months in winter quarters 
principally physical and biological. 
(7)3 Numerable (sic) and extensive sledge journeys in the spring and summer 
covering a good many thousand miles, of which the principal is Capt. Scott’s 
journey upon which a latitude of 82o 17’ south was attained and an immense 
tract of new land discovered and charted as far as 83o 30’ south with peaks and 
ranges of mountains as high as 14,000 ft.   
(8) The great continental inland ice reached…at a considerable distance from the 
coast and at an altitude of 9,000 ft. 
(9) A considerable amount of magnetic work at sea, also soundings, deep sea 
dredging etc. 
These are just the large principal results, there are many other minor ones. 
(Bernacchi, 1903b) 
The official instructions to the director of the civilian scientific staff did not clearly 
state any of the real objectives of the scientific work, but they did say that if any findings new 
to science were detected then all effort should be made to communicate this to the Joint 
Committee. Otherwise they are a statement of limitations placed on any materials generated 
by the expedition including diaries, journals and photographs. The scientific objectives of the 
expedition related to magnetic research were more clearly stated in the instructions to the 
commander of the expedition. They are paraphrased below, with commentary on the extent to 
which each was achieved (British National Antarctic Expedition, 1901). 
 
• Instruction: The objects of the expedition are, … (b) to make a magnetic survey in the 
southern regions to the south of the 40th parallel and to carry on meteorological, 
oceanographic, geological, biological and physical investigations and researches.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 The numbering here is inconsistent as Bernacchi confused page numbers with paragraph numbers in the original document.	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Outcome: The geographical exploration elements of this objective were achieved. The 
magnetic research was only partially successful.  
 
• Instruction: The scientific work of the Executive Officers of the ship will be under 
your immediate control, and will include magnetic and meteorological observations, 
astronomical observations, surveying and charting, and sounding operations.  
Outcome: The officers of the ship contributed to the scientific effort and in 
Armitage’s case, he probably applied significantly more time and effort to the 
magnetic work than the apparatus warranted. 
 
• Instruction: You should endeavour to carry out the magnetic survey from the Cape to 
your primary base station south of the 40th parallel, and from the same station across 
the Pacific to the meridian of Greenwich. It is also desired that you should observe 
along the tracks of Ross, in order to ascertain the magnetic changes that have taken 
place in the interval between the two voyages. 
Outcome: Continuous records were made at Winter Quarters but there was no 
conscious effort to follow the tracks of Ross except within the Ross Sea. Observations 
made at sea in high southern latitudes were of no value although undertaken with 
regularity and diligence. Data was unreliable and never reported.  
 
• Instruction: The expedition will be supplied with a complete set of magnetic 
instruments for observing at sea and ashore. Instructions for their use have been 
drawn up by Captain Creak and yourself and three of your officers have gone through 
the course of instruction at Deptford with Captain Creak and at Kew Observatory.  
Outcome: The Lloyd-Creak dip circle was found to be inadequate for the operating 
conditions. The Antarctic Manual instructions and the course of instruction for 
officers were insufficient to give Bernacchi any confidence that an understudy could 
take over his role in case of misadventure or movement away from the observatory at 
Winter Quarters. 
 
• Instruction: As regards magnetic work and meteorological observations generally, you 
will follow the programme arranged between the German and British Committees, 
with the terms of which you are acquainted. 
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Outcome: The instructions in the Antarctic Manual contained an error and, as 
Bernacchi lacked familiarity with the regime of magnetic observations he was 
oblivious to his faulty timing. By virtue of continuous run Eschenhagen 
magnetometers, the data collection was sufficiently successful to provide global data 
sets that overlapped temporally. Nominal data pooling resulted between the German 
and British expeditions.      
 
The objectives of locating the magnetic pole and building a long run set of observations at 
a high latitude was achieved. Aside from amassing additional data, no tangible progress 
towards solving the riddle of terrestrial magnetism was evident. It was unrealistic to expect 
any significant leaps in knowledge as the system of observations and the results collected 
were similar to those that had been in operation for decades. A lay person’s view was that 
data confirmed known cycles of magnetic activity, provided detailed descriptions of the 
phenomenon of magnetic storms and gave a better understanding of the rate and direction of 
movement of the magnetic pole. In summary, some of the scientific objectives were satisfied 
and a number fell short but the instructions were indistinct and open-ended in most cases, just 
giving a general guidance, rather than an achievable target.  
7.1.2 On budget? 
In spite of a lavish provision compared to other expeditions of the era, the Discovery ran over 
budget by a significant amount. The whole expedition budget was committed before the ship 
departed from Britain. Markham had excelled at acquiring expedition funding, but he also 
expended that sum in an interesting manner. In hindsight, his insistence on construction of a 
new expedition ship and disregard of opportunities to purchase and refit an adequate ship was 
a folly. He knew of the need for a second ship to be sent as a relief expedition and he 
withheld this requirement from the organisers and funding sources. Only after Discovery was 
at sea did he commence the search to find and purchase the Morning (Yelverton, 2000, p. 67).  
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Freezing Discovery in the ice for an extra season caused the costs to balloon, creating 
a major embarrassment and precipitating the expedition to fall into disrepute in some circles. 
The Admiralty, as an instrument of the government, bailed out the expedition at great cost by 
purchasing, refitting and sending out the Terra Nova as well as the Morning in the summer of 
1903-04. Scott was quoted in the New Zealand papers as having stated that the two-ship relief 
expedition was a waste of public money, but he moved quickly to recover from the 
potentially career limiting faux pas. The cost of overstaying was great, in the region of 
£15,000 an amount similar to Markham’s unrealised expectation of the sale price of the 
Discovery (Huggins, 1903; Yelverton, 2000, p. 323). 
7.1.3 On time? 
The Discovery overstayed its planned campaign by at least twelve months. This was 
unsurprising as the likelihood of misadventure was well known for frontier expeditions to 
polar regions of the era. The cause of the extended stay relates to Scott’s decision to 
overwinter the ship, then the impossibility of extricating the Discovery from the ice in the 
summer of 1902-03. Although the data and specimen collection phase overran the planned 
schedule, the publication of scientific reports was acquitted in reasonable time when 
compared to similar expeditions. To provide perspective, all of the Discovery scientific 
reports were published by 1912 whereas Drygalski’s Gauss reports were still being released 
as late as 1931, partly due to the intervention of the First World War (Rosove, 2001, pp. 108-
122). Mawson’s Aurora (1911-1914) magnetic reports were only published in 1925. 
Shackleton’s Nimrod magnetic report was never published, except as a narrative account of 
the trek towards the magnetic pole written by David (Shackleton, 1932, pp. 260-311) and 
later as a segment in the magnetic report of Mawson’s AAE, where some of the data 
appeared for the first time (Mawson, 1925, pp. 50-52). Shackleton died in 1922 during the 
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Quest expedition and Mawson probably realised this was the last opportunity for publication 
of the data.  
Extra value was gained scientifically by overwintering the Discovery, with an 
additional year’s data obtained in magnetic and meteorological studies at Winter Quarters. 
The opportunities for additional sledge journeys also added significantly to the scientific 
value of the second year. Scott’s western plateau journey gave magnetic declination values on 
an extended track away from the base. His party crossed the line of 180° declination, an 
important way point in the construction of the chart of declination in the region of the 
magnetic pole, but the accuracy of his longitude determinations is questionable. Bernacchi 
and Royds’ barrier journey was especially valuable to the magnetic, meteorological and 
glaciological studies. Geographically it supported the idea that the ice barrier was extensive, 
mostly featureless and afloat. The second year gave Ferrar opportunity to geologise around 
the mountains in virgin territory, after breaking away from the role of support party for 
Scott’s (November 1903) western polar plateau trek: “Captain Scott therefore arranged that I 
should accompany him to the edge of the inland ice, and should do as much geological work 
as possible on the return journey” (Ferrar, 1905). He discovered the Beacon sandstone 
complex that confirmed the continental nature of Antarctica, determined initially by David 
after analysis of Borchgrevink’s Cape Adare samples from Bull’s 1895 whaling campaign 
(David Branagan, personal communication, 7 October 2009). In summary, although the 
Discovery’s Antarctic campaign ran considerably over time, some of the most significant 
outcomes were only achieved as a result of the additional opportunities provided by the 
second season.  
 
  
275 
7.1.4 Repeat funding?  
Scott’s second Antarctic expedition, the Terra Nova (1910-1913) was marked by an arduous 
pre-expedition drive for funding. Markham had managed all the fundraising effort for the 
Discovery expedition, but the Terra Nova was Scott’s expedition. It was sanctioned, but not 
managed by the RGS and Scott struggled to get government, institutional and philanthropic 
support. Scott was aware of the importance of a robust scientific program to attract funding 
even though it was no secret that the prime objective of the expedition was to reach the 
geographic South Pole. The funding he received from the RGS and RS was parsimonious 
(£500 from the RGS) compared to Markham’s earlier efforts and the level of support from 
the Navy was diminished on the second effort. He resorted to appeals to the general public 
and the outcome was a significantly smaller pot of funds with which to mount the campaign. 
Scott wished to have the Discovery again but it had been sold off to the Hudson Bay 
Company for £10,000, less than a quarter of its construction cost and was therefore 
unavailable (Savours, 2001, p. 74). The Terra Nova had returned to whaling after taking part 
in the relief expedition of 1904 and Scott was able to purchase her for £12,500 (Ryan, 2011, 
p. 216). 
A handful of factors made funding harder to acquire. There may have been fatigue 
after the prior requests for Antarctic expedition funding coupled with a desire by institutions 
to redirect funds towards other explorations. The RS did not see itself as a vehicle to mount 
expeditions, but more as a facilitator for promulgation of outputs and outcomes. Executive 
members of the RS were aware of the difficulties of the relationship with the RGS during 
their joint management of the Discovery expedition at which time, even though they had 
provided funding and support, they had become powerless in the battle against Markham to 
keep the agenda focused on scientific outcomes. Scott was trying to raise funds on the back 
of a scientifically credible expedition program intended to provide balance to the objectives. 
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At the same time he was in deep conflict with William Napier Shaw (1854-1945) of the RS, 
over what he perceived as errors in the first meteorological report. Prospective fund providers 
probably saw Scott’s Terra Nova as a high-risk venture with low prospects of bringing new 
scientific knowledge to light.  
Although Bernacchi turned to tropical exploration after the Discovery expedition he 
retained a strong emotional connection to the Antarctic. He planned to lead an expedition for 
1925 but it never eventuated. His plan was to establish a base in King George VII Land, at 
Biscoe Bay and have traverse parties, using Citröen Kegresse half-track vehicles similar to 
those used by Louis Audouin-Dubreuil (1887-1960) in 1922 to make the first crossing of the 
Sahara. Bernacchi negotiated for the purchase of the Terra Nova, and had the refit and 
delivery from Newfoundland scheduled to allow landing a party in early 1925. A feasible 
scheme of depot laying and support parties to allow two main treks to be undertaken for 
exploration of the unknown quadrants towards Charcot and Graham’s Land, and south-east 
towards the Queen Maud Range and Weddell Sea region were planned. It was a sound plan 
with a program of scientific work to complement the exploration. Bernacchi’s complete 
budget and staffing arrangements were detailed, but funding was not forthcoming and the 
expedition never proceeded (Bernacchi, 1924). Bernacchi had provided the initial finance in 
the planning stages then approached the government for the bulk of financial support, but got 
none. Bernacchi’s failure to gain repeat funding in this instance is not a truly relevant 
indicator of scientific success, as Bernacchi was ageing and his plan, being highly ambitious, 
was therefore costly.  
7.1.5 Promotion, peer recognition and career advancement 
Scott’s motivation for joining Markham’s campaign was the prospect of promotion. He 
achieved that aim rapidly, being promoted from Lieutenant to Commander upon his transfer 
from sea service to the expedition in June 1900, then he was promoted further, to Captain, 
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after the return of the expedition. These were not necessarily in recognition of Scott’s service 
to science, but more likely in recognition of his successful exploration. His scientific 
contribution was recognised by Cambridge University barely six months after the 
expedition’s completion and well before any of the data had been analysed: “Dear Captain 
Scott, I [Vice Chancellor of Cambridge] am commissioned by the Council of the Senate of 
this University to invite you to accept the Honorary Degree of Doctor in Science” (Beck, 
1905). 
Bernacchi did not pursue a career in science after his affairs in relation to the 
Discovery were wrapped up. A diary that has recently come to light in a private family 
collection explains the springboard to a new life. It commences:  
March 14th 1906, Set out with my wife on a journey to Peru the object of the journey 
to examine the primeval rubber forests in the interior …on behalf of Sir George 
Newnes who contemplates purchasing a large property of some 85,000 acres. 
(Bernacchi, 1906) 
Bernacchi developed a sense for the rubber planting business during that first trip to the 
Amazon basin. His tour to the “Excelsior” plantation was to sparsely populated and 
extremely inaccessible regions and culminated in travel to the Inambari River in the upper 
Amazon Basin. By 1911 he was director of several rubber plantations (Skelton, 1911) and he 
maintained interests in rubber plantations throughout his life, making frequent trips to Malaya 
and other overseas destinations in pursuit of business opportunities.  
Scientifically, Bernacchi peaked early then tapered off. He never returned to 
Antarctica after the Discovery but he did maintain a close, active interest in polar affairs and 
was well known in society in London as a result of his Antarctic exploits. He provided 
frequent, expert commentary on polar matters for the press and he maintained contact and 
correspondence with a number of his shipmates. Scott was best man at his wedding to 
Winifred Harris on 10 February 1906. A family anecdote tells how at his wedding, Scott 
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giving his speech as best man, offered Bernacchi a place on any further polar expedition. His 
new bride, a formidable woman, told the congregation that Bernacchi would certainly not be 
taking part in further polar campaigns (Atkin, 2011). 
He had been a fellow of the RGS since the Southern Cross expedition and was a 
Council member from 1928 to 1932. He was also a member of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Sciences and a foundation member of the Antarctic Club, established on 17 
January 1929 the anniversary of the day that Scott and his party attained the South Pole. In 
1935 he gave the Alexander Pegler lecture, entitled “Antarctic Exploration Past and Present” 
to the British Science Guild in London, of which he was also a member.  
The recognition of greatest importance to Bernacchi was fellowship of the RS. He 
was nominated for membership by (George) Murray: “I forgot to say I put your certificate up 
for the Royal, signed by men like Kelvin, Rucker, Creak, Ayrton etc. I shall use all the 
influence I have, but you must not expect much at once” (Murray, 1905). He was never 
accepted as a fellow but he did stay in the public eye, for example as the “Organizing 
Director” of the successful Polar Exhibition of 1930 for which he gave the opening lecture. 
The exhibition was open for viewing from 2 to 15 July 1930 in the Central Hall, Westminster. 
Bernacchi called in favours from friends and colleagues and collected together an 
unprecedented and never repeated collection of valuable polar memorabilia including Scott’s 
and Wilson’s last diaries, numerous sledging pennants and equipment, charts and historical 
documents, portraits of explorers and paintings of polar scenes, models, flags, medals from 
private and public collections. Shackleton’s famous lifeboat, the James Caird was also 
featured. Bernacchi complained that he had insufficient space to display all the materials 
gathered and he wrote to Mill in July and August 1930 noting the success of the exhibition. 
Overall 6,500 visitors came to the exhibit, 3,500 to see the new edition of Ponting’s film of 
Scott’s Terra Nova expedition and some profit came from sales in the bookshop. He edited 
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the companion volume, the Polar Book and contributed to its content (Bernacchi, 1930b). It 
described the state of polar science of the time in each of the key disciplines and had 
contributions from well-known Antarctic scientists including Debenham, James Wordie 
(1882-1962), Mill, Simpson, Charles Wright (1887-1975) and Robert Rudmose-Brown 
(1879-1957). The profit from the book was £100 from the 3000 copies printed and the 
exhibition’s total profits were around £300 (Bernacchi, 1930a). Bernacchi’s reputation had 
been built upon his success as an Antarctic pioneer scientist and the successes of the 
Discovery expedition that provided professional credibility to his later enterprises. 
7.1.6 Critical reviews and public perceptions 
The scientific results of the Discovery expedition were first reported for public consumption 
during a lecture by Scott to the RGS. The elements of the speech were categorised as pack 
ice, icebergs, inland ice, glaciers, the Great Barrier and climate. Magnetic studies are not 
mentioned although they might have been found in the segment where “Captain Scott briefly 
referred to the results obtained by the expedition in some other departments” (National 
Antarctic Expedition, 1905). This lecture was reported in full in Geographical Journal, and is 
a report, rather than a review. Although the title implies the geographical results are the focus 
of the lecture there are some references to the scientific work. The first public 
acknowledgement of an error in the synchronous observations is found here, but the 
deficiencies in the magnetic force observations remained hidden. Scott stated the following: 
I am glad to have been informed that an unfortunate error with regard to the hours 
named for term day magnetic observations is not of such importance as was at first 
imagined, and, of course, the curves taken under normal conditions are of unimpaired 
value. It must be long before the full magnetic results are known, but Captain 
Chetwynd has already found that the observations for "variation" taken at sea and on 
sledge journeys work in remarkably well. 
(Scott, 1905a) 
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The Physical Observations volume was reviewed by an anonymous reviewer in the 
Times Literary Supplement under the heading of Antarctic Earthquakes. It considered the 
seismic studies to be unexpectedly valuable as some similarities between seismic shock 
waves and the transmission of telegraph signals might have led to new experiments on long 
distance communication technologies. The determination of the location of the magnetic pole 
was the only outcome of the magnetic surveys that attracted comment. The reviewer quotes 
Chree’s remarks in the report that the magnetic and meteorological observers “set out on this 
important expedition with little or no preliminary training” and that they accomplished their 
“difficult task with remarkable skill and patience” (Antarctic Earthquakes, 1908). This is 
directed at the efforts of Bernacchi who was the central figure in all of the disciplines 
reported in the Physical Observations except the tidal studies. The review winds up with a 
critical reference to Bernacchi’s late recruitment and the work of “those responsible for the 
expedition.”  The review does little to convey whether there is significance in any of the 
results, aside from the seismology, and gives a lacklustre view of the outcomes. Scott’s final 
word to Bernacchi on the matter was that “This wretched Times reviewer is really very 
troublesome” (Scott, 1908c). Chree wrote a robust rebuttal, also published in the Times 
Literary Supplement that accused the reviewer of unreasonably selecting and interpreting 
quotes in order to throw a bad light on the organisation of the expedition. Chree praised the 
training and experience of Armitage and described Bernacchi “as the most experienced 
physicist available” (Chree, 1908a). The reviewer also stated that the organisers made a 
mistake of having an overly ambitious program of physical observations by the inclusion of 
atmospheric electricity, auroras, pendulum observations, seismology, tidal observations and 
terrestrial magnetism. This would have provided ample work for “at least two highly trained 
physicists.”  
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Gregory reviewed the Physical Observations volume (Gregory, 1909b). His review 
was generally complimentary but wrote just one short paragraph on the magnetic results 
where he commented on the close agreement for the position of the magnetic pole between 
the separate methods of declination and inclination. A further review of the Physical 
Observations for the American Geographical Society’s journal was published as a companion 
to a review of the second volume of meteorology reports. It commented that the long time 
required for preparation and publication meant “important facts and conclusions have long 
since found their way to the scientific public.” It also described the work as “dry” and noted 
that the volume offers “little that is new” (Hobbs, 1915).  
Scott had railed against reviewers after the release of the first meteorology volume 
writing to Bernacchi after reading the comments:  
I have been looking again at Shaw’s remarks in the meteorological volume and my 
attention is called to a review in the Times [supplement] Aug 13th. It appears to me 
that Shaw has made a number of inaccurate & damaging statements and must be 
asked to explain them.  
(Scott, 1908b) 
Scott states the review asserts that he (Bernacchi) failed to do the work of the man he relieved 
(William Shackleton), but this is clearly a misunderstanding on behalf of Shaw, as neither 
Shackleton nor Bernacchi had any significant involvement with the meteorological program. 
Scott believed this was an unnecessary and uninformed slur on the work of the scientific 
staff. 
7.1.7 New knowledge and new directions of intellectual inquiry?	  
The Discovery magnetic science program was locked into a regime of data gathering and the 
roles of Armitage and Bernacchi were more akin to technicians than scientists. No significant 
theoretical breakthroughs regarding the phenomenon of terrestrial magnetism or its source 
resulted from the Discovery’s magnetic research and no theories were disproved. More 
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concise descriptions of diurnal, seasonal and secular change became possible and the 
Magnetic Observations report focuses on disturbances, or magnetic storms. An updated 
location for the region of the south magnetic pole was determined, but even this basic 
determination was of doubtful utility to later researchers in the field. The information allowed 
better estimation of the direction and speed of movement of the pole, determined to be 
trending towards the north-east since the prior estimate of Sabine from Ross’s expedition 
(Chetwynd, 1908, p. 157). This was later discredited by comments in the magnetic report 
from Mawson’s AAE stating the position was unreliable being based on observations taken 
on one side of the pole only (Webb, 1925, pp. 55-56). During his 1908-09 sledging journey to 
the magnetic pole during Shackleton’s Nimrod expedition Mawson carried a pre-publication 
copy of the Discovery magnetic report (Shackleton, 1932, p. 307) to assist his estimation of 
the position of the pole rather than as a basis for scientific inquiry. 
It was only through connections with the Arctic auroral work of Birkeland that any 
serious progress toward new directions in terrestrial magnetic theory, or the role of space 
weather progressed. Birkeland developed his theory about the channelling of charged 
particles ejected from the sun along geomagnetic field lines after work on his “Norwegian 
Aurora Polaris Expedition” of 1902-1903. He had previously conducted experiments to test 
his theories about the relationship between terrestrial magnetism and auroras by directing 
beams of cathode rays towards a magnetised terrella within a vacuum chamber (Jago, 2001, 
pp. 171-172). The science on the Discovery was characterised by data gathering only and 
experimental hypothesis testing of this sort was outside the realm of the magnetic program. 
Appendix B of the Magnetic Observations volume connects Birkeland’s researches to those 
of the Discovery in a manner that is acknowledged as superficial, as the volume was almost 
ready for publication when his results became publicly available. Birkeland’s report 
assembles data for magnetic disturbances between October 1902 and March 1903 and 
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consolidates contributions from twenty five observing stations, mostly from the northern 
hemisphere. Birkeland’s definitions of what constitutes a magnetically “normal” situation and 
what constitutes a “magnetic storm” vary from the standards for Kew and for the Discovery’s 
data, so direct comparison and inference is not possible, although the synchrony of periods of 
magnetic disturbance across the globe are confirmed (Royal Society, 1909, pp. 246-274).  
7.1.8 Research collections and new species 
Analysis of studies in the full range of science disciplines during the expedition is outside the 
scope of this thesis, but some brief notes are in order to inform judgements about overall 
scientific success. The series of six volumes of natural history (one geology and five zoology 
and botany) were published between 1907 and 1912 by the BMNH. Rosove’s bibliography 
details the separate sections of each and shows that numerous specialists analysed the 
collections and described the many new species (Rosove, 2001, pp. 345-347). Although the 
oceanographic work carried out was “limited” and the marine collections mostly represent the 
shallow waters of McMurdo Sound, the collections include “a fair share of species new to 
science” and are still considered to be of great significance and value for reference and 
research (Rainbow, 2005). A number of Type specimens (the actual examples used to 
describe the physical characteristics of new species) are preserved in the collection.  
Gregory wrote two extended reviews of the scientific reports from the four 
expeditions to the Antarctic between 1901 and 1904. No new species of birds or seals were 
captured on the expedition according to his reviews, contrary to early reports of a new species 
of bird from South Trinidad Island, but the first known emperor penguin colony was detected 
at Cape Crozier in October 1902. For the general readership, the most easily engaged sections 
of the scientific reports are those written by Wilson on the seal and penguin biology. In the 
same volume, the museum zoologist William Pycraft (1868-1942) debunked Wilson’s ideas 
regarding the status of the emperor as the most primitive form of penguin, and possibly of all 
  
284 
birds. He argued: “the old view that the feathers of the penguins are allied to the scales of 
snakes and thus indicate the primitive nature of the penguin, is without foundation” (Gregory, 
1908). This means that the winter journey by Wilson, Cherry-Garrard and Henry “Birdie” 
Bowers (1883-1912) to Cape Crozier to collect emperor penguin eggs in mid-winter of 1911 
during Scott’s Terra Nova expedition was probably an ill-informed folly, bent on progressing 
scientific research in a direction that Pycraft argued was a dead end.    
Four new species of fish were collected, and five of the other six collected had 
previously been collected by the Southern Cross expedition. Numerous new species of 
invertebrates were collected including thirty molluscs, ten nudibrachs, eighteen amphipods, 
seven ostracods, two cirripedes, three new genera of Pycnogonida (as well as confirmation of 
the existence of a ten legged sea spider), eleven hydroids and eight sponges. Botany was less 
prolific with two new mosses being collected at Granite Harbour and some marine algae. All 
the specialist scientific staff noted “the smallness of the collections” and, in his introduction, 
Hodgson noted the limited opportunities for collection except at Winter Quarters. Gregory’s 
review of the second tranche of reports was published just over a year later expanding the 
tally of new species for the Discovery. Amongst the insects, one new species of Collembola 
(springtail) is added as well as one additional mollusc. Nine previously unknown copepods 
were found and one new starfish, two species of sea-anemone and twenty new sponges 
falling into six new genera (Gregory, 1909a). The same review covers the outcomes of the 
meteorology and physical sciences. The total scientific output of the British, Scottish, 
German and Swedish expeditions that took part in the 1901-04 campaign in the Antarctic 
formed “a library of about thirty volumes” of which the Discovery contributed nine plus a 
separate album of photos and sketches (Gregory, 1908). 
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7.1.9 Detection of natural resources 
No valuable new resources of significance were discovered. Ferrar discovered a thin seam of 
coal containing distinct leaf inpressions that indicated a previously temperate climate (Royds, 
2001, p. 308). As the Antarctic continent is mostly covered by ice and snow it is less than 
ideal as a potential site for mining mineral resources. The potential value of the southern 
ocean fisheries did not figure in any of the reports or narratives of the expedition. Although 
seals were abundant they were not found in the dense populations found on sub-Antarctic 
Islands, most of which had been culled to the brink of extinction by orchestrated campaigns 
such as those operated on Macquarie Island by Joseph Hatch of Invercargill (1837-1928).  
In spite of Armitage’s letter to Keltie stressing the potential commercial value of the 
findings of the magnetic research, nothing of consequence for mariners came out of the 
expedition’s findings (Armitage, 1901b). The economic value of pure scientific research is 
almost impossible to quantify so, although the winter station and sledge journey magnetic 
observations continued laying foundations towards terrestrial magnetic theory, they were of 
no economic value.    
7.1.10 Successful collaborations? 
The issue of synchronous term day and term hour observations is highly confused. There are 
two matters of concern. Firstly, the arrangements for synchronous observations were not 
carried out successfully. Secondly, the planned sharing of data never resulted in a pooled data 
set or analysis of a truly global regime of observations.  
The agreement between the organising committees of Drygalski’s Gauss, Markham’s 
Discovery and numerous land based magnetic observatories was for set periods of 
synchronous magnetic observing over a twenty-four hour period, on the first and fifteenth of 
each month of 1902. In addition there were “term hours” during which manual observations 
were to be made every twenty seconds and those observers with drum recording 
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magnetometers were to run them at the (sensitive) high speed for the hour. The agreed term 
hour commenced an hour later each subsequent term day. In this way any magnetic 
disturbances could be detected and their synchronicity or lag across the globe could be 
detected, and high resolution observations would eventually have been made during each of 
the twenty-four hours of the daily cycle. 
Correspondence between the British and German committees and schedules of 
operations are in the RGS archive but as a number of them are undated and it is not always 
clear who the authors are, the situation will probably remain unclear. The correspondence 
during the preparation period specified the arrangements as early as November 1899. The 
minutes of the German “Sub-Committee of the Scientific Council for Meteorology and 
Terrestrial Magnetism” (translated by Mill) contain details of proposed arrangements for the 
benefit of the “Committee of the British Antarctic Expedition.” They state that term hours 
should commence at: “12 noon (Greenwich) on 1st March 1902”  (Sub-Committee of the 
[German] Scientific Council for Meteorology and Terrestrial Magnetism, 1899). Scott 
responded later to German proposals: “the program forwarded by you is accepted in its 
entirety for adoption by the British Expedition” (Scott, 1901a).  
The undated (English) document entitled Programme of Scheme of International 
Observations of Terrestrial Magnetism during the period of Antarctic research. 1902-1903 
follows in this sequence of documents in the archive. It specifies all matters in relation to the 
observations with calculation methods and instrumental requirements. It contains a schedule 
for term day and term hour observations in an identical layout as published in the Antarctic 
Manual, but it varies from the German scheme. The first term day is listed as 1 February 
1902 and observations are set to commence at midnight (British National Antarctic 
Expedition, n.d.b). Then follow appendices to that program, including a sample observing 
form that commences at noon GMT (British National Antarctic Expedition, n.d.c). 
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Bidlingmaier on Gauss was working to the timetable that commenced according to the 
German proposal:  
March 1st had been designated by agreements as an International Magnetic Day. 
Hourly readings were to be taken over 24 hours, and for one hour, which on this 
occasion ran from noon to 1.00 p.m. GMT, they were to be taken every 20 seconds.  
(Drygalski, 1989, p. 144). 
The Discovery’s Magnetic Observations report is at odds with these details: 
The term days all started at Greenwich midnight. On the first of the regular term days, 
February 1, 1902, the term hour was 0-1 a.m., G.M.T. On the second term day, 
February 15th, 1902, it was 1-2 a.m., G.M.T., and so on, advancing an hour each time 
for the 24 term days, up to and including January 15, 1903. 
(Royal Society, 1909, p, 146). 
The Antarctic Manual, from which Bernacchi worked, gives yet another version. Starting at 1 
February, the first term hour was to commence at midday GMT and run until 1 p.m. GMT. It 
also suggested, unrealistically given the ship’s exploration schedule that instruments should 
be in place for testing on 1 January from 10 a.m. then 15 January from 11 a.m. The error is 
partially acknowledged in the Magnetic Observations volume where Chree says: 
…a mistake had somehow crept into the Antarctic ‘Manual’ which made each term 
hour 12 hours later than it should actually have been, and the observer, Mr Bernacchi-
in the absence of any information to the contrary-naturally supposed the ‘Manual’ to 
be correct. 
(Royal Society, 1909, p. 201). 
It appears that even this acknowledgement of the error contains further errors. Assuming 
Bernacchi was making his term hour observations according to the manual, he would have 
commenced at noon GMT, correctly, and in accord with Bidlingmaier, but he would have 
assumed that the first term hour would have started in 1 February, so his 1 March term hour 
was actually shifted out of synchrony with all other observing posts by only two hours, not 
twelve as reported by Chree. The comment that “The extended scheme proved impracticable 
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in the Antarctic” is an understatement (Royal Society, 1909, p. 201). There is almost no 
consistency across the British documents containing schedules of observations. In the 
magnetic report for the Terra Nova expedition Chree referred to collaborative results from 
the Discovery expedition as a “fiasco” (Chree, 1921, p. 158). In addition to the failure of 
synchronised observations it was a period of nominal space weather activity, a solar 
minimum, so magnetic disturbances were weak and few.  
It is possible that the best results for the cooperative scheme might have been gained 
from the Discovery, as it was the furthest south and closest to the magnetic pole. If Bernacchi 
had been recruited in a timely manner he most likely would have been more familiar with the 
protocols and it’s unlikely that he would have been deceived by the incorrect Antarctic 
Manual schedule, his only source of information on this matter in the Antarctic. Also, if there 
had been consistent scientific leadership from early in the preparations, Bernacchi’s mentor 
would have been alert to this error.  
The outcomes are as confused as the arrangements for data gathering. The magnetic 
science reports of both the Gauss and Discovery failed to include results from each other in 
spite of the intentions to do so during planning. The German authorities suggested that the 
magnetic curves should all be “copied on squared paper and published in this form, so that 
anyone could read off the absolute value answering to any specified instant in time” (Royal 
Society, 1909, p. 202). However, Chree decided it would be better use of the publication 
opportunity to provide the tables of the fast run observations from Christchurch instead, as 
Farr and Skey had taken fast run observations over the full twenty-four hours of the term 
days, not just the specified term hours (Royal Society, 1909, p. 202). This is the only 
reference to results from Gauss and there is no explanation as to why the Discovery reports 
completely omit results from the German expedition. 
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Drygalski’s choice not to include Discovery data was a conscious decision after he 
read the Magnetic Observations volume, published prior to the Gauss results. The German 
report explains the rationale for the omission. Chree sensed some of the McMurdo results 
were unreliable and suspected instrumental error as the cause, describing some results for rate 
of change of declination as “barely credible” (Royal Society, 1909, p. 81). Drygalski decided 
to test for instrumental errors in the German data by comparison of Bidlingmaier's Gauss ice 
station values against their Kerguelen base station observations. He found that they were in 
accord and could be considered reliable. The correlation coefficient between the monthly 
average of H (horizontal magnetic intensity, or force) at the Kerguelen station and the 
Gauss station reached the high value of + 0.0954 (compared to an assumed error only 0.020), 
a “brilliant” example of the accuracy of the measurement at both stations under these difficult 
circumstances. Drygalksi therefore agreed with Chree’s analysis that the Discovery data was 
unreliable and rejected it (Drygalski, 1925, pp. 400-401). 
In contrast, there was a successful collaboration in data sharing for the meteorological 
publications of the Gauss expedition. The following nations took part in the meteorological 
cooperation: Chile, Argentina, Capeland (South Africa), Australia and New Zealand. 
Secondly, German, British, Dutch and American ships handed in data. Thirdly, the 
publications drew on the material of the German, British, Swedish, Scottish and French 
Antarctic expeditions. Lastly, the material from the observatories on Kerguelen Island, 
Laurie-Island and Staten Island is included (Pascal Schillings, Personal Communication, 22 
December 2012). 
7.1.11 Natural phenomena, species and landmarks named for scientists 
Scott quickly worked over the charts with Wilson, Mulock and Markham prior to meeting 
King Edward at Balmoral to ensure that features were named for sponsors and key members 
of the organising committees (Yelverton, 2000, p. 328). These were not in recognition of 
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scientific achievements however. No new natural phenomena were discovered, although, by 
discovering that McMurdo Strait was not a bay, the question of currents taxed the minds of 
Hodgson and Barne who observed changes in the flow rate and direction of the water beneath 
the ice off Hut Point (Scott, 1903). 
Various topographic features are named for Bernacchi, including Bernacchi Head on 
Franklin Island (76° 08' S, 168° 20' E) and Cape Bernacchi (77° 29' S, 163° 51' E) on the 
coast of Victoria Land (Australian Antarctic Data Centre, 2012) but these were named during 
the Southern Cross expedition and no new features were named during, or after the Discovery 
expedition to mark his contribution. Cape Armitage at Winter Quarters on Ross Island (77° 
51' S, 166° 40' E) (Australian Antarctic Data Centre, 2012) was named for Armitage, 
probably in recognition of his overall contribution, not just his scientific work. In the zoology 
and botanical collections there are numerous genera and specific epithets carrying the names 
of Hodgson, Wilson and Discovery (Rainbow, 2005). On a clear day Mount Discovery 
dominates the skyline across the sea ice from New Zealand’s Scott Base, on Ross Island, a 
visible reminder of the exploration and scientific heritage of the locality for modern 
scientists. 
7.1.12 Technologies, equipment or procedures retained 
There are some items of equipment that are familiar and iconic symbols of Antarctic 
exploration that have remained almost unchanged since 1904. These include marker flags on 
bamboo poles, pyramidal polar tents and timber sledges. These items of kit are basic to 
outdoor work and survival, and are ancillary to science. In the scientific arena, weather 
balloons and Stevenson screens (for protection of the meteorological instruments) are still in 
common use in polar and global meteorology. The magnetic instruments used on the 
Discovery and Gauss, or derivatives of them, continued in use for most of the expeditions of 
the era and beyond. Eschenhagen magnetometers, Kew pattern unifilar magnetometers, 
  
291 
Barrow dips and Lloyd-Creak dip circles were used on Scott’s Terra Nova (Chree, 1921, pp. 
1-7, 410-430) and on Mawson’s Aurora expeditions (Webb, 1925, pp. 18-24; Riffenburgh, 
2011, p. 150). The Terra Nova used exactly the same Eschenhagen magnetometer as the 
Discovery (Chree, 1921, p. 18) and likewise with the Lloyd-Creak dip circles (Dover No. 143 
and No. 149), and again the results for magnetic force went unpublished, although there is a 
more thorough treatment of declination and dip at sea in the report of this second expedition 
(Chetwynd, 1908, p. 133; Chree, 1921, pp. 429-449).  
Mawson’s Aurora expedition had “One Lloyd-Creak dip-circle, sea pattern, as 
modified by Dept. Ter. Magnetism, Carnegie Institution” (Webb, 1925, p. 18). One legacy 
provided by the Discovery’s science and that of the Gauss was to guide the remanufacture of 
the Lloyd-Creak by the Carnegie Institution to improve its performance at sea and in icy 
conditions. Another legacy was the proof of the reliability and utility of Professor 
Eschenhagen’s clockwork magnetograph mechanism. A mechanism similar to that was 
established at New Zealand’s Scott Base magnetic observatory on Ross Island (77° 51’ S, 
166° 46’ E), within a few kilometres of Hut Point (Australian Antarctic Data Centre, 2012), 
in 1957 during the International Geophysical Year (IGY). It was still in use as late as 1983 
(Roper, 1983) and is shown at Image 11. The magnetometer shown above at Image 6 (p. 198) 
was in use at Watheroo in Western Australia for forty years between 1919 and 1959 and a 
similar magnetometer remained in use at Australia’s “Mawson” Antarctic base at least until 
1960 (Syd Kirkby, personal communication, 10 May 2012). Although auto-recording, 
networked apparatus is now in use at the Scott Base magnetic observatory, the constant 
recording apparatus must still be calibrated against manual absolute measurements.   
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Image 11: Drum magnetograph in the Antarctica New Zealand, Scott Base magnetic variation house (author’s 
photo).   
 
Discovery had been a proving ground for a range of technologies and techniques. 
Scott’s Terra Nova, using similar, and in some cases the exact same magnetic instruments, 
set out to reproduce the observing regimes of the Discovery at their new winter base, Cape 
Evans, just a short distance north of the old Winter Querters base. This may have been as a 
means of reference or it may have been to cover the numerous deficiencies in the results 
obtained from the Discovery. The doubtful nature of these was characterised by Chetwynd’s 
need to discard many absolute observations as unreliable (Chetwynd, 1908, p. 139) and 
Chree’s decision to unconventionally adjust the base line readings for the absolute 
observations (Royal Society, 1909, p. 81). 
7.2 The drivers of scientific success and Discovery’s outcomes 
The factors identified by the author during the initial stages of this research as prime drivers 
of scientific success on polar expeditions around the Edwardian era are reviewed in this 
section. Each driving factor is analysed here in consideration of the scientific success 
indicators discussed above for the scientific outputs and outcomes of the Discovery, with a 
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special emphasis on the work of Bernacchi and the broader magnetic science program. This 
section draws together conclusions on the relative importance of the contribution of each 
driver to the expedition’s outcomes.  
7.2.1 Historic and cultural context 
The Discovery expedition operated during a period of shifting intellectual tradition. Three 
key elements of the performance of science on nineteenth century navy expeditions were 
changing. Firstly, there was a shift away from the standard of officers as scientists and a trend 
towards appointment of paid civilian scientists. Secondly, the paradigm of scientific work in 
the field being carried out by observers or collectors who then repatriated their data and 
collections for analysis and publication by specialists in museums and universities was 
shifting. The Humboldtian process of empirical collecting was starting to be replaced by 
inquisitive, hypothesis-driven science and a new breed of experimenters and designers of 
research programs began replacing collectors (Bernard Stonehouse, personal communication, 
19 August 2011). The third shift is the changing priority of exploration over science. The 
later Nimrod, Terra Nova and Aurora expeditions engaged more, better-qualified scientists 
than the Discovery and the intellectual atmosphere in the wardroom of these expeditions was 
most likely very different. Note also there were almost no glacial studies on the Discovery but 
on the Terra Nova, just seven years later, Wright, Priestley and Griffith Taylor had a robust 
program of studies in the discipline. 
The Discovery represented a transition stage of the shift with a mix of officers and 
civilians practicing science. Royds, Armitage, Shackleton and Barne all assisted with some 
form of scientific observing or collecting, and there was almost an even balance between 
numbers of civilian scientific staff and officers engaged in scientific work. Discovery’s 
research was carried out by scientists who were not yet eminent in their disciplines, rather 
than by the experienced, high calibre career scientists found on the expeditions whose leaders 
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were scientists. The Challenger represented the commencement of the shift. It was a naval 
vessel but was notable for its appointment of a professor as scientific leader and the selection 
by the RS of a strong team of six civilian scientists (Jones & Jones, 1992, p. 216). 
Civilian scientists staffed the most scientifically successful Antarctic expeditions prior 
to the Great War, and Hayes’ review of scientific outcomes of British expeditions of the era 
concludes: “The scientific results of these expeditions have been proportionate to the number 
and ability of the scientists taken out” (Hayes, 1928, p. 259). Mawson’s Aurora and Bruce’s 
Scotia expeditions had almost exclusively civilian staff, although having no naval 
connections they were not tied to any intellectual tradition. Scott’s Terra Nova did retain 
some naval connections, but the scientific crew were carefully selected civilians with 
experience and qualifications superior to those on Discovery. There are exceptions to the 
trend of diminishing involvement by officers in scientific roles in the RN. For example, 
Commander George Tabeart, RN, recently of the polar survey vessels HMS Endurance and 
HMS Scott, was called upon to make shore landings for the purpose of magnetic survey from 
time to time in the Arctic, so the tradition of officers as scientists is not completely dead 
(personal communication, 3 October 2011).  
 Discovery science was still modelled on the paradigm of gathering data and 
collections in the field then passing that material over to institutionalised specialists. 
Markham made arrangements for disposal of materials to the appropriate specialists as an 
afterthought. The civilian scientists on Discovery expressed their interest in remaining 
involved in the analysis and publication of their collections, and in the case of Bernacchi, 
Ferrar, Hodgson and Wilson they succeeded to varying extents.  
 Prior to the Challenger, the primary purpose of expeditions was geographical 
exploration. Science was incidental except in a handful of cases. The Challenger was purely a 
scientific enterprise that represents a turning point in focus. Most of the Antarctic expeditions 
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between 1897 and 1914 had dual agendas of exploration and science, but of those, Scotia, 
Gauss, Française, Pourquoi-pas?, Antarctic and Aurora had stronger science than 
exploration programs. Markham’s influence ensured Discovery was stronger in the 
exploration agenda. 
In the magnetic science the collaborating observatories whose data was finally used in 
the scientific reports were mostly vestiges of the old Imperial network, and almost 
exclusively from the northern hemisphere, so the collaborations did not provide the sought-
after global coverage. It remains unclear how the Pola observatory in Austria came to be 
involved, but aside from it, the observatories were remnants from the British Empire.   
The full cycle of scientific method from theory, preparation, experimental design, 
gathering, analysis, review of the theory, and finally publication, is not evident in the 
program of Discovery but it was not completely out of step with other Antarctic expeditions 
of the era. The stand out scientific expeditions of Drygalski, Mawson, and Bruce followed a 
similar paradigm of collecting although their programs were organised in a more strategic 
manner and performed by more scholarly and experienced scientific staff, and under 
scientific leaders that were experienced in field research in extreme conditions.  
Mawson broke the metropolitan/colonial nexus with his expedition that, although 
partly reliant on institutional support from Britain, was essentially staffed by Australians and 
New Zealanders, and operated as an independent expedition. The data reduction and the 
majority of the published material was prepared by the chief magnetician to the expedition, 
Webb (1925, pp. 1-200) while Chree provided the expert commentary on the results (1925, 
pp. 201-285) as he did to numerous other expeditions of the era including Discovery, Scotia 
and Terra Nova.   
The historic context provided models around which Markham developed the 
Discovery expedition. His motivation was to re-establish British pre-eminence as a nation of 
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explorers, a nation that could still expand its empire and a nation whose Navy was supreme. 
These ambitions were partially achieved, but it took Admiral Fisher’s reforms and the 
introduction of dreadnoughts to re-assert the position of the RN in the global context. 
Exploration on the expedition was successful with the new furthest south record of 82° 16’ S 
(Scott, 1905b, Volume 2, p. 79) and numerous other sledge journeys that penetrated the 
interior as none had done before. The Ross Sea quadrant became a territorial claim that 
eventually passed on to New Zealand. The Discovery, in spite of its shortcomings as a 
scientific research vessel on this voyage remains an iconic representation of British maritime 
power in spite of its private, rather than naval registration. 
The paradigm of data collection remained dominant throughout the operations of the 
Discovery’s scientific program, and dominated expedition science for at least fifty years, until 
the IGY. Pressing ship’s officers into service for scientific observing was an element of the 
tradition that did not serve Discovery well. Armitage was a competent observer but not a 
trained physicist, so one can speculate how different the outcomes of observations at sea 
might have been if Bernacchi had embarked with the Discovery at the outset of the 
expedition? Bidlingmaier, with the advantage of sea time on the Gauss, was able to develop 
observing protocols for the Lloyd-Creak dip circle that provided useful data, and it’s 
reasonable to speculate that Bernacchi could have done similar work. The working conditions 
were comparable as the Gauss also rolled a great deal and the instruments were identical. 
Most of Armitage’s magnetic work at sea was dismissed as worthless, and some of the 
observations made at the rifle range observatory on Red Hill behind Simon’s Town were also 
rejected (Creak, 1901c). These facts do not support Markham’s belief that officers could turn 
their hand to anything, as long as the fact that Armitage was from the merchant service, not 
the RN, is disregarded. 
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The tradition of dispersing collections and data collected in the field (the periphery) to 
specialists in museums, universities and military institutions (the metropolis) was shifting 
around the time of the 1901-04 campaign. There was some involvement by the civilian 
scientists in data reduction, analysis and preparation for publication of the material from the 
Discovery. Bernacchi, Hodgson and Ferrar all contributed to the reports in their own 
disciplines. Meteorology was completely taken out of the hands of Royds and other 
observers.  
7.2.2 Patronage, funding and institutional support 
The Discovery was a well-funded enterprise and Markham’s need to source additional 
funding for relief expeditions is a reflection on the distribution of funds, rather than 
inadequacy of the total. No contingency was set aside for the relief expedition that Markham 
knew was necessary, even before departure of the Discovery. Although the scientist’s wages 
were paid out of general funds, there were few other expenses directly related to the research. 
Construction of the ship’s magnetic laboratory, the dredging and sounding apparatus and 
associated deckhouse laboratories were costs absorbed into the ship construction bill. 
Instruments and equipment were on loan from the Admiralty, the RGS and the National 
Physical Laboratory. Costs related to shipping and certification of instruments were nominal 
in the scheme of things. There was no financial allowance for the post-expedition work of 
reducing and analysing data and collections or publication of the scientific reports. Most of 
this work was achieved through the goodwill of the Admiralty, the National Physical 
Laboratory, the RS, the BMNH and especially individual efforts by its staff in their own time 
(Lankester, 1905). In hindsight, the expense of construction of a new expedition ship could 
have been avoided. The vessel’s capability as a floating magnetic laboratory was under 
utilised and the same was true for the sounding, dredging and trawling capability of the ship. 
  
298 
Was the funding sufficient to achieve the best scientific outcomes? Yes, initially, but 
funds that should have gone to post-expedition analysis and publication were not quarantined. 
Did the sponsors get (scientific) value for money for their investment in the expedition? The 
answer here is no, as the predicted commercial benefits went unrealised. The body of data on 
terrestrial magnetism was expanded but the impossibility of placing a monetary value on 
research programs that add to the body of knowledge without generating measureable 
commercial outcomes is self-evident.    
The paradigm of abundant public funding for explorations shifted after the Discovery 
expedition. The notable expeditions that followed relied most heavily on philanthropy and 
public subscription for finance. British governments, the RGS and the RS were more reserved 
in their support of expeditions like Shackleton’s Nimrod and Endurance, Scott’s Terra Nova 
and Mawson’s Aurora. Markham’s failure to bring the expedition home within budget and 
mishandling of the two relief expeditions were a disservice to all expedition promoters that 
followed.     
Patronage and funding went hand in hand, as funding was rarely forthcoming if there 
was no support or patronage by key institutions or senior figures. Both are highly important, 
but for funding there is a minimum threshold that must be exceeded to allow an expedition to 
proceed. In the case of the Discovery the funding and patronage was a feedback system. The 
first funding boost from Longstaff assured the prospects of the expedition prompting further 
donations. Sponsorship by the RS and a certain amount of momentum in fundraising made 
royal patronage possible, which in turn promoted further funding and agreement of the RN to 
become involved. Intellectual patronage of the expedition by the RS failed to reach potential. 
After the two societies fell out there was no effective direction to the magnetic program from 
the RS, in spite of the abundance of physicists amongst its fellows. 
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There was no direct relationship between levels of funding and scientific outcomes of 
expeditions of the Edwardian era. Borchgrevink’s Southern Cross was well funded for a 
single ship expedition with a very small crew, but the scientific outputs were modest. Bruce’s 
Scotia and Drygalski’s Gauss were modestly funded (see Table 2, page 121) but the scientific 
outputs were exceptional. Abundant funding is not a critical driver of success although for 
each expedition there is a threshold value that must be reached for the operation to proceed. 
Funding is one of the “make or break” factors.  
7.2.3 Leadership and governance 
The successful model of modern scientific research involves senior practitioners designing 
the research regime, procuring funding, designing the experiments or observations, then 
recruiting and directing the activities of technicians that operationalise the plan. Care to foster 
data management and analysis leading to publication is a characteristic of modern science 
and the model was also appropriate in 1901.   
There was no effective governance structure overseeing the Discovery expedition 
preparations and, once at sea, control on board was maintained by the fiction of the RN 
hierarchy. In spite of a Joint Committee comprised of thirty-two eminent representatives of 
the RS and RGS it was Markham who, for better or worse, maintained ultimate control of 
expedition preparations. His efforts to get the expedition up are praiseworthy and there was 
no other motivator with the tenacity to have made it become a reality but the evidence shows 
that Markham may not have been as familiar with the science as might be expected of a 
person with almost absolute control of the expedition preparations. Few people dared 
challenge Markham on any matter and George Murray described his manner in meetings 
thus: “Upon my word Markham is a man. Foster and the others were mere invertebrates” 
(Murray, 1901d). 
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Scientific sub-committees were generally ineffective. The minute book shows that the 
magnetic sub-committee met only twice. The first meeting in mid 1899 provided general 
guidance about which magnetic research could and should be undertaken, what instruments 
might be suitable and special considerations for the magnetic observatory during construction 
of the ship. The second meeting in February 1900 resolved that there should be a civilian 
trained observer, but no names were put forward and ultimately there was no evidence of 
committee involvement in the recruitment of the physicist (British National Antarctic 
Expedition, 1899).   
A question often posed about the expedition is to what extent would scientific 
outcomes have been different if Gregory had joined as scientific director? Specifically, would 
he have been able to effectively lead the scientific work of the officers as well as the 
civilians, or would Scott’s direct and absolute command have trumped him? Day-to-day 
logistical decisions at sea and on the ice, balancing the tension between exploration and 
science, would have required delicate negotiation between Scott and Gregory, and Scott’s 
absolute control would have favoured Markham’s preference for exploration. The scientific 
outcomes would have been superior under Gregory due to better planning and organisation at 
the outset, better recruitment, better comprehension of the scientific and logistic requirements 
then better coordination of analysis and publication. On the Discovery Scott proved to be 
sympathetic to the scientific operations, but only when they did not clash with the needs of 
exploration. After publication of the first meteorology report, Field criticised Scott’s 
scientific acumen:  
Captain Scott is evidently unable to realise the standard of the work which was 
expected of his staff and has no right to complain when its shortcomings are pointed 
out. To pass them over in silence might lead to their repetition in future expeditions. 
(Field, 1908) 
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Evidence shows that the expeditions of the era with scientists as leaders were more 
productive scientifically (Rosove, 2001. pp. 49-54, 59-72, 104-123 & 253-260). One 
exception was the Terra Nova, but the abundance of scientific output was boosted by the 
availability of abundant funding from the public subscription for Scott’s family after his 
death. Drygalski’s believed in the same model of leadership as Gregory, that the leader 
should have ultimate authority in all arrangements and decisions, and that the commander 
should be responsible for the operation of the ship only (Drygalski, 1989, p. 11). A 
developing trend toward scientists as leaders is confirmed by the example of ANARE 
expeditions of 1947-48 to Heard and Macquarie Islands: “The leader on each island was a 
scientist in the tradition of scientific leadership established by Sir Douglas Mawson” 
(Fanning 1981, p. 36). 
In Discovery’s case the scientific outcomes were affected significantly by leadership 
and governance decisions, especially at the preparation stage of the expedition. Ineffective 
governance translated directly to ineffective preparations and although good governance can’t 
guarantee success, poor governance most likely leads to failure. Decisions about the 
objectives, the logistics and the balance of control between the (mostly non-existent) 
scientific director and the commander changed the course of the work of the expedition from 
the outset. In spite of Scott’s benevolent approach to the scientific programs, there was a 
notable scientific leadership vacuum after Mill left the ship at Madeira. The work program of 
the physicist at the ice station was ambitious and the magnetic reports contain many instances 
where, either observer errors or instrumental errors caused data to be considered unreliable 
and was excluded from results. Leadership and governance is the single most significant 
driver of scientific success. It influences most of the other drivers. Poor leadership and 
organisation can be fatal to an expedition, as was the case in Borchgrevink’s Southern Cross 
and Filchner’s Deutschland.  
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7.2.4 Preparations 
The haphazard nature of the expedition preparations has been described in section 5.1. The 
Discovery’s governing committees were either dysfunctional or ineffective, or both, and the 
conflict within the Joint Committee prevented effective operation. Markham’s influence 
prevailed in almost every instance and the ongoing disputes over the objectives and 
expectations, scientific leadership and logistics left the scientific program subservient to 
exploration. The magnetic sub-committee was benign, providing no useful contribution to 
planning or preparation. After Scott’s trip to the continent to meet Nansen and Drygalski in 
October 1900 he knew that, in spite of the long gestation of the expedition, the Discovery 
preparations were running critically behind. The knock-on effects were late recruitments, late 
arrival of instruments and equipment, inadequate training and a diminished opportunity for 
sea trials with the scientific apparatus.   
Once established at the winter station there were preparations for Antarctic fieldwork that 
could have been made, but were neglected. Practice at erecting tents, using the cookers, 
skiing, dog and man-hauling sledges could have been acquitted during the winter months 
when there was less opportunity for active field work and outdoor science. There was an 
abundance of idle time for the lower deck and failure to prepare well for travel away from 
base and outdoor survival showed naïve optimism. Skelton wrote to Scott in 1912 about ski 
training after a trip to Switzerland: “It is such a pity we had no one on the Discovery to teach 
us properly, because everything depends on the first lessons” (Skelton, 1912). 
Diligent preparations are not a guarantee of success but poor preparations can directly 
diminish scientific outputs. On Discovery the diligence of individuals compensated for 
haphazard and late running preparations. Poor preparation had a significant affect on the final 
outcomes.  
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7.2.5 Instructions 
The instructions to the commander were explicit regarding the sector of Antarctica to be 
explored and the timing of, at least, the initial ship movements. Scott, as commander was 
locked into the program dictated by these instructions. The instructions to the scientific 
director were much less explicit and failed to give direction regarding expected outcomes and 
the means by which they might be achieved. The responsibilities of the position were never 
stated. If it was a case of giving an open hand to follow lines of inquiry according to 
emerging information, then only a scientific practitioner such as Gregory, Bruce or Mawson 
would have had the intellectual agility to take proper advantage of opportunities. These are 
moot points in the circumstance where Scott took on both roles. The Antarctic Manual was 
an additional source of instruction to the scientific work of the expedition, especially in 
relation to seawater analysis and meteorology but the terrestrial magnetism instructions were 
brief and, as shown above, were faulty in a way that caused incorrect data collection.  
In most circumstances correct, explicit and well-informed instructions are essential to 
the work of a scientific research program, especially where the practitioners do not have a 
strong ownership of the work or the outcomes and synchronised observing is planned. The 
exceptions are where scientists are highly motivated and have the agility to take advantage of 
opportunities presented to them, such as Murray Levick’s (1876-1956) adelie penguin life 
history and behaviour studies performed at Cape Adare during the Terra Nova expedition 
(Hooper, 2010, pp 151-152). The officer in charge of the meteorological observations, Royds, 
was diligent but disengaged from the work, becoming bored and frustrated by the routine, 
especially in winter (Royds, 2001, p. 151). He had some training but on the expedition’s 
return he had no involvement with the outcomes. Fortunately there were lengthy detailed 
instructions for meteorology observing in the Antarctic Manual. The magnetic observer 
Bernacchi was also somewhat disengaged, but not through a lack of interest or as a result of 
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conflicting priorities related to management of the ship. He was appointed late, so took no 
part in the first six months of the magnetic work at sea. Instructions were critical to his 
successful performance of the work in Antarctica as he had little opportunity to become 
familiar with the expectations and procedures required by those that set the magnetic science 
agenda. He had no part in the development of the scientific program and acted as an observer 
only until he commenced to make some post-expedition contribution to the results analysis. 
The importance of scientific instructions ranks highly amongst the drivers of scientific 
success in late Victorian expeditions, especially within a leadership vacuum. 
7.2.6 Collaborative relationships 
Collaborative scientific relationships can be effective strategies to enhance the eventual value 
of individual efforts. In scientific programs they fall into two categories: firstly program 
development and coordinated observations and secondly, joint data pooling and publication. 
Global phenomena such as terrestrial magnetism, meteorology, tides, gravity and seismology 
are candidates for networked observations. The same is true for extra-terrestrial phenomena 
like auroras and space weather, although these areas of study were in their infancy in 1901.  
In the case of the Discovery the prospects for collaboration were exceedingly good as 
there was agreement at the outset of synchronous magnetic observing between the Gauss, the 
Discovery and numerous land stations. These were listed by Markham as Kew, Falmouth, 
Bombay, Mauritius, Melbourne, Christchurch, Staten Island, Kerguelen, English Expedition, 
German Expedition, Potsdam and Swedish Expedition (Markham, n.d.g., p. 90). Many 
elements were common to the German and British expeditions: new ships constructed as 
magnetic observatories, instruments, observing protocols and employment of trained civilian 
scientists to perform the work. The locations of the two vessels were planned to be 
complementary during the observing period and the regime was established to ensure global 
synchronous observations across the world.  
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In spite of these arrangements the collaborative relationship regarding magnetic 
science between the expeditions broke down in the synchronous observation strategy and 
post-expedition data sharing. The same was not true for the meteorology where the data was 
shared effectively. Although collaborations are not vital for scientific success of an 
expedition, the potential value of such an arrangement is significant.   
7.2.7 Recruitment, training and development of skill and knowledge 
The recruitment of experienced, well-qualified staff and arrangements for their training and 
pre-expedition preparation are success drivers of prime importance to outcomes. Bernacchi 
was recruited at the last minute, allowing little time for training and familiarisation with the 
instruments and protocols. The error in his timing of the synchronous term hour observations 
can be attributed to the late recruitments as much as, in different circumstances he would 
surely have become familiar with the correct protocols and detected the error published in the 
Antarctic Manual. In his narrative Scott praised the work of the officers in a general 
statement: “It has been recognised that each officer in his department has added something to 
the advancement of scientific knowledge” (Scott, 1905b, p. 76) but this was written well 
before any data or collections had been analysed. Training of the ship’s officers at Kew 
should have provided Bernacchi with understudies for the Antarctic observations, but they 
were under-prepared.  
Bernacchi was a good choice as physicist, but some of the physical science outcomes 
could have been superior if (William) Shackleton had remained. This was about logistics, not 
skill of the observer, except in the case of Shackleton’s forte, spectroscopic photography. 
Bernacchi would have been available on board to manage the Lloyd-Creak instrument that 
caused Armitage great trouble. Shackleton had visited Potsdam for training and would have 
been in contact with Bidlingmaier and would have known that the start date for the 
synchronised term hour observations was 1 March 1902, not 1 February (Longhurst, 1901a). 
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The most reliable magnetic data from the expedition was procured by Bernacchi at the ice 
station and, although not perfect for instrumental reasons, that data underpins the bulk of the 
official scientific reports. His informal training at Melbourne observatory, then his experience 
in Antarctica on the Southern Cross, then working up his results for publication, all provided 
a sound foundation for his Discovery work. The absence of a physicist on Discovery’s 
outward journey to New Zealand represented a missed opportunity. 
The selection and training of the civilian scientific staff was not a reflection of the 
high profile and expectations of the expedition and could be considered a second string team. 
Bernacchi was unqualified although well trained and experienced, and Ferrar was a green, 
recent graduate. Wilson made errors in identification of birds: a supposed area of strength and 
interest, and the bulk of his collecting was from lower latitudes. Murray proved himself to be 
short in leadership skills and ignorant of sciences beyond his own discipline. Scott’s scientific 
leadership was at best benign, neither hampering nor really promoting the intellectual climate 
of the scientific team. Hodgson was the stand out with experience and training, but his 
potential was entirely quashed by logistic decisions. Koettlitz was the best of the scientists in 
terms of long field experience and capability, but he never followed through to publication. 
The officers (especially Armitage and Royds) had to fit scientific observations into their 
already onerous responsibilities and errors in the first meteorological volume confirm that 
Royds was not fully engaged with the end to end process, though this was no fault of his. 
These men worked diligently, but the expedition as a whole would have been better served by 
some different recruitment choices, especially in scientific leadership, such as Gregory and 
Bruce for example, both of whom were actively kept away from the expedition.  
In the context of deficient instructions, challenging instruments and a scientific 
leadership vacuum the selection of scientific staff was critical. In a physical science program, 
the instruments, the performance of observations and adherence to protocols are the nub of 
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quality outputs. In the case of natural sciences such as geology, the calibre of the scientist is 
more directly related to output, as decisions about sampling during fieldwork require on the 
spot judgement. A poor choice of scientist can ruin the prospects for any research program, 
but a meticulously planned and well-directed program can accommodate for shortcomings in 
staff skill or instrumental deficiencies by planning for all contingencies. There is a rare 
exception that counters this argument about recruitment choices and training strategies being 
critical to outcomes. Bidlingmaier’s magnetic assistant on Gauss, Lenart Reuterskjöld (1882-
?) was a competent and valuable magnetic observer and assistant, yet he was a last minute 
addition to the crew in Capetown. Bidlingmaier and Reuterskjöld alternated magnetic hut 
duties each six hours and the sailor had sole charge of the magnetic observatory during 
Bidlingmaier’s month long sledge journey. There was no recruitment process or formal 
training, yet he proved to be an important team member and contributor to the scientific 
program (Drygalski, 1989, p. 31).      
7.2.8 Equipment and instruments 
There were three categories of instruments used on the expedition. The highly accurate, 
observatory-quality instruments installed in the purpose built observatory huts at Winter 
Quarters. These were the Kew pattern monofilial magnetometer and the Eschenhagen 
variometer and clockwork drum apparatus. On the Gauss a balance wheel in the mechanism 
of the Eschenhagen apparatus split from the extreme cold, but repairs were made after which 
no further difficulties were encountered (Drygalski, 1989, p. 165). These instruments were 
suitable for the task and matched those used at the established global observatories.  
The second category was instruments for observations at sea. The Lloyd-Creak dip 
circle was the primary instrument and it was developed especially to collect the data for dip 
and magnetic intensity. Like the Eschenhagen, it was developed shortly before the voyage but 
it had not been tested in its normal working environment, a moving ship. It had deficiencies 
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and the results were unreliable, causing them to be mostly excluded from the final results. 
The results that were included were from high latitudes only, presumably inside the fringing 
ice pack where wave motion and therefore ship movement is damped. The Lloyd-Creak 
circles were in common use in later expeditions, but only in the form modified by the 
Carnegie Institution in Washington, D.C., and primarily for terrestrial observations. 
The third category is the set of instruments provided for use on sledge journeys. Aside 
from the pocket compasses, Barrow dips were called into service for the sledge journeys 
where magnetic science was a priority (Armitage’s western journey and Bernacchi’s Barrier 
journey). These devices hardly raised a mention in any diaries, narratives or reports, as they 
were familiar. The Barrow dip, an older, more reliable style of instrument became the 
fallback at sea, but it lacked the facility to take direct measurements of magnetic force.    
The impact of inadequate instruments was fatal to the prime objectives of Discovery’s 
magnetic force observing program at sea. The flow-on to published results is self-evident. 
Instrumental error, mostly related to Bernacchi’s absolute observations and the labile nature 
of the traces that ran off the scale of the photosensitive paper, led to exclusion of large 
amounts of data from the Winter Quarters.  
7.2.9 Logistics 
Logistics choices regulated opportunities for scientific work at sea and on the ice. Melbourne 
was to have been established as a magnetic base station and the observatory facilities and 
Bernacchi’s mentor, Baracchi were intended to assist in calibrating the ship’s instruments. 
The decision to bypass Melbourne was made to ensure that the magnetic observations at sea 
at a high latitude below Australia, close to the point of maximum magnetic intensity, were 
possible. Potentially unique and valuable data from that point could have been procured, but 
its omission from the scientific reports indicates its unreliability. The change of schedule that 
took Discovery direct to Lyttelton (Christchurch) had the positive effect of introducing Farr 
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and Skey into the workings of the expedition. Their contribution was notable before, during 
and after the expedition, but it obliged construction of a new observatory. The instructions to 
the commander specified landfall at either Melbourne or Christchurch, not both, and it’s 
unclear whether Scott always intended to go via New Zealand irrespective of the Melbourne 
plan. Slow progress of the ship diminished opportunities for oceanographic, dredging and 
trawling activities. 
The logistic decision to overwinter the ship in Antarctica in 1902 had a number of 
repercussions. A comfortable, safe haven was provided allowing scientists to focus on their 
work and less on matters of survival as would have been the case in hut life. The availability 
of crewmen to assist with functions like construction of the magnetic observatory huts, 
auroral observations and the provision of manpower on sledging journeys might have been 
restricted if the ship had retreated north after establishing a land party. The conditions that 
Bidlingmaier worked under at the Gauss ice station were severe compared to Bernacchi’s 
Winter Quarters observatory and the results were as good, or better. This indicates that the 
magnetic program could have succeeded if the Discovery landed a party for the winter. 
Coastal exploration and oceanography were diminished by the decision to overwinter the ship 
in Antarctica but: “If they had not determined to use the ship as a house boat, the information 
as to the continent would not have been obtained through our exertions” (Darwin, 1931). 
There is no explanation why no further use was made of the ship’s magnetic observatory 
during the stay in Antarctica although Royds states that non-magnetic phosphor bronze stoves 
were installed for winter heat to allow observations to continue (Royds, 2001, p. 177).  
The logistics related to sledging journeys were mostly about exploration, not science. 
Scott supported Royds and Bernacchi’s Barrier journey, whose objectives were exploratory, 
glaciological or magnetic, depending on whose account you read. In general, science was 
interwoven into the agenda for exploration, not vice versa, so logistics did not necessarily 
  
310 
favour the needs of individual scientists like Hodgson and Ferrar. Koettlitz undertook his 
research mostly on base, so was unaffected. Wilson lamented his selection for the southern 
journey as he correctly surmised there would be no wildlife but he did make a valuable 
contribution to the geographical record by drawing the landscapes presented by the mountain 
range and Mulock’s observations from his 1903 southern journey fixed many landmarks 
more accurately.  
The logistic choice that resulted in Discovery being icebound for two years was 
advantageous to the physical science and meteorology programs. The trade-off was 
diminished results in oceanography, trawling and coastal exploration. The unpredictability of 
scientific work in the Antarctic and the short field season still mean that logistics choices 
must be made on the fly and the right decision can be a matter of survival of the scientific 
crew. The impact and significance of logistic choices varies according to the scientific 
discipline and nature of the scientific inquiry, and whether the work would generally be 
carried out at sea, on base or in the field.   
7.2.10 The work of the scientist 
Magnetic science at sea was carried out diligently but ineffectively due to the combination of 
inadequate instruments, the ship’s characteristic heavy roll, the shifting of the tinned 
provisions below the magnetic observatory and the absence of a scientific mentor. The ship 
was well found magnetically (the deviation values were small) but factors did not align to 
allow good results. The declination (variation) results found in the scientific reports could 
have been procured on any ship with correctly adjusted compasses. Armitage confines his 
closing comments in the appendix of his narrative to the magnetic variation, and does not 
mention the dip and force data: “The observations for variation have proved very good, and 
the results of these alone are sufficient reward for all the monotonous labour connected with 
the magnetic observations at sea” (Armitage, 1905, p. 304). The manner in which magnetic 
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science was performed at sea was a significant limiting factor on outcomes, but only in the 
context of the other elements that needed to converge to provide suitable observing 
circumstances.  
The practice of magnetic science at the Antarctic base met or exceeded expectations. 
The observations derived from the continuous recording Eschenhagen magnetograph and the 
Kew magnetometer were the cornerstones of the physical science reports of the expedition. 
Fixing the location of the magnetic pole was mainly possible from data obtained from the 
sledging journeys and aboard the ship within the Ross Sea. This data was enhanced by the dip 
and intensity readings from Winter Quarters. The objectives of the expedition did not include 
a bid to actually reach the magnetic pole and neither of the western sledge journeys had the 
range to do so. Dip circles were taken on only two of the sledging traverses, Armitage’s 
western mountain trek and Bernacchi’s Barrier journey. Most of the deviation observations 
on other sledge journeys were made with the aid of pocket compasses, making them a lower 
order of reliability. The small size of the instrument increased potential reading error and the 
proximity of the magnetic pole made compasses sluggish due to the low horizontal magnetic 
force. Drygalski’s pocket compass observations of declination were: “impossible with this 
instruments as it was too sluggish, and there was too much friction for it to react to the 
variations, given the weakness of the horizontal force in polar latitudes” (Drygalski, 1989, p. 
144). Royds described his pocket compass observations as “comparatively useless” (Royds, 
2001, p. 175). 
 There is no fault with the performance of the magnetic observations by Armitage or 
Bernacchi. Both did more than required for successful outcomes. The instrumental 
difficulties, along with a scientific leadership vacuum in physics undermined their efforts. If 
all other contributing elements driving the science are positive, then the actual performance is 
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a lower order of importance as a driver itself. A skilled technician could produce acceptable 
outcomes if other circumstances wer favourable. 
7.2.11 Social and intellectual landscapes 
The diaries and narratives of the expedition do not effectively convey a picture of the 
intellectual landscape. Aside from the occasional scientific debates in winter, the lectures 
presented for the education of the lower deck and some articles in the South Polar Times that 
described scientific work, there are no hints about the frequency or vigour of scientific 
debate. On the passage out to New Zealand, Armitage was acting almost alone as 
magnetician but may have discussed the operations with Barne, who was less experienced. 
On the ice Armitage and Bernacchi had common knowledge of the magnetic work but there 
is no record to indicate they discussed or debated any of the physics. In general, the social 
climate was harmonious, so the development of a vibrant intellectual landscape was possible.  
Comments about Scott’s willingness to engage with the scientists are mostly in reference to 
his second expedition.  
A hallmark of good science is the formulation of the right questions, whose 
investigation leads to novel outcomes, a process promoted by the creation of a vibrant 
intellectual space. The Discovery’s magnetic science program at sea and in Antarctica was a 
mildly intellectually challenging enterprise confined to a series of data collecting procedures. 
There was no freedom to really develop new questions or approaches to their solution in the 
case of magnetic science. The instructions and the spatial and logistical limitations confined 
Bernacchi and Armitage to the perpetuation of Sabine’s simplistic data collection and 
aggregation paradigm. 
Scott and Shackleton both became freemasons prior to their departure on Discovery 
(Huntford, 1985, p. 42). This was a strategic career move as Markham’s cousin, Admiral 
Albert Markham (1841-1918) had established the Navy lodge in 1896, and it was a place 
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where ambitious officers could make contact with their superiors away from the hierarchy of 
the RN. The lodge was populated by many high ranking and decorated naval officers and 
senior civil servants, and HRH The Prince of Wales was the lodge’s first Master (Navy 
Lodge No. 2612, 2013). This relationship says little about the intellectual climate of the 
wardroom in Antarctica, but the civil relations between Scott and Shackleton in public, above 
an undercurrent of ill feeling after the expedition may be attributed to it (Barczewski, 2007, p. 
49). 
Vibrant social and intellectual landscapes on expeditions promote scientific outcomes, 
but are not critical. Individuals may shine, even under adverse conditions. Bernacchi did so 
on the Southern Cross, in spite of the uncomfortable social landscape under Borchgrevink’s 
poor leadership.   
7.2.12 Serendipity 
In the Physical Observation report, Chetwynd notes that: “the magnetic conditions were 
largely affected by local attractions” (Chetwynd, 1908, p. 134). Detail from a modern chart of 
magnetic intensity for the Ross Island locality (Figure 13) shows that Hut Point (at lower 
right hand corner of image) is an area with a steep magnetic intensity gradient. The chart 
shows low intensity in blue and high intensity in purple, with an overlay of isodynamic lines 
(lines of equal magnetic intensity). By chance, Bernacchi established his Antarctic 
observatory in an area where local anomalies added significant signal noise on top of the 
magnetic signature generated by the earth’s internal dynamo and perturbations from space 
weather. Chree described Winter Quarters as a region of appreciable local magnetic 
disturbance and mentioned the significant differences between the observatory data and the 
data from the tent established briefly on the sea ice, far from land with its influencing 
volcanic rock. He concluded on a positive note: “there would not be much reason to fear 
anything more than a reduction in declination” (Royal Society, 1909, p. 88).    
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Figure 13: Detail of magnetic intensity in the locality of Ross Island (Damaske & Behrendt, 1996). 
 
Bad luck can be fatal to a program of research or exploration. Mawson’s AAE 
Western Party under Frank Wild’s leadership (1873-1939) took a risk and constructed a hut 
on an ice shelf that survived their year’s sojourn. Filchner did the same but the hut was 
destroyed by the collapse of the ice almost immediately after construction was complete. This 
may have been more poor judgement than bad luck, but it demonstrates the fragility of 
survival and work in the era of early polar expeditions. 
Scientific and geographical outcomes can turn on chance events like the detection of 
mosses at Granite Harbour, discovery of the Dry Valleys by Scott or Barne’s determination  
“almost by accident” that a depot on the ice barrier moved 608 yards (556 m) seaward in 
thirteen and a half months (Scott, 1905b, Volume II, p. 300). Another exception piece of 
good luck was discovery of fourteen undigested specimens of a new species of fish in the gut 
of a seal butchered for food (Skelton, 2004, p. 188). The discovery of Scott Island in the 
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mouth of the Ross Sea by the Morning on 25 December 1902 was also pure chance (Conrad, 
1999, p. 115). Priestley wrote: “Such is the romance of polar science, and so dependant upon 
the merest chance its results may be” (Priestley, n.d., p. 7).  
7.2.13 Post-expedition handling and publication of data and collections 
Post-expedition management is critical to the full cycle of scientific process. The example of 
errors in the first meteorology report demonstrates how the effort of the field observers can 
be completely squandered in the absence of post–expedition collection supervision. During 
the Edwardian era it was commonplace for official scientific reports to take many years to 
develop and Bernacchi’s estimate that it would take at least two years was optimistic, even 
assuming his involvement as a sub editor. The Physical Observations volume was published 
after four years and the Magnetic Observations after five. These compare well with the 
publication of Drygalski and Mawson’s magnetic reports, both in 1925.   
The scientific leadership vacuum evident at sea and on the ice became more 
pronounced after the return of the expedition. Neither Markham nor Scott had remained 
involved with the post-expedition work, and this is especially evident in the case of the 
meteorology reports (Yelverton, 2000, pp. 409-413). An earlier example of poor post-
expedition management is the case of the loss by Borchgrevink of the zoological notebooks 
written by Hanson, who perished at Cape Adare (Crawford, 1998, p. 207). His collection was 
valuable as the scientific record from the first overwintering party on the mainland of 
Antarctica, but diminished in its potential due to the negligent loss of the collecting notes. 
In Discovery’s case there was considerable confusion as to where the magnetic data 
would be sent, who had intellectual ownership of the data, and who would reduce, analyse 
and publish on it. It is fortunate that the magnetic results were handled well by Chetwynd of 
the Admiralty, and Chree of the National Physical Laboratory. Gregory’s original plan was to 
have a committee directing post-expedition arrangements (Gregory, 1900a) in which case 
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some unfortunate events may have been avoided. Koettlitz had a falling out with Ray 
Lankester, Director of the BMNH and as a consequence walked away with his collection and 
records that were never seen again. Two years of bacteriological work in the Antarctic was 
lost and never published because no one was overseeing the post-expedition arrangements, 
and it was only by chance that Hodgson made an inquiry about the progress of the work that 
brought the debacle to light (Hodgson, 1908). Koettlitz believed the civilian scientists were 
all treated in a shabby manner, being given no voice as to their own collections: “I am quite 
of the same mind as you with regard to disgust as to the way we of the scientific staff have 
been treated, as of the unfairness of the contrast between Captn Scott’s treatment and ours…” 
(Koettlitz, 1905).  
Neither Scott nor Royds saw the first meteorological report before its publication. 
Many of the errors contained within the volume could easily have been rectified by Royds’ 
involvement during production, or at least a final chance to proof read the work (Markham, 
1908). Scott did not live to see the erratum notice in the introduction to the second volume 
and he would have been disappointed it did not satisfy his demands to put right what he 
regarded as a slur against the observers, in particular Royds. Likewise, Scott had not seen the 
Magnetic Observations volume prior to its publication then review in the newspaper (Scott, 
1908c). Opportunities for better outcomes from the Discovery science publications were 
squandered as a result of dislocation between collector and analyst and the poor post-
expedition management of data and collections. In contrast, quality outcomes were produced 
from Mawson’s AAE and Drygalski’s Gauss magnetic research. Webb, the magnetician on 
Mawson’s AAE wrote more than half of the scientific report on Terrestrial Magnetism 
(Webb, 1925). Drygalski oversaw the publication of all the Gauss scientific reports, twenty in 
total, plus two atlases. Bidlingmaier and Karl Luyken (1874-1947), the magneticians on the 
Gauss and at the Kerguelen Base station respectively, wrote the major parts of the German 
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terrestrial magnetism reports (Rosove, 2001, pp. 108-122). Bernacchi recorded the German 
post-expedition arrangements in his diary: 
Dr Luyken-the German who was in charge of the magnetic work on Kerguelen Island 
in 1902 lunched with me at the club. Told me of the arrangements made in Germany 
for reduction and publication of scientific work conducted on the Gauss Expedition. 
Infinitely better than ours-A special Antarctic office has been established in Berlin 
[illegible] & the head of each department … has charge of his own work with his 
assistants under him… Will take about 5 years to complete-there were nearly double 
the amount of observations- they propose to do it in a little over 1 year.  
(Bernacchi, 1904) 
In spite of the logistical effort put into the sledge journey to the region of the magnetic 
pole during Shackleton’s Nimrod expedition, no volume devoted to magnetic science was 
ever published. Shackleton engaged Mawson as he needed a physicist, but Mawson was a 
geologist. Mawson made some contributions to the geological papers within the science 
reports (Rosove, 2001, pp. 389-390) but magnetic science from the Nimrod expedition is 
reported only briefly as part of Mawson’s AAE Terrestrial Magnetism report (Webb, 1925, 
pp. 50-52). On Discovery there was a slight shift away from the entrenched “metropolis and 
periphery” intellectual tradition of handling materials and, for the magnetic science, this 
arrangement probably led to the best publication outcomes as the observers were not theorists 
and may not have recognised the significance of novel results. 
As a driver of scientific success, post-expedition management of data and collections 
then fostering publication are critical irrespective of the quality and quantity of materials and 
data gathered. This important element of the scientific program on Discovery was not planned 
and then, although Markham controlled the dispersal of all the scientific intellectual capital of 
the expedition by settling agreements for others to analyse and publish on it, there was no 
adequate follow through after the ship returned to England.  
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A framework of criteria for future assessments of historic polar or frontier science 
programs has been established and tested in this chapter by review of the elements of the 
magnetic science program on the Discovery. Conclusions about the scientific successes and 
failures of the expedition, and a ranking of the impact and importance of their drivers follow 
in the closing chapter.  
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Chapter 8: Analysis of Discovery’s scientific outcomes 
Debate about definitions of successful expeditions and their scientific research programs is 
not a new phenomenon. Bernacchi mentioned wardroom discussions on the topic in May 
1903: 
Some interesting arguments have taken place in ward room lately. One yesterday 
dealing with the meaning of the “success” of an expedition + an explorer ‘ideal’ 
(whatever that is).  
Some contend that an expedition was not a success unless it fully carried out its 
original plans + others that it was equally successful if it failed in its original plans but 
accidentally or otherwise made equally important discoveries etc. It was all very 
absurd… 
(Bernacchi, 1902c) 
Conclusions about Discovery’s success and whether it achieved the potential of the scientific 
program in terrestrial magnetism form the core of this chapter. 
8.1 Achievements & Successes 
The report of Bernacchi’s 1908 lecture to the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science provided the best synopsis of the main findings of that magnetic work. It was 
delivered when publication of the two physical science volumes was imminent and it clarified 
the main findings that were difficult for the non-scientist to comprehend. The points were: 
• Observations at Winter Quarters were carried out over a two-year campaign 
• The average declination for that location was about 152° E.  
• The regular diurnal range of declination is five or six times as large as found at the 
Kew observatory 
• Even when the sun is continuously below the horizon the diurnal range remains at 
least twice the values found at Kew 
• The seasonal change in the type of variation is very small 
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• There was no notable difference between changes in declination from day to night, 
unlike in temperate climates, where daytime changes are conspicuously larger and 
more rapid 
• The horizontal force at Winter Quarters was about a third of that observed at Kew but 
the range of diurnal inequality was about 50 % higher 
• The vector diagrams for the magnetic elements are much less symmetrical in 
Antarctica than at Kew, the direction of motion is anti-clockwise and there is little 
difference between seasons 
• A striking feature of the diurnal inequality in all magnetic elements is the large size of 
the fundamental Fourier wave with a twenty-four hour wavelength 
• Declination observations at Winter Quarters, on sledge journey and at sea combined 
to place the magnetic pole in a locality about 72° 50’ S, 156° 20’ E. The inclination 
observations give close agreement.   
(American Geophysical Union, 1908) 
The alignment between instructions and outcomes for the magnetic science program are 
reviewed at section 7.1.1., but to expand understanding of the significance of Discovery’s 
other results, a comparison of expectations embedded in the instructions (British National 
Antarctic Expedition, 1901) against achievements in exploration and other science disciplines 
follows: 
• Instruction: Whenever possible while at sea, deep sea sounding should be taken with 
serial temperatures, and samples of sea water at various depths are to be obtained, for 
physical and chemical analysis. Dredging operations are to be carried on as frequently 
as possible, and all opportunities are to be taken for making biological and geological 
collections. 
Outcome: This was not successful. Kilometres of sounding wire, often with Pettersson 
bottles and thermometers attached (over 8,700 fathoms or 15,900 m), were lost during 
four soundings in June-July 1904. The scientific operations listed were infrequent at 
sea (Skelton, 2004, pp. 208-211). 
 
• Instruction: It is desired that the extent of land should be ascertained by following the 
coastlines, that the depth and nature of the ice cap should be investigated, as well as 
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the nature of the volcanic region, of the mountain ranges, and especially any 
fossiliferous rocks. 
Outcome: A nominal amount of new land (150 miles or 240 kilometres) was detected 
by coastal survey from the ship but charts of known coastline were improved by 
Mulock’s accurate charting of the western coast of the Ross Sea (Hayes, 1928, p. 
144). New coastline was discovered on sledging journeys on the Ice Barrier and on 
sea ice that bordered the coast. Scott’s plan for Discovery to investigate coastal areas 
to the west of Cape North was hampered by lack of coal on the return journey. There 
was no technology available to make measurements of the depth of the ice cap, but 
snow pits were dug and samples taken to attempt characterisation of the overburden. 
Plant fossils were discovered, but their exact nature could not be determined. 
 
• Instruction: explore the Ice Barrier of Sir James Clark Ross to its eastern extremity; to 
discover the land that was believed by Ross to flank the barrier to the eastward, or to 
ascertain that it does not exist; and generally to endeavour to solve the very important 
physical and geographical questions connected with this remarkable ice formation. 
Outcome: Successful work was done on this matter. King Edward VII Land was 
discovered at the eastern end of the Barrier and Borchgrevink’s finding that the 
Barrier had receded significantly since Ross was confirmed. The flow of the Barrier 
from the coastal ranges towards the sea was confirmed and the fact that it was afloat 
was also supported. 
 
• Instruction:  If the ship is overwintered in the ice then three main objectives for 
geographical exploration are noted: advance into the western mountains, an advance 
to the south and exploration of the volcanic regions. 
Outcome: All these were successfully acquitted. 
	  
8.2 Failures and unmet expectations 
During gestation, every element suggested the Discovery expedition could and should have 
represented best practice in Antarctic scientific research prior to the Great War if compared 
against the measures of quality, productivity, new knowledge generation and the achievement 
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of outcomes against objectives. The results for the magnetic research fell short of 
expectations in all these key elements and accurate location of the magnetic pole, the 
reliability of data gathered both at sea and ashore, the utility of data sharing with the German 
expedition and publication of charts for mariners.  
Where is the evidence to support Yelverton’s statement that the magnetic pole was 
located: “certainly well enough to build the magnetic map of the Southern Hemisphere” 
(Yelverton, 2000, p. 311). There is none, as data from one expedition and just a handful of 
southern hemisphere observatories are insufficient to build such a chart and, with respect to 
magnetic observations, no point on the globe is especially more important than any other 
(Cawood, 1979). Also, the position of the magnetic pole determined from Discovery’s data 
was thrown into serious doubt by the findings of Mawson’s AAE results. Webb’s Terrestrial 
Magnetism report specifically mentions the outcomes determined by Chetwynd in which he 
located the magnetic pole at 72° 51’ S, 156° 25’ E, or 167 miles (269 km) from the position 
determined by Mawson’s own expedition (Webb, 1925, p. 55). Mawson’s magnetist, Webb, 
was well trained as a field observer by the Carnegie Institution of Washington and as an 
operator of the Eschenhagen magnetometer by Dr. J. M. Baldwin (1878-1945) of Melbourne 
Observatory (Webb 1965, p. 2). The expedition used the improved derivatives of the Lloyd-
Creak dip circle, modified by the Institution in the light of difficulties encountered by 
Bernacchi and Bidlingmaier. Webb commented on the accuracy of the Discovery result:  
Since the values of D and I, on which Commander Chetwynd’s charts were based, 
were confined almost exclusively to one side of the Magnetic Polar Area, there is 
room for considerable uncertainty in conclusions regarding location of the Pole … 
location by intersection of magnetic meridians is of little account unless a large 
number of determinations on at least three sides of the Magnetic Pole Area are 
available.  
(Webb, 1925, pp. 55-56) 
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Webb later wrote in memoirs that Farr of the Canterbury Observatory believed that his 
(Webb’s) location of the magnetic pole to be the most accurate of those made during that 
epoch (Webb, 1965, pp. 9-10).  
 There was sufficient reliable data to support the production of extensive magnetic 
reports and the bulk and density of those can mislead readers into believing that the 
Discovery’s research met expectations. This research has shown it fell short of potential. 
Chapter seven above details the extent of data considered unreliable, the failure to publish 
data on magnetic force at sea, rejection of the bulk of absolute magnetic measurements from 
Winter Quarters, the proportion of magnetograms considered unreliable as a consequence of 
the failure of absolute observations and the trace running off scale, the failure of collaborative 
data sharing with Drygalski, the error of timing of the term day observations and numerous 
other incidental faults and shortcomings. Difficulties with the instruments undermined the 
value of the ship as a floating magnetic observatory and the expectation that there would be 
commercial value through new magnetic charts was never realised. The prospect that 
sufficient new material would come to light to progress theory of the causes of terrestrial 
magnetism also went unrealised.  
The American meteorologist Matthew Fontaine Maury (1806-1873) provided an 
example of how massed data from at-sea observations could be put to good effect by 
producing charts of seasonally reliable wind patterns for the use of sailing masters. An 
example is his Sailing Directions for the Atlantic that provided tangible economic benefits by 
shortening average sailing times on major trading routes (Halford, 2005, p. 99). The magnetic 
equivalent, complete revision of magnetic charts for the southern oceans anticipated by 
Markham was never realized. Neither was the development of new theories of causes of 
terrestrial magnetism. These were both unrealistically ambitious expectations touted by 
Markham to gain support at the beginning of the expedition.   
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8.3 Opportunities squandered? 
Failure to take advantage of opportunities that presented themselves before, during, and after 
the expedition contributed to the failure to meet expectations in the magnetic science and in 
other disciplines. A central facet of the magnetic observation program was squandered by not 
testing the Lloyd-Creak Circle at sea, by recruiting Bernacchi so late that he could not join 
the ship on its outward passage, and by not offering Armitage opportunities to practice with 
the instrument away from observatory conditions. 
Collaborations could have been forged with a broader range of magnetic specialists. 
Bauer was one of the leading magnetists in 1900, but there is no record of any attempt to 
consult or collaborate with him. Mawson subsequently worked with Bauer in preparation for 
his AAE, arranging for the Carnegie Institution’s Department of Terrestrial Magnetism to 
train Webb, and for the loan of instruments. There was also missed potential for additional 
magnetic observatory data:  
Prof. Dr Eschenhagen drew attention, with regard to international cooperation, to the 
fact that the United States had planned the establishment of three complete 
observatories at Washington, in Hawaii and in Alaska. The establishment of these 
might be accelerated if the desire of the Committee that they should be made available 
for co-operation at the time of the Polar expeditions were brought to the notice of the 
United States by the Imperial Government. 
 
(Minutes of Sub-Committee of the [German] Scientific Council for Meteorology and 
Terrestrial magnetism, 1899). In Sweden, Birkeland was preparing for his Arctic auroral 
observatory research that included magnetic surveys. His findings were included in the 
Magnetic Observations volume but better value from shared observing methods might have 
been possible. If the RS had been more closely involved with preparations for the expedition, 
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these important connections with world leaders in the discipline might have produced 
positive outcomes for partners.  
How would the outcomes have been different if Gregory remained scientific director 
of the civilian staff and his plan of operations had been followed? It’s probable that the 
Lloyd-Creak circle would have been tested at sea and improved before the expedition left. 
The collaborative scheme of data sharing might have come to fruition, allowing deeper 
interpretation and advances in theoretical knowledge from truly global data. The post-
expedition management of collections and data would have been planned in advance and not 
executed in the haphazard manner that transpired. Melbourne might have been the base 
station, and even if not, observations from there may have added to the global data set. 
Different transport strategies using dogs might have resulted in longer and more scientifically 
significant sledging journeys from the winter base.  
There are additional instances of squandered opportunities not directly related to 
magnetic sciences that stand out. Markham’s disregard of opportunities to purchase an 
existing ship, such as the offer of Diana from Kinnes of Dundee for £3,600 in 1899, and his 
insistence on the construction of a new vessel was a folly, probably motivated by national 
pride and the desire to leave a tangible legacy. The time and energy expended in management 
of construction may have been better spent on preparations for science and exploration. This 
research concludes there is no direct relationship between cost of the expedition vessel and 
scientific success. The carnage of the land rail population on Macquarie Island was in vain. 
The target species was endemic, rare and collectible, but in error, the species collected was 
another, the New Zealand weka, that had been introduced to the island (Skelton, 2004, p. 29).    
There were some instances of missed opportunities for investigation that might have 
been considered low hanging fruit, scientifically. Bernacchi was busy with Milne’s 
seismograph within a few days march of an active volcano. Surely it crossed the minds of 
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Scott, Ferrar and others that an ascent of Mount Erebus would advance science at a cheap 
investment of time and effort. On the Barrier journey, Royds had sterile tubes for collecting 
and sealing Antarctic air samples. It might have been a coup to use the procedure to collect a 
sample of gas from the crater’s mouth.  Why disregard the opportunity and leave the glory for 
others to achieve? Another squandered opportunity was the scientific output lost with the 
failure to deposit Koettlitz’s microbiological collections at the museum or to publish any 
results in that discipline. This was a direct consequence of the failure of post-expedition 
management of collections, another example of the institutional failure by management of the 
expedition. 
Wilson and Koettlitz squandered opportunities for research into human biology. Men 
of the Discovery were under extreme levels of physiological and psychological stress. They 
knew that Hanson had died during the Southern Cross expedition, mental health issues had 
emerged during the Belgica expedition and it transpired that the Gauss expedition base-
station (Kerguelen) and relief voyage members died of beri-beri (Headland, 2009, p. 233). 
Aside from taking blood samples for performing cell counts, and the monthly physical 
measurements, no further studies were made. It was an ideal opportunity for a comparative 
nutrition study along the lines of that performed during the Terra Nova Cape Crozier emperor 
penguin egg collection journey of 1911 when the three men tried different diets, each loaded 
with constituents of standard sledging rations: protein, fat or ship’s biscuits. Better 
knowledge of nutritional requirements for sledging parties was critical information for later 
extended overland journeys. Koettlitz explained to Hodgson that he had left the notes on 
blood and physical examinations of the men in Dover when he migrated to South Africa and 
it might be possible to recover them (Hodgson, 1909). Wilson lectured to the British Medical 
Association in 1905 providing a descriptive account of nutrition, the appearance of scurvy, 
clothing, exercise and the privations of sledge travel and harsh weather. He stated that “All 
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the bacteriological work, however, was done by Dr Koettlitz and his results will no doubt 
appear in dure course” (Wilson, 1905). 
Overwintering the ship represented diminished opportunities for dredging, trawling 
and oceanographic work, as well as further coastal exploration. The majority of species 
richness in the Antarctic is in the benthic fauna and the total macrofaunal richness of the 
continental shelf may exceed 17,000 species (Clarke, 2008). Confining sampling to the 
locality of Hut Point peninsula severely limited Hodgson’s opportunities. In contrast to 
Discovery’s meagre sample of only ten species of fish, four of which were new to science, the 
Terra Nova expedition discovered 17 new species and seven new genera (Priestley, 1914).  
If the Discovery had not overwintered and more sounding and deep-sea temperatures 
had been possible, scientists from the expedition might have recognised the phenomenon of 
the Antarctic convergence, or polar front. Wilhelm Meinardus (1867-1952) recognised its 
existence and published his finding in the meteorological volume of the Gauss scientific 
reports (Fogg, 1992, p. 198). Discovery was potentially well placed to reveal the 
phenomenon, but in fairness, the Challenger was better placed, but also missed this important 
feature.  
The Antarctic Manual contained only nine pages of information on glaciology and sea 
ice yet the extent of ice and the presence of impressive glaciers in the Victoria Land quadrant 
were well known to expedition organisers. Glaciology was a developing scientific discipline 
of the time and Louis Agassiz (1807-1873) had advanced the discipline considerably during 
the nineteenth century (Fogg, 1992, p. 248). No ice specialist was included amongst the 
civilian scientific team. 
8.4 Comparison against contemporaneous expeditions 
This research has revealed numerous flaws in the magnetic science on Discovery and it is 
reasonable to speculate in conclusion whether a similar range of previously unrecognised 
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failures are hidden for other expeditions. Development of a thorough and objective 
comparison between Discovery and similar expeditions of the era is outside the scope of this 
research due to the unmanageable volume of additional investigation required, but some 
commentary is warranted. Throughout the course of the research sources related to scientific 
work on other expeditions have been consulted, so it is reasonable to draw some tentative and 
somewhat subjective conclusions that attempt to satisfy the perennial question of how the 
expeditions rank in terms of scientific success. This research has shown the drivers of 
scientific success are complex, numerous and unequal in importance and impact. A ranking 
of expeditions is possible with the aid of a scaffold of drivers of scientific success. A legacy 
of this analysis may be assistance to later researchers who wish to build on this research by 
developing objective and accurate analyses of science on expeditions other than Discovery. A 
brief commentary on scientific outcomes of selected expeditions follows. 
Drygalski’s Gauss shared many characteristics with Discovery. Both were created and 
managed by institutions rather than by individuals. Government sponsorship provided 
funding for both, although Discovery also had significant philanthropic contributions. Both 
expeditions had custom built vessels with magnetic observatories as a central feature. 
Drygalski’s expedition had a historic context framed by Germany’s leadership in magnetic 
research through the nineteenth century, but did not suffer from the impositions of RN 
traditions. Drygalski recruited Bidlingmaier who was a scholar of magnetic science and who 
performed the magnetic research above expectations. Drygalski, a scholar with expedition 
experience provided scientific and expedition leadership and the quality scientific outcomes 
is a reflection of his personal agenda. Geographic outcomes were modest, a consequence of 
circumstance rather than a trade-off that balanced science against exploration, as was the case 
on Discovery. Gauss had the same suite of magnetic instruments as Discovery and 
encountered similar difficulties, mostly overcome by Bidlingmaier’s efforts. A particular 
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strength of the Gauss expedition was the ongoing post-expedition management of the data 
and collections, and preparation of publications that extended through the years of the First 
World War and continued until 1931. Contributions of the scientists are abundant throughout 
the official scientific reports. They are: “a striking testimony to the scope and quality of the 
science performed on the expedition” (Rosove, 2001, p. 108). Drygalski’s outcomes are 
generally regarded to be the best of the 1901-1904 Antarctic campaign. 
Bruce gave solid expedition and scientific leadership to the Scotia expedition team of 
accomplished scientists.  As the first Scottish national expedition there was no guiding 
intellectual tradition. Many individual research papers were published in journals before their 
appearance in the seven official scientific reports (Rosove, 2001, p. 50). The expedition did 
not achieve remarkable geographic results but the focus was on scientific work not 
exploration. There was some collaboration with Argentina who took over the observatory site 
and maintained it as an ongoing meteorological recording station. One facet of Bruce’s 
superior leadership was his post-expedition management of materials and data, fostering their 
preparation for publication. 
Shackleton’s Nimrod expedition had a primary focus on exploration. He was aware 
that a scientific program was an essential part of establishing credibility with prospective 
sponsors, so there was a solid program focused on geology. There are five published volumes 
of scientific results, two each of biology and geology (including ice studies) and one on 
meteorology. No magnetic volume was published. Shackleton selected an interesting mix of 
scientists, choosing Priestley for his skill with the banjo rather than his geological knowledge, 
and taking the Australians Edgeworth David and Mawson as an afterthought (Tony Fleming, 
personal communication, 8 March 2011). These facts indicate that Shackleton was either not 
genuinely concerned about the scientific outcomes, or believed that non-specialist scientists 
could sufficiently cover other branches of science. 
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Scott’s Terra Nova shared its contextual background with Discovery but many other 
characteristics were dissimilar. While the Discovery was well funded, the Terra Nova was 
mounted on a relatively slim budget and in spite of a focus on the attainment of the 
geographic pole the scientific program was robust. Scott was the organiser and leader, 
receiving nominal support from the RGS and RS. He was able to procure instruments on loan 
from the same sources as the Discovery and the recruitment of civilian scientists was less 
haphazard than the first venture as Wilson, appointed scientific director, had control of 
proceedings. The logistics were closer to the model that could have given better outcomes for 
Discovery. The Terra Nova landed a party for the winter before retreating north to deploy a 
second scientific party and carry out coastal exploration.  
The magnetic program was almost identical to the Discovery protocols. The suite of 
instruments again included Kew and Eschenhagen magnetometers and on this expedition 
twenty-three observatories were synchronised to take a total of 36 term hour observations. 
Four of the dip circles were the same as taken on Discovery. The two Dover circles, Nos. 26 
and 27 were used and Lloyd-Creak Circles, Nos 143 and 149, improved according to the 
Carnegie Institution’s method, were also taken (Chree, 1921, pp. 429-430). An analytical 
method developed by Bidlingmaier was applied to characterise the diurnal disturbances 
(Chree, 1921, pp. x-xi). Like the Discovery results, the at-sea results include complete records 
for declination that are reported as “variation” in deference to Commander Harry Pennell’s 
(1882-1916) contribution and preference. There are no results for magnetic force and only a 
handful of inclination measurements (Chree, 1921, pp. 430-449). Terra Nova had no 
magnetic observatory so there was probably no expectation on improvement of Discovery’s 
at-sea data. At Scott’s Cape Evans base the absolute instruments were housed in an 
observatory hut, but the Eschenhagen apparatus was established in an ice cave to reduce the 
swings in temperature suffered by Bernacchi’s instruments in the Discovery variation hut. 
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One outcome was determination that the magnetic pole was migrating in a north-westerly 
direction, consistent with data compiled from Shackleton’s Nimrod and Mawson’s Aurora 
expeditions and the long term trend since Ross, but at odds with Chetwynd’s Discovery 
conclusion of a north-easterly trend (Mawer, 2006, p. 236). The abundance of the Terra Nova 
scientific reports is partly an artefact of the finance made available through public 
subscriptions to the memorial fund established after Scott and his companions perished.   
Mawson’s AAE, the Aurora expedition, was more successful than Scott’s Terra Nova 
by almost any measure, and represents the pinnacle of scientific exploration of the era. Hayes 
concludes: “Lastly, Sir Douglas Mawson’s results far exceed all others because he made the 
greatest inroad into the unknown with the finest scientific staff” (Hayes, 1928, p. 260). 
Mawson struggled to acquire sufficient funding and the expedition outcomes represented 
value against investment. Opportunities for science and exploration were maximised by 
deployment of three base stations (Macquarie Island, Commonwealth Bay and Wild’s 
Western Base) and a well-planned scheme of sledging journeys. The expedition encountered 
bad luck, firstly by locating their Main Base in a funnel of icy winds coming off the polar 
plateau, then Mawson’s own sledge journey was marred by death of his colleagues and his 
own near-fatal journey back to base. Mawson provided overall expedition leadership and the 
objectives were primarily scientific. The staff of civilian scientists was well chosen and well 
trained. Science was performed to a high standard using quality instruments, including 
modified Lloyd-Creak circles, and a sledge journey to the locality of the magnetic pole, 
approaching from the north, was undertaken by Webb, Bage and Hurley. Mawson eventually 
managed a deal with the government of New South Wales where he traded his archive 
material and scientific collections (now in Sydney’s Mitchell Library and the Australian 
Museum) for the government’s undertaking to fund and organise the publications. The 
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reports were published over decades with the last meteorology report being produced in 1947 
(Rosove, 2001, pp. 251-260).  
Nordenskjold’s Antarctic and Charcot’s Pourquoi-pas? and then the Français 
expeditions were strongly focused on scientific objectives but are outside the scope of this 
research. The Southern Cross under Borchgrevink and Deutschland under Filchner were both 
plagued by the breakdown of interpersonal relationships and doubtful leadership. The Kainan 
Maru under Shirase was under-funded, poorly prepared, lacked a scientific program and had 
no relevant scientific expertise aboard. In summary, the most scientifically successful 
expeditions of the era (both in quality and quality of output and significance of results) were 
Bruce’s Scotia, Drygalski’s Gauss, Mawson’s Aurora and Scott’s Terra Nova. All these 
expeditions cost significantly less than the Discovery, making it true that: “The scientific 
results were a poor dividend for the capital invested, and other expeditions of the day were 
more profitable” (Jones, 1980). 
8.5 Key figures: Markham, Scott and Bernacchi 
Markham was motivated to recreate the glory days of RN Arctic exploration and possibly 
saw his role as similar to Sir John Barrow (1764-1848), Second Secretary to the Admiralty 
who oversaw the organisation of many expeditions. His legacy would be the re-establishment 
of the pre-eminence of England’s profile as an exploratory and territorial force. In spite of the 
complex committee structure, Markham retained almost total control of all matters to do with 
pre-departure arrangements of the expedition. His will always prevailed through control of 
committees and his involvement in every facet of organisation, but this did not work to the 
benefit of the expedition at many levels. The potential contribution of eminent and 
experienced scientific leaders like Gregory and Bruce was squandered by Markham’s priority 
of exploration at the expense of science. The RS withdrew collectively from the adversarial 
environment that developed once Markham no longer needed the reputation of the society or 
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the scientific program as fundraising levers. Many elements of the expedition were modelled 
on obsolete or irrelevant strategies. Discovery’s construction on the same lines as its 
predecessor, the clothing, rations, organisational structure and sledging practices from the 
1875 expedition toward the North Pole were also models for the Discovery. Markham 
controlled recruitment that mostly proceeded according to his ideals (young, RN and with 
family heritage) and by his personal selection in many cases. The civilian scientific staff were 
less qualified and less experienced than their counterparts on almost every other expedition of 
the era. Skelton closes his Discovery diary with a reference to Markham: “I do believe all his 
actions have been more controlled by sentiment, favouritism etc. than by practical, common 
sense duty towards the expedition as a national undertaking” (Skelton, 2004, p. 222). 
Markham’s motivation for sharing so-called “confidential” notes from Scott, 
especially the frank commentaries on the unsuitability of Murray as a scientific leader, is 
unclear. Markham’s acrimonious relationship with most members of the RS might have 
prompted this attack on Murray, who was more strongly aligned with the RS than the RGS. 
Markham was well connected and, being an excellent motivator and fundraiser, it’s possible 
the expedition would never have existed except for his efforts but there is no evidence that 
Markham had a sufficient depth of understanding of the science that he was controlling, or of 
the full cycle of scientific process from planning to publication. After the tragedy of the Terra 
Nova expedition donations to the Scott memorial fund were abundant. Markham was asked to 
estimate the cost of working up and publishing the scientific results. He made an estimate of 
£13,576, but Archibald Geikie (1835-1924) questioned this value stating: “Sir Clements 
Markham is a bold man. He had no access to the accounts and had nothing to do with the 
publication of the scientific results of the ‘Discovery’ Expedition” (Geikie, 1913). However, 
as there were sufficient funds no further attempts were made to predict the expenditure and 
the fund allocated £15,000.  
  
334 
 Markham failed to realise that, in the discipline of terrestrial magnetism in that 
era, the acquisition of new knowledge and theory was an evolutionary process, ideally 
founded on successful collaborations and extended observing networks operating over time. 
He promised revolutionary results (new theory, mariners charts) then undermined the 
opportunities to achieve them, and built expectations out of proportion to what could 
realistically have been achieved given the various circumstances that diminished 
opportunities for quality science. 
A large volume of Antarctic history remains focused on Scott and his portrayal as 
either a tragic hero, or else a bungler, but this research has not been about Scott: he’s an 
incidental player in the narrative whose core is appraisal of how science was organised and 
practiced. Scott had no particular aspirations towards polar exploration and was young for the 
level of responsibility he undertook. He acknowledged his lack of ice experience and general 
ignorance of exploration in correspondence with Drygalksi (Lüdecke, 2003). Scott’s 
scholarship did not prepare him for the role of scientific directorship so he was probably at 
the limit of his capability in this area, and without a personal support system once south of 
New Zealand. 
Although this research has shown some deficiency in leadership skills, some personal 
shortcomings and a naïve approach to scientific directorship on this first expedition, Scott is 
not particularly blameworthy. He was a victim of inadequate preparation for the leadership 
tasks. His background as an ambitious torpedo lieutenant with high career aspirations within 
a very structured institution never provided the opportunities to prepare for leadership in 
polar exploration and science. The scientific elements of the expedition would have been 
better served by the experience and professionalism that Professor Gregory’s scientific 
directorship could have provided. Gregory summed up Scott’s lack of preparation: 
“I may as well say I do not think Scott at all a good man for the work: 
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1) His forte is that he is very prepossessing 
2) It is his first command & for a man who talks so much about discipline I think it is a 
pity for his first command to be so unusual 
3) I think he is a poor organiser, his departments are in arrears, & he is so casual in al his 
plans. He appears to trust to luck things which ought to be a matter of precise 
calculation. 
4) He has no experience of expedition equipment 
5) Instead of looking after his own work, he has apparently devoted most of his time 
making himself acquainted with mine: telling Koettlitz to buy microscope, getting 
chemical sent from abroad & not telling me even that it had come & on questions of 
furs, food, sledges, ski & things which are in his department his ignorance is appalling 
6) He is a mechanical engineer not a sailor or a surveyor. And he does not seem at all 
conscious of these facts or inclined to get experience necessary. 
Personally I like Scott but I am sorry he does not stick to his own work” 
(Gregory, 1901a) 
In terms of reputation, Scott had some lucky escapes. It would have been a major 
embarrassment if he returned without the ship’s boats after allowing them to become buried 
in the ice. Matters might have been dire if anything had subsequently happened to the ship 
when bereft of its boats. They were only exhumed and made seaworthy after months of hard 
labour by crew and carpenters. Scott came very close to losing the ship, a number of times. 
Firstly, with the help of the Terra Nova rescue effort and a provident swell that broke up the 
sea ice, he only just averted abandoning it in the ice. Then, shortly after re-floating it, he ran 
aground on the shoal just off Hut Point where the ship was battered for about eight hours 
before she slipped off on the rising tide. Royds mentions that the ship had also grounded on 
the shoal on arrival (Royds, 2001, p. 337) and Scott’s diary entry of 16 March 1903 indicates 
he knew of the shoal and its location (Scott, 1903). A week later Bernacchi described the 
consequence of the bilge pumps becoming blocked: 
While the water was gaining so rapidly we were actually in a sinking condition & if 
we had not succeeded in getting the other pump under way, as there seemed every 
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probability at one time, the good ship ‘Discovery’ would soon have been under the 
briny seas of the Antarctic.  
(Bernacchi, 1904) 
Scott might have challenged some of the omissions and deficient outcomes reported 
in the Magnetic Observations volume. It was published after the first meteorological report 
over which there was so much discontent. Scott was preparing for the Terra Nova and he 
would have been averse to further public debate over scientific outcomes from Discovery, as 
he was building a strong scientific program as a plank of his fundraising strategy. The 
reviews had glossed over or missed the deficiencies of the magnetic program on Discovery, 
so Scott probably thought it best to accept the mild criticisms without further comment. He 
was still at sea in a RN vessel and had been involved in an embarrassing collision with 
another battleship, and, although he was later found to be blameless, the matter would have 
been in the public mind. 
 What can be made of Priestley’s claim that Scott was: “Before everything, a 
scientist…” (Priestley, 1915, p. 25). Contemporary praise of Scott as a scientist refers to the 
vastly more mature version of Scott on his second expedition, in spite of its stated prime 
objective being the trek to the geographic South Pole. His experience of overseeing the 
civilian staff on Discovery comprised his scientific apprenticeship, then the criticism of the 
meteorological reports showed him the need for careful performance of scientific procedures 
and meticulous record keeping. He had four years between expeditions during which his 
understanding of scientific process probably developed.  
Bernacchi’s interesting biography was one of the triggers for this research. He had a 
genuine interest in Antarctic science and as a young man was highly motivated to become 
proficient with skills and knowledge of value to polar expeditions as a means of joining one 
(Atkin, 2011). For family and business reasons he later gave up scientific work and polar 
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travel. The overall results of the magnetic program of Discovery would have been a 
disappointment to him. He was a very competent observer and fulfilled the requirements of 
his position, but he did not proceed to a career as a theoretician. This was a cultural quirk of 
Bernacchi’s family who existed as gentleman entrepreneurs, not employees. Importantly, 
Bernacchi’s omission of the difficulties with the Lloyd-Creak circle and the errors in term 
hour observations during his public lectures is evidence of his loyalty to Scott, who remained 
a personal friend.  
Bernacchi was more than a technician. He realised the importance of collecting dip 
and intensity observations on the Barrier journey for the better estimation of the magnetic 
pole location and it was his initiative to take detailed magnetic observations in the tent on the 
sea ice that was a master stroke, adding value to the Winter Quarters observations: 
I think that is one of the most valuable observations in the whole series, because it has 
really enabled us to reduce all the disturbed observations and get corrections for them. 
These observations are not only exceptionally valuable in themselves, but they formed 
a key to the final reduction of the sea observations I have mentioned, as well as those 
on land.  
(Creak, 1905)  
Gregory resigned from the expedition without any sign of ill feeling. His level of 
professionalism is shown in his reviews of scientific work on Antarctic expeditions that were 
evenhanded and complimentary towards the Discovery (Gregory, 1908, 1909a, 1909b). 
8.6 Institutional Failure  
One important outcome of this research is the conclusion that Discovery could, and should 
have performed better in aspects of its scientific work, particularly terrestrial magnetism for 
which a purpose-built ship had considerable advantages over a converted whaler. The 
coalition between the two premier societies of England failed, and the quality and quantity of 
scientific output never approached its potential, especially in magnetic research. While the 
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general public and the RGS may have viewed the expedition as a great success, the RS and 
the RN might have had a more reserved opinion.  
  The management of the expedition was characterised by a combative environment 
and Markham had modelled most aspects of the expedition on the Arctic expedition of 1895 
and obsolete traditions of Arctic expeditions of the mid nineteenth century. There was no 
solid governance or management of the expedition and, in summary, institutional failures led 
to: 
• No scientific director and a scientific leadership vacuum during preparation, 
operations and post-expedition management. 
• Late recruitment of Bernacchi, a situation that had direct impacts on results. 
• Under-preparation, insufficient training in some key areas, and failure to test vital 
instruments and equipment under operational conditions. 
• Mis-management of funds leaving no contingency for a relief expedition or analysis 
and publication of results. 
• Construction of the vessel to a conservative design by a shipyard without the requisite 
skills or access to sufficient insect-free, seasoned timber.  
• Failure of collaborative arrangements in the magnetic program. 
 
The expedition had the prospect to be the best scientific exploring expedition in history 
with its combination of new vessel, abundant funding, RS sponsorship and the prospective 
involvement of senior scientists. At the beginning, the likelihood of many of the drivers of 
scientific success converging in a positive way seemed very high, but many of them fell away 
as the preparations developed. Leadership and governance, preparations, collaborative 
relationships, recruitment and training, logistics and post expedition management were all 
deeply affected by Markham’s control.  
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8.7 Ranking the drivers of scientific success  
Salveson (1998) and Hayes (1928) relied on proxies as indicators of scientific effort and most 
authors cited in chapter two have made generalisations about scientific success without 
explanation of the criteria supporting their claims, aside from quantity of scientific reports. 
Proxies for effort applied towards scientific outcomes include: expedition costs, number of 
scientists on board, length of campaign, distance travelled on scientific quests and the number 
of scientific publications produced. These are either indicators of potential to do science, or a 
measure of volume of output, but they do not account for quality and don’t consider big 
picture outcomes such as the development of new theory or reappraisal of paradigms.   
This research analysed the expedition’s magnetic program in detail and according to 
the framework of drivers of scientific outcomes and the conclusions about whether the 
magnetic science achieved its potential are founded on defined criteria. None of the success 
drivers worked alone to create optimum outcomes and different factors operated at different 
stages of Discovery’s research program, but in most stages success relied on the convergence 
of positive influence from a number of the drivers. Is there one driver that is pre-eminent? 
Yes. Successful top level organisation and leadership is the most significant factor, as it can 
feed to all other drivers, except that of luck. The elements that made good science in 1901 
(like scientific rigour, well developed methodology, clever use of current technologies, 
inquisitive approaches that seek explanation to anomalies and effective communication 
strategies) are common to quality science today. The cycle of scientific observations, analysis 
and development of theory ideally ends with a foundation for predictions. None of the 
Discovery magnetic science outcomes were predictive: they were backward looking 
descriptions of observed phenomena in accord with the reporting standards of the day. 
It’s the synergy of drivers of scientific success that produce stellar outcomes of 
research programs. This research has demonstrated that the success drivers are closely 
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interrelated but at the risk of presenting the analysis as simplistic, they can be tentatively 
ranked in order of importance into three classes: critical, contributory and peripheral. Drivers 
that fall into the “critical” category are those that can make or break outcomes. Governance 
and leadership is the most critical element influencing expedition success as nearly every 
driver can be influenced by management choices and organisational failures. The Discovery 
expedition results were greatly diminished by poor decisions or negligence at the 
management level. Insufficient funding can prevent an expedition from moving past the 
planning stage and bad luck can undermine scientific programs of expeditions that do 
succeed past that stage. Shackleton’s Endurance (1914-1916) had a scientific program that 
was never realised as the ship never made a landfall and was later crushed by ice pressure. 
This was an example of bad luck, or possibly poor judgement, depending on your personal 
assessment. Recruitment and training of the scientific staff falls into the “critical” category as 
it has the most direct relationship to quality scientific results of any of the recognised drivers. 
Pre-expedition planning and preparations, then post-expedition management of data and 
collections can also be classed as “critical” drivers of success as these elements can influence 
the overall success of scientific campaigns directly. 
Most of the elements selected as drivers of scientific success fall into the 
“contributory” category. Scientific leadership sits in this category as robust leadership fosters 
outcomes, although performance by individuals can overcome deficiencies in scientific 
leadership. Instructions are high, but not critical in importance unless the calibre of the 
leadership or the scientific staff is low, in which case detailed instructions about observing 
protocols and the performance of science are necessary. If the staff are especially proficient 
quality results are possible, in spite of deficient instructions. Other “contributory” factors 
include equipment and instruments, logistics, the work of the scientist and the social and 
intellectual landscapes.  
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 The collaborative relationship with Drygalski’s Gauss was peripheral. A successful 
relationship would have been icing on the cake, but none of the sponsoring institutions or 
individuals chose to comment on the shortcomings. Many results that are only adequate could 
have been more significant if the relationships for data gathering and data sharing had been 
better handled. The error in the term hour observations, failure to agree on a common style of 
reporting magnetic results and the lack of communication between data analysts after the 
expedition meant both the Discovery and Gauss magnetic reports missed a potential 
dimension in the final results. 
The historic context and intellectual traditions of scientific exploring expeditions have 
peripheral impact on scientific outcomes, assuming that they are judged by standards of the 
day. On Discovery the paradigm was “collect and describe” and in the example of biological 
sciences success was measured by quantity, diversity and rarity of specimens collected and 
the intrinsic value is often proportional to the difficulty of collection. Modern science would 
assess the meaning of the collection in terms of broader contexts such as food chains, 
population density, genetic clines within species across gradients in latitude, interdependence 
between species, or evolutionary theory and fitness for purpose of organisms. In the magnetic 
research, Discovery’s shortcomings were hardly mentioned in any reporting, but universal 
success was claimed on the strength of long run continuous records in a new locality, another 
allusion to results being more valuable if they are difficult to procure. This outcome was in 
accord with Sabine’s Victorian paradigm of putting effort towards amassing data at the 
expense of analysis and development of theory. 
 No single driver of scientific success can guarantee that research program outcomes 
meet expectations or potential, but analysis of this ranking indicates that the elements that 
work together to maximise success are meticulous planning of the expedition and design of 
the scientific program through to publication, top calibre scientists trained to proficiency with 
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instruments and the observing protocols and, finally, selection of an inspirational scientific 
leader with a heavy grounding in science who could facilitate development of a vibrant 
intellectual climate.  
8.8 Discovery’s legacies 
Two iconic physical legacies remain from the Discovery expedition. They are the ship 
herself, that is the centrepiece of the Dundee Heritage Museum (Image 13), and the 
expedition hut on Ross Island (Image 12) that continues to be maintained by the Antarctic 
Heritage Trust (NZ). The scientific instruments were probably returned to the lending 
institutions then re-used on subsequent expeditions and museum and private collections hold 
many artefacts from the voyage including sledging pennants, sledges, crockery, and 
equipment. Shackleton burnt the magnetic observatory huts in 1909 to create a signal fire to 
attract attention of the Nimrod on his return from his southern journey (Shackleton, 1932, p. 
226). From time to time the Discovery hut was used during Scott’s Terra Nova expedition, 
then by Shackleton’s Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition support party (1914-1917). It was 
not revisited until 19 February 1947 when a helicopter from the icebreaker USS Burton 
Island landed nearby (Quartermain, 1963, p. 64). The charred magnetic hut remains were 
photographed by the crew but have since been bulldozed. Fortunately the relative 
inaccessibility of Mawson’s Hut at Commonwealth Bay has allowed the historically 
important magnetograph hut, a rare example from the era, to remain sufficiently intact to be 
stabilised by heritage carpenters. The absolute and transit huts did not have the protection of 
rocks banked against their sides and the extreme weather has taken its toll. 
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Image 12: Discovery Hut on Ross Island, 2008 (author’s photo).   
 
Discovery informed how science was organised and performed for later expeditions of 
the Edwardian era. The expedition entrenched a model of Antarctic expedition strategies that 
was a derivation of the RN Arctic expeditions, depending on ships for transport, an 
established base from which investigative parties fanned out, the availability of manpower 
and retention of an already dated mentality related to inefficient man haulage methods and 
barely used local resources. On Discovery, a “suggestion” book was maintained to give a 
place where officers and scientists could jot down ideas about improvements to gear or 
methods for the information of future expeditions but the fate of this useful document is 
unknown (Royds, 2001, p. 264). 
Scott’s final expedition is an example of the application of the intellectual legacies of 
the Discovery. His preparation shows he became aware of the importance of taking a superior 
team of scientists and he knew the risks and missed opportunities associated with keeping the 
exploration vessel in the far south over winter. Geikie of the RS was personally supportive of 
Scott’s “plucky and interesting exercise” (Geikie, 1909). The plan for magnetic science owed 
a great deal to the heritage of the Discovery’s magnetic program and although there was 
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significant replication of procedures, it sought to rectify shortcomings.  Scott’s “Notes on the 
Scientific Objects of the Expedition” drafted in 1909 specify the program: 
The ship will be equipped with a gyroscopic compass and a magnetic compass can be 
so placed as to be comparatively free from disturbance: direct comparisons will 
greatly facilitate a magnetic survey to determine the declination. It may further be 
found possible to use a dip circle under suitable conditions for observations of 
inclination and force.  
The ship will traverse and retraverse the Ross Sea and her courses will be directed to 
obtain observations in the most interesting areas. Attention will be paid to the 
provision of expert observers. 
 The most important magnetic work I propose for the shore parties is the 
repetition of the continuous magnetographs and of the absolute observations obtained 
by the ‘Discovery’ Expedition to throw light on secular and seasonal changes. In 
addition I hope that absolute observations may be obtained at other fixed spots and 
especially in King Edward VII land. 
 Observations for declination will be made by sledge parties with improved 
instruments. I am especially anxious to meet the views of experts in arranging the 
details of this programme. 
(Geikie, 1909) 
This plan provides a valuable insight showing that Scott intended use of improved 
instruments, he paid attention to acquiring expert observers, he would repeat shore party 
observation procedures from Discovery and make full use of the ship as an observing 
platform. This is evidence that Scott sought to rectify deficiencies from, and build upon the 
Discovery results. The science on Discovery also built foundation knowledge for the work of 
Shackleton’s Nimrod and Mawson’s Aurora expeditions. 
Aside from the contribution to the mass of data on terrestrial magnetism there were no 
significant intellectual legacies for physicists. No new theories about terrestrial magnetism 
resulted from the research on Discovery and the concept of the earth as a dynamo was not 
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proposed until years later and comprehension of the contribution of space weather to 
magnetic signals was only progressed substantively after the IGY. 
This research has addressed questions posed in the preliminary stages. The key 
elements of the research question raised in section 1.5 and the location of the responses 
within the body of the thesis are: 
• What were the indicators of scientific success in 1904? (addressed at section 7.1) 
• What were the drivers of scientific success in 1904? (addressed at section 7.2) 
• How adequate were planning, recruitment, preparations and training? (addressed at 
sections 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 5.1) 
• How was geomagnetic science performed? (addressed at chapters 5 and 6) 
• What were the Discovery expedition’s magnetic science outcomes, how did they 
contribute to new knowledge in the discipline and how did each fare against the 
indicators of scientific success? (addressed at sections 6.9, 6.10 and 7.1) 
• Was the magnetic science on the expedition a scientific success and if so, what factors 
contributed to that success? If not, why? (addressed at chapter 8)  
• Did the Discovery magnetic science outcomes meet objectives and expectations, and 
could it have achieved more? If so, by what means? (addressed at chapter 8) 
 
Considerable doubt has been thrown on many elements of the scientific organisation and 
practice of the campaign, and numerous shortcomings in the research into terrestrial 
magnetism and other disciplines have been revealed after a century of obscurity. The main 
scientific objectives for the magnetic program were potentially achievable, but not met. A 
large volume of magnetic data was secured and used in production of the scientific reports, 
but a great deal was also considered unreliable and excluded from analysis. Other data that 
was intended to allow review of charts for the southern oceans was never published in the 
scientific reports and there is no evidence of its inclusion in any published charts. The 
ultimate outcome of this research is a challenge to the paradigms that the Discovery 
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expedition was scientifically successful and the belief that quantity of data and collections 
equates to success. 
The intention of this research was to open a new door of scholarship in the reporting 
of Antarctic expedition science and this first analytical assessment of Discovery science 
according to defined parameters provides a framework for future assessments of expedition 
science. It made comparisons between the scientific outcomes of the expedition against stated 
objectives and against a suite of indicators of success relevant to the Edwardian era. It 
analysed the processes and outcomes of the magnetic science program on a pathfinding 
Antarctic expedition and concluded that success or failure in scientific and exploratory 
endeavours cannot be tracked to only one or two key factors. Successful voyages of scientific 
exploration relied on the serendipitous convergence of many factors, some outside the control 
or judgement of the leaders.  
A practical outcome of the research is a schedule of success indicators against which 
to measure scientific program outputs. They were proposed, tested and shown to be of utility 
for researchers working in this area. An objective framework for assessment of the scientific 
programs of historic polar expeditions based on the elements of those programs, rather than 
indicators, proxies or even opinions formed from the collective contributions of prior 
historians and commentators is now available for future researchers. In time, as more of the 
holdings in the SPRI Thomas Manning archive are catalogued, then made available for public 
viewing, the outcomes of this research may be overturned or become less relevant. History is 
not a fixed record, but evolves as new material comes to light or is reinterpreted by analysis 
based on novel themes.  
Terrestrial magnetism was a suitable test case for the suite of indicators of scientific 
success and for analysis, definition and rating of the drivers of success. Meteorology would 
also have been an ideal candidate for this research, as many elements were common to both 
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disciplines. Both required observers trained to use specialist instruments, continuous data 
gathering was required at sea, on base and in the field, International collaborations were 
negotiated and the outputs, two years of data, were handed over to another institution for 
analysis and publication.  
How important was the contribution to knowledge of terrestrial magnetism from the 
Discovery? Abundant observations may only translate into development of theory years after 
collection although at the time of collection and initial analysis they may seem unremarkable. 
Alternatively, after time has passed data may be considered stale and improvement in the 
instruments and procedures for collection may supersede the data’s usefulness. The latter 
case is most correct for Discovery. After most of the expeditions of the pre-war era had 
returned, Bauer, possibly the world’s most eminent magnetist of his time, wrote a synopsis of 
the state of scientific knowledge in terrestrial magnetism:  
The cause of the earth's magnetism possibly by this time, if not before, you may have 
said to your-selves: ‘Granted that the compass needle points north and south 'because 
the earth itself is a magnet, what, in turn, causes the earth's magnetism, why are the 
magnetic poles not only not situated at the geographical poles, but not even 
diametrically opposite-one another, or why, instead of wandering to and fro with the 
lapse-of time, do, not the magnetic poles remain fixed in position?’ Lest any of these 
questions should cause you sleepless nights, let me say that, for the present at least, it 
would appear the better policy to confess ignorance. We may also take comfort in the 
fact that if the student of the earth's magnetism has not yet discovered the true cause of 
his science, neither has the investigator of magnetism, in general, been able as yet to 
answer the question: ‘what is a magnet?’ 
(Bauer, 1914) 
He then concluded with a statement that confirms that the field stalled at the empirical data 
collection stage in the cycle of scientific method. “The accumulation of data must at present 
be the chief aim of the student of the earth’s magnetism.”  
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Image 13: Discovery in Dundee, September 2011 (author’s photo). 
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Appendix I: Antarctic Expeditions: 1897-1914 
Vessel Expedition Name Leader Dates Field of Operation 
Belgica Belgian Antarctic 
Expedition 
Adrien de 
Gerlache  
1897-1899 Antarctic Peninsula and 
Bellingshausen Sea 
Southern Cross British Antarctic 
Expedition 
Carsten 
Borchgrevink 
 
1898-1900 Cape Adare, the Ross Sea 
and the face of the Ross 
Ice Shelf 
Discovery British National 
Antarctic Expedition 
Robert Falcon 
Scott (R N) 
1901-1904 Ross Sea region 
Antarctic Swedish South Polar 
Expedition 
Otto Nordenskjöld 1901-1904 Antarctic Peninsula 
Gauss German South Polar 
Expedition 
Erich von 
Drygalski. 
1901-1903 Crozet and Kerguelen 
Islands then along the 
Indo-Atlantic Coastal 
Antarctica 
Scotia Scottish National 
Antarctic Expedition 
William Speirs 
Bruce 
1902-1904 Antarctic Peninsula 
Français French Antarctic 
Expedition 
Jean-Baptiste 
Charcot 
1903-1905 Antarctic Peninsula 
Nimrod British Antarctic 
Expedition 
Ernest Shackleton 1907-1909 Ross Sea and overland 
towards South Pole 
Pourquois-pas? Second French South 
Polar Expedition 
Jean-Baptiste 
Charcot 
1908-1910 Antarctic Peninsula 
Fram Norwegian Antarctic 
Expedition 
Roald Amundsen 1910-1912 Ross Ice Barrier and 
overland to the South Pole 
Terra Nova British Antarctic 
Expedition 
Robert Falcon 
Scott (R N) 
1910-1913 Ross Sea region and 
overland to the South Pole 
Kainan Maru Japanese Antarctic 
Expedition 
Nobu Shirase 1910-1912 Ross Sea region in the 
first season of 1910-11, 
then King Edward VII 
Land 
Deutschland German South Polar 
Expedition 
Wilhelm Filchner 1911-1912 Weddell Sea 
Aurora Australasian Antarctic 
Expedition 
Douglas Mawson 1911-1914 Macquarie Island, and 
coastal continental 
Antarctica between 90° E 
and 158° E 
Endurance and 
Aurora 
Imperial Trans-
Antarctic Expedition 
Ernest Shackleton 1914-1916 Endurance in the Weddell 
Sea and Aurora in the 
Ross Sea 
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Appendix II: Chronology of magnetic science and innovation 
Date Development Source 
1581  Norman (after 20 years at sea has established himself as chart maker 
and compass builder) published Newe Attractive, published his account 
of discovery of Dip, and invented the dip needle or inclinometer 
Gurney, 2004, p. 
61,   
Mawer, p. 5-6 
1600  Publication of De Magnete by William Gilbert. He proposed that the 
earth is a magnet and demonstrates the distribution of magnetic 
inclination or dip over the earth, and over a small spherical lodestone, 
which he called a "terrella". Gilbert believed (incorrectly) that the 
terrestrial magnetic field was constant.  Gilbert believed that angle of 
inclination would be of use to navigators for the calculation of latitude. 
He believed the interior of the earth was composed of iron with its 
magnetic energy concentrated at the poles. 
Kivelson & 
Russell, 1995, p. 4.   
Mawer, 2006, p. 6,  
McConnell, 2005. 
1635 Henry Gellibrand showed that the declination at London had reduced 
significantly in the previous 54 years leading to recognition of the 
phenomenon of secular change in declination.  
Mawer, 2006, p. 7, 
McConnell, 2005.  
1639  Henry Bond (senior) predicted correctly that the declination in London 
would gradually reduce to a value of zero by 1657. He proposed a 
simple dipole theory with the dipole precessing in a six hundred year 
clockwise orbit around the geographic north pole.  
Jonkers, 2003, p. 
85, McConnell, 
2005.  
Mawer, 2006, p. 7 
1683-92  Edmund Halley develops theory to explain variation based on four 
magnetic poles, two fixed on the earth's surface and two revolving on 
an inner nucleus of the planet, revolving with a period of about 700 
years. 
  
Mawer, 2006, p. 7  
1722  Clockmaker George Graham made a declinometer sensitive enough to 
show changes over the course of a day, some of which showed a diurnal 
cycle, and some of which showed random change. Collaborating with 
Andres Celcius of Sweden they showed that the diurnal cyclic changes 
related to local time whereas the random changes were simultaneous 
and independent of local time of day. Graham also realised that the time 
it took for the magnetic dip needle to come to rest indicated the strength 
of the magnetic force (intensity), resulting in the "vibration" method of 
determining force.  
Mawer, 2006,      
pp. 7-9  
1741  The observations of Celsius were continued by Hiorter who made a 
total of over 20,000 observations on more than 1000 different days. 
From this data Hiorter confirmed the diurnal variation of the 
geomagnetic field.  Simultaneous observations of strong geomagnetic 
activity on April 5th by Graham in London and Hiorter in Sweden 
confirms that geomagnetic and auroral activities are correlated. 
Kivelson & 
Russell, 1995,     
pp. 5-6 
Jonkers, 2003, p. 
109 
1785-1788  Jean-Honoré de Lamanon, physicist on the voyage of La Perouse used a 
dip magnetometer with the needle suspended by a thread (reducing 
friction) to show that intensity increased with increasing latitude, as 
demonstrated by increased oscillations before settling of the dip needle 
at high latitudes.  
Mawer, 2006, p. 10  
1812  Flinders wrote to the Admiralty with a series of experiments to be made 
on ships. Included is the idea of swinging the ship to obtain a round of 
compass bearings for deviation compensation. Admiralty agreed. The 
result was confirmation of Flinders' theory that the deviation was 
related to the direction of travel, iron on board the ship and the ship's 
magnetic latitude, specifically the magnetic dip. His solution was a bar 
of soft iron to be placed in the compass binnacle below the steering 
compass. 
Gurney, 2004, p. 
171  
1817-19 William Scoresby (Arctic whaler with an avid interest in the natural 
science of the Arctic) wrote a paper on his observations on the magnet 
taken during a whaling voyage to high latitudes in the Esk (1817) and 
read to the RS in 1819. He noted the compass sluggish, had taken 
measurements of variation, dip and intensity as well as making notes on 
deviation. He determined that most of the iron in the ship's fabric was in 
the vertical and that it had become magnetic by induction from the 
earth's magnetic field. He added to Flinders theory by proposing that the 
deviation at high latitudes was influenced by the vertical and horizontal 
Gurney, 2004, pp.  
179-181  
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magnetic forces. The former becomes the stronger influence close to the 
magnetic pole whilst the latter becomes weaker in that locality. The soft 
iron can lose its induced magnetism and change polarity on crossing the 
magnetic equator.  
1819  The Norwegian, Christopher Hansteen published Magnetismus der Erde 
postulating that there were two principal magnetic axes, and therefore 
four principal points of convergence of the direction of the magnetic 
needle, all constantly moving.  
Mawer, 2006, p. 14  
1820  Hans Oersted discovered that a conducting wire in an electrical circuit 
attracted compass needles. This commenced an era of hypothesis 
driven, laboratory experimentation, while geomagnetic specialists 
continued to rely on observation and inductive method.  
Mawer, 2006, p. 11  
1829-1835  Humboldt arranged simultaneous observations to be made in France 
and Russia. This led to a network of observatories across Russia and 
including Sitka in Alaska and Peking. On six "term days" each year 
simultaneous observations were made each five minutes for twenty-four 
hours. This was onerous work as self-recording instruments had not yet 
been invented.  
Mawer, 2006, p. 11  
1831  James Clark Ross established a camp at the locality of the North 
Magnetic Pole on the Boothia Peninsula using magnetometer and dip 
circle.  
Mawer, 2006, pp.  
3-4  
1832  Gauss "arrived at a method for measuring intensity absolutely, in units 
of mass, distance and time, rather than by comparison between the 
number of oscillations of the same needle in different locations. The 
observational technique devised with his collaborator, Wilhelm Weber, 
involved counting oscillations, as before, then using the dipping needle 
to deflect the compass needle."  
Mawer, 2006, p. 12  
1834  Weber and Gauss opened an observatory in Göttingen that became 
responsible for coordinating term days and collecting and publishing 
observations. The Göttingen Magnetic Union resulted from the 
collaboration.  
Mawer, 2006, p. 12  
1838  George Airy, Astronomer Royal used magnets to successfully correct 
compass deviation on the Rainbow after swinging the ship in the basin 
at the Deptford victualling yards at Greenwich. This was followed by 
his engagement to carry out the same procedure for Ironsides, the first 
iron-hulled sailing ship.  
Gurney, 2004, pp. 
200-203  
1838 Gauss used Sabine's data to determine mathematical formulae to 
describe earth magnetism and predicted the magnetic poles would be at 
77° 84' N, 296° 30' E and 77° 8' S, 116° 30' E. Published as Allgemeine 
Theorie des Erdmagnetismus it also postulated that nearly all normal 
magnetic force came from the earth but daily, seasonal and irregular 
disturbances were probably cosmic in origin.  
 
Turner, 2010, pp. 
122-123, 
McConnell, 2005, 
p. 353.  
1850 Sunspot measurements over a period of 25 years by Heinrich Schwabe 
allow him to deduce that the variation on the number sunspots is 
periodic, with a period of about 10 years.  
Kivelson & 
Russell, 1995, p. 6 
1851  Richard Carrington spots a great flare of white light on the sun while 
sketching sunspots, a phenomenon confirmed by a second observer 
some distance away. At this moment, the Kew observatory's 
measurements of the magnetic field had been disturbed. Finally, 18 
hours later, one of the strongest magnetic storms ever recorded broke 
out. Auroras were seen as far south as Puerto Rico. It is concluded that 
the disturbance would have to be moving at over 2 300 km/s.  
Kivelson & 
Russell, 1995, p. 6 
1896  Journal Terrestrial Magnetism came into existence under editorship of 
Louis Bauer, who had a doctorate on the secular variation of 
geomagnetism.  
McConnell, 2005, 
p. 357.  
1902-03  Kristian Birkeland concludes after his third expedition that large 
electric currents flowed along the magnetic-field lines during aurorae.  
Kivelson & 
Russell, 1995, p. 7 
1909 Mawson, David and MacKay arrived at locality of South Magnetic Pole 
at 72° 25' S, 155° 16' E. on 16 January. 
Shackleton, 1932, 
p. 310  
1912  Bage, Webb and Hurley of Mawson's Australian Antarctic Expedition 
again sledge to the south magnetic pole determining it to be at 71° 10' 
S, 150° 43' E., meaning that in 1909 Mawson may have missed it by 
about 130 kilometres.  
McConnell, 2005, 
p. 357.  
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Appendix III: Specifications for construction of Discovery’s 
magnetic observatory 
Appendix III, Item 1: 
Preliminary notes on the requirements for the magnetic observatory during Discovery’s 
construction are found in handwritten form authored by Captain Creak, whose name appears 
on the back of the document in Markham’s distinctive handwriting (Creak, n.d.b). 
Antarctic Expedition 1899 
If successful magnetic observations are to be made over the large water areas in a ship the 
following items in her construction should be attended to- 
 
1 Vessel to be built entirely of wood & propelled by steam. 
 
2 No iron or steel to be used in the structure of the ship. 
 
3 It is suggested that phosphor bronze should be largely used where steel is generally 
employed 
 
4 The engines to be far aft, leaving the centre of the vessel free for the magnetic instruments 
 
5 On no account should any iron or steel be fixed within 30 feet of the place selected for the 
magnetic observations 
 
6 If any iron or steel is concealed in the ship’s structure, the magnetic instruments will find it 
out & suffer accordingly – 
 
7 It is absolutely necessary that no iron or steel should be used in the vessel which would 
cause a vertical magnetic force at the observing station. Horizontal forces can be eliminated 
in a great measure by swinging the ship, the vertical force cannot. 
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Appendix III, Item 2: 
The following is quoted directly from the lecture notes for the ship constructor’s lecture to 
the Forty-sixth Session of the Institution of Naval Architects (Smith, 1905):  
 
The fitting of a magnetic observatory was one of the special features of the design. In 
addition to making satisfactory arrangements for the Standard Compass for the proper and 
safe navigation of the vessel, which was in itself a difficult matter for a vessel about to 
penetrate such very high latitudes, it was necessary to make a special house for the purposes 
of a magnetic observatory, warmed by non-magnetic lamps, in which it would be possible for 
an observer, with a fair amount of personal comfort, to make the magnetic observations 
constituting such a prominent feature of the work of the expedition. 
The construction of the observatory is fully dealt with in Clause 31 of the Specification. The 
work done in this observatory was of enormous magnitude and of great value. The 
observations made are being analysed and systematically dealt with by Captain Chetwynd, 
the present Admiralty Superintendent of Compasses, and will, in due course, be made public 
for the information of navigators and all others interested in magnetic phenomena in high 
southern latitudes. It is no part of the present paper to go into this matter, beyond describing 
the magnetic circumstances relating to the location of the observatory; but it may be of 
interest to state that the condition that there be no magnetic metals within a radius of 30 ft. Of 
the magnetic observatory had very far-reaching effects. For instance, the main shrouds had to 
be hemp cordage, and the shrouds were set up by hemp lanyards rove through the old 
fashioned wood dead-eyes, so familiar in the days of their youth to the older members present 
among us. 
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Appendix III, Item 3: 
The following is Clause 31 of the ship construction specifications for Discovery quoted in full 
in Smith, 1905: 
Specifications for Magnetic laboratory 
A magnetic observatory is to be constructed and fitted where shown on the upper deck to 
receive a magnetic pedestal instrument which will be provided by the President. This 
instrument is to be firmly secured to the deck by the contractor, who is to provide all 
necessary fastenings for the purpose. 
The magnetic observatory is to be very fully lighted from the top by means of the special 
pattern illuminators referred to under cabins and cabin fittings. Cowls are also to be provided 
for ventilation; side illumination is not required. 
The following fittings are to be provided and fitted in the magnetic observatory, viz.:- 
A writing desk, with drawers underneath; an observing stool with long legs; ample bookshelf 
accommodation; a copper or brass warming lamp, mounted low down in gimbals. 
The sides, door and roof of the magnetic observatory are to be lagged with 1½ inch woven 
asbestos, secured with ½ inch fir matchboarding. 
An 1½ inch well-lagged copper voice pipe is to be led from the standard compass to a 
convenient place inside the magnetic observatory. This pipe is to have a large bell-mouth at 
each end, so as to admit of easy conversation and to avoid the necessity of whistling. A water 
tight cover to be provided at its upper end to prevent the passage of water when the pipe is 
not in use. 
Stowage is to be provided outside the magnetic observatory for magnetic instruments, and 
preferably 30 ft. from it although this is not essential. The stowage will involve cupboard and 
drawer accommodation of 2ft. deep by 5ft. by 5 ft. frontage. All this stowage accommodation 
may be of light dry fir. 
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The laboratories on the upper deck are chiefly intended for the reception and examination of 
specimens dredged up from the bottom of the sea.  
They are to be fitted with a large sink, provided with ample drainage, and with numerous 
shelves and racks for the reception of bottles of various sizes to receive specimens. Desks and 
sitting accommodation are to be provided. Side lights are to be provided as indicated in the 
profile, and ample overhead lighting is also to be provided. These laboratories are to be 
lagged and warmed as described for the magnetic observatory. Details of the required fittings 
will be furnished by the overseer on application when necessary to proceed with the work. 
The magnetic observatory and the laboratories on the upper deck are to be constructed of 2 
inch teak, well tongued with brass tongues, and secured in the most efficient manner, so as to 
be capable of withstanding very severe blows from the sea. Brass stay rods, and all other 
necessary securities, are to be freely used to secure this object. 
(Smith, 1905) 
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Appendix IV: Schedules of magnetic instruments 
Appendix IV, Item I. 
The following list is from a schedule attached to October 1900 correspondence between 
Macgregor of the Admiralty and Longhurst, secretary to the Discovery expedition: 
“Standard Compass Binnacle patt. 47a, Compass pat. 14. with metal brackets. 
Steering Compass Binnacle pattern 47a, Two, patt.14 Two 
The cards of the above compasses have a period as follows 
Card No. 1, 25 secs. 
Card No 2, 15 secs. 
Azimuth mirror of size suitable for compass, patt 14 same value as Pattern 
56…. 2 no.  
Boat’s Compasses liquid Compasses patt 20, specially constructed to 
avoid liquid freezing…2 No.  
Note :- The binnacles compasses, and azimuth mirrors will have small modifications 
from the ordinary service pattern as shown above to fit them for Antarctic service. 
Following to be supplied from Deptford: 
Spheres,   patt. 59  Two pairs 
Flinders bars,   patt  45,  Two sets 
Patt  54 15 No. 
Magnets,   patt  55a.  40 No.   
   Patt  55b 10 No. 
Covers, spare,  53c  2 No. 
(McGregor , 1900)  
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Appendix IV, Item II. 
The following list of magnetic instruments for research and navigation is from the booklet 
List of Instruments Provided, (n.d.).  
Fox Dip and Intensity Apparatus   3 
Dip and Intensity Apparatus, with Lloyd’s needles 2 
Compass for Magnetic Observatory   1 
Horizontal vibration needle, in case   1 
Vertical Vibration needle, with circle   1 
Fox Gimbal table for magnetic observatory  1 
Special Standard Compass, with spare gear  1 
Unifilar Magnetometer, for Absolute Horizontal Force and Declination   2 
Barrow’s Dip Circle, for absolute inclination, fitted with Lloyd’s needles for total force 2 
Instruments, for observing the diurnal Variation of all three magnetic elements   2 
CHRONOMETERS 
Box        5 
Pocket        3 
Deck Watches       4 
COMPASSES, ETC 
Bowls        3 
Boats        6 
Landing Compass      1 
Mirrors (Azimuth)       2 
Cards        6 
Prismatic       3 
Pocket        3 
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Appendix IV, Item III. 
The following list of magnetic instruments for research (not navigation) from the opening of 
the Physical Observations volume: 
Two Unifilar Magnetometers, Nos. 25 and 36, by Elliot Bros. 
Two Inclination Circles, Nos. 26 and 27, by Dover. 
Two Lloyd-Creak Circles, Nos 143 and 149, by Dover. 
Two Fox Circles, Nos. 28 and 29, by Dover. 
One set of Eschenhagen Magnetographs. 
(Chetwynd, 1908, p. 133) 
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Appendix V: Magnetic observation data sheets 
 
Appendix V, Item I. 
Christchurch, 16 December 1901, Dip by Lloyd-Creak Circle # 149 
 
Appendix V, Item II. 
Christchurch, 16 December 1901, Total Force by Lloyd-Creak Circle # 149 
 
Appendix V, Item III. 
Christchurch, 5 December 1901, Kew Pattern Magnetometer (Elliot # 25) Deflection  
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